Stryker Strikes Out

The United States Army’s Stryker program is misguided because Desert Storm demonstrates that threats still exist to which Stryker’s protection and firepower are insufficient.[1] In addition, it does not pass basic mobility and deployability requirements.

The measure of success for a combat vehicle is determined by its level of crew protection and its firepower. Many modern vehicles in various stages of testing and development attempt to make maximum use of technological sensors and diagnostics to augment the vehicle’s protection. Modern variants also use technology to augment their fire capabilities by attempting to digitally link them to other modern weapons platforms on the battlefield. But what happens if the vehicle temporarily loses power, or the computer “locks up?” The answer is that those technological systems are no longer available, and the vehicle instantly becomes extremely vulnerable. Such circumstances are not a matter of speculation, they will and do happen all the time. Combat vehicle designers must therefore design the vehicles so that they can fight – and win – in such a “degraded mode.” A vehicle that cannot fight in degraded mode should get a grade of “F” for survivability.

This paper will show why the Stryker concept is misguided, by comparing the Stryker to the M2/M3 Bradley. The Bradley is the most comparable modern fighting vehicle, and as such the Stryker should be markedly better if the Army is to adopt it for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This paper will compare the two systems in the areas of Protection, Firepower, Mobility and Deployability.

The most obvious area to measure from a protection standpoint is the vehicle’s armor. The Bradley provides 65mm of protection on the sides compared to the Stryker’s 14.5mm.[2] These figures are provided by the respective manufacturers. Bradley armor is supposed to offer protection against everything short of direct hits by artillery or tank main gun rounds. However, this writer (an Armor officer with 15 years of experience, to include combat in Desert Storm) personally witnessed the effects of .50 caliber, 25 millimeter (both American), and 12.7 mm (Soviet) machine gun fire against a Bradley. All calibers easily penetrated the front, sides and rear of the Bradley, killing the crew.[3]

As stated above, the Stryker protection level should be better than the Bradley’s; but is it? It appears that the Stryker’s armor is no better than the Bradley’s, and may be worse. During a rigorous field test of the Stryker (Millenium Challenge 2002) conducted in August 2002, “thirteen of fourteen Strykers were destroyed by small arms fire, grenades and guns mounted on enemy vehicles, during ambushes and other encounters on one of the exercise’s missions.”[4] Such performance does not outshine the Bradley’s; but perhaps the Stryker is more lethal?

A reasonable criterion to measure success is whether the vehicle can shoot while on-the-move. Stabilized gun platforms have been used on various American and Soviet weapons systems for over two decades; therefore it is well within the limits of technology that such systems be incorporated into future designs due to the decided advantage they provide. In fact, not having a stabilized platform has become a serious disadvantage.

The Bradley’s main weapon systems are a 25 millimeter chain gun, and a TOW missile launcher. One of the vehicle’s offensive limitations is that it cannot fire its TOW while on-the-move. The Bradley must first stop, raise the TOW launcher, arm the missile, then fire. This entire process takes approximately 30 seconds. Therefore, the TOW is usually employed while the vehicle is in a defensive position offering as much protection as possible (hull defilade), but its 4000 meter range gives it exceptional stand-off distance.[5]

The Bradley’s 25mm chain gun can be effectively fired while moving, and has an effective range of 2000 meters.[6] It is a very lethal weapon, capable of penetrating all infantry fighting vehicles on the modern battlefield. This writer has also seen the effects of the 25mm chain gun against older Soviet tanks (T-54/55 and T-62). When able to get a shot at the tank’s thinly armored engine compartment in the rear, the Bradley caused enough damage to disable the tank and engulf it in flames from its own fuel.

In contrast, the Stryker’s main weapons are a 105mm gun (on the Mobile Gun System variant) and a grenade launcher; but neither variant can fire on-the-move. Furthermore, the entire target acquisition process takes approximately two minutes.[7] An evaluation by the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) noted that soldiers had trouble using the vehicle’s remote weapon station periscope, and instead were forced to engage the enemy by climbing on top of the vehicle and using Javelin missiles (not part of the vehicle’s weapons system).[8]

Once again, the Stryker cannot compete against the Bradley. Stryker loses the lethality battle.

The Bradley is capable of maximum speeds of 45 miles per hour, and has a range of 300 miles. It was specifically designed to be able to keep up with the M1 series tank on the modern battlefield, over any terrain. In fact, over extremely broken terrain, the Bradley can actually travel slightly faster than the M1. The reason for the Bradley’s cross-country success is that is has a set of wide tracks, powered by a 600 horsepower engine.

It is important to note that General Shinseki and his supporters (during the vehicle selection phase of Stryker’s development) attempted to seed disinformation by claiming that wheeled vehicles are more mobile than tracks, in a blatant attempt to effect vehicle selection. There are also many allegations of rigged tests in favor of the wheeled vehicle, and Shinseki has stated that his ultimate goal is to rid the Army of tracked vehicles. But despite Shinseki’s disinformation attempts, armor experts know very well that wheeled vehicles cannot compete against tracked vehicles for mobility.[9]

In addition to the Bradley’s superior off-road mobility, it is fully amphibious. Different variants have either a pontoon or a skirt, which take between 15 and 30 minutes to deploy, respectively. Once ready, the Bradley can swim by using its tracks to propel it through the water at a top speed of four miles per hour.[10]

The Stryker also has a maximum range of 300 miles, but can travel at a top speed of 62 miles per hour while on roads. During its Millennium Challenge field testing, the Stryker impressed some dismounted soldiers by its speed at getting them to the fight. But the vehicle had its problems when operating off-road; “a total of 13 tires on the 16 Strykers needed to be replaced during the 96-hour war game."[11]

Wheeled vehicles in Desert Storm, to include the much-vaunted HMMWV, had significant problems operating in the desert sands; and the rocky portions of the desert wreaked havoc on tires. Every wheeled vehicle in this writer’s unit had tire problems. The situation became so bad that the brigade leadership issued a directive requiring all wheeled vehicles to remain on paved (or improved) surfaces whenever possible.

The Bradley weighs approximately 25 tons. It can be transported by any mean, to include transport aircraft, but must utilize aircraft larger than the C-130 which is only capable of transporting 13 tons when it is fully fueled and outfitted for combat operations.[12]

The original requirement for an interim armored vehicle stated that it must be easily transportable by C-130. At 19 tons the basic version of the Stryker is lighter than the Bradley, yet it is still too heavy and too tall to be deployed by C-130.[13] The Stryker is not yet certified for C-130 transport. While Strykers were transported by C-130 for their field test during Millenium Challenge 2002, they required a special one-time waiver from the Air Force. In addition, the C-130s lightened their load by using as little fuel as possible, and by discarding additional armor protection normally required for combat operations.[14]

The Strykers do not meet the “easily transportable” test because they must be modified for flight. The crew must disassemble and remove the remote weapon station (40mm grenade launcher, or .50 caliber machine gun), as well as externally mounted ammunition and racks, so that the Stryker can fit into a C-130.[15]

In conclusion, the Stryker cannot surpass the Bradley in lethality or survivability, as demonstrated by the Bradley’s successes during Desert Storm and Stryker field-testing. The Stryker is, in fact, inferior to the Bradley in these areas. Mobility and deployability are two additional fields in which the Stryker demonstrates its inferiority. Stryker is not a leap ahead in technology or innovation, but merely an inadequate weapons system championed by senior Army leadership who have wed themselves to a wheeled vehicle, at any cost. Ultimately, Stryker will fail before it reaches full production, and where it counts the most – on the battlefield. This failure will have a significantly adverse effect on Army Transformation, and will cause the new Army leadership to cancel (or drastically change) the entire transformation process.

[1] Preliminary data coming back from units in the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom confirm the same.

[2] “M2A3 Bradley,”[data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003; and “Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems [data on-line] www.gdls.com; accessed 11 August 2003. The Stryker’s 14.5mm armor is applique (bolt-on) that must be added to the vehicle once it reaches its destination. No data is available concerning the Stryker’s actual armor thickness, although it is rumored to be only ½ inch aluminum.

[3] This incident occurred on 26 February 1991 in southern Iraq, during an engagement between a Bradley from Task Force 4-32 Armor (3rd Armored Division) and an Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 tank. A partial account is given in Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Certain Victory (Washington: Brassey’s, 1994), 274. Staff Sergeant Christopher Stephens and Private First Class Adrian Stokes were both killed in action.

[4] Frank Tiboni, “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002: 2.

[5] “M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org.man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

[8] Don Loughlin, “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” 9 October 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003. Loughlin uses quotes from the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s (ATEC) 6 August 2002 report entitled “Stryker Findings.” The report was originally presented as a vugraph presentation, and was formerly available at http://www.geocities.com/lavdanger/strykerfindings.htm. Several authors reference this ATEC report, yet I have been unable to locate a working link the actual document.

[9] Loughlin, 16-19; and David T. Payne Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003, 2.

Clancy, Tom and General Franks, Fred, Jr., Into the Storm – On the Ground in Iraq. New York: Berkley Books, 1998.

Kraus, Theresa L. and Schubert, Frank N. General Editors, The Whirlwind War – The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Certain Victory – The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington: Brassey’s, 1994.

Cox, Matthew. “Airborne Units Land Fast, Hit Hard, Remain Relevant,” Army Times, August 14, 2000.

Svitak, Amy and Tiboni, Frank. “DoD May Scale Back Stryker to Fund FCS,” Defense News, October 7, 2002.

Tiboni, Frank. “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002.

Loughlin, Don. “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” October 9, 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

Payne, David T. Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003.

“Future Combat Systems: Badly Reinventing the M113 or ‘Cash Cows’ That Will ‘Morph’ into the ‘LAV-4’ Armored Car?” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/wheeledfcscashcow.htm; accessed 12 August 2003.

“M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2A3 Bradley,” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” United States Army Center for Military History, June 11, 2001 [data on-line] http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/www/256.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems, available from www.gdls.com; Internet, accessed 11 August 2003.

Please excuse my limited knowledge of your profession but I was always trained to understand that the APC was to get to the fight, not drive thru the fight. When main battle tanks or scouts encountered tank killer teams the troops dismounted to engage and the gunner / driver of the APC provided overwatch and heavy weapons support.

I understand the troops desire to have pretty much the same protection from 12.7mm and RPG threats but is it a realistic goal that can be accomplished with current technology in the numbers required ?

What country has an APC that meets this requirement of C-130 deployable and withstands PG-7 and heavy machinegun, ect ect.....??? My world of limited armor use revolved around the M60A3 MBT with an M9 dozer blade attached and the M113 for EOD work .

Is the real issue here trying to make an APC a fighting vehicle. I'm just confused with such details, educate me if ya have time .

Stay Safe Ya'll !

And your point is? Why don't you compare the Stryker with, say the F-15E. That comparison would be about as meaningful as this one.

Do you know how many Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) equipped Mechanized Infantry Battalions are to be converted to Stryker equipped combined arms battalions? The answer is two: 1st Bn, 23d Infantry, and the 5th Bn, 20th Infantry, both belonging to the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division which is the only heavy brigade to be converted. All of the rest are light infantry brigades. Therefore, you should compare a foot-mobile light infantry squad with a Stryker equipped infantry squad. That comparison would be a little more useful.

I don't know much, but I do know that a .50 cal will punch through 14.5 mm of armor as if it wasn't there, even at distance. If it won't even stop a relatively puny (for the battlefield) round like the .50 cal, then why even bother with armor at all?

The weapons systems suck. No automatic stabilization of the guns or optics. Slow target asquisition and engagement.

Basically, all you have hear is a fancy, expensive truck that would get it's @$$ kicked by a soviet BMP or US Bradley.

The problem with that type of APC is that it slows down the advance if you have to stop for every opponent with a .50 cal. As we saw in Iraq, speed wins battles if it can be done. The Bradley is powerful enough to provide that speed since it's troops only have to stop for major threats. It also has the advantage of being able to take on the older tanks we often find in potential opponent's inventories.

The problem with the Stryker is that they've compromised out all the possible advantages of a medium APC but kept all the disadvantages and added in high costs just for fun. For now, it's better to stick to a mix of Hummer's and Bradley's for moving infantry via ground vehicles.

Perhaps Shineski (the black beret pimp) should run as vice prez along with Clark...apparently they share some of the same character disorders than General Shelton illuminated yesterday...

General Shelton's remarks on Gen Clark

Right on target. The overwhelming majority of crticism against the Stryker is based on a total misunderstanding of the vehicle's tactical role.

Before someone writes another of these lame comparisons of apples and oranges, please read Kurt "Panzer" Meyer's Grenadiers, or (to a lesser extent), Hans von Luck's Panzer Commander to see how light armoured vehicles are properly employed. At the very least, any book on a fellow named Erwin Rommel might shed some light on the subject (Rommel usually detached the light armoured units from their parent divisions to be used under his direct command).

Finally, as a kid during the early 1980s, I remember everyone shrieking about a new death-trap, so deadly and poorly designed that the armour would burn on impact, killing everyone inside. The name of that death-trap? The Bradley.

Is the real issue here trying to make an APC a fighting vehicle.

It's a flexible weapon, capable to some degree of many things. It's going to be up to the tactical commanders as to how it is used, and tactics will no doubt evolve as the vehicle gains experience. Right now it appears to be an APC, high profile, heavy, expensive, but fast on the highway. Sounds like my SUV.

I remember everyone shrieking about a new death-trap, so deadly and poorly designed that the armour would burn on impact, killing everyone inside. The name of that death-trap? The Bradley.

HBO even did a movie about it. The Pentagon Wars

You are correct. Critics have gotten hung up on the paradigm shift from Armored Personnel Carrier to Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the latter which places emphasis on the vehicle, not the squad.

The Strkyer exists as a way to get the 9 man infantry squad to the fight, and provide a base of fire. It is not intented to do the entire job itself, it exists to provide transportation to the squad.

The Army provided, in the ORD for the vehicle a large set of mutually exclusive requirements to be met. Some of them have been met, some never will be, until the technology to allow it exists. Barring getting the Air Force to come up with a replacement for the C130, the weight/protection will always be a tradeoff.

Lastly, the Marine Corps LAV-25 has armor that will only protect to 7.62 ball, fired from AK-47 at classified range, and they lost very few of them in Iraq. True, the Stryker doesn't have the 25mm cannon, so it is an imperfect comparision.

The vehicle does not have 14.5mm of armor on it (where did this misconception come from?), the armor is supposed to be capable of stopping 14.5mm rounds, fired from the former Soviet machine gun. I can assure you that the armor needed to do that, and the armor on the vehicle is more than a half inch thick.

For armor protection, perhaps you should talk to the Marines, their LAV-25 is significantly less protected than the Strkyer.

And these vehicles are not currently replacing M113s and tanks in Iraq when they arrive, either. We're talking about a force of around 3000 soldiers, intermixed with the rest of the 160,000. There are currently plans for 6 Stryker brigades. That is not nearly a large enough force to convert the entire army to Stryker brigades.

Future Combat System (which will probably be wheeled also-not my choice) is the expected replacement for the legacy force, sometime (the yardstick keeps moving, it may be slipping backward) around 2010, which will mean that the Abrams will be somewhere around 30 years old at the time (with block improvements, of course.) The whizbang technology that FCS is counting on is probably not going to be around, so expect to see Abrams and Bradleys prowling around battlefields for at least the next 20 years or so. This is not the end of the tracked vehicle on the battefield, and the Stryker (if used properly) can provide a useful capability for the Army.

That's just my perception as to this new and improved.......setting here on the couch in retirement I yeild to those still in the arena to bring me up to speed.

Thanks ........Stay Safe !

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