Posted on 09/21/2003 10:17:16 AM PDT by Congressman Billybob
More than a month ago, I laid down a marker in a column that no one could competently report on the ongoing story of the occupation of Iraq without reviewing the closest similar situation in American history, the occupation of Germany. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has mentioned this comparison several times in detail in his press conferences since then. Former Secretary of State Kissinger has mentioned the same in several recent interviews in the national press.
But all of the reporters present on all of those occasions have reacted to the subject like deer in headlights. Neither they nor any other national reporters have cracked a book or researched the facts on this comparison. So I have done it myself.
How much effort did it take? One call to the Pentagon Press Office to state my question. One call to their outside research office that specializes in military history. A couple clicks on the website of the Government Press Office to order the definitive history of the German occupation. And then a week reading the fascinating, information-packed, turgidly written book, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 by Dr. Earl Ziemke, published by the Center for Military History, United States Army, 1990. (This is the fourth and latest edition.)
On the main points, this history confirmed what I wrote in my prior column: The population of the American Zone in Germany, including its part of Berlin, was slightly smaller than the current population of Iraq. The number of occupation troops authorized for Germany was slightly larger than the number in Iraq. The number of attacks on American troops in Germany was slightly less than in Iraq, but close. Some attacks were isolated; some were organized. In addition, there were acts of sabotage in Germany, as in Iraq, and also assassination attacks on German "collaborators" with the Americans, as in Iraq. In both nations, some of the attackers were not natives.
(Total American troops in Europe on V-E Day was about 3.2 million, most of them in Germany. However, many of these were slated for immediate return to the United States and demobilization, based on a point system for length of service and other factors. Most of the rest were slated for transfer to the Pacific, where the war was continuing. Only a small number were assigned to the occupation of Germany. The others were transferred out as soon as transport and logistics could be arranged.)
In Germany, the destruction of homes, businesses, the economy and the society were greater than in Iraq due to the more extensive fighting in the war and especially to the carpet bombing that preceded the invasion of Germany. The reconstruction of Germany back to a fully functional society – both economic and political – therefore took longer than it will in Iraq. The task was not largely completed in Germany for four years, whereas in Iraq it should take about two years.
Reading this history makes clear that the recent French demand that the Americans "turn Iraq back to the Iraqis in a month" is brass-plated hypocrisy of the highest order. But it also demonstrates that questions from the American reporters whether the job in Iraq is almost completed, or might be completed in a year or so, is akin to fractious children in the back seat on a long-distance trip, querulously repeating "Are we there yet?"
As I said to the American press in my prior column, "Do your d*mned homework." Now that I've done that homework from a farmhouse on a mountain at the end of a half-mile gravel road, I add this comment to the American press: "You have the nerve to call yourselves reporters?" The effort was easy. And the conclusions are obvious.
One of the fascinating sidebar stories in Dr. Ziemke's definitive book was the multi-year fight between the Department of War (now called Defense) and the Department of State over what should be the basic American policy toward occupied Germany. This took place in a series of memoranda to President Roosevelt and later President Truman, with hard fights clause-by-clause over what policies the President would set.
Early on, the official policy of America was to "do nothing concerning the reconstruction" of Germany's economy and society. This was to be left only to the Germans themselves, regardless of their lack of money, equipment, homes, factories or shops. It took two years for the United States to recognize that its own self interest demanded a functional Germany back on its feet as a bulwark against the Soviet buildup in Eastern Europe. And the American policy was changed to helping the Germans reconstruct their nation, effectively and quickly.
A similar realization came more quickly concerning Japan, which we occupied without firing a shot on the main islands once the Japanese surrendered unconditionally after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. General Douglas MacArthur, in charge of the occupation of Japan, recognized that the house-by-house fighting that had been avoided by Japan's surrender could yet break out, if he could not assure minimal levels of housing and food for the Japanese populace. He sent a famous telegram in the fall of 1945 to Washington that said, "Send me food, or send me bullets."
In short, the policy disputes between the Departments of State and War concerning the occupation of Germany made the current disputes between State and Defense look minor, like the question of whether to serve red wine with fish. In addition, as Dr. Ziemke points out, there were policy disputes between elements in the American Army with different assignments. The operating units on the ground in Germany were often at direct cross purposes with the special units belatedly organized to go in and sponsor "nation-building" as we now call it.
There were more than 20,000 military trials conducted during the occupation of Germany. The vast bulk of these were trials of American military personal for fraternization violations or assorted forms of theft, including currency manipulations. Dr. Ziemke provided the back-up statistics for both areas.
During about six months the currency remissions from American soldiers back to the United States exceeded by millions of dollars the gross pay received by those soldiers. This was attributed to self-reported "gambling winnings," but in fact was due to black market sales and currency manipulations between German marks, occupation marks, and the dollar. On the fraternization issue, the reported cases of venereal diseases steadily increased, directly tracking the Army's gradual relaxation of fraternization policies.
In terms of getting control of the German population and restoring that nation to minimal functions, the much smaller number of military trials which involved German civilians and attackers and saboteurs from other nations, offers a more instructive parallel to Iraq. And that brings us to the example of General George Washington and British Major John Andre.
Major Andre was captured behind American lines in civilian clothes, and when searched was found with documents describing the intended betrayal of the garrison of West Point by General Benedict Arnold. General Washington accorded Major Andre a military trial (then sometimes called a "drum head" trial) and he was sentenced to death. Washington offered to British General Clinton an exchange of Andre for Arnold, who had fled to British lines when his perfidy was discovered. Clinton refused the exchange. Andre was hung by the neck until dead on October 2, 1780.
The relevance of this to both Germany and Iraq is this: Andre was tried and executed under the Law of War, which was well established centuries before the United States came into existence. The continued validity of the Law of War, even under the US Constitution, was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1942 in Ex Parte Quirin. In Quirin the Court held unanimously that eight German saboteurs who had entered the US from two submarines off the coast could be so tried, without resort to the Bill of Rights or other provisions of the Constitution except war powers. Six of those eight were hanged; two were convicted and their sentences carried out even though they claimed to be American citizens (one clearly was an American, born in Chicago.)
The same power was used in the occupation of Germany. Of those given military trials and then executed in Germany, some were Germans but others were fighters against the occupation who came from other nations. A similar problem has arisen in Iraq. Most of those fighting against the occupation are Iraqis. But some of those captured with weapons, explosives, and plans for the use of such articles, are citizens of other nations.
At present, the Americans in Iraq are simply taking into custody those that survive firefights in such circumstances. If the example of Germany is used, as approved by the Supreme Court, such "illegal combatants" could be given military trials and executed. This would send a clear message to Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia – the three primary sources of the non-Iraqi attackers – that they would do well to guard their own borders and keep their own people at home, if they do not want to see them executed in Iraq.
Note: these military trials of low-level attackers was entirely separate from the elaborate War Crimes trials for top leaders of Germany. The same distinction between low-level attackers and leaders can and should apply in Iraq for the same reasons.
The last example from Iraq is provided by Der Fuhrer Adolf Hitler. Hitler killed himself in his bunker in Berlin, just before it fell to the Russians in May, 1945. His survivors burned his body and that of Eva Braun to inhibit identification. Forensics were not what they are today, and the Russians were not fully cooperative with the investigation.
It was not until September, 1945, that an investigation by a British officer concluded that Hitler was definitely dead. But most Germans still believed that he was still alive. Both organized and unorganized resistance continued in his name. General Eisenhower remained under a standing Order to "capture Adolf Hitler." Rumors of where Hitler might be hiding were investigated as far away as Bavaria and Argentina.
The principal difference between most Germans' continued belief that Hitler was still alive and possibly still leading the resistance and similar beliefs about Saddam Hussein in Iraq is the invention of videotape. The editing capacities available to anyone with two tape decks and a supply of electricity make it possible to "keep the leader in place" regardless of his current biological status or availability. (The same, of course, also applies to Osama bin Laden.)
In December, 1945, an attempted capture of a high-ranking Nazi by the Americans failed, but in the false bottom of his suitcase were found original documents from Hitler's bunker including Hitler's Will, drafted the day of his suicide. That finally settled the issue, even for the Germans.
The other example from Hitler for Iraq concerned the de-Nazification of Germany. The original American policy was to remove all Nazi party members from every position of authority in any respect. Not just police, administration and schools, but banks, businesses and any other leadership position. Over time, this policy was relaxed, because the Americans found that they could not operate the factories, power plants, etc., without using some of the "mere party members" of the Nazis.
The same difficult situation is presented in Iraq. The de-Ba'athification of Iraq must, of course, capture or kill all Iraqi leaders of the Ba'ath Party. Whether any "mere members" of the Ba'ath Party should be employed in any functional capacities in the reconstruction of Iraq is a problem that has not yet been resolved.
A fair reading of the history of the American occupation of Germany leads to the conclusion that America is about two years ahead of the pace of achievement, month by month, in Iraq as compared to Germany. Of course there is the minor distinction that the American media, led by the New York Times, were not snapping at the heels of General Eisenhower and his staff and soldiers as they carried out their mission in 1945-46. (The only criticisms by the American press concerned limited de-Nazification, not the "failure" of the entire mission.) Nor were there packs of candidates of the opposing party, then the Republicans, attacking President Truman for his "failure" in Germany as they campaigned for the presidential election of 1948.
In short, the major drawbacks to the American occupation in Iraq are not in Iraq. Compared to the one close example, Germany, the major defects of the Iraqi occupation are only in the pages of the American press and in the stump speeches of assorted badly-informed American candidates for President.
I strongly recommend Dr. Ziemke's book to all those who apparently do not have a clue about how long, difficult, and sometimes dangerous the work of reconstructing a defeated nation really is. Facts are useful things, but only to those few who bother to search them out and then have the capacity to understand what they read. We shall see how large (or small) the group of reporters and candidates who do that, turns out to be.
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About the Author: John Armor is an author and columnist on politics and history. He currently has an Exploratory Committee to run for Congress.
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(C) 2003, Congressman Billybob & John Armor. All rights reserved.
I would personally love to take my family. Be careful what you pray for. You're going to make a fine congressman.When will you find time to post to FR ?
But odds are, I will have to ration my time on the Internet generally. Some of my Net time is spent researching my articles. Other than my weekly columns -- and maybe even those -- I'll have to give up. Odds are, I will dedicate a four-hour stretch (on Monday or Friday, naturally) to go on FR. And other than that, I'll assign a staff member to lurk on FR and to follow other tidbits on the Net that are below the radar of the lamestream media.
I'll keep in touch. But it cannot be as much as it has been for the last six years.
John / Billybob
John / Billybob
Anyone who has a personal contact with any newspeople is welcome to do with my article what you will. But absent the personal contact, my experience suggests that such efforts are a waste of time, sadly/
John / Billybob
. . . The reconstruction of Germany back to a fully functional society – both economic and political --. . . was not largely completed in Germany for four years, whereas in Iraq it should take about two years.
Would you say that West Germany was in better shape after two years of not-so-benign neglect than Iraq is now? Politically, perhaps it was--2 years of deNazification following less than 15 years of Nazi rule, compared to Iraq's few months of deBaathification following dozens of years of Baath rule.Economically, tho, I'll bet it was worse. If so the economic reconstruction of Germany only took two years of U.S. help. I don't see that Iraq should take continued US government investments (I hope the term may be used in the non-Clintonesque sense) for more than a year. I certainly hope that by then Iraq has a rule of law in place which will allow private enterprise to undertake the rest of the reconstruction more efficiently than the government can.
Germany took more than four years to patch up and get functional. Iraq will take a full two years, by comparison.
John / Billybob
It was pointed out in my local newspaper that apprehension, trial and execuition for these individuals took 36 days. And the liberals complain about civil rights abuses to the prisioners in Gitmo. FDR makes Bush and Ashcroft look like pikers.
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