The Litmus Test for American Conservatism (The paloeconservative view of Abe Lincoln.)

Abraham Lincoln is thought of by many as not only the greatest American statesman but as a great conservative. He was neither. Understanding this is a necessary condition for any genuinely American conservatism. When Lincoln took office, the American polity was regarded as a compact between sovereign states which had created a central government as their agent, hedging it in by a doctrine of enumerated powers. Since the compact between the states was voluntary, secession was considered an option by public leaders in every section of the Union during the antebellum period. Given this tradition — deeply rooted in the Declaration of Independence — a great statesman in 1860 would have negotiated a settlement with the disaffected states, even if it meant the withdrawal of some from the Union. But Lincoln refused even to accept Confederate commissioners, much less negotiate with them. Most of the Union could have been kept together. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas voted to remain in the Union even after the Confederacy was formed; they reversed themselves only when Lincoln decided on a war of coercion. A great statesman does not seduce his people into a needless war; he keeps them out of it.

When the Soviet Union dissolved by peaceful secession, it was only 70 years old — the same age as the United States when it dissolved in 1860. Did Gorbachev fail as a statesman because he negotiated a peaceful dissolution of the U.S.S.R.? Likewise, if all states west of the Mississippi were to secede tomorrow, would we praise, as a great statesman, a president who refused to negotiate and launched total war against the civilian population merely to preserve the Union? The number of Southerners who died as a result of Lincoln’s invasion was greater than the total of all Americans killed by Hitler and Tojo. By the end of the war, nearly one half of the white male population of military age was either dead or mutilated. No country in World War II suffered casualties of that magnitude.

Not only would Lincoln not receive Confederate commissioners, he refused, for three crucial months, to call Congress. Alone, he illegally raised money, illegally raised troops, and started the war. To crush Northern opposition, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus for the duration of the war and rounded up some 20,000 political prisoners. (Mussolini arrested some 12,000 but convicted only 1,624.) When the chief justice of the Supreme Court declared the suspension blatantly unconstitutional and ordered the prisoners released, Lincoln ordered his arrest. This American Caesar shut down over 300 newspapers, arrested editors, and smashed presses. He broke up state legislatures; arrested Democratic candidates who urged an armistice; and used the military to elect Republicans (including himself, in 1864, by a margin of around 38,000 popular votes). He illegally created a “state” in West Virginia and imported a large army of foreign mercenaries. B.H. Liddell Hart traces the origin of modern total war to Lincoln’s decision to direct war against the civilian population. Sherman acknowledged that, by the rules of war taught at West Point, he was guilty of war crimes punishable by death. But who was to enforce those rules?

These actions are justified by nationalist historians as the energetic and extraordinary efforts of a great helmsman rising to the painful duty of preserving an indivisible Union. But Lincoln had inherited no such Union from the Framers. Rather, like Bismarck, he created one with a policy of blood and iron. What we call the “Civil War” was in fact America’s French Revolution, and Lincoln was the first Jacobin president. He claimed legitimacy for his actions with a “conservative” rhetoric, rooted in an historically false theory of the Constitution which held that the states had never been sovereign. The Union created the states, he said, not the states the Union. In time, this corrupt and corrupting doctrine would suck nearly every reserved power of the states into the central government. Lincoln seared into the American mind an ideological style of politics which, through a sort of alchemy, transmuted a federative “union” of states into a French revolutionary “nation” launched on an unending global mission of achieving equality. Lincoln’s corrupt constitutionalism and his ideological style of politics have, over time, led to the hollowing out of traditional American society and the obscene concentration of power in the central government that the Constitution was explicitly designed to prevent.

A genuinely American conservatism, then, must adopt the project of preserving and restoring the decentralized federative polity of the Framers rooted in state and local sovereignty. The central government has no constitutional authority to do most of what it does today. The first question posed by an authentic American conservative politics is not whether a policy is good or bad, but what agency (the states or the central government — if either) has the authority to enact it. This is the principle of subsidiarity: that as much as possible should be done by the smallest political unit.

The Democratic and Republican parties are Lincolnian parties. Neither honestly questions the limits of federal authority to do this or that. In 1861, the central government broke free from what Jefferson called “the chains of the Constitution,” and we have, consequently, inherited a fractured historical memory. There are now two Americanisms: pre-Lincolnian and post-Lincolnian. The latter is Jacobinism by other means. Only the former can lay claim to being the primordial American conservatism.

David W. Livingston is a professor of philosophy at Emory University and the author of Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium (University of Chicago Press).

[Non-Seq] Buchanan knew this, and made sure that the agreement he made with the South Carolina congressmen did not prohibit moving troops around Charleston. It just prevented reinforcing them.

"He seemed satisfied, and said it was not his intention to send reinforcements, or make any change. We explained to him what we meant by the words "relative military status," as applied to the forts; mentioned the difference between Major Anderson's occupying his then position at Fort Moultrie, and throwing himself into Fort Sumter. We stated that the latter step would be equivalent to reinforcing the garrison, and would just as certainly as the sending of fresh troops, lead to the result which we both desired to avoid."

When we rose to go, the President said in substance, "After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen."

- SC reps Miles and Keitt

n we rose to go, the President said in substance, "After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen."
- SC reps Miles and Keitt

"These gentlemen claim to be ambassadors," he said. "It is preposterous! They cannot be ambassadors; they are lawbreakers, traitors. They should be arrested. You cannot negotiate with them; and yet it seems by this paper that you have been led into that very thing. With all respect to you, Mr. President, I must say that the Attorney General, under his oath of office, dares not to be cognizant of the pending proceedings. Your reply to these so-called ambassadors must not be transmitted as the reply of the president. It is wholly unlawful, and improper; its language is unguarded and to send it as an official document will bring the presidency to the point of usurpation."

-- The Coming Fury, p. 165 by Bruce Catton

Walt

President Lincoln called out volunteers under the Militia Act. The Supreme Court cites the Act in the Prize Cases ruling. Just because you never heard of it doesn't mean much.

In 1787, during the Constitutional Convention, there was a proposal for a clause "authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent state". James Madison, in opposition, stated, "The use of force against a state would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound". The clause was not adopted for inclusion in the constitution. Therefore, though it was considered, there is no constitutional power authorized to the general government to use force against a state.

Just because you never heard of it doesn't mean much.

As I am sure you are aware, and which is why you provided no name, link or date for your IRRELEVANT quote, the words were spoken by then Attorney General Stanton on December 29, 1860. It is after the meeting that had taken place between Buchanan and the South Carolina commissioners.

Remember that the megalomaniacal usurping traitorous president-elect reached out to the traitorous General Scott on December 21, 1860. On December 28 the traitorous Scott sent a memo to Secretary of War Floyd, copy to President Buchanan, advocating Fort Sumter not be abandoned, but be resupplied and reinforced.

Clearly, the lawful President should have suspended habeas corpus, had the usurping traitorous President-elect arrested, tried by military tribunal, pronounced sentence on Thursday and have hanged him on Friday.

When we rose to go, the President said in substance, "After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen. I do not know that any paper or writing is necessary. We understand each other." One of the delegation, just before leaving the room, remarked, "Mr. President, you have determined to let things remain as they are, and not to send reinforcements; but, suppose that you were hereafter to change your policy for any reason, what then? That would put us, who are willing to use our personal influence to prevent any attack upon the forts before Commissioners are sent on to Washington, in rather an embarrassing position." "Then," said the President, "I would first return you this paper."

It appears that President Buchanan broke his word, given as a gentleman. He had little time to find out who or what had caused Major Anderson to move against orders. There would be additional difficulty in abandoning the militarily useless and indefensible Fort Sumter as the megalomanical usurping hate-filled President-elect, who was attempting to foment war, had written on December 24, that, if Sumter were abandoned, he would "announce publicly at once that they are to be retaken after inauguration."

It appears that Buchanan didn't agree that the agreement prevented the garrison in Charleston from moving to Sumter, just that additional troops couldn't be sent. The fact that the administration approved of Major Anderson's actions seems to indicate that the misunderstanding was on the part of the South Carolina delegation.

The agreement between Buchanan and the South Carolinians didn't prevent Anderson from switching forts. Anderson moved in spite of the agreement or the new instructions Buchannan had sent to him by courier, "It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your own life or that of your men in a hopeless conflict in defense of these forts."

Apparently Anderson also ignored the part of Buell's instructions that said, "You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression ..." If his move to Fort Sumter was benign and peaceful, why did he feel he had to sneak into the fort and why did his troops round up the workers there at bayonet point? Geeze, Louise!

The administration approved? You must have missed my post 916 above which showed that Assistant Secretary of State Trescot, Secretary of War Floyd, and President Buchanan all said the move to Fort Sumter was against the orders given to Anderson. At the risk of repeating myself, here is how Buchanan reacted to the news:

Buchanan slumped into a chair. "My God!" he cried wearily. "Are calamities ... never to come singly! I call God to witness -- you gentlemen better than anybody else know that this is not only without but against my orders. It is against my policy." ...

Doesn't sound like Buchanan agreed with the move. Apparently, however, Buchanan's word didn't mean much because he then tried to reinforce the fort with troops from the Star of the West. After than fiasco, the inept Buchanan, the Jimmy Carter of his age, left the problem to the incoming administration.

They should have hung Lincoln more than once.

Here is the first time he acted like an English King.

Months before the Northern newspapers urged the Federal government to militarially intercede in the Secession movement, Lincoln’s actions proved his conciliatory sentiments in his inauguration speech were contrived and deliberately worded to set the stage for unprecedented treachery against the states and people that he called ‘fellow countrymen’.

At practically every opportunity, Mr. Lincoln successfully defeated any and all efforts directed at a peace that would retain the protections of the Constitution as they were established by the Founding Fathers and the states that ratified the Bill of Rights along with the United States Constitution.

Mr. Lincoln’s actions were apparent to his contemporary political-industrial leaders, one of whom expressed the following:

(Lincoln and some in the Republican party) “are striving to break up the Union under the pretense of preserving it,” and “they are struggling to overthrow the Constitution while professing undying attachment to it, and a willingness to make any sacrifice to maintain it… [and] are trying to plunge the country into a cruel war as the surest means of destroying the Union upon the plea of enforcing the laws and protecting public property.”

In December of 1860, after the Crittenden Compromise was developed, key Southern Congressional members indicated that it would be a satisfactory compromise to the states likely to secede. Therefore, secession and military conflict could be avoided.

The Committee of Thirteen, who was negotiating the Compromise, along with William Seward, decided that a representative should be sent to Springfield to inform then President-elect Lincoln.

The greatest Republican boss of the day, Thurlow Weed was chosen to convey the plan to Lincoln.

Weed was very much in support of the plan as well as other Republicans and Southern Democrats. This meant that peace could have been had. But personally Lincoln was not in agreement with the proposals in the Compromise.

On December 20, the day that South Carolina voted to leave the Union, in a meeting with Thurlow Weed, Lincoln gave his out of hand rejection of the compromise, and put his answer in writing.

Most importantly, during the next two months, his political manipulations to marshal Republican support of his position, eliminated the peace effort. His opposition to the effort and its eventual failure was engineered by Lincoln before he took office.

He was setting the course of the country toward war even before he took office.

Here is the second time he interceded to stop the peace:

South Carolina Governor Gist had, on December 6, 1860, through state representatives meeting with President Buchanan, obtained an Armistice agreement between the State of South Carolina and the Federal Government that was designed to maintain peace in Charleston harbor. Both parties agreed not to make improvements in their facilities, nor to act aggressively toward each other.

This was done to give negotiations for peace a chance by enabling the Governor to present to the people and politicians of South Carolina tangible proof of the peaceful intentions of the government.

It is evident that Lincoln had begun to formulate a plan to reinforce Sumter even before his inauguration. On 12 December 1860, a full three months before he had taken the oath of office, Lincoln was already acquainting at least one of his future subordinates with his policy of coercion when he sent, by messenger, the characteristically secret message to General Winfield Scott:

"Please present my respects to the general, and tell him, confidentially, I shall be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to either hold or retake the forts, as the case may require, at and after the inauguration.”

Two weeks later, Major Anderson, contrary to his direct orders of November 15, and December 23 from President Buchanan and the Secretary of War, abandoned Fort Moultrie and moved his forces to Fort Sumter.

This action, which sparked profound resentment from the South Carolinians, as well as confusion among his superiors in the War Department and alarm from President Buchanan, was accomplished at the urging of General Scott in response to Lincoln's December communication.

President-elect Lincoln’s secret communication to General Scott, urging him to formulate plans to retain the fort, was consistent with Scott’s representative Major Buell’s suggestion to Major Anderson that he could withdraw to Ft. Sumter if he chose to do so.

Without any pretense of legal or constitutional authority, Lincoln was interfering with the official capacity of the US Government in a standing agreement between the President of the United States, and South Carolina.

Lincoln would later ridicule this agreement of his government in his address to Congress on 4 July 1861 as a "quasi armistice." It should come as no surprise that Lincoln would so ridicule and disregard another obligation to which the U.S. Government was bound -- the Constitution for the United States of America.

The people of the State of South Carolina became aggressive in December of 1860 in their self-defense with this revelation that the Federal Government would use military coercion as policy.

It is also noteworthy that Lincoln was planning a show of hostility against the people of South Carolina at least eight days before that State's secession from the Union, thereby exposing as mere subterfuge his later designation of the South Carolinians, and their fellow Southerners, as "insurrectionists." The American people would have been justly alarmed had the light of discovery revealed Lincoln's secret agenda for all to see.

Buchanan or Congress should have had him arrested in Springfield and charged with inciting insurrection.

His fourth effort at sabotaging the peace of the country:

The Washington Peace Conference met at the Willard Hotel, in Washington, from February 4th, through February 27th, 1861. The conference was convened at the request of the Virginia legislature, but only some of the states sent representatives. Former president John Tyler of Virginia was the presiding officer.

Their proposals were framed as a single amendment of seven sections. In its essence it was very similar to the Crittenden Compromise, although slightly different in wording and some of the details, borrowing a bit from some of the proposals made to the Committee of Thirteen.

Not accepting that the best possible solution was being offered, Lincoln again rebuffed the work of the border states and Northern Congressmen who were attending the conference and attempting to make progress toward peace. Again, he was influencing events according to his preferences, which he knew full well the South would not accept.

Again, he effectively destroyed this peace effort before he took office.

He should have been run out of town when he showed up to give his speech.

That was the third, this was the fourth.

As soon as the formation of the Confederacy was completed, the new government chose and empowered three influential Southern leaders to meet with the officials of the Federal government and arrange a new, peaceful relationship between the two governments. They were formally empowered by the following:

No. 17. A RESOLUTION

For the appointment of Commissioners to the Government of the United States of America.

"Resolved by the Confederate States of America in Congress Assembled, that it is the sense of this Congress that a commission of three persons be appointed by the President elect, as early as may be convenient after his inauguration, and sent to the government of the United States of America, for the purpose of negotiating friendly relations between that government and the Confederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith."

Adopted February 15, 1861.

Acts and Resolutions of the First Session of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States, Held at Montgomery, ALA., Enquire Book And Job Press, 1861

On 25 Feb 1861 CSA President Jefferson Davis requested the advice of Congress on the following to serve on that commission: former LA Governor André Bienvenu Roman, GA Rep. Martin Jenkins Crawford, and AL Diplomat John Forsyth.

The Confederate Commissioners were in possession of the power to negotiate directly with the Union Federal Government for the repayment of the Confederate government’s portion of the national debt, and to obtain the Union’s estimate of the value of seized Union property in Confederate possession, for which the Confederacy would compensate the Union.

This was a clear effort to establish normal, peaceful relations with the Union in order that commerce could continue, and that war could be avoided. President Lincoln was formally notified of this honorable effort by the following:

MONTGOMERY, February 27, 1861.

The President of the United States:

For the purpose of establishing friendly relations between the Confederate States and the United States, and reposing special trust, &c., Martin J. Crawford, John Forsyth, and A. B. Roman are appointed special commissioners of the Confederate States to the United States. I have invested them with full and all manner of power and authority for and in the name of the Confederate States to meet and confer with any person or persons duly authorized by the Government of the United States being furnished with like powers and authority, and with them to agree, treat, consult, and negotiate of and concerning all matters and subjects interesting to both nations, and to conclude and sign a treaty or treaties, convention or conventions, touching the premises, transmitting the same to the President of the Confederate States for his final ratification by and with the consent of the Congress of the Confederate States.

Given under my hand at the city of Montgomery this 27th day of February, A.D. 1861, and of the Independence of the Confederate States the eighty-fifth.

JEFF N DAVIS.
ROBERT TOOMBS, Secretary of State.

Later, Rep. John Perkins, commented on the President’s efforts at securing peace:

"WHEREAS, The Congress of the Confederate States have ever been desirous of an honorable and a permanent settlement, by negotiation, of all matters of difference between the people of the Confederate States of America and the government of the United States, and to this end provided, immediately on its assembling at Montgomery, in February, 1861, for the sending of three commissioners to Washington to negotiate friendly relations on all questions of disagreement between the two governments on principles of right, justice, equity and good faith; and, whereas, these having been refused a reception ..."

At Lincoln’s direction, none of his cabinet, nor any other official government representatives were allowed to meet with the commissioners.

Normal, peaceful relations being offered in good faith and honor to the new government of the Union, but were rejected out of hand by Mr. Lincoln.

He had the option and responsibility to submit this issue to Congress, but he himself, unilaterally, and against the advice of his cabinet, shunned peace.

Thank you for posting all the interesting information. I do have what I believe is one small correction. You assert that Anderson moved two weeks after Lincoln's message of 12 Dec 1860. The Lincoln message was dated 21 Dec 1860 and was in response to a letter of 17 Dec 1860. Below is how it appears in the Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln.

LINK

To Elihu B. Washburne [1]

Confidential
Hon. E. B. Washburne Springfield, Ills.
My dear Sir: Dec. 21. 1860

Last night I received your letter giving an account of your interview with Gen. Scott, and for which I thank you. Please present my respects to the General, and tell him, confidentially, I shall be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to either hold, or retake, the forts, as the case may require, at, and after the inaugeration. Yours as ever A. LINCOLN

Annotation

[1] ALS, IHi. Washburne wrote on December 17 summarizing an interview with General Winfield Scott to the effect that Scott had recommended reinforcement of the Charleston forts in October, that Fort Moultrie was practically defenseless, and that Fort Sumter with only five workmen in it was the key to the harbor.

I've not seen a figure for how many workmen were in the fort. If I can get away, I hope to visit Fort Sumter in a few weeks. If I find out there, I'll let you know.

Here is a communication from Captain J.G. Foster, one of the engineering officers in Charleston describing the work being done at Forts Moultrie and Sumter.

Colonel R. E. DE RUSSY,

Commanding Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

COLONEL:

...

I am abating nothing of the activity of preparation in Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter, and in fact am increasing it.

If the Department becomes aware of any change of policy in regard to this preparation in these forts, or in either of them, I beg that instructions may be given me at once, so that I may vary my operations accordingly, for my p[resent expenses are very heavy. In Fort Sumter the mounting of the guns, laying a flagging of first and second tiers of casemates, forming embrasures of second tier, and finishing the barracks is progressing regularly, and as fast as separately organized parties can work. The force will be to-morrow 150 men.

...

J. G. FOSTER,

Captain, Engineers.

DECEMBER 19, 1860.

I think the answer may well be that the number of civilians working at Ft. Sumter varied over time, but that in the days leading up to Major Anderson moving his garrison there, a sizable workforce was employed.

Enjoy your visit to Sumter.

5th hostile action:

In his inaugural address, Lincoln had stated that, “The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government.”

The Confederate Commissioners had pressed to meet Lincoln and to arrange a peacefully negotiated settlement for and purchase of the forts in the South still held by Union troops, Ft Pickens and Ft Sumter.

When consulted regarding the disposition of Ft. Sumter, all of Lincoln’s cabinet officers, except the post-master, were against any re-supply. They all knew it would inaugurate war.

Lincoln was advised to withdraw the federal troops from the two forts, which would be a concession in the interest of peace. This would allow the American people the opportunity to negotiate a settlement in the spirit of the Constitution.

Operating against the advice of his cabinet, military leaders, and the commanding officer at Ft. Sumter who stated that re-supply would bring war, Lincoln commanded that a secret fleet be organized and sent to both South Carolina and Florida.

The Commander of Confederate forces in Charleston and Jefferson Davis had been alerted by Lincoln that provisions would be landed, and if resisted, troops would accompany the resupply team.

For six months, the newspapers, politicians, businessmen, virtually everyone knew that Federal ships sailing into Charleston Harbor meant war.

Yet, late on the evening of April 11, 1861, sailing on orders from Lincoln, the "Harriet Lane" followed later by the "Baltic" sailed to the Harbor, one firing on a Southern freighter ship entering the harbor.

Acting unilaterally Lincoln had developed, organized, ordered, and overseen the deployment of armed military to an area where armed conflict did not exist....that is until the fleet arrived.

Last........

In early April of 1861, representatives of all the counties in Virginia met to discuss the political options that would avoid war. The representatives were generally Virginians loyal to the Union. It became their common belief that Virginia should not secede if the new President would not initiate military action at Fort Sumter, and would negotiate with the seven seceded states in order to encourage their peaceful return to the Union.

Hearing of the convention, Lincoln summoned a representative to Washington to learn of the work of the convention.

In conference with Mr. Lincoln, Virginia legislator Col. John Baldwin made it clear that any action at Ft. Sumter would cause the people of Virginia to seek secession. Lincoln had clear, firm evidence that the path to further breakup of the Union rested on his treatment of the Fort Sumter matter.

His method to hold onto the border states and avoiding war was clear. However, the path to financing the government laid in a different direction.

He left Col. Baldwin without a commitment to peace.

Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian General, military strategist and author of several definitive war strategy books, correctly said "war is the continuation of business rivalry through non-diplomatic means".

Destruction in a country eliminates competition for manufacturers, creates new business for merchants and new investments for bankers. War is paradise when you profit from it.

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