Posted on 09/06/2003 9:14:08 AM PDT by quidnunc
Abraham Lincoln is thought of by many as not only the greatest American statesman but as a great conservative. He was neither. Understanding this is a necessary condition for any genuinely American conservatism. When Lincoln took office, the American polity was regarded as a compact between sovereign states which had created a central government as their agent, hedging it in by a doctrine of enumerated powers. Since the compact between the states was voluntary, secession was considered an option by public leaders in every section of the Union during the antebellum period. Given this tradition — deeply rooted in the Declaration of Independence — a great statesman in 1860 would have negotiated a settlement with the disaffected states, even if it meant the withdrawal of some from the Union. But Lincoln refused even to accept Confederate commissioners, much less negotiate with them. Most of the Union could have been kept together. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas voted to remain in the Union even after the Confederacy was formed; they reversed themselves only when Lincoln decided on a war of coercion. A great statesman does not seduce his people into a needless war; he keeps them out of it.
When the Soviet Union dissolved by peaceful secession, it was only 70 years old — the same age as the United States when it dissolved in 1860. Did Gorbachev fail as a statesman because he negotiated a peaceful dissolution of the U.S.S.R.? Likewise, if all states west of the Mississippi were to secede tomorrow, would we praise, as a great statesman, a president who refused to negotiate and launched total war against the civilian population merely to preserve the Union? The number of Southerners who died as a result of Lincoln’s invasion was greater than the total of all Americans killed by Hitler and Tojo. By the end of the war, nearly one half of the white male population of military age was either dead or mutilated. No country in World War II suffered casualties of that magnitude.
Not only would Lincoln not receive Confederate commissioners, he refused, for three crucial months, to call Congress. Alone, he illegally raised money, illegally raised troops, and started the war. To crush Northern opposition, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus for the duration of the war and rounded up some 20,000 political prisoners. (Mussolini arrested some 12,000 but convicted only 1,624.) When the chief justice of the Supreme Court declared the suspension blatantly unconstitutional and ordered the prisoners released, Lincoln ordered his arrest. This American Caesar shut down over 300 newspapers, arrested editors, and smashed presses. He broke up state legislatures; arrested Democratic candidates who urged an armistice; and used the military to elect Republicans (including himself, in 1864, by a margin of around 38,000 popular votes). He illegally created a “state” in West Virginia and imported a large army of foreign mercenaries. B.H. Liddell Hart traces the origin of modern total war to Lincoln’s decision to direct war against the civilian population. Sherman acknowledged that, by the rules of war taught at West Point, he was guilty of war crimes punishable by death. But who was to enforce those rules?
These actions are justified by nationalist historians as the energetic and extraordinary efforts of a great helmsman rising to the painful duty of preserving an indivisible Union. But Lincoln had inherited no such Union from the Framers. Rather, like Bismarck, he created one with a policy of blood and iron. What we call the “Civil War” was in fact America’s French Revolution, and Lincoln was the first Jacobin president. He claimed legitimacy for his actions with a “conservative” rhetoric, rooted in an historically false theory of the Constitution which held that the states had never been sovereign. The Union created the states, he said, not the states the Union. In time, this corrupt and corrupting doctrine would suck nearly every reserved power of the states into the central government. Lincoln seared into the American mind an ideological style of politics which, through a sort of alchemy, transmuted a federative “union” of states into a French revolutionary “nation” launched on an unending global mission of achieving equality. Lincoln’s corrupt constitutionalism and his ideological style of politics have, over time, led to the hollowing out of traditional American society and the obscene concentration of power in the central government that the Constitution was explicitly designed to prevent.
A genuinely American conservatism, then, must adopt the project of preserving and restoring the decentralized federative polity of the Framers rooted in state and local sovereignty. The central government has no constitutional authority to do most of what it does today. The first question posed by an authentic American conservative politics is not whether a policy is good or bad, but what agency (the states or the central government — if either) has the authority to enact it. This is the principle of subsidiarity: that as much as possible should be done by the smallest political unit.
The Democratic and Republican parties are Lincolnian parties. Neither honestly questions the limits of federal authority to do this or that. In 1861, the central government broke free from what Jefferson called “the chains of the Constitution,” and we have, consequently, inherited a fractured historical memory. There are now two Americanisms: pre-Lincolnian and post-Lincolnian. The latter is Jacobinism by other means. Only the former can lay claim to being the primordial American conservatism.
David W. Livingston is a professor of philosophy at Emory University and the author of Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium (University of Chicago Press).
Yeah, he was talking about that emancipation thing and being Forced Into Glory. Of course, until the bitter end he had James Mitchell around, he was chatting ("I believe that it would be better to export them all") with Ben Butler about colonization, and reportedly had Dan Sickles off in Columbia working on colonization when he was assassinated.
From the ACW moderated forum:
An interesting point. I just finished "American Scoundrel" by Thomas Keneally and he writes about Lincoln sending Dan Sickles to, IIRC, Panama to negotiate several dealings. One of which was the possible establishment of a colony for freed slaves. In fact, Lincoln was assassinated while Sickles was on this trip. --------------- Keneally claims it was Colombia: "The President needed an emissary to go on government business to Panama and Colombia. Greater Colombia, or New Grenada, as the Federation of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Panama styled itself, formed one loose federal state ruled from the highland capital of Bogotá, Colombia. He was to leave by January with the purpose of persuading the Panamanian authorities to allow Union troops to cross the Isthmus of Panama, something they had recently prohibited. He was then to travel to Bogotá and raise, with the federal authorities there, the possibility of Colombia's offering a home to freed black slaves who were now pooling in Washington and in Northern cities." [Thomas Keneally, _American Scoundrel: The Life of the Notorious Civil War General Dan Sickles,_ p. 310]
[Wlat] The day after the first battle of Bull Run, President Lincoln wrote down an outline of how to procecute the war, and the war did follow that outline.
You mean you admit that he planned to keep the war going for four years?
If the the South was just too poor to support itself, where did it ever find the money to buy guns or raise an army or in any way defend and support itself through a war that would nearly bankrupt the U.S. Government?
If I read this correctly, the South was unable to support itself, it had been supported for many years by the North, and the ever-philanthropic North just couldn't bear to part with their Southern welfare children.
just walk in a manner that endangered the safety and peace of the whole continent.
If your logic holds, why did not Canada threaten the whole continent?
Obviously it was not the tariffs themselves
[Honest Abe - March 4, 1861] The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere.
Obviously, it was the tariffs.
In this wonderful material expansion and prosperity the Norther States had the advantage. Of the total population of 31,444,321, returned by the census of 1860, two-thirds were in the States which remained in the Union in 1861. The value of the real and personal property of the whole country was estimated at $16,159,000,000, of which $10,957,000,000 was credited to the northern groupFinancial History of the United States, Part 2, 8 Ed., 1922, Davis Rich Dewey, p. 272-4
The North had two-thirds of the population and two-thirds of the wealth. Just when you had me thinking the North had some big per capita wealth advantage.
|Page 368|
OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 1, vol 1, Part 1, page 368
APRIL 3, 1861.
Honorable WM. H. SEWARD, Secretary of State:
DEAR SIR: We expect to touch at Key West, and will be able to set things in order there and give the first check to the secession movement by firmly establishing the authority of the United States in that most ungrateful island and city. Thence we propose to send dispatches under cover to you. The officers will write to their friends,
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OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 1, vol 1, Part 1, page 369
understanding that the package will not be broken until after the public has notice through the newspapers of our success or defeat. Our object is yet unknown on board, and if I read the papers of the eve of our departure aright our secret is still a secret in New York. No communication with the shore, however, will be allowed.
Your dispatch arrived as I was on my away to the Atlantic, just before the hour at which she was to sail, and two or three hours after that appointed for the Powhatan. When the arrow has sped from the bow it may glance aside, but who shall reclaim it before its flight is finished?
A violent gale compelled us to lay head to wind for twenty-four hours. We ran one hundred miles out of our course. The Powhatan having taken this gale earlier may have got through it with less delay, so that it is not now likely that we will overtake her. She had orders to call off Key West, and by boat or signal ascertain whether we had passed. It is important that she should reach the port before us.
* * *
The dispatch and the secrecy with which this expedition has been fitted out will strike terror into the ranks of rebellion. All New York saw, all the United States knew, that the Atlantic was filling with stores and troops. But now this nameless vessel, her name is painted out, speeds out of the track of commerce to an unknown destination. Mysterious, unseen, where will the powerful bolt fall? What thousands of men, spending the means of the Confederate States, vainly beat the air amid the swamps of the southern coast, and, filling the dank forts, curse secession and the mosquitoes!
* * *
God promised to send before his chosen people and advance-guard of hornets. Our constant allies are the more efficient mosquitoes and sand-flies. At this time the republic has need of all her sons, of all their knowledge, zeal, and courage.
Major Hunt is with us, somewhat depressed at going into the field without his horses. His battery of Napoleon guns, probably the best field guns in our service, is to follow in the Illinois; but the traitor Twiggs surrendered his horses to the rebels of Texas, and the company
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of well-trained artillerists finds itself, after eight years of practice in that highest and most efficient arm, the light artillery, going into active service as footmen. They, too, feel, the change deeply.
* * *
I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
M. C. MEIG,
Captain of Engineers.
False. Here is the relavant communication surrounding Major Anderson's move from Ft. Moultrie to Ft. Sumter.
FORT MOULTRIE, S. C., December 11, 1860.
Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, commanding at Fort Moultrie, S. C.
You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt, by violence, to obtain possession of the public works or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint those expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me verbally to give you such instructions.
You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that treason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.
D. C. BUELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
Major Anderson got his orders from the same man who chose him to go to Charlston in the first place, Secretary of War John Floyd.
Six newspaper editorials, four of which don't mention anything about trade flowing south. A fifth is a dire prediction without supporting evidence and the sixth is from a New Orleans paper. Let me ask again. When so few imports were destined for the southern markets then why would trade suddenly flow south if the rebellion had been a success?
"The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection. The course here indicated will be followed unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper, and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised, according to circumstances actually existing and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections." -- Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1861
Maybe it was all about mail delivery?
To begin with, they stole everything they could from Federal arsenals and armories at the beginning. This included hundreds of thousands of rifles and anything else that wasn't nailed down. 130,000 rifles alone were taken from the Federal arsenal at Springfield MA in 1860 before South Carolina seceded.
Secondly, the 1861 crop was paid for in cash in March of 1861. This crop was never planted, and the Davis government seized the prepayments whenever they could. Third, the Davis government withheld the right to seize any and all southern property at any time for use in the war without payment, though they did tend to issue grossly over inflated script for it.
The southern war effort amount to about 1 billion dollars in total by best estimates. This is at best somewhat of a guess, but in any case, the Confederacy was in debt from day one and never got it's head above water financially. About a third of that was stolen directly from the North before or at the start of the war. The balance came from the sale of cotton and primarily from the what wealth there had been in the south at the start of the war. The south bled itself white finanically, never rose out of bankruptcy, and left itself virtually completely destitute. The North prospered and ended he war much wealthier than it began it in terms of current assets and production. It did go into debt to the tune of about 2 billion, but it never lost control of it's currency, and greenbacks only inflated to about half their prewar value by the end of the war. Considering the size of the debt, that was indeed a remarkable accomplishment. That debt was also eventually entirely paid off, even though the process suffered great abuse and fraud after the southern states returned to control the Senate again.
The south did supply it's own food, but little else. By embargoing their own cotton, they did drive up the price of cotton, and this gave them what cash they were able to get relative to their ability to smuggle it out past the blockade.
If I read this correctly, the South was unable to support itself, it had been supported for many years by the North, and the ever-philanthropic North just couldn't bear to part with their Southern welfare children.
For the government, the south was a relatively cheap date, and southern lands and ports were critically important to control to prevent European entry into American affairs. It was a no brainer. It is true though that there was a very long list of Northern businessmen who went bust extending credit to the south, just walk in a manner that endangered the safety and peace of the whole continent.
If your logic holds, why did not Canada threaten the whole continent?
It wasn't destitute as the south was, and it was far too small in terms of population. Canada did present a constant threat though because of the British, and there were continaul tensions on the border and over fishing rights. The US though was always hampered by the Southern dominated Senate which was unwilling to fund an adequate navy for fear it would be used to intercept the illegal slave trade into the south.
The key to Canada though was that the St Lawrence froze over in the winter, and so for many months Canada had no way to receive British reinforcements unless they landed in New England and marched overland. This they were not about to do, though the British parliament did consider occupying southern ports in the 1850's in an effort to end slavery.
Obviously it was not the tariffs themselves
[Honest Abe - March 4, 1861] The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Obviously, it was the tariffs.
No. The tariffs were chosen as a symbolic argument, since from the very beginniong, collecting the Tariffs at Charleston cost more than the revune they produced. Even when Abe sent a Naval ship to Charleston to collect the tariffs, Congress tried to overrule him on the grounds that it wasn't worth the actual return on the investment. The ship usage and cost of the crew would be more than the amount of tariffs that would be collected. It obviously was not financial value of the tariffs, but the question of the right to collect them even if they weren't worth the effort financially.
In this wonderful material expansion and prosperity the Norther States had the advantage. Of the total population of 31,444,321, returned by the census of 1860, two-thirds were in the States which remained in the Union in 1861. The value of the real and personal property of the whole country was estimated at $16,159,000,000, of which $10,957,000,000 was credited to the northern group Financial History of the United States, Part 2, 8 Ed., 1922, Davis Rich Dewey, p. 272-4 The North had two-thirds of the population and two-thirds of the wealth. Just when you had me thinking the North had some big per capita wealth advantage
Figures don't lie, but liars figure. The figures seem a bit high, but the proportions are fair relative to the census. However, the thing to remember though is that the southern figures included the value of slave as property, and that this would, by proportion, acouunt for at least half to the value of 'real property' in the south. This is not a legitimate value, as slaves were people, not furniture, and although setting them free would take away their artificial book value, their value to the economy as producers was not lost. Again though, remember that these figures at best came from the federal census, which was grossly distorted by DeBow[s in the south where politically, the slave interests had control of these matters. As I pointed out earlier, the census returns show a 90% literacy rate in the south, yet in fact less than 10% of the whites in the south were actually literate as was discovered after the Civil War when DeBow's lost it's control of the census. In addition, items of produce and production in the north were calculated with less than market value, so the federal numbers are questionable in respect to the fact that they distorted the real numbers in favor of the south.
Consider the tariff returns of 1850. Only 5% of the tariff collecitons that year came from the slave states. When I credit the south with paying 14% of the Federal taxes, I am being most generous, yet, there is no question the south continually raided the Federal largesse in excess of half the tariff incomes. Still, the average citizen in the North finished paying his tariff contribution by the end of the first week of January, whereas the average southern never paid anything.
Cotton may have been 65% of exports, but no where near that percentage of total agrarian production, and beyond that, even far less of total GNP. Outside of cotton and tobacco, the south was as poor as a churchmouse in a Synagogue.
Let's assume Marshall was correct in his opinion (God knows judges are frequently wrong). Marshall also wrote in Marbury vs Madison:
". . . the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument."
Now read this section of the South Carolina declaration of secession:
"By this Constitution, certain duties were imposed upon the several States, and the exercise of certain of their powers was restrained, which necessarily implied their continued existence as sovereign States. But to remove all doubt, an amendment was added, which declared that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. On the 23d May , 1788, South Carolina, by a Convention of her People, passed an Ordinance assenting to this Constitution, and afterwards altered her own Constitution, to conform herself to the obligations she had undertaken.
Thus was established, by compact between the States, a Government with definite objects and powers, limited to the express words of the grant. This limitation left the whole remaining mass of power subject to the clause reserving it to the States or to the people, and rendered unnecessary any specification of reserved rights.
We hold that the Government thus established is subject to the two great principles asserted in the Declaration of Independence; and we hold further, that the mode of its formation subjects it to a third fundamental principle, namely: the law of compact. We maintain that in every compact between two or more parties, the obligation is mutual; that the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a material part of the agreement, entirely releases the obligation of the other; and that where no arbiter is provided, each party is remitted to his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its consequences.
In the present case, that fact is established with certainty. We assert that fourteen of the States have deliberately refused, for years past, to fulfill their constitutional obligations, and we refer to their own Statutes for the proof.
The Constitution of the United States, in its fourth Article, provides as follows: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.
This stipulation was so material to the compact, that without it that compact would not have been made. The greater number of the contracting parties held slaves, and they had previously evinced their estimate of the value of such a stipulation by making it a condition in the Ordinance for the government of the territory ceded by Virginia, which now composes the States north of the Ohio River.
The same article of the Constitution stipulates also for rendition by the several States of fugitives from justice from the other States.
The General Government, as the common agent, passed laws to carry into effect these stipulations of the States. For many years these laws were executed. But an increasing hostility on the part of the non-slaveholding States to the institution of slavery, has led to a disregard of their obligations, and the laws of the General Government have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution. The States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa, have enacted laws which either nullify the Acts of Congress or render useless any attempt to execute them. In many of these States the fugitive is discharged from service or labor claimed, and in none of them has the State Government complied with the stipulation made in the Constitution. The State of New Jersey, at an early day, passed a law in conformity with her constitutional obligation; but the current of anti-slavery feeling has led her more recently to enact laws which render inoperative the remedies provided by her own law and by the laws of Congress. In the State of New York even the right of transit for a slave has been denied by her tribunals; and the States of Ohio and Iowa have refused to surrender to justice fugitives charged with murder, and with inciting servile insurrection in the State of Virginia. Thus the constituted compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-slaveholding States, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from her obligation.
South Carolina made a good case. The rebellious states were not the Southern states, but the Northern. I surmise Lincoln knew the South was right, which left him with three choices: (1) enforce the constitution and push the Northern states (the ones that elected him) back in line; (3) let the Southern states sedede; or (3) ignore his constitutional duties and wage war against the South. Lincoln chose the latter. His desire to maintain the Union was more powerful than his desire to support and defend the Constitution. The cost was over a half-million lives, the elimination of the Constitution as a viable restraint on tyranny, and the eventual moral, spiritual, and financial bankrupcy of our once great nation (coming soon).
I can understand a judge not knowing the Constitution (it happens all the time). But Robert E. Lee? That's depressing.
DRED SCOTT v. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)
The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.
As I am sure you are aware, the Supreme Court explicitly said the opposite of what you try to assert. All are free to disagree with the decision but at the time it was, in fact, the applicable law.
In like manner one is free to disagree today with the decision in Roe v. Wade, but that make not one scintilla of difference. If one is asked if abortion is legal in the U.S. today, whether one agrees with Roe or not, the only honest answer is, "Yes."
[mac] False. Here is the relavant (sic) communication surrounding Major Anderson's move from Ft. Moultrie to Ft. Sumter.
Your CYA memo is identified below, where it appears, in blue print.
No, I had it right and you failed to provide a link to the official record for a very good reason. It shows that, yet again, you suffering from a chronic case of recto-cranial inversion. What you quote is extracted from the middle of a long letter from President Buchanan to the Commissioners of the State of South Carolina. It would have been better had you included one more paragraph, namely, "These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception, in regard to a particular which does not in any degree affect the present question. Under these circumstances it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had "tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act" on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which as not yet been alleged. Still, he is a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing."
Also, you failed to mention that, "His Secretary of War, impatient of a delay, every moment of which he felt touched his own honor, resigned. He did so solely on the ground that the faith of the Government, solemnly pledged, was broken, if it failed promptly to undo what had been done contrary to its wishes, against its settled policy and in violation of its distinct agreement. The President accepted his resignation without comment."
I put it in full context below.
|Page 115|
OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 1, vol 1, Part 1, page 116
WASHINGTON CITY, December 31, 1860.
Hons. ROBERT W. BARNWELL, JAMES H. ADAMS, JAMES L. ORR:
GENTLEMEN; I have had the honor to receive your communication of the 28th instant, together with a copy of your "full powers from the Convention of the People of South Carolina" authorizing you to treat with the Government of the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned, and also copy of the ordinance, bearing date on the 20th instant, declaring that "the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of 'the United States of America' is thereby dissolved."
In answer to this communication I have to say that my position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress on the 3rd instant. In that I stated that "apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the Federal Government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations heretofore existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that State. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign States. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign de facto government, involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be naked act of usurpation. It is therefore my duty to submit to Congress the whole question in all its bearings."
Such is still my opinion, and I could therefore meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest character, and I was quite willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware.
It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regret that, in your opinion, "the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible." In conclusion you urge upon me "the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of
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Charleston," stating that, "under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment."
The reason for this change in your position is that, since your arrival in Washington, "an officer of the United States, acting, as we (you) are assured not only without but against your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering to a most important extent the condition of affairs under which we (you) came."
You also allege that you came here "the representatives of an authority which could at any time within the past sixty days have taken possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) cannot doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor rather than to its own power."
This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message of the 3rd of December instant I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it "has been purchased for a fair equivalent, 'by the consent of the legislature of the State, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals', &c., and over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants."
This being the condition of the parties on Saturday, December 8, four of the Representatives from South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties, of the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning, the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the Representatives of South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy:
WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860.
His Excellency JAMES BUCHANAN,
President of the United States:
In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express too you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston previously to the action of the convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and Federal Government, provided that no re-enforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.
JOHN McQUEEN.
WM. PORCHER MILES.
M. L. BONHAM,
W. W. BOYCE.
LAWRENCE M. KEITT.
And here I must, in justice to myself, remark that at the time the paper was presented to me I objected to the word "provided," as it might be construed into an agreement on my part which I never would make. They said nothing was further from their intention; they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter
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into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has proven that they have faithfully kept this promise although I have never since received a line from any one of them, or from the convention, on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to re-enforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might be still preserved, and that time might thus be gained for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.
But I acted in the same manner as I would have done had I enter into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible. The world knows that I have never sent any re-enforcements to the forts in Charleston Harbor and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made "in their relative military status."
Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th instant to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice the 21st instant. It is as follows:
Memorandum of verbal instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, commanding at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina.
You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this State shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. He has therefore carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works or interfere with their occupancy. But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the Government, he deems it proper that you shall be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me verbally to give you such instructions.
You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than obey of the three forts, but an attack on or attempt to take possession of either one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar defensive steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.
D. C. BUELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
FORT MOULTRIE, S. C., December 11, 1860.
This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.
JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.
These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception, in regard to a particular which does not in any degree affect the present question. Under these circumstances it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had "tangible
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evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act" on the part of the authorities of South Carolina, which as not yet been alleged. Still, he is a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing.
Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie, and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first prompting were to command him to return to his former position, and there await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This could only have been done with any degree of safety to the command by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But before any steps could possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information, dated on the 28th instant that the "palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney and a large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort Moultrie." Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it that, the officer had acted not only without but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the movement was made, seized by a military force two of the three Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag instead of that of the United States. At this gloomy period of our history starting events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day, the 27th instant, that possession of these two forts was taken the palmetto flag was raised over the Federal custom-house and post-office in Charleston; and on the same day every officer of the customs, collector, naval officer, surveyor, and appraisers, resigned their offices. And this, although it was well known from the language of my message that, as an executive officer, I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws.
In the harbor of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the Federal flag floated only four days ago; but now over two of them this flag has been supplanted, and the palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these circumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this, negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion had ever been made to it in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer there in command of all the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another. I cannot admit the justice of any such inference. And at this point of writing I have received information by telegraph from Captain Humphreys in command of the arsenal at Charleston, that it "has to-day (Sunday, the 30th) been taken by force of arms." Comment is needless. It is estimated that the property of the United States in this arsenal was worth half a milition of dollars.
After this information I have only to add that, whilst it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter as a portion of public property of the United States against hostile attacks, from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I may possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defense can be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston.
With great personal regard, I remain, yours, very respectfully,
JAMES BUCHANAN.
---------------
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, December 31, 1860.
To the PRESIDENT:
Lieutenant-General Scott again begs leave to trespass for a moment on the indulgence of the President of the United States particularly as he learns by rumor that there is no head to the War Department.*
Such are the necessities of the service that it is hoped the vacancy in question may be speedily filled, and, incidentally, that the new Secretary, if ad interim, may not be a junior officer of the Army, as it would wound the pride of any senior to serve under such Secretary.
Lieutenant-General Scott deems it to be his duty to lay, the accompanying letter before the President.+ The writer is a distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, and an eminent lawyer of the New York bar. Major-General Sandford, mentioned by him, is an officer and citizen of great merit and discretion, commanding the City Division of Volunteers.
General Scott does not recommend the acceptance of Mr. Hamilton's proposition,+ as we have disposable regulars enough for that single purpose; by that we already require many and large detachments for the protection of our coast defenses farther south is becoming daily more and more evident.
In reference to General Scott's note of yesterday to the President, he respectfully adds; Of course, the War Department and General Scott cannot communicate anything to Major Anderson, or receive by mail or telegraphic wires anything from him (who must be regarded as in a state of siege), except by permission of the authorities in Charleston; and it is just possible in his state of isolation a system of forged telegrams from this place may be played off so successfully as to betray him into some false movement.
Most respectfully submitted to the President of the United States.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
P. S.- As a sequence to the foregoing, it is respectfully suggested that there seems to be no other way of freely communicating with Major Anderson than by water, say by a revenue cutter running regularly between Wilmington, N. C., and Fort Sumter.
W. S.
---------------
*No record of Mr. Floyd's letter of resignation can be found in the War Department.
+Not of record.
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Reply of Commissioners to the President.
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 1, 1861.
To his Excellency the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
SIR: We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December in reply to a note addressed by us to you on the 28th of the same month, as Commissioners from South Carolina.
In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that "your position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress of the 3rd instant," that you possess "no power to change the relations heretofore existing," between South Carolina and the United States, "much less to acknowledge the independence of that State," and that, consequently, you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say that the State of South Carolina having, in the
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exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the State had simply exercised here unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal consideration which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of the which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the State.
That willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the State which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.
You say: "It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the Federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and I therefore deeply regret that, in your opinion, 'the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible.'" We expressed no such opinion and the language which you quote as ours is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was, "But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible." Place that "assurance" as contained in our letter in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.
Again, professing to quote our language, you say:"Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without but against my orders," &c. We expressed no such opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted was applied solely and entirely to our assurance, obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration-a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.
Some weeks ago, the State of South Carolina declared her intention in the existing condition of public affairs to secede from the United States. She called a convention of her people to put her declaration in force. The convention met and passed the ordinance of secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered. In your annual message you declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding State, but that you were bound by your constitutioned oath, and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not re-enforce the garrisons in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the some garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most efficient member of your Cabinet rather than allow these garrisons to be strengthened. You com-
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pelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter to return immediately to the arsenal forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whose testimony will be placed upon the record whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts if commissioners should be sent to the Government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina that no attempt would be made to disturb you possession of the forts and property of the United States if you would not disturb their existing condition until commissioners had been sent and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made,"provided that no re-enforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status remain as at present." And, although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper, although you "considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen," as an obligation on one side without corresponding obligation on the other, it must be remembered (if we are rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send re-enforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to you officers commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding.
Besides all this, you had received formal and official notice from the governor of South Carolina that we had been appointed commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday at three o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at once the next day. Early on that day (Thursday) the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until half past two o'clock on Friday in order that you might consult your Cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it.
With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the Cabinet upon the publicly-avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the Government, and that unless the pledge was instantly redeemed he was dishonored, denial was impossible. You did not deny it; you do not deny it now; but you seek to escape from its obligation on two grounds; 1st. That we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and 2nd. That the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both.
In the first place, we deny positively that we have ever, in any way, made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on the record. In it we inform you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We
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stated the events, and we said that until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed; and then, having made this request for explanation, we added:"And, in conclusion we would urge upon you he immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible," &c. "Under present circumstances"! What circumstances? Why, clearly, the occupation of Fort Sumter and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explanation or partial disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter which would or could have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you are pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you; but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiation should be conducted.
In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say: "This I cannot do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being."
In reply to this statement we are compelled to say that your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston Harbor. And in support of this impression we would add that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation and the most unsullied integrity-men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievement place their testimony beyond cavil-that such suggestions had been made to and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which ad to recommend it its own wisdom and the weight of such authority.
As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe-
1. That, even it this were so, it does not avail you for defense, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday; the news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day men of the highest consideration-men who had striven successfully to lift your to great office, who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration- sought you and entreated you to act, to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that, if the facts were so-that if the commander had acted without and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges-that you would restore the status you had pledged your honor to maintain.
You refused to decide. You Secretary of War-your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter-waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two Cabinet meetings had adjourned before your knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done, and your prompt
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decision at any moment of that time would have avoided the subsequent complications.
But if you had known the acts of the authorities, of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days you have had in Charleston Harbor not force enough to hold the forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty, one of those two the most important in the harbor; it could have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man that it would have been taken but for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were with difficulty restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances given on your behalf, which we cannot believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm; wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision.
Scarcely had their commissioners left, than Major Anderson waged war. No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense-one only justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew, under cover of the night, to a safer position. This was war.
No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, "not only without orders, but this act, with all its attending circumstances was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and even at this moment, while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that re-enforcements are hurrying on to the conflict so that when the first gun shall be fired there will have been on your part, one continuous consistent series of actions commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular re-enforcement and terminating in defeat or victory.
And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you cannot say-you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this "tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act on the part of the authorities of South Carolina" (which is the only justification of Major Anderson) you are forced to admit "has not yet been alleged." But you have decided. You have resolved to hold by force what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence, and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter, will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.
By your course you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and relying upon Him who is the God of Justice as well as the God of Hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her, hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly.
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Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note, leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the status quo existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating as we think, your determination to re-enforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we propose returning to Charleston on to-morrow afternoon.
We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servants,
R. W. BARNWELL,
J. H. ADAMS,
JAMES L. ORR,
Commissioners.
[Indorsement.]
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
3 1/2 o'clock, Wednesday.
This paper just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.
Statement of Messrs. Miles and Keitt of what transpired between the President and the South Carolina delegation.
In compliance with the request of the Convention, we beg leave to make the following statement:
On Saturday, the 8th of December several of the South Carolina delegation, including ourselves, waited upon the President. At this time there was a growing belief that re-enforcements were on the eve of being sent to the forts in Charleston Harbor.
It was known that the subject was frequently and earnestly discussed in the Cabinet. It was rumored that General Cass and Mr. Holt were urgent that re-enforcements should be sent. Upon our being announced the President, who was then in Cabinet council, came out to us in the anteroom. We at once entered into a conversation upon the topic which was so closely occupying his thoughts as well as ours. The President seemed much disturbed and moved. He told us that he had a painful interview with the wife of Major Anderson, who had come on from New York to see him. She had manifested great anxiety and distress at the situation of her husband, whom she seemed to consider in momentary danger of an attack from an excited and lawless mob. The President professed to feel a deep responsibility resting upon him to protect the lives of Major Anderson and his command. We told him that the news that re-enforcements were on their way to Charleston would be the surest means of provoking what Mrs. Anderson apprehended, and what he so much depredated. We said further that we did not believe that Major Anderson was in any danger of such an attack; that the general sentiment of the State was against any such proceeding; that prior to the action of the State Convention, then only ten days off, we felt satisfied that there would be no attempt to molest the forts in any way; that after the convention met, while we could not possibly undertake to say what that body would see fit to do, we yet hoped and believed that nothing would be done until we had first endeavored, by duly accredited commissioners, to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of all matters, including the delivery of the forts, between South Carolina and the Federal Government. At the same time we again reiterated
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our solemn belief that any change in the then existing condition of things in Charleston Harbor would, in the excited state of feeling at home, inevitably precipitate a collision.
The impression made upon us was that the President was wavering and had not decided what course he would pursue. He said he was glad to have had this conversation with us, but would prefer that we should give him a written memorandum of the substance of what we had said. This we did on Monday, the 10th. It was in these words:
His Excellency JAMES BUCHANAN,
President of the United States:
In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston previously to the action of the convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and Federal Government, provided that no re-enforcement shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.
JOHN McQUEEN.
WM. PORCHER MILES.
M. L. BONHAM.
W. W. BOYCE.
LAWRENCE M. KEITT,
WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860.
The President did not like the word "provided" because it looked as if we were binding him while avowing that we had no authority to commit the convention. We told him that we did not so understand it. We were expressing our convictions and belief, predicated upon the maintenance of a certain condition of things, which maintenance was absolutely and entirely in his power. If he minted such condition, then we believed that collision would be avoided until the attempt at a peaceable negotiation had failed. If he did not, then we solemnly assured him that we believed that collision must inevitably and at once be precipitated. He seemed satisfied, and said it was not his intention to send re-enforcements or make any change. We explained to him what we meant by the words "relative military status," as applied to the forts; mentioned the difference between Major Anderson's occupying his then position at Fort Moultrie and throwing himself into Fort Sumter. We stated that the latter step would be equivalent to re-enforcing the garrison and would just as certainly as the sending of fresh troops lead to the result which we both desired to avoid. When we rose to go the President said in substance, "After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen. I do not know that any paper or writing is necessary. We understand each other."
One of the delegation, just before leaving the room, remarked: "Mr. President, you have determined to let things remain as they are, and not to send re-enforcements; but suppose that you were hereafter to change your policy for any reason, what then? That would put us, who are willing to use personal influence to prevent any attack upon the forts before commissioners are sent on to Washington, in rather an embracing position." "Then," said the President, "I would first return you, this paper." We do not pretend to give the exact words on either side, but we are sure we give the sense of both.
The above is a full and exact account of what passed between the President and the delegation. The President, in his letter to our commissioners, tries to give the impression that our "understanding" or "agreement" was not a "pledge." We confess we are not sufficiently versed in the wiles of diplomacy to feel the force of this "distinction
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without a difference." Nor can we understand how, in "a matter of honor among gentlemen," in which "no paper or writing is necessary," the very party who was willing to put it on that high footing can honorably descend to mere verbal criticism to purge himself of what all gentlemen and men of honor must consider a breach of faith. The very fact that we (the Representatives from South Carolina) were not authorized to commit or "pledge" the State, were not treating with the President as accredited ministers with full pours, but as gentlemen, assuming, to a certain extent, the delicate task of undertaking to foreshadow the course and policy of the State, should have made the President the more ready to strengthen our hands to bring about and carry out that course and policy which he professed to have as much at heart as we had. While we were not authorized to say that the Convention would not order the occupation of the forts immediately after secession and prior to the sending on of commissioners, the President as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, could positively say that so long as South Carolina abstained from attacking and seizing the forts, he would not send re-enforcements to them, or allow their relative military status to be changed.
We were acting in the capacity of gentlemen holding certain prominent positions, and anxious to exert such influence as we might possess to effect a peaceful solution of pending political difficulties, and prevent, if possible, the horrors of war. The President was acting in a double capacity-not only as a gentleman, whose influence in carrying out his share of the understanding or agreement was potential, but as the head of the Army, and therefore having the absolute control of the whole matter of re-enforcing or transferring the garrison at Charleston.
But we have dwelt long enough upon this point. Suffice it to say that considering the President as bound in honor, if not by treaty stipulations, not to make any change in the forts or to send re-enforcements to them unless they were attacked, we of the delegation who were elected to the Convention felt equally bound in honor to do everything on our part to prevent any premature collision. This Convention can bear us witness as to whether or not we endeavored honorably to carry out our share of the agreement.
The published debates at the very commencement of the session contain the evidence of our good faith. We trusted the President. We believed his wishes concurred with this policy and that both were directed to avoiding any inauguration of hostilities. We were confirmed in our confidence and reassured in our belief by a significant event which took place subsequent to our interview. He allowed his premier Cabinet officer, an old and tried friend, to resign rather than yield to his solicitations for the re-enforcement of the garrison at Charleston. We urged this as a convincing proof of his firmness and sincerity. But how have we been deceived! The news of Major Anderson's coup produced a sudden and unexpected change in the President's policy. While declaring that his withdrawal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter was "without orders, and contrary to orders," he yet refused for twelve hours to take any action in the matter. For twelve hours, therefore, without any excuse, he refused to redeem his plighted word. No subsequent acts on the part of our State, no after reasons, can wipe away the stain which he suffered to rest upon his "honor as a gentleman," while this hours, big with portentous events, rolled slowly by. His Secretary of War, impatient of a delay, every moment of which he felt touched his own honor, resigned. He did so solely on the ground that the faith of the Government, solemnly pledged, was broken, if it failed promptly to
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undo what had been done contrary to its wishes, against its settled policy and in violation of its distinct agreement. The President accepted his resignation without comment. He did not attempt to disabuse the mind of his Secretary as to what was the true position of the Government.
What a spectacle does the President's vacillating and disingenuous course present! He allows one Secretary to resign rather than abandon a policy which he has agreed upon. Scarcely have a few short weeks elapsed, and he accepts the resignation of another rather than adhere to that very policy. He makes an agreement with gentlemen which, while he admits that they have faithfully kept it on their part, he himself evades and repudiates. And this he does rather than redress a wrong, correct an error-what he himself considers an error-committed by a subordinate, without his orders and contrary to his wishes! It was at least due to Mr. Floyd, who, as one of his Cabinet, had officially and personally stood by his administration from its very commencement- through go do report and through evil report-to have explained to him that he was, in the President's opinion, laboring under a misapprehension; at least to have said to him, "You are mistaken about this matter: do not leave me on a false issue." But no; he coldly, ungraciously, yet promptly, receives the resignation without a syllable of remonstrance, and thus tacitly but unequivocally accepts without shame the issue presented. He does not deny that the faith of his Government is pledged, but he deliberately refuses to redeem it.
WM. PORCHER MILES.
LAWRENCE M. KEITT.
You are truly a genius. You are the first person to explain why Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of the post offices.
None of the framers suggested the states were sovereign. That's why federalist James Wilson was beaten half to death during the ratification debates. Everyone -knew- it was permanently binding.
Why do you push the South Carolinians' lies?
Walt
The laws are also the supreme law of the land, including the Milita Act, which leaves the determination of when rebellion or insurrection exists to the sole discretion of the president.
No state can get out of the Union on its own mere resolve.
Walt
President Lincoln implemented the blockade as a tool to combat the southern rebellion. It wasn't implemented until the Davis regime had initiated hostilities.
As Abraham Lincoln pointed out in his Cooper Union speech of 2/27/60, the framers' clear intent was to eventually end slavery. That is why they arranged to end the slave trade in 1808 and why they outlawed slavery in the territories. Lincoln showed in this speech that a clear majority of the framers were on record as favoring an end to slavery. That is when he became a marked man in the south.
When the slave power attempted to wrench the country away from this position, people in the north took issue. They deserve great credit for this.
The slave power deserves nothing but condemnation, but they have a ready defender in you.
A Constitution that condones slavery should be thrown down, don't you agree? The Republican Party had found a way to peaceably end slavery -- restrict it to the territory where it was, and it would die. The slave power --whom you defend-- were willing to fight tooth and nail to protect --human slavery--. You are making the connection here, right?
Walt
That is disgusting.
Walt
Most imports were destined for Northern consumers. Why would those imports have flowed south? They would have paid the confederate tariff as well as the U.S. tariff. How much sense does that make?
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