Posted on 08/21/2003 8:33:17 AM PDT by rwfromkansas
Edited on 04/22/2004 12:37:00 AM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
MONTGOMERY, Ala.
(Excerpt) Read more at foxnews.com ...
No. The promotion of non-belief interferes with belief - necessarily.
I call it an assumption on the part of the courts because they give no reasoning to support it. Yes, they give some somewhat credible reasoning to support the notion that the 14th applies the free-exercise clause to the states, because if you're arrested for giving a Hail Mary you can say that you've been deprived of "liberty" without "due process of law" and all that jazz.
But then the courts simply make the assumption - I chose the word deliberately - that since the 14th applies the free-exercise clause, it must also apply the establishment clause in the same way, with no evidence that I've seen so far to suggest that they've subjected that assumption to any kind of critical examination. How does a state's promotion of a religious belief - in a non-coercive way - violate someone's due process? They don't answer. You've begun to answer, and I appreciate that, and I've begun to address that answer in my post above. But everything I've seen so far fully justifies my use of the word "assumption" to describe SCOTUS's methodology.
But the question I was getting at was whether it's also true that the promotion of belief interferes with other beliefs, necessarily.
Nicely put. This is why I don't prefer an equal-protection argument in this case. I just figured I'd lay out another option for you ;)
We could, as I say, guarantee fair treatment for everyone by simply taking away their soapboxes and shutting down the public square, but that would certainly interfere with the right of people to express themselves and their faith in a peaceable manner. And so, given my fondness for the utilitarian notion that more speech is better than less, I am inclined to argue that the fact that we might be less than perfect in insuring equal access should not trump the right of free expression for as many citizens as possible - shutting down the square serves no one, where we ought to be trying to serve as many as possible. And while we might not successfully insure perfect access for everyone, I'm really quite certain that we can find a way to do a better job than Roy Moore has done.
Nicely put. This is why I don't prefer an equal-protection argument in this case.
Wait a minute, are you telling me that if Moore had not put the Commandments up, and simply insisted upon leaving the rotunda area unadorned, and refused to allow citizens to put up displays of their own, he would be just as much in violation of the Constitution as he is now? That's how your post came across to me.
Ah, you didn't read Brennan after all, did you? ;)
Oh, alright - here you go. You will probably find much to disagree with, but Brennan at least attempts to address the arguments against incorporation of the Establishment clause.
No one questions that the Framers of the First Amendment intended to restrict exclusively the powers of the Federal Government. Whatever limitations that Amendment now imposes upon the States derive from the Fourteenth Amendment. The process of absorption of the religious guarantees of the First Amendment as protections against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment began with the Free Exercise Clause. In 1923 the Court held that the protections of the Fourteenth included at least a person's freedom "to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. . . ." 18 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 . See also Hamilton v. Regents, supra, at 262. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, completed in 1940 the process of absorption of the Free Exercise Clause and recognized its dual aspect: the Court affirmed freedom of belief as an absolute liberty, but recognized that conduct, while it may also be comprehended by the Free Exercise Clause, "remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." 310 U.S., at 303 -304. This was a distinction already drawn by Reynolds v. United States, supra. From the beginning this Court has recognized that while government may regulate the behavioral manifestations of religious beliefs, it may not interfere at all with the beliefs themselves.The absorption of the Establishment Clause has, however, come later and by a route less easily charted. It has been suggested, with some support in history, that absorption of the First Amendment's ban against congressional legislation "respecting an establishment of religion" is conceptually impossible because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose any attempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state churches. Whether or not such was the understanding of the Framers and whether such a purpose would have inhibited the absorption of the Establishment Clause at the threshold of the Nineteenth Century are questions not dispositive of our present inquiry. For it is clear on the record of history that the last of the formal state establishments was dissolved more than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and thus the problem of protecting official state churches from federal encroachments could hardly have been any concern of those who framed the post-Civil War Amendments. Any such objective of the First Amendment, having become historical anachronism by 1868, cannot be thought to have deterred the absorption of the Establishment Clause to any greater degree than it would, for example, have deterred the absorption of the Free Exercise Clause. That no organ of the Federal Government possessed in 1791 any power to restrain the interference of the States in religious matters is indisputable. See Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. 589. It is equally plain, on the other hand, that the Fourteenth Amendment created a panoply of new federal rights for the protection of citizens of the various States. And among those rights was freedom from such state governmental involvement in the affairs of religion as the Establishment Clause had originally foreclosed on the part of Congress.
It has also been suggested that the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment logically cannot absorb the Establishment Clause because that clause is not one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which in terms protects a "freedom" of the individual. The fallacy in this contention, I think, is that it underestimates the role of the Establishment Clause as co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone. The Free Exercise Clause "was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of faith." McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 464 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Finally, it has been contended that absorption of the Establishment Clause is precluded by the absence of any intention on the part of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to circumscribe the residual powers of the States to aid religious activities and institutions in ways which fell short of formal establishments. That argument relies in part upon the express terms of the abortive Blaine Amendment - proposed several years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment - which would have added to the First Amendment a provision that "[n]o State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." Such a restriction would have been superfluous, it is said, if the Fourteenth Amendment had already made the Establishment Clause binding upon the States.
The argument proves too much, for the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion can hardly be questioned; yet the Blaine Amendment would also have added an explicit protection against state laws abridging that liberty. Even if we assume that the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment saw no immediate connection between its protections against state action infringing personal liberty and the guarantees of the First Amendment, it is certainly too late in the day to suggest that their assumed inattention to the question dilutes the force of these constitutional guarantees in their application to the States. It is enough to conclude that the religious liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment would not be viable if the Constitution were interpreted to forbid only establishments ordained by Congress.
The issue of what particular activities the Establishment Clause forbids the States to undertake is our more immediate concern. In Everson v. Board of Education, a careful study of the relevant history led the Court to the view, consistently recognized in decisions since Everson, that the Establishment Clause embodied the Framers' conclusion that government and religion have discrete interests which are mutually best served when each avoids too close a proximity to the other. It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government. It has rightly been said of the history of the Establishment Clause that "our tradition of civil liberty rests not only on the secularism of a Thomas Jefferson but also on the fervent sectarianism . . . of a Roger Williams." Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States (1961), 84.
Our decisions on questions of religious education or exercises in the public schools have consistently reflected this dual aspect of the Establishment Clause. Engel v. Vitale unmistakably has its roots in three earlier cases which, on cognate issues, shaped the contours of the Establishment Clause. First, in Everson the Court held that reimbursement by the town of parents for the cost of transporting their children by public carrier to parochial (as well as public and private nonsectarian) schools did not offend the Establishment Clause. Such reimbursement, by easing the financial burden upon Catholic parents, may indirectly have fostered the operation of the Catholic schools, and may thereby indirectly have facilitated the teaching of Catholic principles, thus serving ultimately a religious goal. But this form of governmental assistance was difficult to distinguish from myriad other incidental if not insignificant government benefits enjoyed by religious institutions - fire and police protection, tax exemptions, and the pavement of streets and sidewalks, for example. "The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." 330 U.S., at 18. Yet even this form of assistance was thought by four Justices of the Everson Court to be barred by the Establishment Clause because too perilously close to that public support of religion forbidden by the First Amendment.
The other two cases, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, and Zorach v. Clauson, can best be considered together. Both involved programs of released time for religious instruction of public school students. I reject the suggestion that Zorach overruled McCollum in silence. The distinction which the Court drew in Zorach between the two cases is, in my view, faithful to the function of the Establishment Clause.
I should first note, however, that McCollum and Zorach do not seem to me distinguishable in terms of the free exercise claims advanced in both cases. The nonparticipant in the McCollum program was given secular instruction in a separate room during the times his classmates had religious lessons; the nonparticipant in any Zorach program also received secular instruction, while his classmates repaired to a place outside the school for religious instruction.
The crucial difference, I think, was that the McCollum program offended the Establishment Clause while the Zorach program did not. This was not, in my view, because of the difference in public expenditures involved. True, the McCollum program involved the regular use of school facilities, classrooms, heat and light and time from the regular school day - even though the actual incremental cost may have been negligible. All religious instruction under the Zorach program, by contrast, was carried on entirely off the school premises, and the teacher's part was simply to facilitate the children's release to the churches. The deeper difference was that the McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the public school classroom in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of secular subjects, while the Zorach program did not. The McCollum program, in lending to the support of sectarian instruction all the authority of the governmentally operated public school system, brought government and religion into that proximity which the Establishment Clause forbids. To be sure, a religious teacher presumably commands substantial respect and merits attention in his own right. But the Constitution does not permit that prestige and capacity for influence to be augmented by investiture of all the symbols of authority at the command of the lay teacher for the enhancement of secular instruction.
More recent decisions have further etched the contours of Establishment. In the Sunday Law Cases, we found in state laws compelling a uniform day of rest from worldly labor no violation of the Establishment Clause (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 ). The basic ground of our decision was that, granted the Sunday Laws were first enacted for religious ends, they were continued in force for reasons wholly secular, namely, to provide a universal day of rest and ensure the health and tranquillity of the community. In other words, government may originally have decreed a Sunday day of rest for the impermissible purpose of supporting religion but abandoned that purpose and retained the laws for the permissible purpose of furthering overwhelmingly secular ends.
Such was the evolution of the contours of the Establishment Clause before Engel v. Vitale. There, a year ago, we held that the daily recital of the State-composed Regents' Prayer constituted an establishment of religion because, although the prayer itself revealed no sectarian content or purpose, its nature and meaning were quite clearly religious. New York, in authorizing its recitation, had not maintained that distance between the public and the religious sectors commanded by the Establishment Clause when it placed the "power, prestige and financial support of government" behind the prayer. In Engel, as in McCollum, it did not matter that the amount of time and expense allocated to the daily recitation was small so long as the exercise itself was manifestly religious. Nor did it matter that few children had complained of the practice, for the measure of the seriousness of a breach of the Establishment Clause has never been thought to be the number of people who complain of it.
We also held two Terms ago in Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, that a State may not constitutionally require an applicant for the office of Notary Public to swear or affirm that he believes in God. The problem of that case was strikingly similar to the issue presented 18 years before in the flag salute case, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, supra. In neither case was there any claim of establishment of religion, but only of infringement of the individual's religious liberty - in the one case, that of the nonbeliever who could not attest to a belief in God; in the other, that of the child whose creed forbade him to salute the flag. But Torcaso added a new element not present in Barnette. The Maryland test oath involved an attempt to employ essentially religious (albeit nonsectarian) means to achieve a secular goal to which the means bore no reasonable relationship. No one doubted the State's interest in the integrity of its Notaries Public, but that interest did not warrant the screening of applicants by means of a religious test. The Sunday Law Cases were different in that respect. Even if Sunday Laws retain certain religious vestiges, they are enforced today for essentially secular objectives which cannot be effectively achieved in modern society except by designating Sunday as the universal day of rest. The Court's opinions cited very substantial problems in selecting or enforcing an alternative day of rest. But the teaching of both Torcaso and the Sunday Law Cases is that government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice.
- Justice Brennan, Abington School District v. Schempp
If you see a christian sinning in a way that does not end in death, you should ask God to forgive him and God will give him life, unless he has sinned that one fatal sin. But there is that one sin which ends in death and if he has done that, there is no use in praying for him.
This simply means you cant pray for a person who has died from the fatal sin of suicide.
2 JOHN 1:10
If anyone comes to teach you, and he doesn't believe what Christ taught, Don't even invite him into your home. Don't encourage him in any way. If you do You will be a partner with him in his wickedness.
This means not to take part in a wicked persons beliefs that are not compatible with Christ. Do not allow them to teach you their beliefs.
EPHESIANS 5:6-7
Don't be fooled by those who try to excuse these sins, for the terrible wrath of God is upon all those who do them. Don't even associate with such people.
This one is easy. Dont partake and excuse the evil sins that goes against God's word. Jesus spoke to many that shunned Gods word by practicing evil without heeding God's warnings. Jesus taught but certainly didnt partake.
EPHESIANS 5:11
Take no part in worthless pleasures of evil and darkness, but instead rebuke and expose them . . .(5:13) But when you expose them, the light shines upon their sins and shows it up, and when they see how wrong they really are, some of them may even becom children of light!
Same as above. More of an extension of the previous scripture you included and is EXACTLY what I was saying in exposing them, rebuking them and teach them of God's love and compassion for them. You witness to them in an attempt to expose their sins. The love you show for your fellow man will not show you as a great ambassador to Christianity, but it may just sway a Godless soul into seeking Christ.
Christians should not be a bunch of powder puff hippies, no, but we should be good, loving people who are giving, kind, knowledgable and unafraid for being what we are.
It's a discretionary act on his part. He's not required to decorate the rotunda at all, but once he does, it cannot be exclusive to his particular viewpoint in matters of religion. If he had chosen to decorate the rotunda in a secular manner, he could have done so in whatever manner he sees fit without ever implicating the establishment clause, which has been the source of his troubles from the beginning - nothing in the First Amendment prevents Judge Moore from using his office to stake out a position on secular issues, after all. Indeed, his job requires him to do exactly that. But once religion becomes the subject, the establishment clause comes into play, and Judge Moore has less of a free hand than he might otherwise wish for, by virtue of the fact that he's an agent of the state.
It's not an addiction until you're printing threads out on paper so that you can read them while you're away from the computer ;)
Until next time...
that may be, but the alabama state constitution goes further than the establishment clause does.
btw, whether such actions are deemed constitutional or not, using one's government office to promote one's own particular religious faith as superior to all others is distasteful to the point of being vulgar. civil servants are suppose to serve the public, not service their own personal agendas.
perhaps you can resolve this paradox by considering the fact that their constitutionality was never tested in those 170 years.
Perhaps but since several of the states had established religions during and after debate on and ratification of the Constitution, that theory won't float.
It took 170 years for activist liberal judges to warp and distort the Constitution sufficiently to ensure the Christian-despising result they wanted.
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