Alabama SC justices cave, order Ten Commandments removed

AP on Fox News ^ | 8-21-03 | AP on Fox News website

[rwfromkansas]

MONTGOMERY, Ala.

[jwalsh07]

BTW, with all this high falutin 'high wall' stuff, I have yet to see a single post that indicates anyone citing someone actually HARMED by this display. Not liking it cause you cant abide them 'bible thumpers' doesnt count!

That's because the other side is arguing about collective affronts to feelings instead of the abridgement of an individuals right to worship.

For argument's sake, let them theoretically impeach Judge Moore. Then we can get to the heart of the matter.

Is the display of the Ten Commandments constitutionally protected or not.

What do you think General?

[inquest]

You talk of my "interpretation" of establishment in Islamic countries, but you post nothing to refute or even question it.

Of course I did. Your case regarding their "establishment" was that they passed laws inspired by religious beliefs. I countered that the BOR was inspired by a religious belief, and to underscore it asked you why it is, if lack of belief in a Creator is a religious belief, that belief in a Creator isn't a religious belief? You - who's so quick to get on my case if I don't answer your questions pronto - didn't bother to answer that question.

So, tell me, what level of organized religion do I need to be involved with before my "religious beliefs" rise to the level of "religion."

That question is a total non sequitur upon itself. Religious beliefs are not religion, so they're not going to "rise to the level" of religion. Religion, as I've said a number of times, is a mode of worship, and by logical extension whatever apparatus is built around it.

[lugsoul]

Guess what? The Establishment Clause doesn't say anything about anyone being harmed - the state can't adopt a religion even if every single citizen supports it.

Your disregard for the Constitution becomes more apparent with every post.

[lugsoul]

"Religion, as I've said a number of times, is a mode of worship, and by logical extension whatever apparatus is built around it."

And that definition is yours, not the Founders'. You may need an "apparatus" to worship. Not everyone does.

[WOSG]

The problem is this: The court that ruled on Everson in 1947 or so WOULD MOST CERTAINLY HAVE CONSIDERED JUDGE MOORE'S ACTIONS FULLY LEGAL AND PROPER.


SO the fact that Judge Moore's actions abide by the rules of Justice Black's opinion is no surprise. OYu can 'check' the list all you want - the problem istn *there*.

The real problem is that Judge Moore is running into the buzzsaw of the extremist Brennanite view of the establishment clause that forbids practically any expression of religious sentiment in any official capacity. this is oppressive, anti-freedom and wholly outside the scope of the intended text of the establishment clause. Look at the "Lemon" test, and you will see the problem.

The same nutty extremism that forbids "under God" in the pedge for example, leads us to this case.

So you may do well not to bother flogging the horse of Everson, but looking at the extremism inherent in the Lemon test and more recent bad rulings from the ACLU-inspired extremists.

[inquest]

You may need an "apparatus" to worship. Not everyone does.

I didn't say it had to have an apparatus. I was only saying that whatever apparatus that does exist is included in the definition of the word.

[WOSG]

Funny how you dont answer the question.

Burkha laws - legal or not?

[lugsoul]

Because your premise is flawed - you flip back and forth between claiming that a set of beliefs is not a "religion" to claiming that a lack of beliefs is a "religion." Your question makes no sense. No - the Bill of Rights is not "religious law" no matter how much you want to turn it into religious law. The Sharia is "religious law" - it comes straight from the Koran and the Hadiths. You may not be able to tell the difference, but 99% of the people on the planet can.

[lugsoul]

No. But the reason it is illegal is dependent upon the reason it is imposed. If it is done in the context of adopting Sharia, the 1st Amendment would be one reason it is not allowed. If not, you've always got the 14th.

[general_re]

In short, neither of these two rulings shed any light whatsoever on how Moore's action abridged anyone's privileges or immunities, deprived anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied anybody the equal protection of the laws.

Well, of course not - Roy Moore wasn't the issue in those cases ;)

For that, you need to read the trial court and appellate decisions, particularly their explanation of how he ran afoul of the Lemon test...

[jwalsh07]

Scalia has said numerous times that the Lemon Test has become a dart board for legal knives. It doesn't obtain as precedent or common sense.

[lugsoul]

"I didn't say it had to have an apparatus. I was only saying that whatever apparatus that does exist is included in the definition of the word."

Now you are crawfishing. You DID say that a religion had to be organized to be "established." Make up your mind.

[WOSG]

It's a question, not a legal theory. Quit evading the questions:

Is anyone harmed by this?
Who?

The establishment clause protects people's freedom. Who's freedom is violated here?


I am the one defendin the Consitution here, from sophists and extremists who want to destroy our freedom of expression.

[general_re]

Post Moore's court briefs and we'll see about it.

Too long. Check the court decision for their assessment of his "federal courts have no authority over me" defense.

[jwalsh07]

Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District 508 US 384 (1993)


JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the judgment.

I join the Court's conclusion that the District's refusal to allow use of school facilities for petitioners' film viewing, while generally opening the schools for community activities, violates petitioners' First Amendment free speech rights (as does N.Y.Educ.Law 414 (McKinney 1988 and Supp. 1993), to the extent it compelled the District's denial, see ante, at 386-387). I also agree with the Court that allowing Lamb's Chapel to use school facilities poses "no realistic danger" of a violation of the Establishment Clause, ante, at 395, but I [508 U.S. 385, 398] cannot accept most of its reasoning in this regard. The Court explains that the showing of petitioners' film on school property after school hours would not cause the community to "think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed," and further notes that access to school property would not violate the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Ante, at 395.

As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 -587 (1992), conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test," but also declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. See, e.g., Weisman, supra, at 644 (SCALIA, J., joined by, inter alios, THOMAS, J., dissenting); Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655 -657 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 -349 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 -113 (1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); id., at 90-91 (WHITE, J., dissenting); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (WHITE, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 , [508 U.S. 385, 399] 134-135 (1977) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment); Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (noting instances in which Court has not applied Lemon test). When we wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it, see, e.g., Aguilar v. Fenton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down state remedial education program administered in part in parochial schools); when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely, see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislative chaplains). Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than helpful signposts," Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973). Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.

For my part, I agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced. See, e.g., Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools - An Update, 75 Calif.L.Rev. 5 (1987); Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.Cal.L.Rev. 495 (1986); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S.Ct. Rev. 1; Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 Cath. U.L.Rev. 1 (1984); R. Cord, Separation of Church and State (1982); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 673 (1980). I will decline to apply Lemon - whether it validates [508 U.S. 385, 400] or invalidates the government action in question - and therefore cannot Join the opinion of the Court today.

I cannot join for yet another reason: the Court's statement that the proposed use of the school's facilities is constitutional because (among other things) it would not signal endorsement of religion in general. Ante, at 10. What a strange notion, that a Constitution which itself gives "religion in general" preferential treatment (I refer to the Free Exercise Clause) forbids endorsement of religion in general. The attorney general of New York not only agrees with that strange notion, he has an explanation for it: "Religious advocacy," he writes, "serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents, and yields a benefit only to those who already believe." Brief for Respondent Attorney General 24. That was not the view of those who adopted our Constitution, who believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good. It suffices to point out that, during the summer of 1789, when it was in the process of drafting the First Amendment, Congress enacted the Northwest Territory Ordinance of that the Confederation Congress had adopted, in 1787 - Article III of which provides, "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Unsurprisingly, then, indifference to "religion in general" is not what our cases, both old and recent, demand. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 -314 (1952) ("When the state [508 U.S. 385, 401] encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemption for church property); Lynch, 465 U.S., at 673 (the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions. . . . Anything less would require the `callous indifference' we have said was never intended" (citations omitted)); id., at 683 ("Our precedents plainly contemplate th that, on occasion, some advancement of religion will result from governmental action"); Marsh, supra; Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus christ of Latterday Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (exemption for religious organizations from certain provisions of Civil Rights Act).

For the reasons given by the Court, I agree that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment forbids what respondents have done here. As for the asserted Establishment Clause justification, I would hold, simply and clearly, that giving Lamb's Chapel nondiscriminatory access to school facilities cannot violate that provision because it does not signify state or local embrace of a particular religious sect.

[WOSG]

Hey, could you post the quote or cite for this ...

I havent thought to look at his writings on this.

I am sure he's as annoyed with the sour effects of Lemon as I am. :-)

[lugsoul]

Every Alabama citizen and litigant who does not believe that the Judeo-Christian God is sovereign over them and their system of civil law, when the state officially declares otherwise.

[general_re]

The same displays and prayers that were Constitutionsl for the first 170 years of the union are now Unconstitutional.

Not necessarily. The First Amendment merely recognizes more than simply the various sects and denominations of the Christian community.

[jwalsh07]

Your wish, my command. Look up two posts. :-}

[inquest]

Because your premise is flawed - you flip back and forth between claiming that a set of beliefs is not a "religion" to claiming that a lack of beliefs is a "religion."

No, I didn't say that lack of belief was a religion. Read my post again.

You're either hyperventilating or you're deliberately trying to twist my words around. You started off reasonable, but you're getting shriller by the post. I'd like to continue, but not under these conditions.