Posted on 04/28/2003 3:23:07 AM PDT by kattracks
Commander: U.S. Underestimated in Iraq
By CHRIS TOMLINSON .c The Associated Press
BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - Before the capital fell, armchair generals painted gloomy scenarios of perilous street fighting and plenty of American dead in Baghdad. America could fight from the air, they said, but lacked the stomach for a fight on the ground.
Wrong, insists the man who commanded the assault on Baghdad. Col. David Perkins, commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division, says the war showed that Americans can fight in any environment.
``We did desert, we did swampland, we did canals, we did rural areas and we did urban areas - each of them have their challenges ... and in each of them the American soldier, along with their equipment, was able to adapt, overcome those challenges and be victorious,'' said Perkins, of Keene, N.H.
Perkins' brigade of about 4,000 soldiers was ordered to take Baghdad, first with an April 6 raid and then capturing key locations in the city center the following day.
``There was a misperception out there that the U.S. military can only fight from 20,000 feet with laser-guided bombs,'' said Perkins. ``This war shows that the U.S. military - the Army and the Marines - can fight up close, can take the fight to the enemy.''
For months, Iraqi leaders warned that U.S. troops would be massacred in house-to-house fighting on Baghdad's streets, and independent military analysts predicted weeks of urban combat. In the end, organized resistance by Saddam Hussein's forces in the capital melted within five days.
The 2nd Brigade lost eight soldiers during the entire war, five in a missile attack on their tactical operations center south of Baghdad. Perkins' driver, Cpl. Henry L. Brown, 22, of Natchez, Miss., was among those killed.
``When you put a name to a KIA (killed in action), it becomes very personal,'' Perkins said.
Perkins, 44, had high praise for his soldiers, many of whom weren't born when he graduated from West Point in 1980. ``These kids will do what is asked of them and do it in an exemplary manner,'' he said.
The Iraq war was Perkins' first combat experience. Sitting in his temporary office in Saddam's New Presidential Palace, Perkins said Army training prepared him and his men well, but nothing could simulate ``the ultimate test.''
``I saw it in the eyes of my commanders the first time we got in a big fight,'' Perkins said. ``You didn't get this false bravado, but very serious contemplation.''
Perkins was the lead architect of the fastest, deepest attack by an invading army in history - more than 228 miles in less than 48 hours. The goal was to put tanks and mechanized infantry within a day's march of Baghdad quickly, to persuade Saddam's regime to capitulate.
Looking back, Perkins said, it was wrong to think Saddam's loyalists would have given up power without a fight.
``I think there was a desire ... that for the sake of Iraqi lives and Americans that the whole thing would collapse and we'd just drive into the city,'' Perkins said.
But, he said, ``Anybody who probably knew very much about the way he ran things and maintained power should have known he wasn't going to walk away from this.''
Perkins will complete his two-year stint as the 2nd Brigade commander in June, by which time he hopes to have the unit back at Fort Stewart, Ga. His next assignment will be at the Pentagon, and he hopes to be able to spend more time with his wife and two teenagers.
In the meantime, he is going to have plenty of time to write reports about the Iraq campaign. He's already certain about what worked well.
``It would be a very big miscalculation for any potential foe in the world to think there is some environment the U.S. Army can't fight in,'' Perkins said. ``We can fight anywhere.''
04/28/03 01:42 EDT
And how...
I found this strategy risky, with such lengthy and vulnerable supply lines, but it certainly turned out to be an excellent move.
Actually this deep attack wasn't as risky as it appeared. The media played up the long logistical supply lines and how weak it was, but in reality with the coalition owning the sky it was never a problem. With the number of medium and heavy lift helicopters and the C-130s available, that distance was inconsequential.
"The only thing we don't do anymore is quagmire", he added.
Was it because we thoroughly destroyed the Republican guard?
Was it because the initial thrust through the city with a column of tanks was so devastatingly destructive and intimidating?
Was it because our propaganda was so convincing?
Stratfor, in its January analysis, was very much afraid of the problems we would encounter in trying to capture a large capital city. What we did has no precedent which I can think of - other than capititulations similar to what the French did in the '40s and what many others did when faced with the Mongols in the 12 and 1300s.
I disagree. The C-130s and helos were vulnerable to air defenses, especially Stingers, which were more prevalent as one approached Baghdad. The supply lines were long and vulnerable (especially to guerrilla tactics), and consisted mostly of ground units until we secured Baghdad Int'l Airport.
I'm certainly no military expert but a good friend is a retired Army general -- he retired in 1996. He said this was "the most amazing military campaign in history . . . besting Patton's U-turn and scramble during the Battle of the Bulge by a longshot." He was so excited, giddy like a little kid, LOL, that I'll never forget his quote.
He taught tactics and history at the Academy during his career so I'll take his word for it. But he did add a little caveat addressing your concerns. He said that lengthy supply lines can only be planned and maintained when the ability of your enemy "to see" you is severely limited.
I asked him what he meant. He said we're so far ahead of other countries technologically that there was only three or four countries with satellite, aircraft, or human intelligence that could report "near-time" experiences to battlefield commanders quickly enough to do them any good. And then they would have to have the ability to do something about it . . . which, considering our air superiority over everyone makes this part damn difficult so they would have to provide "manpower disruptions" or artillery to slow us down.
He figures there's only three countries who could bother our long supply lines . . . luckily two of them wear white hats. I was surprised by his choices . . . UK, Australia, and China. Russia's military, according to him, is on a par with the Germans now, and their hardware is deteriorating -- which makes them even more dangerous because they'd have to go nuclear to survive. France? He said Australia would annihilate the French army in six months, UK in three, us in two weeks. He wasn't joking, he wasn't bent out of shape with them . . . He said "The French have lost the righteousness required to succeed in war." They value nothing worth fighting and dying for.
He said Australia scores ALMOST as well as we do when we have joint maneuvers and that they've made a concerted effort to go hi-tech. And, according to him, the UK warriors are on a par with ours but their strategists only "lack imagination" and they could be as good as ours -- the downside for the UK is they can't put the dough behind their military like we do. He said a large portion of our joint exercises are paid by American taxpayers. He calls this "the best investment the military has ever made" because the Special Forces between our countries are "seamless" warriors. Either country can be reinforced by Special Forces from the other country and there is no learning curves.
I'm sorry this is so long but Dan's a fascinating man and I thought his insights would help you and others understand what the REAL Professional Soldiers think. By the way, he agrees with Rummy's Plan of "re-tooling the military" to a faster, more mobile force and only the "pencil-dick Army bureaucrats who've never charged a machine gun nest" would think otherwise. His words, LOL, not mine.
He retired in '96 because Pee Wee Clinton was reelected.
Stingers can be defeated with flares and suppression from attack helicopters and other ground attack close air support aircraft. Resupply under fire is what the helicopter pilots train for, it comes with the territory. Air resupply, while not as efficient and more dangerous than ground resupply is perfectly feasible in this instance.
Not really that vulnerable. And despite what you hear in the media, whatever resistance there was was planned for, it just took a slightly different shape. And when you execute a supply line, you plan for X-% of loss - or "shrinkage." It's just the cost of doing bidness. Our shrinkage turned out to be far lower than that allowed for in the Plan.
Franks figgered the long supply lines would not be a problem if our men and women in the field and in the air simply did their jobs. Our men and women in the field and in the air DID do their jobs - and Franks was right. When you construct a Plan, you work within the known capabilities of your assets. In Franks' case, he knew very well what his forces were capable of, and he knew the quality of leadership in the field. Which is what turned what some might call a "daring" plan into one with plenty of margin to succeed.
And it succeeded easily.
Michael
I completely agree, but he was also speaking generally about conventional enemy forces. We never would have attempted these long supply lines had we not enjoyed air superiority, but our log(istic) runs were vulnerable nonetheless to the Fedayeen Saddam and other guerillas.
Yes, Stingers can be defeated by flares... if the pilots have enough reaction time. Resupplying means coming in low and slow - a perfect target. And Stingers can be suppressed by other aircraft... usually after one or two have taken down targets. Why risk aerial resupply when the ground log runs were able to fill the gap in short order? Had our troops been pinned down and out of ammo, I'd agree the risk would be worth it. But not in the cases I've heard portrayed via the media/talking heads.
Obviously my situational awareness is a bit limited here in Virginia. :-)
Allow me to point out with pride:
COL David Perkins, West Point class of 1980
I don't argue with anything you said. But it doesn't change my point that the supply lines were vulnerable - definitely more vulnerable than had we advanced at a slower clip.
I think it's mostly about the will to fight. The Iraqis would have noticed that it was their guys on foot, and our guys with armored vehicles accurately shooting incredible quantities of large-caliber ammunition, backed by aircraft that could drop huge bombs on a designated manhole cover.
To fight our guys was literally certain death. And for what -- to protect a regime that they feared and hated? I wouldn't mess with that, and neither would any rational person.
Makes perfect sense to me.
You don't risk aerial resupply unless resupply by ground means becomes impossible. My only point was that at no time was there any possibility of our guys running out of bullets or chow as the media would have had us believe. They completely discounted the Army and Marine helicopter resupply capability. That's why the Army CH-47s exist, to haul, water, food, fuel, ammo etc.
How about Columbia? Lets clean up that rats nest once and for all, and erase the lie that we were defeated in battle by the North Vietnamese...
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