I disagree. The C-130s and helos were vulnerable to air defenses, especially Stingers, which were more prevalent as one approached Baghdad. The supply lines were long and vulnerable (especially to guerrilla tactics), and consisted mostly of ground units until we secured Baghdad Int'l Airport.
Stingers can be defeated with flares and suppression from attack helicopters and other ground attack close air support aircraft. Resupply under fire is what the helicopter pilots train for, it comes with the territory. Air resupply, while not as efficient and more dangerous than ground resupply is perfectly feasible in this instance.
Not really that vulnerable. And despite what you hear in the media, whatever resistance there was was planned for, it just took a slightly different shape. And when you execute a supply line, you plan for X-% of loss - or "shrinkage." It's just the cost of doing bidness. Our shrinkage turned out to be far lower than that allowed for in the Plan.
Franks figgered the long supply lines would not be a problem if our men and women in the field and in the air simply did their jobs. Our men and women in the field and in the air DID do their jobs - and Franks was right. When you construct a Plan, you work within the known capabilities of your assets. In Franks' case, he knew very well what his forces were capable of, and he knew the quality of leadership in the field. Which is what turned what some might call a "daring" plan into one with plenty of margin to succeed.
And it succeeded easily.
Michael