To: kattracks
I still haven't seem a good description of how we managed to take Baghdad so quickly and with so little resistance. Why didn't the Iraqis put up a better fight?
Was it because we thoroughly destroyed the Republican guard?
Was it because the initial thrust through the city with a column of tanks was so devastatingly destructive and intimidating?
Was it because our propaganda was so convincing?
Stratfor, in its January analysis, was very much afraid of the problems we would encounter in trying to capture a large capital city. What we did has no precedent which I can think of - other than capititulations similar to what the French did in the '40s and what many others did when faced with the Mongols in the 12 and 1300s.
To: liberallarry
Now a lot of folks are very concerned about a second Korean campaign.
The difference here is that, were we able to stabilize our line, each side would have interior lines of supply. Go back to the first war: each side did that Verdun thing for two years once Ridgeway's 1951 offensive petered out. We could hope for the same thing to happen here for a while until we were able to reinforce and then do an Inchon.
The DPRK soldier, however, has better unit cohesion and is a much better fighter than his Iraqi, Chinese, or even Vietnamese counterpart. His problem is supply and the question of Chinese policy. If Kim Jong Il starts a war without Beijing's permission, China will wash their hands of him, provided we promise to pull our troops out of the peninsula following any war (which we would as the price of Chinese neutrality).
Watch the Chinese. They are not happy about Kim's surprise. It makes for an unneccessarly complication to their diplomacy, strengthens the hand of the Japanese rearmament lobby, and makes China look inneffective when faced by the tantrums of "younger brother".
Be Seeing You,
Chris
13 posted on
04/28/2003 7:48:34 AM PDT by
section9
(My new Apple means that Major Kusanagi gets a vacation, until I figure out how to load her image!)
To: liberallarry
Stratfor, in its January analysis, was very much afraid of the problems we would encounter in trying to capture a large capital city. What we did has no precedent which I can think of - other than capititulations similar to what the French did in the '40s and what many others did when faced with the Mongols in the 12 and 1300s. I think it's mostly about the will to fight. The Iraqis would have noticed that it was their guys on foot, and our guys with armored vehicles accurately shooting incredible quantities of large-caliber ammunition, backed by aircraft that could drop huge bombs on a designated manhole cover.
To fight our guys was literally certain death. And for what -- to protect a regime that they feared and hated? I wouldn't mess with that, and neither would any rational person.
Makes perfect sense to me.
17 posted on
04/28/2003 7:54:57 AM PDT by
r9etb
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