New Tactics, Hard Choices

NY Times ^ | 3/28/2003

[saquin]

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March 28, 2003

New Tactics, Hard Choices

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

AMP DOHA, Kuwait, March 27 ? The United States military now faces a series of difficult calculations in its efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his government.

One way to accomplish that goal is to try to advance quickly to the outskirts of Baghdad, destroy the Republican Guard troops defending the approaches to the capital and then win the fight inside the city.

Once Mr. Hussein is deposed, the fedayeen and other paramilitary forces that have been attacking allied troops as they head north would find themselves cut off from the main source of their power.

In this view, the paramilitary forces would then be defeated by American and British troops or destroyed by Shiite Muslims eager to settle scores after decades of repression. A new order would be established in Iraq from the inside out.

But there is another possible approach, one that commanders indicated earlier this week they might favor. That is to defer the rush to Baghdad and to focus instead on ridding Iraqi cities in the south of fedayeen. That would make it easier for the United States to run supply lines north and could encourage the Shiites in the south to throw off the yoke.

In addition, the United States might take advantage of the delay in attacking Baghdad by bringing in additional forces from the United States, like the Fourth Infantry Division, and by readying them for combat to build up the offensive punch.

American and British forces could also start providing food, medical aid and other assistance to Basra and other southern cities, providing an incentive for Baghdad residents to cooperate with American forces. A new Iraq would be created from the outside in.

As military planners ponder the war's most crucial phase, it is likely that a hybrid of these two approaches will emerge, some kind of strategic third way that would allow the allies to retain their strategic focus on Baghdad.

[saquin]

While I admittedly know nothing about military tactics, the idea of delaying the attack on Baghdad for a couple of weeks is starting to make sense to me. Why not take that time to gain control of the rest of the country by continuing to pick off the isolated patches of militants, isolate Saddam in Baghdad while continuing to try to gain intelligence on his whereabouts so we can take him out, while winning hearts and minds by distributing humanitarian aid through the rest of the country possibly inciting an uprising against the regime. This also might entice Saddam to grow impatient and continue to send columns of Republican Guards out of Baghdad to confront our troops in the open, where we can destroy them.

I don't see much of a downside to waiting a couple of weeks, as long as we use that time to consolidate our control of the rest of the country outside Baghdad. Any thoughts?

[Arkinsaw]

I don't see much of a downside to waiting a couple of weeks

Well, there are some downsides to it. But not as much as sending a single tired infantry division, a tired Marine division, and the 101st to take on all those Republican Guards and then go into city fighting at this point.

The 4th Infantry Division will be a welcome sight to these guys I am sure.

[Hoosier-Daddy]

Attack Baghdad in the heat w/ chem suits?

[Arkinsaw]

Attack Baghdad in the heat w/ chem suits?

Well, its better than doing it and not being sure you can pull it off.

[Reagan Man]

>>> ... Mr. Hussein ...

Give me a break.

He's the butcher of Baghdad!

[PRND21]

...while winning hearts and minds

Not interested.

[Hugin]

Most of the retired military media consultants seem to agree with you. Surround Baghdad, keep pounding C&C, consolidate supply lines, and wait for the 4th Div, and possibly other units to arrive. I heard Linda Vester on Fox say that intelligence sources are telling her of "chatter" from Republican Guards units saying asking for more ammo, food and instructions. If they are cut off from HQ, running out of supplies and starving, waiting will make them weaker, while our guys recoup and reinforce. Meanwhile we can keep pounding them with everything from B52s to A10s and Apaches.

One thing I haven't heard mentioned much is Tikrit, Saddam's home town and stronghold of the Baath party. I can't believe the Pentagon planners have left it out of their calculations. Maybe that's part of what the 101st Airborne is up to?

[Diddle E. Squat]

I wonder if this is going much closer to plan than the buzz would indicate. Rush north(with pretense of a quick strike on Baghdad), but short of the red line, draws the RG away from Baghdad and to dig in, then stop in position to cutoff their potential retreat to Baghdad. Now hold them, while reinforcements arrive, and test some tactics, probe, soften, etc. Mop up in the south, secure the southern cities, and get pictures of aid for psyops for Baghdad civilians. Take the time and identify and pick off Syrian resupply attempts, build the north, and let Spec Ops continue Baghdad prep.

Maybe all the talk of taking Baghdad quickly was mainly just for show, unless they got lucky with the massive surrender campaign(which didn't happen).

[gonzo]

"...I don't see much of a downside to waiting a couple of weeks..."

No downside at all. Now that the weather is clearing, the zoomies can clean-up what's left of the Iraqi armour, and our guys get a hot meal and some rest.

The airfields are secured, and massive power is on the way as we speak.

It ain't gonna be a cakewalk, but it's gonna be the mother-of-all-asskickings..............FRegards

[PRND21]

Good post, but what are the zoomies?

[gonzo]

"...Good post, but what are the zoomies?..."

Slang for fast-movers, generally USAF, Navy, or Marine, killer ground-support jet aircraft.

A-10's, F-14's, 15's, 16's, and 18's. Anything with Air-to-Ground missiles, or a big-goddam-gun.

My personal favorite is the A-10 Warthog with that 30mm Gatling cannon! It definitely gives a tank driver a very bad day.............FRegards

[wretchard]

The "rush to Baghdad" was deliberately planned to accomplish two things. First, the 3rd ID's presence near Baghdad effectively pins down 5 to 6 IRG divisions. Second, it screens the deployment of the 101st, like a bullfighter's cape conceals the sword.

I should add a third: it fixates the feckless press. The really deadly blows to the Baath regime have gone unremarked. They are the seizure of the southern and northern oil zones, the deepwater port and the capture of H2, H3 and Talil airfields. These are logistical coups of the first order. The other deadly blow is the march across the Land Between the Rivers by the Marines from Nasiriyah to Al Kut. This west to east march will cut Iraq in two.

Much is being made of the "failure" to bring up the 4th ID before commencing hostilities. This was deliberate, or at least necessary. Doubling the number of mech infantry divisions would double the logistical strain. Right now, operations are logisitcally constrained, not limited by combat power. In truth, Franks has not utilized major portions of his command: the 101st and one brigade of the 82nd. They are waiting on logistics more than another mech infantry division. The rapid advance to Baghdad could not have been made with the two mechanized divisions. The logistical tail would not have supported it.

According to field manuals from the mid 1990s, the bare logistical requirements for Southwest Asia are 150 pounds per man per day. Right now, the total lift required is 4,500 tons per day, on a 60,000 man ground force baseline. To put that in perspective, that is the weight of a British destroyer trucked up every day. Adding the 4th ID would add nearly 2,000 tons per day to that requirement.

Clearly, laying a pipeline, developing airfields, opening the port are tasks which must precede the effective employment of 4th ID. There's this too: as the US advances into Iraq, it will have to take on the logistical burden of distributing relief.

There's an old adage that amateurs talk tactics while the pros talk logistics. That's partly true in this case.