Posted on 03/25/2003 1:17:01 PM PST by vannrox
Edited on 07/12/2004 4:01:59 PM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
A classified document signed by President Bush specifically allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical attacks. Apparently changing a decades-old U.S. policy of deliberate ambiguity, it was learned by The Washington Times.
The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including potentially nuclear weapons to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies, the document, National Security Presidential Directive 17, set out on Sept. 14 last year.
(Excerpt) Read more at washtimes.com ...
That's what this war is all about. Low tech bugs and germs have completely neutered our nuclear arsenal, as everyone knows that we won't use them.
If someone fired off a nuke, they would immediately be toast, the threat would end, and a million or so would be dead in an uninhabitable small area of the earth. Dire, but controllable.
If a madman reintroduced smallpox to the world, billions could die, and even if the madman was nuked, the smallpox would still be spreading. Human interaction would become very risky, and the world economy would grind to a halt, while the smallpox continued to spread. Dire, and uncontrollable.
The madman must be stopped!
That's the thing. They don't care...in fact our enemies would love to use that as an excuse to attack us. I am all for protecting our troops from attack but a nuclear response could escalate this into a world wide conflict....a world wide nuclear conflict. These are hypothetical roads I would rather the US not travel.
Isn't that some kind of a breach of security? What does it mean to be "classified" these days?
-PJ
Won't happen until after one of them actually use a nuke. Once the dam is burst, it's Katie bar the door.
Someone please explain this clearly.
Battlefield nukes with a few kilotons yield detonated over the units firing the chemical munitions will be very effective. As long as they are not ground bursts fallout will be minmal. The downside is that our own forces will have to be warned of the time and location so no one is flash-blinded; that would clue in the embedded reporters. Some of them are leftists who would get word out and warn the enemy.
Nuclear Weapon Database:
United States Arsenal
Note: All specifications are from recent Jane's Information Group publications (Strategic Weapon Systems, Fighting Ships, Naval Weapon Systems, and All the World's Aircraft), except "Throw-weight", and "Yield" which are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance 1995-6, "Locations," and "Number Deployed" are from Arkin and Norris' "Nuclear Notebook" in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and sources mentioned in the text. Disagreements are footnoted (with hypertext links), as are selected facts in the text.
The entries are listed as follows:
The Minuteman III is a direct successor of the original Minuteman ICBMs first deployed in 1962. This latest version, deployed in the early 1980s, will be the only American ICBM under the Nuclear Posture Review, the current Department of Defense plan for the U.S. nuclear arsenal under START II. All 500 missiles will be deployed in existing silos (hardened to withstand an estimated 2,000 pounds per square inch blast overpressure, little protection against today's more accurate missiles)2 in the interior of the country. Fifty of these missiles will be treaty-countable, but in a non-operational reserve status. The 500 Minuteman IIIs are based at Malmstrom, Minot, and F E Warren Air Force Bases -- those currently at Grand Forks AFB will be transferred out by April 1998.3
START II mandates that all Minuteman IIIs be downloaded from their current three MIRVs to a single reentry vehicle. Their current warheads are being removed and the more advanced W87 warhead from the retired MX's will be substituted.4 The W87s are safer, with features such as insensitive explosives, fire resistant pits, and the enhanced nuclear detonation system (ENDS). Also, the force is undergoing a costly overhaul at a near-term cost of $8.2 Billion as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office,5 and a total lifetime cost of $23 Billion for upgrading and maintenance through 2020, as estimated by the General Accounting Office (there appears to be considerable dispute over the cost estimates).6 These improvements are supposed to bring the Minuteman III up to MX standards of accuracy (CEP of approximately 100 meters).
One of the improvements recently completed is the Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting system, or REACT. It replaces the 1960s-era tape-based targeting system (the Command Data Buffer, CDB), where tapes had to be manually inserted into each silo. Whereas the old system took 20 hours to manually retarget the entire Minuteman force, today's computerized version can do so in half the time, with essentially instant retargeting on demand for single missiles. An Air Force officer light-heartedly described the enhanced capabilities as "nuclear war in Windows." Whether or not this capability, which the U.S. did not require given similar SLBM retargeting improvements, was worth the $632 million price tag is another matter.7
Even though U.S. ballistic missile submarines will be capable of maintaining day-to-day deterrence with instant retargeting, robust communications, and excellent accuracy, the Minuteman III is being retained largely because of entrenched interests in maintaining the Cold War construct of the U.S. nuclear triad. In the post-Cold War world, the redundancy of the triad is no longer necessary -- two legs, or even just the submarines, are sufficient.
Peacekeeper ICBM (LGM-118, MX)
The Peacekeeper carries 10 warheads (and is capable of carrying 12) with a very high accuracy; the lowest CEP of any deployed ballistic missile. The MX was largely a mirror image of the SS-18, also a heavy, accurate ICBM with 10 warheads, that far surpassed the Soviets in accuracy. In fact, the MX approaches the limit of intercontinental-range ballistic missile accuracy without some sort of terminal guidance, or Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MARV), which has been studied but not deployed. However with a sizable nuclear warhead, there would be no operational significance or gain from terminal guidance -- 90 meters is more than enough destroy any surface target by placing it in the crater of the blast.
The Peacekeeper is the first U.S. ICBM to use "cold launch" technique. The missile is ejected from the silo by a cold gas generator which lofts the missile tens of meters into the air before the main engines ignite. This process, which the Soviets used extensively, reduces damage to the silo, allowing for swift refurbishment, and if, possible reloading.11
However, according to the General Accounting Office, there is some uncertainty about the MX's purported great accuracy; "accuracy estimates for the Peacekeeper -- the lead ICBM system -- were based on a very limited number of test shots, some using operationally unrepresentative software or hardware." The Department of Defense also refused to share reliability data with the GAO and scaled back testing, further throwing doubt onto the performance of the missile.12 However, with the system due for elimination under START II, these allegations are not of major concern.
Only 50 of these missiles were actually deployed, all in modified Minuteman silos at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming.13 This small, conventional deployment was in spite of the prolonged debate over basing for the MX that raged in the early 1980s. The many suggestions for a rail mobile system, superhard silos, densely located silos, air-mobile, and even the "shell game" of numerous empty multiple protective shelters were all shelved in favor of this cheaper, conventional deployment.14
As a multiple warhead missile, the MX must be eliminated under START II, but the U.S. will likely avoid destroying its most accurate ballistic missile until the treaty nears entrance into force in 2003. The U.S. will probably use the removed W87 warheads, the safest in the U.S. arsenal, to arm the Minuteman III missiles that will be retained under START II. See entry on the Minuteman III ICBM for further details.
The first Trident submarine, the U.S.S. Ohio, was delivered in 1981, and production will cease in 1997 with the delivery of the final Trident. This ultra-quiet submarine is much longer than the older Poseidon boats and has 24 missile tubes instead of 16. Unlike many of its predecessors, the Ohios do not require overseas basing, given the long range of their missiles, and hence, the larger patrol area. The Ohios that operate in the Pacific are based at Bangor, Washington, while those in the Atlantic are based at King's Bay, Georgia.
The first eight boats are fitted for the Trident I C-4 missile and the next ten in class are fitted to fire the larger Trident II D-5 SLBM. Under the Nuclear Posture Review, the oldest four Tridents will be retired, and the next four will be retrofitted to enable them to carry the D-5. Thus the American SSBN (nuclear ballistic missile submarine) fleet will consist of 14 Ohio-class boats all equipped with the D-5 missile. To put this into perspective, in 1988 the Department of Defense called for a maximum SSBN force goal of 40 boats.15
The Navy justifies continued production of the newer D-5 by claiming it would be more expensive to maintain two types of SLBMs (though until a few years ago the U.S. maintained three types of SLBMs.). A more probable reason is the desire to keep D-5 production lines in California open, in addition to the declared reason of preserving the industrial base to produce more SLBMs if necessary.16 The U.S. could save over $4 Billion in FY 1997-2001 if it canceled the D-5 backfit program for the four submarines and retained the older C-4 missiles in the fleet.17 Such a costly modernization program, when the current C-4 missiles work perfectly fine, appears ill-advised and wasteful.
The Ohio class submarines have maintained a 2/3 at-sea rate by having two crews (designated Blue and Gold), which alternate on 70 day patrols, interrupted only by a 25 day refit period, with an overhaul every 9 years. There has recently been serious talk of cutting operations tempo in half by going to one crew for each boat. According to the CBO, going to one crew and a 1/3 at-sea rate would save $300 million a year, and still provide 4-5 submarines at sea at any one time, with 96-120 missiles and 480-600 warheads deployed. This should be more than sufficient to maintain day-to-day deterrence in the post-Cold War world.
The Ohio-class submarines are equipped with Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) receivers that allow them to remain in essentially constant contact with the shore. This contradicts the Cold War strategic truism that submarines are difficult to communicate with. In fact, SSBN communications are essentially equivalent in speed and reliability with that of ICBM silos.18
The Ohios will remain the backbone of the American deterrent force under START II, with half the country's deployed strategic warheads. The key advantage of these weapons is that they are essentially invulnerable, and, according to the General Accounting Office, there are no technologies in sight that will threaten them. Indeed, the Ohio class boats are even more difficult to detect than previously thought.19
These secure advantages of the sea leg have led many to conclude that the U.S. should eliminate the vulnerable, redundant, and expensive ICBM leg of the triad.
Introduced in 1979, the C-4 carries 8 W76 warheads each with a 100 kiloton yield, long range, and moderate accuracy, though little hard-target destruction capability. It has a longer range than its predecessor, the Poseidon, allowing for greater SSBN patrol areas, U.S. basing, and, it was thought, greater survivability. The gas ejection launch technique employed is similar to that of the Peacekeeper missile, and can be launched either just below the surface, or while surfaced.
The Trident I was carried on the Lafayette class SSBNs, but all have now been retired. The C-4 is also installed in the first eight Ohio class missile subs. According to the Nuclear Posture Review, the first four of these boats are slated for removal from the nuclear role (either through retirement or removal of missile tubes and reorientation to other missions). The other four are scheduled to be backfit to carry the more advanced Trident II D-5 SLBM.
Approximately 3,000 W76 warheads were manufactured, over twice as many as are needed to implement START II. These spare warheads will be retained as part of the U.S. "hedge" stockpile. If there were a Russian "breakout" from START II, they could be rapidly uploaded onto the existing missiles.20 For more information see the Ohio-class Trident SSBN and Trident II D-5 SLBM entries.
This highly accurate missile was first deployed in 1989, and is slated to arm the entire U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet. The D-5 is the first SLBM to have a credible hard target kill capability, contradicting the traditional notion that the sea leg's weapons are inaccurate.
In the latter days of the Cold War as the missile was under development, there was considerable opposition to the D-5 for this very reason, as its accuracy makes it a destabilizing weapon. In Cold War terms, during a crisis, an enemy might fear that a counterforce strike from these highly accurate weapons might cripple their forces, and the enemy might be tempted to strike first. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency even described it saying, "The Trident II could ... be perceived as a first strike weapon."21
Production of the D-5 continues today, given the decision to backfit the remaining four Ohio subs with this missile. The D-5 was originally to be equipped solely with the high yield W88 warhead, but production was halted in 1990 because of the closure of the Rocky Flats, Colorado facility that produced the plutonium triggers. Lower yield W76 warheads are mixed in with the approximately 400 high yield W88s that were produced.22 While each missile must be loaded solely with either the W88 or W76 warhead, U.S. submarines can carry a mixture of missile of each warhead type.
An SLBM Strategic Retargeting System (SRS) was approved in 1995. With this system, D-5s will be able to rapidly retarget to any spot in the world.23 It is the naval analogue to the Minuteman III's REACT targeting upgrade.
This icon of the Cold War remains in service today, and will for some time to come. The B-52H's were delivered in the early 1960's, and have been heavily modified since then. The H model is the most recent of the B-52 series, and been modified to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), completing its transition from the penetration to the standoff role. Twelve ALCMs or ACMs (advanced cruise missiles) can be carried externally, while 8 can be carried internally on the common strategic rotary launcher (CSRL).
Under the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review, the nuclear B-52H force is slated to be reduced from 94 to 66, carrying "approximately 950 cruise missiles." To maintain this level and remain compliant with START II, some of the B-52Hs will have to have their recently-installed internal launchers (the CSRLs) removed to allow them to carry 12 rather than 20 cruise missiles.26
The B-52 force was taken off strip alert in September 1991 -- since 1960 a third of the B-52 force had always been armed and ready to take off on 15 minutes' notice of a Soviet attack.27 Today, the cruise missiles for the bombers are kept separate from the planes, in bunkers. Currently the B-52Hs are stationed at two bases: the 2nd Bomber Wing at Barksdale AFB Louisiana, and the 5th Bomber Wing at Minot AFB North Dakota, each with 28 aircraft, with 10 aircraft as spares.28
Despite the widespread perception that these aging planes should be retired, the head of Strategic Command (STRATCOM, SAC's successor organization) in 1990 noted that the H-model airframes and key components had only reached half of their life expectancy. The Air Force estimates the B-52Hs will be usable until approximately 2030.29
Further, the B-52s have received extensive upgrades and modifications over the years, and remain fully operational, as was shown by their extensive action in the Gulf War. In that conflict the older B-52Gs were very active, dropping a third of all coalition bombs by tonnage30, while the more "sophisticated" B-1B fleet was grounded. A standoff platform need not be a high-tech weapon system -- it only needs to fly within a thousand miles of its target and fire its cruise missiles. The B-52s are ideal for performing this mission for years to come.
The B-1B was originally planned as a supersonic nuclear penetrating bomber, with production ending in 1989. It was designed for low-level missions, and has sophisticated jamming equipment and low observable design purported to have 1% of the radar cross section (RCS) of the B-52. The latter claim has been disputed by the General Accounting Office, which maintains that this only represents the head-on measurement, with radar visibility from other aspects much higher.33 From the start, the B-1B has been plagued by difficulties, including four crashes, and numerous electronic warfare system, flight control, and avionics problems. Justification for the great expense of these heavy bombers has yet to be realized.
The B-1B can carry a variety of nuclear weapons, up to 24 gravity bombs, or 8 ALCMs internally, and also has six external hardpoints which could carry an additional 12 ALCMs. However, as a practical point, these would not likely be used in a nuclear penetrating mission, given the prodigious internal carriage capability as well as the degradation in flight performance and radar signature carrying external stores entails.
Under Article IV of START II, up to 100 bombers may be reoriented for conventional bombing and will not be treaty countable. The U.S. is exercising this option with the 94 B-1Bs. Modification and training under the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program has been ongoing. Should START II fail (for any of various reasons), it would be a simple matter to reorient these bombers to the strategic nuclear role.
The stealth bomber was originally slated to be deployed in large numbers and take over the penetration role from the B-1B Lancer, which is being reoriented towards conventional missions under START II. This flying wing design is supposed to be able to evade radar detection, largely through its composite (mainly graphite/epoxy) construction, honeycomb structure, exterior coating, and its very shape. Cooling of its engine exhaust and even its dark color also make it less detectable to infrared and visual detection (at night) respectively.
A primary mission used to justify the B-2 was the hunting of the Russian mobile missiles such as the SS-24 and SS-25 which were built in the late 1980s. The extremely expensive stealth features of the B-2 would presumably keep it undetected and safe as it roamed the Russian hinterland, seeking these elusive targets. However, the dismal failure of the "Great Scud Hunt" of the Gulf War (where hundreds of coalition sorties failed to destroy a single mobile Scud missile launcher) calls into question whether such missiles could be easily found.
Another doubtful justification for building the B-2 was the supposed high Soviet air defense threat. In retrospect, this threat was greatly exaggerated then, and naturally, the Russian air defense system today is in shambles.
The B-2 payload capacity is 16 nuclear gravity bombs (B53, B61, B83), short-range attack missiles (AGM-69 SRAM, though these missiles were recently eliminated) or advanced cruise missiles (AGM-129 ACM, although only the B-52Hs are planned to carry the ACM). The Air Force originally called for 132 B-2's, then cut the request to 75, and will likely settle for 21 bombers (20 were planned, but one of the prototypes is being modified to make it operational).35 There was a recent attempt in Congress to procure another 20 B-2's, but this prohibitively expensive measure, unjustified in military terms, failed. Given the short production run, the program cost of each B-2 bomber will be approximately $2.2 Billion.36 The B-2s are deployed at Whiteman AFB, Missouri.37
The Air Launched Cruise Missile, or ALCM, is a small, subsonic air-breathing missile with a range of well over a thousand miles. It uses terrain following guidance to fly low (about 30 meters above ground) and is quite accurate, much like the Tomahawk of Gulf War fame. Its small size makes it difficult for air defenses to detect and intercept. The nuclear version is the AGM-86B, though there is also a conventional variant known as the AGM-86C, which additionally uses a GPS receiver for even greater precision.
With the accuracy of a cruise missile combined with a nuclear warhead, the ALCM is much more capable of destroying hard targets than any ballistic missile. However, with its slow speed relative to ballistic missiles the ALCM is generally not perceived as a destabilizing weapon.
The ALCM was introduced in the early 1980s to extend the life of the B-52s by converting them from penetration to standoff platforms. There are over 1,500 nuclear ALCMs available, though the U.S. plans on deploying only approximately 950 on a B-52H fleet of 66 aircraft.39
The Advanced Cruise Missile is the follow-on to the ALCM. It entered into service in 1991, with 1,461 missiles planned, but the program was cut short and only 460 ACMs were produced.40 The ACM incorporates stealth features to reduce radar cross section and infrared signature and also has greater accuracy and longer range than its predecessor. Many details about this new system remain classified.
One justification put forward for the ACM was the specter of a similar Russian system purported to be in development. The AS-X-19 Koala was touted as a supersonic, long-range, stealthy cruise missile. It was also supposed to be ready for deployment in the early 1990s, though the program was cancelled around 1993.41 Ironically enough, the U.S. counterpart, the ACM, was cancelled only after several hundred missiles were produced.
Actually, the argument that the ACM was needed because of its improvements over the ALCM do not ring true. The range of the ALCM was better than had been originally reported (2,400 kilometers), and the ACM (3,000 kilometers range) offers little improvement. Likewise, the ACM's small increase in accuracy has no operational significance. The GAO has also concluded that the belief that the ALCM had low survivability, and required the ACM as a replacement, has not been demonstrated.42 However, given that the ACM has already been procured in large numbers, despite its large, superfluous expense, it will serve well to equip approximately half the the B-52H fleet under START II.
The B53 was designed as a high yield bomb to be carried internally by the B-52s. 340 of these bombs, with large (9 megaton) yields by American standards, were built. However, although it was slated to be replaced by the B83, its retirement was curtailed in 1987, probably to retain a high yield weapon to destroy very hardened underground targets.43 The U.S. will likely retain 50 B53 bombs under START II.44
The B53 does not have the safety and security features of the newer B61 and B83 bombs. Its fuzing is also more primitive, and must be accomplished on the ground by maintenance personnel. The B53's 9 megaton warhead (similar to that used in the retired Titan II ICBM) is a survivor of the early days of nuclear weapons when yields were very large.
B61 Mod-7 gravity bomb (strategic)
This is the most common version of U.S. gravity bomb that will be in service under START II. The B61-7 has four yield options that can be selected in flight. This strategic version can be dropped at high speed from as low as 15 meters in a "laydown" delivery (a delayed surface burst where the bomb parachutes to the ground allowing the bomber to escape the blast.) The B61 can also be delivered free-fall or parachute-retarded ground or air-burst. The latest versions have in-flight fusing and yield selection, as well as integrated Permissive Action Links (PALs), requiring the correct code for arming. Over 3,000 B61s were manufactured during the Cold War, though many are tactical versions. See the tactical B61 for further details.. About 750 Mod 7 strategic B61's remain in the active inventory.46
With the reorientation of the B-1B to conventional operations, and the use of the B-52Hs as dedicated cruise missile carriers, gravity bombs will strategically be the sole purview of the 21 B-2s. A variant of the B61 is under development for destroying deep bunkers, such as the Libyan chemical weapons plant at Tarhuna. The improved B61 will have an enhanced penetration capability, and is slated to become operational in 1997.47
The B83 is the most recent major U.S. bomb design, and possibly the last. It is the first megaton-range bomb designed for laydown (delayed blast, allowing the aircraft to deliver the bomb at very low altitude and escape) surface delivery against hardened targets. As such its nose cone is capable of withstanding high-speed impact with concrete or steel (in excess of 30 meters per second) with a delayed detonation up to 120 seconds to allow the aircraft to escape the blast. The B83 can survive delivery at up to Mach 2 at 45 meters.48 It was originally intended to be the principal weapon of the B-1B Lancer, but will likely be carried by the B-2 stealth bomber under START II.
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Systems
Tomahawk TLAM-N SLCM (BGM-109A)
The Tomahawk TLAM-N (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile - Nuclear) sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) was carried aboard a variety of ships and submarines. All have been removed and are in storage since September 1991, when President Bush recalled all non-SLBM sea-based nuclear weapons (a sweeping measure, which when included with the Russian reciprocation, removed on the order of 6,000 operational warheads).51
The missile is launched with a solid fuel booster to initially accelerate it, which is subsequently jettisoned as the turbofan engine takes over. Guidance is similar to the air-launched cruise missile, with terrain contour matching (tercom) in which the missile has a digital map of the terrain it is to fly over, and follows it at low altitude to the target. In addition to the nuclear version, there is of course the TLAM-C (conventional) of Gulf War fame. The conventional versions have improved terminal guidance which allows for a CEP on the order of 10 meters or less, though such precision is unnecessary with the TLAM-N, given the 200 kiloton warhead.
Approximately 350 nuclear SLCMs were produced, and all will remain in storage. Surface ships can mount the Tomahawk in Armored Box Launchers (ABL) and Vertical Launch Systems (VLS). Submarines can mount them in vertical Capsule Launch Systems (CLS) or in steel launch canisters from conventional Torpedo Tubes (TT).52 Currently, 78 submarines and 66 surface ships have launchers capable of using the TLAM-N. It carries the same W80 warhead as the ALCM, and is very similar to that cruise missile in many respects.53
During the 1980's the sea-launched cruise missile became known as the "fourth leg" of the triad to some strategic analysts, Given its long-range, and the forward deployment of U.S. naval forces, it did qualify as a strategic system. It was regarded by many arms controllers as "the nemesis of arms control" because of the vexing problem of verification when dealing with a small weapon that can be carried aboard various ships and submarines.54 However, only a small number of long-range nuclear SLCMs were manufactured by either side in the Cold War, and they, along with all naval nuclear weapons, have been removed from U.S. and Russian ships.
B61 Mod-3,-4,-10 gravity bomb (tactical)
These are the tactical variants of the B61 bomb, see the description of the Mod-7 strategic B61 for further details. The F-111, F-4E, F-16, A-6E, and F/A-18 aircraft are all capable of carrying the B61 nuclear gravity bomb.55 Large numbers of these aircraft will remain in the U.S.force structure in the conventional role. Three variants of the tactical B61 exist, the Mod-3, Mod-4, and Mod-10, the last of which is a converted W85 Pershing II warhead. Each version has four variable yields from .3 to 170 kilotons -- the settings for the various tactical versions are B61 Mod-3 (.3, 1.5, 60, and 170 kilotons), B61 Mod-4 (.3, 1.5, 10, and 45 kilotons), B61 Mod-10 (.4, 5, 10, and 80 kilotons). 350 tactical B61s remain in the U.S. stockpile, some of which would be allocated for use by NATO forces.56
The U.S. once deployed the entire panoply of tactical nuclear weapons (from nuclear artillery and demolition mines to short-range rockets and even air-to-air missiles). However, nearly all have been removed and are slated for destruction, largely as a result of President Bush's unilateral initiative of September 27, 1991. Indeed, the only operational non-strategic forces are currently the B61 tactical bombs, largely allocated for use in Europe (and perhaps the TLAM-N SLCMs, though these could arguably be considered strategic, and are in storage in any case.)
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.