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Analysis

Iraqi leaders seem to have accepted that their war-prevention strategy has failed. In hopes that the U.N. Security Council would prevent the United States from launching an unsanctioned war, Baghdad's strategy was to cooperate overtly with weapons inspections while, in fact, doing everything possible to buy time.

The Iraqi government saw the United States as boxed in on two sides. The United States wanted to wage war in the context of a coalition. Washington's European allies, save Britain, did not want a war; its regional allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, did not want a war. Hussein's read of the situation was that without European sanction and Saudi cooperation, the United States would not attack.

Hussein's view appeared to be that the European and Saudi positions had nothing to do with the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Each had their own, idiosyncratic reasons -- strategic or political -- to want to avoid war. On a deeper level, Hussein seemed to sense that the combination of overwhelming U.S. power, coupled with Washington's post-Sept. 11 obsession, made the United States dangerous to a wide range of nations. Any increase of U.S. power, such as a defeat of Iraq, simply would intensify this fear. Therefore, from Baghdad's viewpoint, the inspections were irrelevant -- a cover for Europe and Saudi Arabia to block U.S. actions they opposed anyway.

That was the logic behind the 12,000-page weapons declaration delivered to U.N. inspectors. Hussein apparently reasoned that European states would have a fine excuse for an exhaustive -- and extensive -- study of the documents and that they would seize on it. The mere fact that the 12,000 pages were merely copies of previously submitted material was insignificant, from Baghdad's point of view. The declaration was intended not to be taken seriously but to buy time for everyone concerned.

Hussein miscalculated U.S. influence. It certainly was true that European leaders did not want a war; it also was true that they wanted to resist the growth of U.S. power. What Hussein didn't understand, it appears, is that the desire to check great power derives from fear of it. It was one thing for Europe to oppose the United States in a way that had some plausibility -- therefore, thwarting the United States by insisting that the inspections go forward was defensible. Thwarting the United States over an indefensible document was another matter entirely. That was too risky. Washington had too many cards it could play.

Therefore, when the Bush administration forced its way into reviewing the document, it might have violated protocol, but it took away from the inspectors the ability to put the document in the best light possible and to allow European leaders to buy more time. Given the nature of the 12,000 pages and the fact that Washington could demonstrate Iraq's failure to comply with U.N. resolutions, the inspectors, while not using the magical phrase "material breach," could not argue with U.S. claims that Baghdad was not compliant.

That changed the entire dynamic of the relationship between Washington and Europe. The United States could prove at least some degree of noncompliance. By the rules that European states have established, Baghdad was beyond the pale. It was then simply a question of how far beyond the pale and what the trigger point would be. At least for the time being, the heart went out of the anti-war sentiment in Europe. Except for Germany, which marches to its own drummer these days, the Europeans remain opposed to war, but not with the vigor previously displayed. This means that the United States could wage war without risking its general coalition. Even though he is British, the recent announcement by NATO Secretary-General George Robertson that it is a moral imperative for the alliance to support the United States meant that the pieces are falling into place.

It was at this point that Iraq shifted into war-fighting mode. Stories of war games, of food distribution in anticipation of war, movement of troops and equipment, have begun to filter out of Iraq. Baghdad now is signaling that the regime understands its play has failed and that it expects a fight.

In this new projection of resignation to war, there is one last Iraqi stratagem. Hussein has seen the decline of anti-war sentiment around him. Within the region, he has observed Syria's moves and Iran's flirtation with Britain. He certainly heard the offer by a Saudi assistant defense minister to help police a post-war Iraq. But, as a gambler, he needs a gut-check, to see if he can get some weak hands to fold.

Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, France, Russia -- all are weak hands. They are not deeply committed to anything, save that they don't want massive and uncontrollable consequences to engulf them. Their current perception is that the low-risk path is with the United States -- a quick defeat of Hussein's regime, followed by the spoils, with few risks for anyone. They are willing to play that game if that is the only game to play -- but not if the risks increase.

Hussein's obvious option is to raise the stakes. To be more precise, he must convince all of these countries that there will be consequences if they side with Washington. An extended war between Iraq and the United States won't bother them one bit. Most of these countries would love to see the United States bogged down in Iraq; that isn't the key. The key has to be that, in the event of a war, Hussein will do something that will harm their fundamental interests.

Destroying his own oil fields will upset some, not others. Riyadh would be delighted. For Hussein, the most logical move would be threatening some broader action, something that would hurt all players -- not actually following through, but making a credible threat. He has few options: One is to threaten a global terror campaign, which in and of itself would not be particularly effective. Baghdad would have to implement it in such a way that it would deter action rather than trigger it. Threatening Saudi Arabia's oil fields would be another path. If Hussein could invade Saudi Arabia -- or attack it with some weapon of mass destruction that would take it off the market -- that would hurt a lot of people. Again, it is a question of the threat, not the action.

It is not clear that Hussein actually can pursue any of these options, or that he is in a position to credibly bluff them. However, the logic of his situation is to try, one last time, to scare the weak fence-sitters into blocking the United States. He needs to make some move to redefine the current situation. With war looming in about a month, Hussein has a few weeks in which to act. Unless he wants a Hitler-like Gotterdammerung -- which is not his style -- he must make some move, such as a negotiated resignation, that will assure his survival.

Something has to happen, and the ball is in Baghdad's court.