The Trump nbC Post

The discussion of the original intent, meaning, and and national security purpose of the "natural born Citizen" term in the presidential eligibility clause in Article II Section 1 Clause 5 of our U.S. Constitution is back in the news.

The accurate way to apply the Constitution, as stated by Judge Robert Bork, the leading constitutional scholar of his time, is to apply the Constitution as written and originally understood and intended.

In Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Court did what it appears to be a good-faith effort to find the original understanding of natural born citizen (NBC) - someone who is born on U.S. soil to parents legally here but not necessarily U.S. citizens. IMO, it was a valid constitutionally-based decision and stands as the legal mandatory authority making Vivek an NBC from what I can tell.

Remember, this case was decided in 1898. It was sometime early in the 1900’s that the Supreme Court began to habitually abandon the Constitution as written and originally understood and intended the basis for their decisions.

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The distinction of Wong Kim Ark (1898) is that it applied to persons "domiciled" as "permanent residents" of the United States for a basis of citizenship, whereas the parents of Kamala Harris held the status of "visitors" who retained the "domicile" of their native Jamaica and India at the time of Kamala's 1964 birth.

Documents evidencing Kamala Harris ineligibility for VP (and the Presidency) under terms of the Constitution (Natural Born Citizen clause plus the 12th Amendment) available via these links:

Kamala Kancel Website (downloadable PDF available via link)

Kamala Kancel Twitter Site (twitter login required to view)

She’s fine...zerohisseff set the low bar...

/s

Hopefully, this issue will finally be resolved.

ZERO ALSO WAS NEVER NATURAL BORN CITIZEN....

HIS DADDY WAS A CITIZEN OF KENYA

HOWARD DEAN NEVER VETTED HIM PROPERLY

WHEN SOME MURMURS WERE STARTING, PELOSI STEPPED FORWARD AND “CERTIFIED” OBAMA.

BOTH WERE WRONG.

FYI. An article written by Attorney Mario Apuzzo† back in 2009 regarding WKA (1898) and the 14th Amendment: http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2009/07/neither-14th-amendment-nor-wong-kim-ark.html

FYI: A White Paper about “natural born Citizen” term in our U.S. Constitution that I wrote in 2016: http://www.kerchner.com/protectourliberty/naturalborncitizen/TheWhoWhatWhenWhereWhyandHowofNBC-WhitePaper.pdf

And we can all see the results in allowing a non-”natural born Citizen” of the United States gaining the Oval Office and becoming Commander in Chief of our military and seeing who he promoted and put in charge of our military forces. The “natural born Citizen” term is/was a national security term put into our Constitution to restrict anyone born with foreign influence on them, i.e., dual citizenship and innate foreign allegiance requirements from becoming the President and Commander in Chief once the founding generation was gone. Ignoring that with the dual-Citizen at birth Obama (now in his behind the curtain 3rd term) and now Harris, and we all see what has happened to our country, its borders, the Constitution, and the Rule of Law.

A child who is born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is born a citizen of the United States.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 662-63:

In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."

https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030101.html#M301_1_1

[State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual]

8 FAM 301.1-1 INTRODUCTION

c. Naturalization – Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship Subsequent to Birth: Naturalization is “the conferring of nationality of a State upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever” (INA 101(a)(23) (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(23)) or conferring of citizenship upon a person (see INA 310, 8 U.S.C. 1421 and INA 311, 8 U.S.C. 1422). Naturalization can be granted automatically or pursuant to an application. (See 7 FAM 1140.)
d. “Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States”: All children born in and subject, at the time of birth, to the jurisdiction of the United States acquire U.S. citizenship at birth even if their parents were in the United States illegally at the time of birth:
(1) The U.S. Supreme Court examined at length the theories and legal precedents on which the U.S. citizenship laws are based in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). In particular, the Court discussed the types of persons who are subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that a child born in the United States to Chinese parents acquired U.S. citizenship even though the parents were, at the time, racially ineligible for naturalization;
(2) The Court also concluded that: “The 14th Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.” Pursuant to this ruling:
(a) Acquisition of U.S. citizenship generally is not affected by the fact that the parents may be in the United States temporarily or illegally; and that; and
(b) A child born in an immigration detention center physically located in the United States is considered to have been born in the United States and be subject to its jurisdiction. This is so even if the child’s parents have not been legally admitted to the United States and, for immigration purposes, may be viewed as not being in the United States.

Birthers continue to recycle failed legal arguments, some of the arguments having failed for more than a century.

The LOSING Briefs from the precedent setting U.S. Supreme Court case of Wong Kim Ark reveal the slightest tinge of racism involved in the attempt to save the nation from Yellow Peril. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), at the U.S. Supreme Court. Brief on Behalf of the losing Appellant (United States), by George D. Collins, Of Counsel for Appellant, and also signed by Holmes Conrad, Solicitor General; at page 34:

For the most persuasive reasons we have refused citizenship to Chinese subjects; and yet, as to their offspring, who are just as obnoxious, and to whom the same reasons for exclusion apply with equal force, we are told that we must accept them as fellow-citizens, and that, too, because of the mere accident of birth. There certainly should be some honor and dignity in American citizenship that would be sacred from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing alienage. Are Chinese children born in this country to share with the descendants of the patriots of the American Revolution the exalted qualification of being eligible to the Presidency of the nation, conferred by the Constitution in recognition of the importance aud dignity of citizenship by birth? If so, then verily there has been a most degenerate departure from the patriotic ideals of our forefathers; and surely in that case American citizenship is not worth having.

Birthers have taken to wasting the time and resources of the legal system with scores of frivolous lawsuits in Federal and state courts. Charles Gordon, in his paper “Who Can Be President of the United States: the Unresolved Enigma,” 28 Maryland Law Review, Number 1, Winter 1968, observed at page 29:

Since interpretation of the presidential qualification clause involves a federal constitutional question, such an issue would unquestionably wind up in the federal courts, by removal of actions commenced in state courts, or by Supreme Court review of a state court’s decision. [Footnotes omitted]

Several actions seeking an ancient writ of quo warranto to oust the sitting President have predictably failed. In his paper cited supra, at page 30, Charles Gordon observed,

In the first place, a person seeking to launch such a contest would have to overcome the seemingly insuperable hurdle of legal standing to sue. In the federal practice his lack of direct interest would seem fatal.

Nearly a half-century later, when courts found a lack of direct interest and a resultant lack of standing, birthers exclaimed that the judges were corrupt. The blackness of the President does not create standing.

First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Vinita v. Kissee, 1993 OK 96, 859 P.2d 502, paragraph 40, footnotes omitted:

“Simply put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did.” “There is no room for a pure heart, empty head defense under Rule 11.”

In Wong Kim Ark, at 169 U.S. 649, 674-675, the U.S. Supreme Court said:

So far as we are informed, there is no authority, legislative, executive or judicial, in England or America, which maintains or intimates that the statutes (whether considered as declaratory or as merely prospective) conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizens have superseded or restricted, in any respect, the established rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. Even those authorities in this country, which have gone the farthest towards holding such statutes to be but declaratory of the common law have distinctly recognized and emphatically asserted the citizenship of native-born children of foreign parents. 2 Kent Com. 39, 50, 53, 258 note; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf.Ch. 583, 659; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 371.
Passing by questions once earnestly controverted, but finally put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States.

In Schick v. United States, at page 69, the Court said:

“That,” said Mr. Justice Bradley in Moore v. United States, 91 U. S. 270, 91 U. S. 274, referring to the common law, “is the system from which our judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language of the Constitution and of many acts of Congress could not be understood without reference to the common law.”
Again, in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 124 U. S. 478, is this declaration by Mr. Justice Matthews: “The interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.”
In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 169 U. S. 654, Mr. Justice Gray used this language: “In this as in other respects, it must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162; Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 114 U. S. 422; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 624-625; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465.”
See also Kepner v. United States, post, p. 195 U. S. 100; 1 Kent, Com. 336.
Blackstone’s Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the federal Constitution, it had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England, so that undoubtedly the framers of the Constitution were familiar with it.

In Wong Kim Ark, Brief on Behalf of the losing Appellant [United States], page 22-23, the losing side argued:

“Subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is the language of the Constitution, and it is the most significant provision of the definition of citizenship there contained. Who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States? Manifestly not those who are subject to the jurisdiction of any other nation, or who owe allegiance to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty. Such is the contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution’s definition by the very Congress that framed it, as is evidenced by what is now section 1902 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. It is there enacted: “All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.” Clearly, then, it was never intended that children born in the United States of alien parents should be considered citizens.
Such children at the moment of birth would be subject to a “foreign power,” to wit, the country of the parent, for it is a principle of international law, and recognized by the United States (sec. 1993, Rev. Stat. U. S.), that the children born abroad of citizens or subjects are citizens or subjects of the country of the parent. So, in respect to this case, it is the law of the Chinese Empire that the children of subjects when born abroad are subjects of the Emperor, Therefore, when Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco of Chinese parents there domiciled he at the moment of birth became a subject of the Emperor of China, and for that reason could not have been born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.

At page 24, the losing Brief argues,

It is true, he was born in the United States; but he was not at the time of his birth, and certainly at no time afterwards, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof;” we mean, of course, the political jurisdiction of the nation; not the territorial jurisdiction, or which is the same thing, the jurisdiction, or more accurately, the operation of the laws. All the authorities agree that the provision of the Constitution's definition, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” has reference to the political jurisdiction of the United States in its international relation of a sovereign nation, and not to the operation of the laws. In other words, the sovereignty of the United States is of a dual nature—internal and external. The jurisdiction of the law pertains to the former; and the political power of the nation to the latter. All persons born in the United States and subject to the political power thereof are citizens—natural born citizens; it follows that persons born in the United States of aliens are not citizens.

At page 35, the losing side added,

It is said in the district court’s opinion that—
The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory.
* * *

Here is a more complete version of that quote from the district court:

The doctrine of the law of nations, that the child follows the nationality of the parents, and that citizenship does not depend upon mere accidental place of birth, is undoubtedly more logical, reasonable, and satisfactory, but this consideration will not justify this court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial authority.

The inconvenient existing and controlling judicial authority came from the Circuit Court for the 9th Circuit.

The existing judicial authority was from In re Look Tin Sing, Circuit Court, California, 21 Fed R 905 (1884), Opinion of the Court by U.S. Supreme Court Justice (1863-1887) Stephen Field, sitting as a Circuit Court justice.

At 21 Fed R 906:

The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside.” This language would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person born in the United States. Any doubt on the subject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must, at the time, be both actual and exclusive. The words mentioned except from citizenship children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is regarded as part of their own country. This ex-territoriality of their residence secures to their children born here all the rights and privileges which would inure to them had they been born in the country of their parents.

At 21 Fed R 908-909:

With this explanation of the meaning of the words in the fourteenth amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” it is evident that they do not exclude the petitioner from being a citizen. He is not within any of the classes of persons excepted from citizenship, and the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.

The Supreme Court rejected the pig slop that was offered up and ruled the direct opposite, affirming the District Court which had ruled according to the existing binding precedent set in the Circuit Court, extending that binding precedent to all state and Federal courts. That was in the 19th century. It is binding precedent today.

Ludlam v. Ludlam, 84 Am. Dec. 193, 26 New York 356 (1863), first Headnote at 193,

Common Law at Time of Adoption of Federal Constitution Determines Question of Citizenship, in the absence of any other law upon the subject.

Munro v. Merchant, 26 Barb. 383 at 384 (1858) headnote states,

“A child born in this state of alien parents, during its mother’s temporary sojourn here, is a native born citizen.”

When will the birthers produce a court opinion stating that John Doe, born in the United States of one or two alien parents, is, or is not, a citizen based on the controlling authority of Emer de Vattel? They have over two centuries of Federal and state court opinions to work with.

At 400-401, Opinion of the Court

It is further contended, on the part of the defendant, that the plaintiff himself is an alien. He was born in Ballston Spa, in this state, while his father was a resident of Canada, and returned to his father's domicil, with his mother, within a year after his birth. His mother was temporarily there—without any actual change of residence, either on her part or that of his father. It is argued that, at common law, a natural born subject was one whose birth was within the allegiance of the king. (Bac. Ab. tit. Alien, A. Com. Dig. A. and B. 7 to 18. Bl. Com: 336, 74.) The cases of children of ambassadors, born abroad, and of children born on English seas were considered exceptions. Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, defines a native born citizen to be- a person born within, and an alien one born out of, the jurisdiction of the United States. (2 Kent's Com. 37—50.) In Lynch v. Clarke, (1 Sand. Ch. B. 583,) the question was precisely as here, whether a child born in the city of New York of alien parents, during their temporary sojourn there, was a native born citizen or an alien; and the conclusion was, that being born within the dominion and allegiance of the United States, he was a native born citizen, whatever was the situation of the parents at the time of the birth.

The parents of Kamala Harris swore in writing that their intention of travel was "solely" for a full-time study, and in exchange acquired status of "visitor" to gain entry to the United States. This status caused the parents of Kamala Harris to retain their "domicile" in Jamaica and India, respectively.

Wong Kim Ark (1898) does not apply to Kamala Harris, as her parents did not have a "domicile" or "permanent resident" status within the United States at the time of her 1964 birth. (In fact, they committed immigration fraud in connection with her birth certificate).

Please have a look at the actual documents linked below, to better inform your (erroneous) opinion.

Documents evidencing Kamala Harris ineligibility for VP (and the Presidency) under terms of the Constitution (Natural Born Citizen clause plus the 12th Amendment) available via these links:

Kamala Kancel Website (downloadable PDF available via link)

Kamala Kancel Twitter Site (twitter login required to view)

In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. 905 (29 Sep 1884)

21 Fed. 905-906:

Field, Justice. The petitioner belongs to the Chinese race, but he was born in Mendocino, in the state of California, in 1870. In 1879 he went to China, and returned to the port of San Francisco during the present month, (September, 1884,) and now seeks to land, claiming the right to do so as a natural-born citizen of the United States. It is admitted by an agreed statement of facts that his parents are now residing in Mendocino, in California, and have resided there for the last 20 years; that they are of the Chinese race, and have always been subjects of the emperor of China; that his father sent the petitioner to China, but with the intention that he should return to this country; that the father is a merchant at Mendocino, and is not here in any diplomatic or other official capacity under the emperor of China.

21 Fed. 906:

The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside.” This language would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person born in the United States. Any doubt on the subject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must, at the time, be both actual and exclusive. The words mentioned except from citizenship children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is regarded as part of their own country. This ex-territoriality of their residence secures to their children born here all the rights and privileges which would inure to them had they been born in the country of their parents.

21 Fed. 909

With this explanation of the meaning of the words in the fourteenth amendment, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” it is evident that they do not exclude the petitioner from being a citizen. He is not within any of the classes of persons excepted from citizenship, and the jurisdiction of the United States over him at the time of his birth was exclusive of that of any other country.

Are you sure SCOTUS said in the Wong Kim Ark (1898) case that Ark was an Art. II, §1, Cl. 5 natural born citizen?

There are two classes of citizen, and two only: natural born and naturalized. A naturalized citizen is a foreign-born person who attains citizenship subsequent to birth by a legal procedure. A natural born citizen is one who attains citizenship at birth.

What happens when birther blather goes to court and meets actual law and precedent. A losing record of futility of 0-226.

https://tesibria.typepad.com/whats_your_evidence/BIRTHER%2520CASE%2520LIST.pdf

The BIRTHER SCORECARD lists all the birther cases, the result, and the result of any appeal.

Ankeny v. Indiana was a case which directly addressed the birther nonsense about Natural Born Citizen and two citizen parents.

Ankeny v Governor Of State Of Indiana
No. 49A02-0904-CV-353.
916 N.E.2d 678 (2009)
Steve ANKENY and Bill Kruse, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNOR OF the STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Respondent.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
November 12, 2009.
Attorney(s) appearing for the Case
Steve Ankeny, New Castle, IN, Bill Kruse, Roselawn, IN, Appellants pro se.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
OPINION
BROWN, Judge.
Steve Ankeny and Bill Kruse (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), pro se, appeal the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss filed by Mitch Daniels, in his official capacity as the Governor of the State of Indiana ("Governor"). Plaintiffs raise nine issues, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6). [1] We affirm. [2]
[916 N.E.2d 680]
The relevant facts follow. On December 9, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a "PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION" against the Governor [3] to prevent the Governor "from issuing a 'Certificate of Ascertainment,' or any other document, to Congress of the United States containing any popular votes for Barack Obama and Joe Biden for the appointment as Chief Electors . . . [or] John McCain and Sarah Palin for the appointment of Electors." Appellants' Appendix at 6. On January 30, 2009, the Governor filed a motion to dismiss alleging in part that "the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Appellee's Appendix at 1. The Governor also filed a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss. On February 17, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the Governor's motion to dismiss. On March 16, 2009, the trial court granted the Governor's motion to dismiss after a hearing. On April 13, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal.
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the claim, not the facts supporting it. General Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bright, 885 N.E.2d 56, 57 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) (citing Charter One Mortg. Corp. v. Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind.2007)). Thus, our review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion based on Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is de novo. Id. at 58. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference construed in the nonmovant's favor. Id. A complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it is clear on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to relief. [4]
[916 N.E.2d 681]
Id. However, a court need not accept as true any "conclusory, non-factual assertions or legal conclusions." Irish v. Woods, 864 N.E.2d 1117, 1120 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007). "Thus, while we do not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to their adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario in which a legally actionable injury has occurred." Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Indiana, 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind.2006).
[...]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B. Natural Born Citizen
Second, the Plaintiffs argue that both President Barack Obama and Senator John McCain are not "natural born Citizens" as required for qualification to be President under Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 [9] of the U.S. Constitution, and that therefore because neither person was constitutionally eligible to become President, "[t]he Governor . . . should [have been] prohibited by order of [the trial court] . . . from issuing any certificate of ascertainment, or any other certified statement, under the State Seal of the State of Indiana. . . ." Appellants' Appendix at 13.
Before addressing the Plaintiffs' specific arguments, we think it helpful to point out the context in which this claim arises. Leading up to the 2008 Presidential Election and in the ensuing months after, a number of lawsuits were filed nationwide challenging both President Barack Obama and Senator John McCain's [10] status as "natural born Citizens" under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Berg v. Obama, 574 F.Supp.2d 509 (E.D.Pa.2008);
[916 N.E.2d 685]
Hollander v. McCain, 566 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.N.H.2008); Cohen v. Obama, No. 08-2150, 2008 WL 5191864 (D.D.C. Dec.11, 2008), aff'd by 332 Fed.Appx. 640, 2009 WL 2870668 (D.C.Cir. Sept.8, 2009); Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, 289 Conn. 522, 958 A.2d 709 (2008). As to President Obama's status, the most common argument has been waged by members of the so-called "birther" movement who suggest that the President was not born in the United States; they support their argument by pointing to "the President's alleged refusal to disclose publicly an 'official birth certificate' that is satisfactory to [the birthers]." Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 409-CV-106CDL, 2009 WL 2997605, at *1 (M.D.Ga. Sept. 16, 2009), reconsideration denied by 2009 WL 3111834 (M.D.Ga. Sept.18, 2009).

The bases of the Plaintiffs' arguments come from such sources as FactCheck.org, The Rocky Mountain News, an eighteenth century treatise by Emmerich de Vattel titled "The Law of Nations," and various citations to nineteenth century congressional debate. [11] For the reasons stated below, we hold that the Plaintiffs' arguments fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that therefore the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaint.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution governs who is a citizen of the United States. It provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Article II has a special requirement to assume the Presidency: that the person be a "natural born Citizen." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. The United States Supreme Court has read these two provisions in tandem and held that "[t]hus new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167, 22 L.Ed. 627 (1874). In Minor, written only six years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court observed that:
The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts.
[916 N.E.2d 686]
Id. at 167-168, 22 L.Ed. 627. Thus, the Court left open the issue of whether a person who is born within the United States of alien parents is considered a natural born citizen. [12]
Then, in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898), the United States Supreme Court confronted the question of "whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth are subject to the emperor of China. . . becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment. . . ." 169 U.S. at 653, 18 S.Ct. at 458. We find this case instructive. The Court in Wong Kim Ark reaffirmed Minor in that the meaning of the words "citizen of the United States" and "natural-born citizen of the United States" "must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the constitution." Id. at 654, 18 S.Ct. at 459. They noted that "[t]he interpretation of the constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history." Id. at 655, 18 S.Ct. at 459 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, 8 S.Ct. 564, 569, 31 L.Ed. 508 (1888)). The Wong Kim Ark Court explained:
The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance—also called 'ligealty,' 'obedience,' 'faith,' or 'power'—of the king. The principle embraced all persons born within the king's allegiance, and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual,—as expressed in the maxim, 'Protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem,'—and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens, were therefore natural-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the king's dominions, were not natural-born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the king.
This fundamental principle, with these qualifications or explanations of it, was clearly, though quaintly, stated in the leading case known as 'Calvin's Case,' or the 'Case of the Postnati,' decided in 1608, after a hearing in the exchequer chamber before the lord chancellor and all the judges of England, and reported by Lord Coke and by Lord Ellesmere. Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 1, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b; Ellesmere, Postnati, 62-64; s. c. 2 How. St. Tr. 559, 607, 613-617, 639, 640, 659, 679.
The English authorities ever since are to the like effect. Co. Litt. 8a, 128b; Lord Hale, in Harg. Law Tracts, 210, and in 1 Hale, P.C. 61, 62; 1 Bl. Comm. 366, 369, 370, 374; 4 Bl. Comm. 74, 92; Lord Kenyon, in Doe v. Jones, 4 Term R. 300, 308; Cockb. Nat. 7; Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
* * * * * *
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn . . . said: 'By the common law of England, every person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled, or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.' Cockb. Nat. 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with Reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics: "British subject' means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the crown. 'Permanent' allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a British subject from the allegiance of an alien, who, because he is within the British dominions, owes 'temporary' allegiance to the crown. 'Natural-born British subject' means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.' `Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any person who (whatever the nationality of his parents) is born within the British dominions is a natural-born British subject. This rule contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British nationality.' The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two: '(1) Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such person's birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien.' '(2) Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person's birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the crown by the sovereign of a foreign state is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.' And he adds: 'The exceptional and unimportant instances in which birth within the British dominions does not of itself confer British nationality are due to the fact that, though at common law nationality or allegiance in substance depended on the place of a person's birth, it in theory at least depended, not upon the locality of a man's birth, but upon his being born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the king of England; and it might occasionally happen that a person was born within the dominions without being born within the allegiance, or, in other words, under the protection and control of the crown.' Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, and the jurisdiction of the English sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the constitution as originally established. [13]
[916 N.E.2d 688]
Id. at 655-658, 18 S.Ct. at 459-460.
Also, as quoted in Wong Kim Ark, Justice Joseph Story once declared in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 7 L.Ed. 617 (1830), that "Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth." Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 660, 18 S.Ct. at 461 (quoting Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 164 (Story, J., concurring)). The Court also cited Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1856):
The first section of the second article of the constitution uses the language, 'a natural-born citizen.' It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.enue
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 662, 18 S.Ct. at 462 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 576 (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
The Court in Wong Kim Ark also cited authority which notes that:
All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.
Id. at 662-663, 18 S.Ct. at 462 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court held that Mr. Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States "at the time of his birth." [14] Id. at 705, 18 S.Ct. at 478.
Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are "natural born Citizens" for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Just as a person "born within the British dominions [was] a natural-born British subject" at the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, so too were those "born in the allegiance of the United States [] natural-born citizens." [15]
[916 N.E.2d 689]
The Plaintiffs do not mention the above United States Supreme Court authority in their complaint or brief; they primarily rely instead on an eighteenth century treatise and quotations of Members of Congress made during the nineteenth century. To the extent that these authorities conflict with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of what it means to be a natural born citizen, we believe that the Plaintiffs' arguments fall under the category of "conclusory, non-factual assertions or legal conclusions" that we need not accept as true when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Irish, 864 N.E.2d at 1120. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Plaintiffs' case. [16] See generally McCalment v. Eli Lilly & Co., 860 N.E.2d 884 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs' arguments had been sufficiently addressed by Indiana Supreme Court precedent and therefore the trial court did not err when it granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); see also, e.g., Diaz-Salazar v. I.N.S., 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir.1983) (noting in its recitation of the facts that despite the fact father was not a citizen of the United States, he had children who were "natural-born citizens of the United States"), cert. denied 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 3112, 77 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1983).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of the Governor's motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and MAY, J., concur.
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FootNotes
1. We note that pro se litigants, such as Plaintiffs, "are held to the same standard as licensed lawyers." Novatny v. Novatny, 872 N.E.2d 673, 677 n. 3 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). This court will not "indulge in any benevolent presumptions on [their] behalf, or waive any rule for the orderly and proper conduct of [their] appeal." Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 496 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).
Thus, we will attempt to address the issues raised by Plaintiffs. To the extent that Plaintiffs raise additional issues, the Plaintiffs fail to develop a cogent argument and cite to authority. Consequently, the arguments are waived. See, e.g., Loomis v. Ameritech, 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (holding argument waived for failure to cite authority or provide cogent argument), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
2. The trial court also granted the Governor's motion to dismiss on the bases of mootness under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(1) and the equitable doctrine of laches. Because we find that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under T.R. 12(B)(6), we need not address the trial court's alternative grounds for dismissal.
3. The Complaint also named the Democratic National Committee, Barack Obama, the Republican National Committee, and John McCain as defendants. The Plaintiffs state, without citation to the record, that "only the Governor of the State of Indiana accepted Service of Summons." Appellants' Brief at 3. We note that the Plaintiffs' case summary lists only the Governor as appellee, the Plaintiffs' notice of appeal lists only the Governor as defendant, and the Plaintiffs' briefs contain certificates of service indicating that the briefs were served upon only the governor.
4. In his brief, the Governor argues that the motion to dismiss included an affidavit, and therefore because "matters outside the pleadings [were] presented to the court on a 12(B)(6) motion, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment under T.R. 56. T.R. 12(B)." Appellee's Brief at 6. While true that the general rule is that when a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under T.R. 12(B)(6) is supplemented with materials outside the pleadings it should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, we note that:
[W]hen examination of the face of a complaint alone reveals that the plaintiff will not be entitled to relief under any set of circumstances, consideration of external materials aimed at substantiating or contradicting the complaint's factual allegations is irrelevant, because a fortiori the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under any factual scenario. In that instance, the trial court should exclude material outside the pleadings which are submitted with a 12(B)(6) motion, rather than convert the motion into one for summary judgment, because the external material are irrelevant to the motion.
Dixon v. Siwy, 661 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Ind.Ct. App.1996). In this case, there is no evidence that the trial court considered the material contained in the affidavit prepared by J. Bradley King, Co-Director for the Indiana Election Division, which contains nine paragraphs explaining the vote-tallying process actually carried out following the November 4, 2008 election. The affidavit was not relevant to the trial court's order granting the Governor's motion to dismiss. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to exclude this affidavit and handle the Governor's motion as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim rather than one for summary judgment. See Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Indiana, 845 N.E.2d 130, 134, 140 (Ind.2006) (affirming the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) even after the parties "filed several affidavits, exhibits, and briefs").
5. The date of the election was chosen pursuant to Ind.Code § 3-10-2-1, which states that "[a] general election shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in each even-numbered year. . . ."
6. The Democratic Party's candidates for Indiana electors were: (1) Jeffrey L. Chidester, of Valparaiso; (2) Owen "Butch" Morgan, of South Bend; (3) Michelle Boxell, of Warsaw; (4) Charlotte Martin, of Indianapolis; (5) Jerry J. Lux, of Shelbyville; (6) Connie Southworth, of Salamonia; (7) Alan P. Hogan, of Indianapolis; (8) Myrna E. Brown, of Vincennes; (9) Clarence Benjamin Leatherbury, of Salem; (10) Daniel J. Parker, of Indianapolis; and (11) Cordelia Lewis Burks, of Indianapolis. The Republican Party's candidates for Indiana electors were: (1) Chuck Williams, of Valparaiso; (2) Edward Smith, of Galveston; (3) Barbara Krisher, of Fort Wayne; (4) Daniel Bortner, of Bedford; (5) Virginia Marner, of Kokomo; (6) Susan Lightle, of Greenfield; (7) Pearl Swanigan, of Indianapolis; (8) William Springer, of Sullivan; (9) David Buskill, of Jeffersonville; (10) Samual Wayne Goodman, of Greenwood; and (11) Juana Watson, of Columbus. Appellants' Appendix at 21-22; see also 2008 Presidential Elector Candidates, available at http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/files/2008_Presidential_Elector_Candidate_ List.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
7. The Archivist of the United States transmits copies "to the two Houses of Congress . . . of each and every such certificate so received.. . ." 3 U.S.C. § 6.
8. The electors prepare the certificates in accordance with 3 U.S.C. §§ 6, 9-11.
9. The Plaintiffs cite the "natural born Citizen" clause as Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, but it is properly cited as Article II, Section 1, Clause 4. See also Ind.Code § 3-8-1-6.
10. The United States Senate passed a resolution on April 30, 2008 which explicitly recognized Senator John McCain as a natural born citizen. S.J. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008). Also, the supposed authority cited by the Plaintiffs to support their claim as to the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution does not support the argument that John McCain is not a natural born citizen. Plaintiffs state in their brief that the difference between being a "citizen of the United States" and a "natural born Citizen" "involves having [two] parents of U.S. Citizenship, owing no foreign allegiance." Appellant's Brief at 23. The Plaintiffs then concede that "John McCain . . . qualifie[s] as a 'citizen of the United States,' by being born of [two] parents who were in turn 'citizens of the United States,' and owed no foreign allegiance.. . ." Id. Their brief continues that "John McCain was born 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the United States, but he was not born in one of the 50 States of the Union under Article IV of the Constitution, and thus. . . was not a 'natural born Citizen. . . .'" Id. at 23-24. Plaintiffs do not cite to any authority or develop any cogent legal argument for the proposition that a person must actually be born within one of the fifty States in order to qualify as a natural born citizen, and we therefore do not address Plaintiffs argument as it relates to Senator McCain. See Loomis, 764 N.E.2d at 668.
11. Plaintiffs do not provide pinpoint citations to the congressional debate quotations to which they cite.
12. Note that the Court in Minor contemplates only scenarios where both parents are either citizens or aliens, rather in the case of President Obama, whose mother was a U.S. citizen and father was a citizen of the United Kingdom.
13. According to Westlaw, Wong Kim Ark has been cited to in over 1,000 cases.
14. We note the fact that the Court in Wong Kim Ark did not actually pronounce the plaintiff a "natural born Citizen" using the Constitution's Article II language is immaterial. For all but forty-four people in our nation's history (the forty-four Presidents), the dichotomy between who is a natural born citizen and who is a naturalized citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant. The issue addressed in Wong Kim Ark was whether Mr. Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States on the basis that he was born in the United States. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705, 18 S.Ct. at 478.
15. We reiterate that we do not address the question of natural born citizen status for persons who became United States citizens at birth by virtue of being born of United States citizen parents, despite the fact that they were born abroad. That question was not properly presented to this court. Without addressing the question, however, we note that nothing in our opinion today should be understood to hold that being born within the fifty United States is the only way one can receive natural born citizen status.
16. We note that President Obama is not the first U.S. President born of parents of differing citizenship. Chester A. Arthur, the twenty-first U.S. President, was born of a mother who was a United States citizen and a father who was an Irish citizen. See THOMAS C. REEVES, GENTLEMAN BOSS, THE LIFE OF CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 3-4 (1975). During the election of 1880, there arose a rumor "that [Arthur] had been born in Canada, rather than in Vermont as he claimed, and was thus constitutionally ineligible to become the Chief Executive." Id. at 3. Although President Arthur's status as a natural born citizen was challenged in the 1880 Presidential Election on the grounds that he was born in Canada rather than Vermont, the argument was not made that because Arthur's father was an Irish citizen he was constitutionally ineligible to be President. See generally id.

"Woodpusher" is up to the typical far-left, OBOT, anti-Constitutional tactic of conflating in a tantamount way the term "natural born Citizen" and "Citizen" and/or "Citizen at/by Birth". They also do the same with the terms "Subject" and "Citizen". Language manipulation and gas-lighting is a frequent tactic of the far-left. It is what they do. Here is a Euler Diagram to show the logical fallacy of their conflation arguments of the various kinds of Citizens regarding "natural born Citizen", the kind of Citizen who is eligible to be the President and Commander in Chief:
https://cdrkerchner.wordpress.com/2016/02/14/euler-logic-diagram-shows-logical-relationship-of-constitutional-article-ii-natural-born-citizens-to-other-type-citizens-of-the-united-states/

Rather than re-post your opinion, please respond to the fact that neither of the parents of Kamala Harris were “permanent residents” of the United States at the time of her birth (and in fact, had “signed away” this right, at the time they applied for entry as students).

The decision was that because Ark was born on U.S. soil, he was a citizen. Although the opinion didn’t use the words, “natural born citizen” (NBC) it would seem that being a citizen because you were born on U.S. soil would be an NBC.

Rather than re-post your opinion, please respond to the fact that neither of the parents of Kamala Harris were “permanent residents” of the United States at the time of her birth (and in fact, had “signed away” this right, at the time they applied for entry as students).

The Opinion in Ankeny v Governor Of State Of Indiana was not written by me.

It is a directly on point, precedent setting case.