The Trump nbC Post

[CDR Kerchner #27] Perkins v Elg (1939)
[Jim W N #29] Before I look it up, did this case supposedly overturn Ark, and if so, how the opinion is based on sound constitutional application (as I did with the Ark case).

I'll save the trouble of looking it up; Circuit and Supreme Court.

https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/99/408/1544373/

Perkins v. Elg, 99 F. 2d 408 - Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 1938

GRONER, C. J.
The main question in this case is whether appellee, a natural born citizen of the United States, has lost her citizenship involuntarily and by operation of law, by reason of her removal from the United States by her parents in her infancy and her residence in a foreign country until she was 21 years of age.
[...]
We think the decision of the lower court is in all respects correct.
The law of England, as of the time of the Declaration of Independence, was that a person born in that kingdom owed to the sovereign allegiance which could not be renounced. Many early American decisions applied that as the common law in this country. All agreed that every free person born within the limits and the allegiance of a State of the United States was a natural born citizen of the State and of the United States. And this was undoubtedly the view of Mr. Justice Curtis in his dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott Case, 19 How. 393, 581, 15 L. Ed. 691, in which he said:
"* * * we find that the Constitution has recognised the general principle of public law, that allegiance and citizenship depend on the place of birth."
This doctrine of citizenship by reason of place of birth is spoken of by the writers on the subject as the jus soli or common law doctrine. The Roman rule is different and is in effect in many of the continental European countries. This is called the jus sanguinis and depends upon the nationality of the parents and not upon the place of birth. Professor Bluntschild, in speaking of the latter doctrine, said:
"The bond of the family lies at the foundation of national and political life, and attaches the child to the people among whom he is born. The opinion that fixes upon the locality of nativity, instead of the personal tie of the family, as the cause of nationality, abases the person to be a dependence of the soil."[1]
But this was not the common law.[2] United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890. When the Constitution was adopted the people of the United States were the citizens of the several States for whom and for whose posterity the government was established. Each of them was a citizen of the United States at the adoption of the Constitution, and all free persons thereafter born within one of the several States became by birth citizens of the State and of the United States.[3]
The first attempt by Congress to define citizenship was in 1866 in the passage of the Civil Rights Act (Rev.St. § 1992, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1). The act provided that:
"All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power are declared to be citizens of the United States."
And this in turn was followed in 1868 by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14, declaring:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
*411 As a result of the adoption of the amendment, whatever differences existed between statesmen and jurists on the general subject prior to the War Between the States was put to rest, and it may now be stated as an established rule that every person born within the United States (except in the case of children of ambassadors, etc.), whether born of parents who are themselves citizens of the United States or of foreign parents, is a citizen of the United States. In the Wong Kim Ark Case, supra, the whole question of citizenship is traced from its source and the subject is so elaborately considered as to make unnecessary any further reference to this phase of the question.
[...]
The record in this case is wholly lacking in any showing of intent, actual or presumptive, on the part of appellee at any time to abandon American citizenship and, lacking such showing, what was said by Attorney General Pierrepont in Steinkauler's Case, 15 Op. Attys. Gen. 15, is true here, that:
"There is no law of the United States under which his father or any other person can deprive him of his birthright. He can return to America at the age of twenty-one, and in due time, if the people elect, he can become President of the United States * * *."
Like opinions were expressed by Secretary Olney on May 29, 1896, in a letter to Mr. Materne, by Secretary Frelinghuysen in 1882, and by Mr. Blaine in 1892. These and many other instances of the application of the rule to a state of facts like those in the present case are to be found in Moore's Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, p. 532, et seq. And the rule is summarized in the statement of Mr. Uhl, acting Secretary of State, in a letter to Mr. Rudolph of May 22, 1895, as follows:
"* * * no principle is better settled than that birth in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the parents, confers American citizenship. The right of election of nationality, which it is generally conceded a person born under such circumstances has, cannot be exercised until he attains his majority. The father cannot by any act of his alter the status conferred upon the son by his birth in this country."

https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep307325/

Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328 (1939); Supreme Court

First. On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, *329 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, § 1; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that case — that a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United States — the Court adverted to the "inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, p. 668. As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law, on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents, does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law.
As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.
Second. It has long been a recognized principle in this country that if a child born here is taken during minority to the country of his parents' origin, where his parents resume their former allegiance, he does not thereby lose his citizenship in the United States provided that on attaining majority he elects to retain that citizenship and to return to the United States to assume its duties. [...]
The decree of the District Court declaring appellee to be a natural born citizen of the United States is in all respects affirmed.
Affirmed.

Article II Facts: https://www.art2superpac.com/issues.html

Woodpusher omitted a key fact in the Perkins v Elg (1939) case and decision. How convenient of him and very typical of his tactics. Woody the pusher of disinformation uses selective quoting and omission of key facts. Her parents were naturalized U.S. Citizens when she was born in the United States. She was a “natural born Citizen” of the United States because she was born in the USA to parents who were both Citizens of the USA when she was born. Later the parents went back to their country of origin and took their child with them. In doing that, the court declared that she had not lost her “natural born Citizen” status due to any actions of her parents.

Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939),

was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a child born in the United States to naturalized parents on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen and that the child’s natural born citizenship is not lost if the child is taken to and raised in the country of the parents’ origin, provided that upon attaining the age of majority, the child elects to retain U.S. citizenship “and to return to the United States to assume its duties.” Not only did the court rule that she did not lose her native born Citizenship but it upheld the lower courts decision that she is a “natural born Citizen of the United States” because she was born in the USA to two naturalized U.S. Citizens.

“But the Secretary of State, according to the allegation of the bill of complaint, had refused to issue a passport to Miss Elg ‘solely on the ground that she had lost her native born American citizenship.’ The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants [307 U.S. 325, 350] (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 , 57 S.Ct. 461, 108 A.L.R. 1000), declared Miss Elg ‘to be a natural born citizen of the United States’ (99 F.2d 414) and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants. The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American citizenship.”

Source: Article II facts: https://www.art2superpac.com/issues.html

Your method of citation can only be called "gross misrepresentation."

Let's take one example: here's how you cite Wong Kim Ark:

Your "

However, here is a fuller quote, beginning here. Bold and italics are emphasis mine. Quote:

----

The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution begins with the words, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of he State wherein they reside."

As appears upon the face of the amendment, as well as from the history of the times, this was not intended to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship, or to prevent any persons from becoming citizens by the fact of birth within the United States who would thereby have become citizens according to the law existing before its adoption. It is declaratory in form, and enabling and extending in effect. Its main purpose doubtless was, as has been often recognized by this court, to establish the citizenship of free negroes, which had been denied in the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393, and to put it beyond doubt that all blacks, as well as whites, born or naturalized within the jurisdiction of the United States are citizens of the United States. The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S. 73; Strauder v. West Virginia (1879), 100 U. S. 303, 100 U. S. 306.; Ex parte Virginia (1879). 100 U. S. 339, 100 U. S. 35; Neal v. Delaware (1880), 103 U. S. 370, 103 U. S. 386; Elk v. Wilkins (1884), 112 U. S. 94, 112 U. S. 101. But the opening words, "All persons born," are general, not to say universal, restricted only by place and jurisdiction, and not by color or race -- as was clearly recognized in all the opinions delivered in The Slaughterhouse Cases, above cited.

In those cases, the point adjudged was that a statute of Louisiana granting to a particular corporation the exclusive right for twenty-five years to have and maintain slaughterhouses within a certain district including the City of New Orleans, requiring all cattle intended for sale or slaughter in that district to be brought to the yards and slaughterhouses of the grantee, authorizing all butchers to slaughter their cattle there, and empowering the grantee to exact a reasonable fee for each animal slaughtered, was within the police powers of the State, and not in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution as creating an involuntary servitude, nor with the Fourteenth Amendment as abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or as depriving persons of their liberty or property without due process of law, or as denying to them the equal protection of the laws.

Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the majority of the court, after observing that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Articles of Amendment of the Constitution were all addressed to the grievances of the negro race, and were designed to remedy them, continued as follows: "We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the language and spirit of these Articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubtedly, while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the Thirteenth Article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this Amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States, which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these Articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent."

And, in treating of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he said: "The distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union."

Mr. Justice Field, in a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley concurred, said of the same clause: "It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States, and it makes their citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any State or the condition of their ancestry."

Mr. Justice Bradley also said: "The question is now settled by the Fourteenth Amendment itself, that citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country, and that state citizenship is secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United States and the citizen's place of residence. The States have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons."

And Mr. Justice Swayne added: "The language employed is unqualified in its scope. There is no exception in its terms, and there can be properly none in their application. By the language 'citizens of the United States' was meant all such citizens, and by 'any person' was meant all persons within the jurisdiction of the State. No distinction is intimated on account of race or color. This court has no authority to interpolate a limitation that is neither expressed nor implied. Our duty is to execute the law, not to make it. The protection provided was not intended to be confined to those of any particular race or class, but to embrace equally all races, classes and conditions of men."

Mr. Justice Miller, indeed, while discussing the causes which led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, made this remark: "The phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."

This was wholly aside from the question in judgment and from the course of reasoning bearing upon that question. It was unsupported by any argument, or by any reference to authorities, and that it was not formulated with the same care and exactness as if the case before the court had called for an exact definition of the phrase is apparent from its classing foreign ministers and consuls together -- whereas it was then well settled law, as has since been recognized in a judgment of this court in which Mr. Justice Miller concurred, that consuls, as such, and unless expressly invested with a diplomatic character in addition to their ordinary powers, are not considered as entrusted with authority to represent their sovereign in his intercourse with foreign States or to vindicate his prerogatives, or entitled by the law of nations to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or public ministers, but are subject to the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, of the courts of the country in which they reside. 1 Kent Com. 44; Story Conflict of Laws § 48; Wheaton International Law (8th ed.) § 249; The Anne (1818), 3 Wheat. 435, 16 U. S. 445, 16 U. S. 446; Gittings v. Crawford (1838), Taney 1, 10; In re Baiz (1890), 135 U. S. 403, 135 U. S. 424.

In weighing a remark uttered under such circumstances, it is well to bear in mind the often quoted words of Chief Justice Marshall: "It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated." Cohens v. Virginia (1821), 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U. S. 399.

That neither Mr. Justice Miller nor any of the justices who took part in the decision of The Slaughterhouse Cases understood the court to be committed to the view that all children born in the United States of citizens or subjects of foreign States were excluded from the operation of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is manifest from a unanimous judgment of the Court, delivered but two years later, while all those judges but Chief Justice Chase were still on the bench, in which Chief Justice Waite said: "Allegiance and protection are, in this connection" (that is, in relation to citizenship), "reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other: allegiance for protection, and protection for allegiance. . . . At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further, and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class, there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens." Minor v. Happersett (1874), 21 Wall. 162, 88 U. S. 166-168.

The decision in that case was that a woman born of citizen parents within the United States was a citizen of the United States, although not entitled to vote, the right to the elective franchise not being essential to citizenship.

----

End quote.

Your quote implies that the Court in Wong Kim Ark "approvingly cited" the opinion of Minors v. Happersett that "natural-born citizens" only included those who were born of citizens, when the Court explicitly noted that any questions or doubts regarding if children born in America of foreign parents counted as "natural-born citizens" was not the subject of their investigation or their decision.

Yet as the Court in Wong Kim Ark clearly intimated, just prior to the previous quote in question, their understanding of natural-born citizenship explicitly fell to the common law understanding, regardless of the parents' nationality. Quote:

----

So far as we are informed, there is no authority, legislative, executive or judicial, in England or America, which maintains or intimates that the statutes (whether considered as declaratory or as merely prospective) conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of citizens have superseded or restricted, in any respect, the established rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion. Even those authorities in this country, which have gone the farthest towards holding such statutes to be but declaratory of the common law have distinctly recognized and emphatically asserted the citizenship of native-born children of foreign parents. 2 Kent Com. 39, 50, 53, 258 note; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf.Ch. 583, 659; Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356, 371.

Passing by questions once earnestly controverted, but finally put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States.

----

End quote.

For you to use your truncated quote as "proof" — that the SCOTUS in Wong Kim Ark believed that "natural-born citizens" meant that only children born in America of American citizens counted as "natural-born" — is you being lazy and careless at best; and an utter liar at worst.

Adjectives mean something. You insist in doing it to deceive people but to be truthful and logically sound in your arguments, you cannot simply ignore the adjective “natural” in the term “natural born Citizen” with “born a Citizen” or simply “Citizen”.

Getting your case dismissed for frivolous filing means more than some incoherent bleating about "adjectives mean something." The court found your incoherent arguments meant less than nothing; rather they were a waste of the Court's time.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed.

natural-born citizen. Persons who are born within the jurisdiction of a national government, i.e., in its territorial limits, or those born of citizens temporarily residing abroad.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 664 (1898), citing Lynch v. Clarke.

That all children, born within the dominion of the United States, of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office, became citizens at the time of their birth, does not appear to have been contested or doubted until more than fifty years after the adoption of the Constitution, when the matter was elaborately argued in the Court of Chancery of New York, and decided upon full consideration by Vice Chancellor Sandford in favor of their citizenship. Lynch v. Clarke, (1844) 1 Sandf. Oh. 583.

Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. 583 (1844), as published in New York Legal Observer, Volume III, 1845

It is an indisputable proposition, that by the rule of the common law of England, if applied to these facts, Julia Lynch was a natural born citizen of the United States. And this rule was established and inflexible in the common law, long anterior to the first settlement of the United States, and, indeed, before the discovery of America by Columbus. By the common law, all persons born within the ligeance of the crown of England, were natural born subjects, without reference to the status or condition of their parents.
[...]
And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section which defines the qualification of the President. "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President," &c. The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since. Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. The position would be decisive in his favor that by the rule of the common law, in force when the constitution was adopted, he is a citizen.

Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 649, 662-63:

In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."

Supreme Court opinions mean more than incoherent bleating about adjectives.

And as all can see, Woodpusher is a verbose spreader of disinformation.

Fact: A “natural born Citizen” of the United States is a person born in the country to parents who were both Citizens (born or naturalized Citizens themselves) of the country when their child was born in the country.

See: Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a child born in the United States to naturalized parents on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen and that the child’s natural born citizenship is not lost if the child is taken to and raised in the country of the parents’ origin, provided that upon attaining the age of majority, the child elects to retain U.S. citizenship “and to return to the United States to assume its duties.” Not only did the court rule that she did not lose her native born Citizenship but it upheld the lower courts decision that she is a “natural born Citizen of the United States” because she was born in the USA to two naturalized U.S. Citizens.

“But the Secretary of State, according to the allegation of the bill of complaint, had refused to issue a passport to Miss Elg ‘solely on the ground that she had lost her native born American citizenship.’ The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants [307 U.S. 325, 350] (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 , 57 S.Ct. 461, 108 A.L.R. 1000), declared Miss Elg ‘to be a natural born citizen of the United States’ (99 F.2d 414) and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants. The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American citizenship.”

Source: Article II facts: https://www.art2superpac.com/issues.html

P.S. There may be someone in the far-left operations center using Sock Puppet tactics in this forum using very similar verbose style and language.

And as all can see, Woodpusher is a verbose spreader of disinformation.

That you would claim this after your disingenuous citation of Wong Kim Ark (as demonstrated in post #44) is laughable. Remove the beam from thine own eye!

P.S. There may be someone in the far-left operations center using Sock Puppet tactics in this forum using very similar verbose style and language.

Because anyone who disagrees with you (and provides numerous legal/judicial citations to make their point) is a "far-left sock puppet", I'm sure.

The evidence of the ineligibility of Kamala Harris to occupy the office of Vice President not only includes the history of US statutes and court interpretations, but the documentation of immigration fraud by her parents at the time of her birth in 1964.

The record also includes continuing fraudulent statements on official documents extending into the 1980's and later, as part of an ongoing attempt to cover-up those acts, which made up the basis for a self-reported claim to "natural-born" citizenship by Kamala herself!

See for yourself: Documents evidencing Kamala Harris ineligibility for VP (and the Presidency) under terms of the Constitution (Natural Born Citizen clause plus the 12th Amendment) available via these links:

Kamala Kancel Website (downloadable PDF available via link)

Kamala Kancel Twitter Site (twitter login required to view)

Far be it from me to defend Kamala Harris's honor (because her politics and race hustling are enough to render her a loathsome politician), I get the distinct impression that you're misinterpreting various aspects of Title 8 of the United States Code.

For starters, the simple fact is this: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." If Kamala Harris was born within the United States whilst being subject to its jurisdiction, then she is a citizen of the United States. Period.

Secondly: would Kamala Harris be liable for any fraud or illegality committed by her mother or father before she was born? No.

Third: let's look at the US Code that was applicable at the of Kamala's birth in 1964, per the Library of Congress. Specifically, the various provisions from Sections 1101 thru 1503.

Now: what is section 1152 relating to? It is under the subchapter II, for Immigration; and part I, the Quota System. The specific title of Section 1152 is "Determination of quota to which an immigrant is chargeable." In other words, it is a means of determining how a quota is impacted in a given year.

Thus, when reading in context (bold is emphasis mine): "Each independent country, self-governing dominion, mandated territory, and territory under the international trusteeship system of the United Nations, other than the United States and its outlying possessions and the countries specified in section 1101 (a) (27) (C) of this title, shall be treated as a separate quota area when approved by the Secretary of State. All other inhabited lands shall be attributed to a quota area specified by the Secretary of State. For the purposes of this chapter, the annual quota to which an immigrant is chargeable shall be determined by birth within a quota area, except that...(3) an alien born in the United States shall be considered as having been born in the country of which he is a citizen or subject, or if he is not a citizen or subject of any country then in the last foreign country in which he had his residence as determined by the consular officer."

Now, how to interpret this?

There are two ways: since we already know that someone born within the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof is a citizen per section 1401(a)(1) of the same Title 8, then this would imply that an "alien born in the United States" as noted in section 1152(a)(3) was somehow not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. So unless you're willing to argue that Kamala wasn't subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of her birth, this doesn't help you (since you don't even dispute the fact that her birth certificate shows she was born in America; only that her parents allegedly lied about their color/race).

Alternatively (and more likely), since section 1152 is explicitly relating to immigration quotas, a child born of immigrants within the United States (and hence a citizen if they were subject to our jurisdiction) was nonetheless treated like an alien solely for the purposes of immigration quotas. That's it. Even if quotas were exceeded, that would not render Kamala Harris's citizenship null and void for that reason alone.

Either way, this means nothing with regards to Kamala Harris's citizenship status (notwithstanding your attempts at claiming residency requirements apply; as far as I'm aware, those are only applicable for children born abroad, which Oakland, CA most certainly is not!). However blameworthy her parents are for their attempts at bypassing America's immigration quotas, or misrepresenting their immigration status (as you've alleged), the fact is this: if Kamala Harris was born within the United States, whilst subject to its jurisdiction, she is a citizen.

Hmmh. Looks like you work the day shift and Woodpusher works the night shift at the Public Relationship Disinformation Operations Center for “Team Obama” and other anti-constitutional Progressive/Marxist operatives pushing out your gas-lighting and tantamount, illogical conflations of “natural born Citizen” with “born a Citizen” and “Citizen” in your citations from verbose material from the same play book.

Adjectives mean something.

“natural born Citizen” Article II Facts: https://www.art2superpac.com/issues.html

Believe whatever you want to believe. (It’s not like I’ve been here for nearly 20 years by this point; besides, as far as I recall, my first interaction with woodpusher didn’t occur until 2022, and that was on the Ukraine/Russia threads.)

I used to believe as you do with regards to the “natural born citizen” argument during the Obama years. You know why I changed my mind?

Evidence.

The outstanding evidence overwhelmingly supported the reality that, as far as SCOTUS interpretation and outstanding statute goes, “a citizen by birth”, “native-born citizen”, and “natural born citizen” are functionally equivalent. The only other class of citizen is one which has been naturalized.

The overview of arguments to the contrary, in my experience, have been either unsupported, spurious (post #44 regarding your faulty citation of Wong Kim Ark comes to mind), contradicted by the plain letter of statute/court precedent, and so forth.

Regardless of how badly some people wish that our system of citizenship was primarily based on “jus sanguinis”, the heritage from the English common law has granted us “jus soli” as the primary determinant. That’s the historical reality, and no amount of citations of Vattel on **international law** will change that.

At this particular juncture, if you want a black letter definition of “natural born citizen” that reflects what you want it to mean, you’re going to need either a statute (subject to Congress’s naturalization authority), or a Constitutional amendment defining it as such.

But good luck with that.

Woodpusher omitted a key fact in the Perkins v Elg (1939) case and decision. How convenient of him and very typical of his tactics. Woody the pusher of disinformation uses selective quoting and omission of key facts. Her parents were naturalized U.S. Citizens when she was born in the United States. She was a “natural born Citizen” of the United States because she was born in the USA to parents who were both Citizens of the USA when she was born. Later the parents went back to their country of origin and took their child with them. In doing that, the court declared that she had not lost her “natural born Citizen” status due to any actions of her parents.

The observant reader will not that CDR Kerchner, in his inimitable way, brought up Perkins v. Elg at his #27, here in its entirety:

See the decision in Perkins v Elg (1939), which I note was after the 1898 WKA case: https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep307325/

It seems like he left out the entire opinion, or any citation to any specific page. He provided only a lnk to a 26-page pdf.

Nowhere does it say that Elg needed two citizen parents to be a natural born citizen. I would note that 1939 was after the 14th Amendment and any provision that added to the constitutional requirements would have rendered the opinion repugnant to the Constitution and null and void.

It did not do that, and Wong Kim Ark contines to be the leading precedent on citizenship acquired by birth within the United States.

https://www.art2superpac.com/issues.html

That source gives a link for its source which goes to Wikipedia.

I cited and quoted Perkins v. Elg and gave a link to the Library of Congress collection of the United States Reports, Volume 307, which contains the official record publication of U.S. Supreme Court opinions.

https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep307325/

Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939),
was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a child born in the United States to naturalized parents on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen and that the child’s natural born citizenship is not lost if the child is taken to and raised in the country of the parents’ origin, provided that upon attaining the age of majority, the child elects to retain U.S. citizenship “and to return to the United States to assume its duties.” Not only did the court rule that she did not lose her native born Citizenship but it upheld the lower courts decision that she is a “natural born Citizen of the United States” because she was born in the USA to two naturalized U.S. Citizens.

That is obviously not written by the court. The Court in Perkins v. Elg would never say "Perkins v. Elg was a decision by the Supreme Court...." That was written by some anonymous soul at Wikipedia who, evidently not satisfied with what the court said, wrote a more fanciful version.

The opening paragraph; of the actual Court opinion reads,

The question is whether the plaintiff, Marie Elizabeth Elg, who was born in the United States of Swedish parents then naturalized here, has lost her citizenship and is subject to deportation because of her removal during minority to Sweden, it appearing that her parents resumed their citizenship in that country but that she returned here on attaining majority with intention to remain and to maintain her citizenship in the United States.

The question before the Court was not to decide if Elg was born a United States citizen, but whether she had subsequently lost the citizenship that she had acquired at birth. Her acquisition of citizenship at birth was not in question.

Repeating what I posted from the Circuit Court:

GRONER, C. J.
The main question in this case is whether appellee, a natural born citizen of the United States, has lost her citizenship involuntarily and by operation of law, by reason of her removal from the United States by her parents in her infancy and her residence in a foreign country until she was 21 years of age.
[...]
The law of England, as of the time of the Declaration of Independence, was that a person born in that kingdom owed to the sovereign allegiance which could not be renounced. Many early American decisions applied that as the common law in this country. All agreed that every free person born within the limits and the allegiance of a State of the United States was a natural born citizen of the State and of the United States.

First. On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, § 1; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that case—that a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United States—the Court adverted to the "inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, p. 668.

That alone should settle forever whether Perkins v. Elg overturned Wong Kim Ark as precedent.

Perkins v. Elg explicitly cited Wong Kim Ark as precedent. Nobody litigated that Elg was not born a citizen. That question was not before the Circuit Court and it was not before the Supreme Court. Nothing in Elg would change had she been the child of two aliens. Elg was born in the United States, subject to its jurisdiction.

“But the Secretary of State, according to the allegation of the bill of complaint, had refused to issue a passport to Miss Elg ‘solely on the ground that she had lost her native born American citizenship.’ The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants [307 U.S. 325, 350] (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 , 57 S.Ct. 461, 108 A.L.R. 1000), declared Miss Elg ‘to be a natural born citizen of the United States’ (99 F.2d 414) and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants. The decree in that sense would in no way interfere with the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American citizenship.”

That is taken from page 307 U.S. 349-50.

How it makes any point for birthers is unknown.

How CDR Kerchner missed pages 329-31 is a mystery. It could be he never read the actual opinion, only his PAC or Wikipedia excerpts. It is not often that I am accused of providing too little, so I must make amends.

Second. It has long been a recognized principle in this country that if a child born here is taken during minority to the country of his parents' origin, where his parents resume their former allegiance, he does not thereby lose his citizenship in the United States provided that on attaining majority he elects to retain that citizenship and to return to the United States to assume its duties.
This principle was clearly stated by Attorney General Edwards Pierrepont in his letter of advice to the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, in Steinkauler's Case, 15 Op. Attys. Gen'l, 15 (1875). The facts were these: One Steinkauler, a Prussian subject by birth, emigrated to the United States in 1848, was naturalized in 1854, and in the following year had a son who was born in St. Louis. Four years later Steinkauler returned to Germany taking this child and became domiciled at Wiesbaden where they continuously resided. When the son reached the age of twenty years the German Government called upon him to report for military duty and his father then invoked the intervention of the American Legation on the ground that his son was a native citizen of the United States. To an inquiry by our Minister, the father declined to give an assurance that the son would return to this country within a reasonable time. On reviewing the pertinent points in the case, including the Naturalization Treaty of 1868 with North Germany, the Attorney General reached the following conclusion:
"Young Steinkauler is a native-born American citizen. There is no law of the United States under which his father or any other person can deprive him of his birthright. He can return to America at the age of twenty-one, and in due time, if the people elect, he can become President of the United States; but the father, in accordance with the treaty and the laws, has renounced his American citizenship and his American allegiance and has acquired for himself and his son German citizenship and the rights which it carries, and he must take the burdens as well as the advantages. The son being domiciled with the father and subject to him under the law during his minority, and receiving the German protection where he has acquired nationality and declining to give any assurance of ever returning to the United States and claiming his American nationality by residence here, I am of opinion that he cannot rightly invoke the aid of the Government of the United States to relieve him from military duty in Germany during his minority. But I am of opinion that when he reaches the age of twentyone years he can then elect whether he will return and take the nationality of his birth, with its duties and privileges, or retain the nationality acquired by the act of his father.

The Superpac source is wacko dingbats.

For example, just before addressing Perkins v. Elg from Wikipedia, it offers this creative brainfart:

3. Rep. John Bingham, Principal Framer of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
As to the question of citizenship I am willing to resolve all doubts in favor of a citizen of the United States. That Dr. Houard is a natural-born citizen of the United States there is not room for the shadow of a doubt. He was born of naturalized parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, and by the express words of the Constitution, as amended to-day, he is declared to all the world to be a citizen of the United States by birth. (The term “to-day”, as used by Bingham, means “to date”. Obviously, the Constitution had not been amended on April 25, 1872.)
Notice that Bingham declares Houard to be a “natural-born citizen” by citing two factors – born of citizen parents in the US.
John Bingham, aka “father of the 14th Amendment”, was an abolitionist congressman from Ohio who prosecuted Lincoln’s assassins.

The SuperPac quote following the stupid header "Rep. John Bingham, Principal Framer of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution" was unrelated to any part of the 14th Amendment.

Of course, everyone who has researched this topic knows that John Bingham was not the Father of the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment. Rep. Bingham offered a 14A bill in the House which included no citizenship clause whatever.

In the Senate, Sen. Jacob Howard offered an amendment to the Bingham bill to include a citizenship clause of Sen. Howard's drafting. Congressional Globe, May 30, 1866, page 2890, column 2, near the bottom. This group of idiots should know John Bingham had nothing to do with the the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment. It is impossible to read the congressional record of the bill and not know.

The words proposed by Sen. Jacob Howard were incorporated into the Constitution via Section I of the 14th Amendment in 1869 — "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."

As shown by the introduction of the clause by Mr. Howard, the intent of the clause was quite clear and specific.

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=11

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the amendments proposed by the Senator from Michigan, [Mr. Howard.]
Mr. HOWARD. The first amendment is to section one, declaring that "all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside." I do not propose to say anything on that subject except that the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to need any further elucidation, in my opinion. This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. This has long been a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country.

John Bingham did not say a mumbling word about the 14th Amendment citizenship clause. The debate on that took place in the Senate. For anyone actually interested in the intent of the framer, the Senate debate is quite educational.

CDR Kerchner is constantly and knowingly shoveling out false information, and citing to nutjob sources.

https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/patriotic-super-pacs/

Article II Super PAC
Here’s a super-PAC so patriotic, it’s named after part of the Constitution. Article II, whose name alludes to the birther theory that President Obama is not a natural-born citizen and is therefore ineligible to be president, is “a small group of fellow Americans, who are sole proprieters of blogs.” That’s important, because “Americans cannot rely on the mainstream media to report on candidates [sic] constitutional eligibility status. Therefore, the responsibility falls on those of us who turned off the news long ago and tuned into the blogosphere—the real American news frontier.” So far, these vanguards of American blogdom have spent $0 against our Kenyan-born usurper.

https://www.opensecrets.org/outside-spending/detail?cmte=C00507533&cycle=2012

https://secure.piryx.com/donate/kp1d1Lpa/ArticleIISuperPac/contribute

https://www.vpap.org/committees/217846/article-ii-super-pac/

https://www.vpap.org/committees/217846/finance_summary/

The premise of your argument is erroneous, as "jurisdiction" in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 1866 authorship of the 14th Amendment meant "not subject to a foreign power" (or, to be more succinct, "allegiance").

Eastman in 2020 wrote how later court rulings in 1872 Slaughterhouse and 1884 Elk v Wilkins clarified this to mean "exclusive" allegiance, where Indians were excluded from US citizenship because they belonged to tribes.

At the time of her birth to alien parents, Kamala Harris acquired "allegiance" of both Jamaica and India, as a citizen to those other countries.

Kamala Harris was not born with "allegiance" to the USA as her status in 1964 was that of an alien, based on the restrictions of her parent's entry to the USA as students - they swore that they retained their permanent residence of their home countries, and did not claim permanent residence within the USA (which happened later, in 1967).

"Allegiance" is critical to a declaration of citizenship, as it affects tax terms and other official status. For example, in World War II, non-resident alien students were exempted from military service, upon this basis.

The immigration fraud of the parents of Kamala Harris was not an isolated instance. They consistently supplied false information and altered timelines on official documents, to cover this up. Kamala herself colluded with her parent's immigration fraud, years later in 1985. Have a look at the documents yourself, to view and verify that claim.

Then, review the requirements of registration for a child born as an alien (but within the USA) to a parent who is a native of India (per the "Asia Pacific Triangle" racial restriction, 8 U.S.C. 12 section 1152, which was in effect in October 1964).

And then stop from mis-informing others by filling this thread with your under-researched and erroneous posts!

Kamala Kancel Website (downloadable PDF available via link)

Kamala Kancel Twitter Site (twitter login required to view)

A simple Euler Diagram defeats all the illogical arguments, conflations of terms, and language manipulation done by the progressives in this forum and elsewhere to defeat the original intent, understanding, and purpose of the "natural born Citizen" of the United States term in the presidential eligibility clause in Article II Section 1 Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution. See below Euler Diagram.

That restrictive citizenship term was used to provide a "strong check" against anyone born with foreign influence on them, i.e., dual-citizenship at birth, from ever being constitutionally eligible to be the Commander in Chief of our military, once the founding generation was gone. The founders were exempted from the "natural born Citizen" term by a "grandfather" clause for them in the presidential eligibility clause, since none of the founders and framers were a "natural born Citizen" of the United States but were instead the "original Citizens". Their spouses became automatically Citizens by the concept of marital fusion of the citizenship of the wife to that of her husband. They would then procreate via their children the "natural born Citizen" of the United States kind of U.S. citizens eligible to be the Commander in Chief, once the founding generation was gone. Thus two original citizen parents giving birth to children in the United States would create the new nation's "natural born Citizen" kind.

No law or treaty or amendment or other man-made legal processes created by Congress using the naturalization powers (naturalizing the person either at birth using 8 USC § 1401 or the 14th Amendment to gain basic Citizenship at birth - or later after their birth using relevant naturalization laws passed by Congress), which were granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution, can create an actual "natural born Citizen". Congress can create a "born Citizen" but Congress cannot create a "natural born Citizen". Adjectives mean something. And that adjective "natural" means created by nature and Natural Law, not man-made Positive Laws.

Only the circumstances of the child's birth per Natural Law can do that, i.e., create a "natural born Citizen". Today with laws changing the fusion of citizenship of a spouse to her husband and allowing the spouse to retain her foreign citizenship, if applicable, the spouse of a U.S. Citizen must cast off her foreign allegiance via her oath of allegiance to the USA when she becomes a U.S. Citizen before her children are born in order for them to be a "natural born Citizen" of the United States. The child to be a "natural born Citizen" of the United States, must be born in the USA to two citizen parents (born or naturalized Citizens themselves) when their child is born in the USA. A child born with unity of Citizenship and sole allegiance to the USA at and by birth.

Who was the first "natural born Citizen" of the United States to be elected President and Commander in Chief, see this report for the answer: https://www.scribd.com/doc/48856102/All-U-S-Presidents-Eligibility-Grandfather-Clause-Natural-Born-Citizen-Clause-or-Seated-by-Fraud

Not only did the court rule that she did not lose her native born Citizenship but it upheld the lower courts decision that she is a “natural born Citizen of the United States” because she was born in the USA to two naturalized U.S. Citizens.

The lower court did not rule that Elg was born a natural born citizen. That was not a contested fact before the court to be decided. Elg was born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. That was simply a fact of the case. The lower court ruled that Elg was, in the present, a natural born citizen, overruling the State Department claim that she had lost her citizenship. The failed claim that she had lost her citizenship affirmed that she had been born a citizen and was still a natural born citizen. It would have been the same had she been born to two aliens.

Fact: A “natural born Citizen” of the United States is a person born in the country to parents who were both Citizens (born or naturalized Citizens themselves) of the country when their child was born in the country.

Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 649, 662-63:

In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."

See: Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a child born in the United States to naturalized parents on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen and that the child’s natural born citizenship is not lost if the child is taken to and raised in the country of the parents’ origin, provided that upon attaining the age of majority, the child elects to retain U.S. citizenship “and to return to the United States to assume its duties.” Not only did the court rule that she did not lose her native born Citizenship but it upheld the lower courts decision that she is a “natural born Citizen of the United States” because she was born in the USA to two naturalized U.S. Citizens.

Might as well give the original source on that load of crap, and it's not the Court. The lower court overruled the State Department claim that she had lost her citizenship, and therefore, she continued to be the natural born citizen she was born as. Her birth citizenship status was not at issue.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perkins_v._Elg

The source was laundered through the Art2 Super PAC site, but here it is straight from Wikipedia.

Perkins v. Elg
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a child born in the United States to naturalized parents on U.S. soil is a natural born citizen and that the child's natural born citizenship is not lost if the child is taken to and raised in the country of the parents' origin, provided that upon attaining the age of majority, the child elects to retain U.S. citizenship "and to return to the United States to assume its duties."[1]
[...]
Holding: A child born in the United States to naturalized parents and raised abroad retains U.S. citizenship until the age of majority, and at that point continues to retain U.S. citizenship if he or she elects to retain it, and elects to return to the United States and assume the duties of a U.S. citizen.

A child born in the United States to two illegal aliens and raised abroad obtains and retains natural born citizenship. However, as also shown in Elg, if the child obtains nationality of the country where they are living, and he or she gets drafted for military service, they are obliged to serve in that foreign military. Elg at 307 U.S. 330. But they can still become President of the United States!

"Young Steinkauler is a native-born American citizen. There is no law of the United States under which his father or any other person can deprive him of his birthright. He can return to America at the age of twenty-one, and in due time, if the people elect, he can become President of the United States; but the father, in accordance with the treaty and the laws, has renounced his American citizenship and his American allegiance and has acquired for himself and his son German citizenship and the rights which it carries, and he must take the burdens as well as the advantages. The son being domiciled with the father and subject to him under the law during his minority, and receiving the German protection where he has acquired nationality and declining to give any assurance of ever returning to the United States and claiming his American nationality by residence here, I am of opinion that he cannot rightly invoke the aid of the Government of the United States to relieve him from military duty in Germany during his minority. But I am of opinion that when he reaches the age of twentyone years he can then elect whether he will return and take the nationality of his birth, with its duties and privileges, or retain the nationality acquired by the act of his father.

Elg at 307 U.S. 345

"The statute does, however, make a distinction between the burden imposed upon the person born in the United States of foreign parents and the person born abroad of American parents. With respect to the latter, section 6 of the Act of March 2, 1907, lays down the requirement that, as a condition to the protection of the United States, the individual must, upon reaching the age of 18, record at an American consulate an intention to remain a citizen of the United States, and must also take an oath of allegiance to the United States upon attaining his majority.
"The child born of foreign parents in the United States who spends his minority in the foreign country of his parents' nationality is not expressly required by any statute of the United States to make the same election as he approaches or attains his majority. It is, nevertheless, believed that his retention of a right "to demand the protection of the United States should, despite the absence of statute, be dependent upon his convincing the department within a reasonable period after the attaining of his majority of an election to return to the United States, there to assume the duties of citizenship. In the absence of a definite statutory requirement, it is impossible to prescribe a limited period within which such election should be made. On the other hand, it may be asserted negatively that one who has long manifested no indication of a will to make such an election should not receive the protection of the United States save under the express approval of the department."
It thus appears that as late as 1925, when the Department issued its "Compilation" including the circular instruction of November 24, 1923, it was the view of the Department of State that the Act of March 2, 1907, had not taken away the right of a native citizen on attaining majority to retain his American citizenship, where he was born in the United States of foreign parents. We do not think that it would be a proper construction of the Act to hold that while it leaves untouched the right of election on the part of a child born in the United States, in case his parents were foreign nationals at the time of his birth and have never lost their foreign nationality, still the statute should be treated as destroying that right of election if his parents became foreign nationals through naturalization. That would not seem to be a sensible distinction. Having regard to the plain purpose of § 2 of the Act of 1907, to deal with voluntary expatriation, we are of the opinion that its provisions do not affect the right of election, which would otherwise exist, by reason of a wholly involuntary and merely derivative naturalization in another country during minority. And, on the facts of the instant case, this view apparently obtained when in July, 1929, on the instructions of the Secretary of State, the Department issued the passport to respondent as a citizen of the United States.
When, precisely there occurred a change in the departmental attitude is not clear. It seems to have resulted in a conflict with the opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of Labor in the case of Ingrid Therese Tobiassen, and the Secretary of Labor because of that conflict requested the opinion of the Attorney General, which was given on June 16, 1932. "It appeared that Miss Tobiassen, aged 20, was born in New York in 1911; that her father, a native of Norway, became a citizen of the United States by naturalization in 1912; that in 1919 Miss Tobiassen was taken by her parents to Norway where the latter had since resided; that at the age of 18 she returned to the United States and took up her permanent residence in New Jersey. The question arose when she asked for a return permit to visit her parents.
The Department of State refused to issue a passport on the ground that Miss Tobiassen had acquired Norwegian nationality and had ceased to be an American citizen. The Attorney General's opinion approved that action. His opinion quoted the provisions of the treaty with Sweden and Norway of 1869 and referred to the Norwegian Nationality Law of August 8, 1924, and to the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1907. The opinion noted that the claim that Miss Tobiassen had ceased to be an American citizen did "not rest upon the terms of the Naturalization Treaty with Norway, but upon a law of that country, as a result of the renunciation by her father, a native of Norway, of his American citizenship, and the resumption of his Norwegian nationality in pursuance of the terms of that treaty." The law of Norway was deemed to be analogous to our statutes "by virtue of which foreign-born minor children of persons naturalized in the United States are declared to be citizens of this country"; and hence the conclusion that Miss Tobiassen having acquired Norwegian nationality had in consequence ceased to be an American citizen was said to be correct.
The opinion does not discuss the right of election of a native citizen of the United States when he becomes of age to retain American citizenship and does not refer to the repeated rulings of the Department of State in recognition of that right, the exercise of which, as we have pointed out, should not be deemed to be inconsistent with either treaty or statute. We are reluctant to disagree with the opinion of the Attorney General, and we are fully conscious of the problems incident to dual nationality and of the departmental desire to limit them, but we are compelled to agree with the Court of Appeals in the instant case that the conclusions of that opinion are not adequately supported and are opposed to the established principles which should govern the disposition of this case.
Nor do we think that recent private acts of Congress for the relief of native citizens who have been the subject of administrative action denying their rights of citizenship, can be regarded as the equivalent of an Act of Congress providing that persons in the situation of the respondent here have lost the American citizenship which they acquired at birth and have since duly elected to retain. No such statute has been enacted.
We conclude that respondent has not lost her citizenship in the United States and is entitled to all the rights and privileges of that citizenship.

Clearly in the Tobiasson case, she was born in the United States in 1911 and her father was naturalized in 1912. The Supreme Court noted that case did not discuss the right of election of a native citizen, and the Supreme Court stated, we are compelled to agree with the Court of Appeals in the instant case that the conclusions of that opinion are not adequately supported and are opposed to the established principles which should govern the disposition of this case.

The U.S. Supreme Court found that the child born in the United States of alien parentage obtained native born citizenship at birth, and the subsequent Attorney General finding that she had lost her citizenship during her age of minority was unsupported by law, and contrary to law.

P.S. There may be someone in the far-left operations center using Sock Puppet tactics in this forum using very similar verbose style and language.

Some clowns on this site prefer Wikipedia and a ridiculous Super PAC over statute laws, codified law, and court opinions. The even try to dress up Wikipedia nonsense as a court opinion. And for convenience sake, they prefer to have Euroweenie international law dictate who is, and is not, a United States citizen. As a part of sovereignty, every sovereign nation has the sole authority to determine who are its citizens. It is called self-determination. A nation that gives that away is not very sovereign.

The premise of your argument is erroneous, as "jurisdiction" in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 1866 authorship of the 14th Amendment meant "not subject to a foreign power" (or, to be more succinct, "allegiance").
Eastman in 2020 wrote how later court rulings in 1872 Slaughterhouse and 1884 Elk v Wilkins clarified this to mean "exclusive" allegiance, where Indians were excluded from US citizenship because they belonged to tribes.

Eastman's 2020 efforts earned him a trial before the Californa State Bar. Last month the trial resulted in a preliminary finding of unethical behavior, including filings with no legal support.

https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/john-eastman-state-bar-trial-18532917.php

It’s now up to a judge whether Trump attorney John Eastman can keep his California law license
San Francisco Chronicle
By Bob Egelko
Dec 4, 2023
Eastman “had a First Amendment right to speak out about election fraud,” and punishing him would have “a chilling effect on legal advocacy for decades to come,” attorney Randall A. Miller wrote in final arguments Friday to the State Bar Court’s judge, Yvette Roland, who presided over the 35-day trial.
Roland has already issued a tentative decision, however, that Eastman committed violations of legal ethics when he tried to help Trump overturn the election results. She is due to issue a final ruling within 90 days, which could be appealed to the state Supreme Court.

Rep. Bingham offered a 14A bill in the House which included no citizenship clause whatever.

In the Senate, Sen. Jacob Howard offered an amendment to the Bingham bill to include a citizenship clause of Sen. Howard's drafting. Congressional Globe, May 30, 1866, page 2890, column 2, near the bottom.

The words proposed by Sen. Jacob Howard were incorporated into the Constitution via Section I of the 14th Amendment in 1868 — "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."

As shown by the introduction of the clause by Mr. Howard, the intent of the Framer of the clause clause was quite clear and specific.

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=073/llcg073.db&recNum=11

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the amendments proposed by the Senator from Michigan, [Mr. Howard.]
Mr. HOWARD. The first amendment is to section one, declaring that "all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside." I do not propose to say anything on that subject except that the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to need any further elucidation, in my opinion. This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons. It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. This has long been a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country.

In re Wong Kim Ark, District Court, N.D. California, 71 Federal Reporter 382 (1896), Morrow, District Judge

71 Federal Reporter 390-391

The Slaughterhouse Cases were decided in 1873, and the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Miller. In the decision most of the provisions of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the constitution received clear, elaborate, and able interpretation and construction. …
But the question which is here directly involved did not arise in that case, nor did the interpretation of the court relate to such a state of facts as exists here. Obviously, therefore, what the court then said with reference to the status of children born here of foreign parents is but obiter dictum. …
… the observations referred to and relied upon, however persuasive they may appear to be, cannot be accepted as declaring the law in this circuit, at least as against the authority of In re Look Tin Sing, where the question was squarely met and decisively settled.

So much for the Slaughterhouse Cases as precedent.

71 Federal Reporter 391

Nor does the interpretation of the phrase in question in the case of Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 5 Sup. Ct. 41, dispose of the matter. There the question was whether an Indian, born within the United States, and who had severed his tribal relations, was a citizen of the United States, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.

There goes Elk as precedent.

Let's try Plyler v. Doe.

https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep457202/

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 (1982)

In appellants' view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within a State's boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that constricting construction of the phrase "within its jurisdiction." ¹⁰
We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due process. To the contrary, we have recognized that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state authority.
__________
¹⁰ "Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... ." (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898), detailed at some length the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense in which the term "jurisdiction" was used.
He further noted that it was "impossible to construe the words 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment], as less comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,' in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons 'within the jurisdiction' of one of the States of the Union are not 'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' Id., at 687.
Justice Gray concluded that "[e]very citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States." Id., at 693. As one early commentator noted, given the historical emphasis on geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. See C. Bouvé, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States 425-427 (1912).

The premise of your argument is erroneous, as "jurisdiction" in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 1866 authorship of the 14th Amendment meant "not subject to a foreign power" (or, to be more succinct, "allegiance").

And by this standard, neither of Kamala's parents were subject to a foreign power by the mere fact of being immigrant aliens, as they were not acting as duly-authorized representatives of either India or Jamaica.

Eastman in 2020 wrote how later court rulings in 1872 Slaughterhouse and 1884 Elk v Wilkins clarified this to mean "exclusive" allegiance, where Indians were excluded from US citizenship because they belonged to tribes.

Good thing Kamala wasn't part of an Indian tribe, was she? Indian Reservations were considered sovereign entities from the point of statute, and not subject to American jurisdiction as a result; however, if a Native American child had been born outside of a reservation prior to the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 (i.e. a "straggling Indian", to borrow a phrase from the Senate report "Report on the Effect of the 14th Amendment Upon Indian Tribes" dated 12-14-1870), they would have been considered birthright citizens in light of Wong Kim Ark, as they would have been born subject to America's jurisdiction.

(Then again, Dr. John Eastman's particular ideas regarding birthright citizenship seem to lack historical veracity, so the fact you cite him as an authority means bupkis.)

At the time of her birth to alien parents, Kamala Harris acquired "allegiance" of both Jamaica and India, as a citizen to those other countries.

And your evidence that they were duly-authorized representatives of Jamaica and India (akin to foreign diplomats), hence exempting them and any of their children born in America from US jurisdiction, is what? The mere fact they were immigrant aliens is not enough; they would have had to been employed by Jamaica or India in an official or diplomatic capacity.

Kamala Harris was not born with "allegiance" to the USA as her status in 1964 was that of an alien, based on the restrictions of her parent's entry to the USA as students - they swore that they retained their permanent residence of their home countries, and did not claim permanent residence within the USA (which happened later, in 1967).

What part of USC Title 8 stipulates specific residency requirements for aliens in order for their children — if born in America and born subject to American jurisdiction — to be considered birthright citizens? Be specific.

Furthermore, as noted in the case of Wong Kim Ark (both parents were Chinese merchants who were considered subject of the Chinese Emperor, and were ineligible for naturalization at the time of Wong's birth [in other words, your idea of "allegiance" was statutorily impossible for them to obtain]; even though they repatriated to China during Wong's teens, WKA himself returned to America, wherein after a long legal battle, his birthright citizenship was recognized accordingly), he was considered subject to America's jurisdiction at birth, even though his parents were ineligible for naturalization at the time. Are you arguing that the status of Kamala's parents was such that it rendered Kamala outside of America's jurisdiction at the time of her birth?

"Allegiance" is critical to a declaration of citizenship, as it affects tax terms and other official status. For example, in World War II, non-resident alien students were exempted from military service, upon this basis.

And do you have any evidence that Kamala Harris tried to repatriate to either Jamaica or India, at the bare minimum?

The immigration fraud of the parents of Kamala Harris was not an isolated instance. They consistently supplied false information and altered timelines on official documents, to cover this up.

That Kamala's parents allegedly committed immigration fraud does not necessarily imply that Kamala was outside American jurisdiction at the time of her birth in Oakland. This would actually need to be proved in a manner consistent with statute and current SCOTUS/constitutional precedent.

Kamala herself colluded with her parent's immigration fraud, years later in 1985. Have a look at the documents yourself, to view and verify that claim.

That Kamala Harris herself allegedly helped her parents commit immigration fraud as an adult does not retroactively render her as being outside of America's jurisdiction at the time of her birth in Oakland. (They're very good reasons to consider her poor VP or Presidential material, but there's a whole host of reasons Kamala makes for a poor stateswoman that have nothing to do with her status as an American citizen.)

Then, review the requirements of registration for a child born as an alien (but within the USA) to a parent who is a native of India (per the "Asia Pacific Triangle" racial restriction, 8 U.S.C. 12 section 1152, which was in effect in October 1964).

And again, as Section 1152 itself specifically designates, its statutes are with regards to immigration quotas. Even if Kamala's parents allegedly committed fraud to avoid the quota restriction, this does not mean Kamala herself wasn't subject to American jurisdiction at the time of her birth. That Kamala may have been considered an alien for the sole purpose of immigration quotas would have had no bearing on her nationality status as a child born in America and subject to American jurisdiction.

And then stop from mis-informing others by filling this thread with your under-researched and erroneous posts!

Given that you think immigration quotas have anything to do with determining the nationality of alien-born children — because if said children are born in America whilst subject to American jurisdiction, they are nationals and citizens of the United States per Section 1401(a)(1) of Title 8, in effect in 1964) — I think I'm on solid ground.

I feel bad for John Bingham. He's getting credit for Section 2 when as you rightly point out, that was not his "baby". He rightly gets credit for Section 1, which unfortunately Slaughterhouse gimped (well they gimped the Privileges or Immunities Clause).

Thank you to AJ Thomas for I believe getting it correct in McDonald v. City of Chicago. It only took over 200 years to fully incorporate the Second Amendment!

Perkins v. Elg, 99 F. 2d 408 - Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 1938

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890. When the Constitution was adopted the people of the United States were the citizens of the several States for whom and for whose posterity the government was established. Each of them was a citizen of the United States at the adoption of the Constitution, and all free persons thereafter born within one of the several States became by birth citizens of the State and of the United States.

It appears the Supreme Court in Elg (1939) agrees.

Thus, Vivek should be considered an NBC.

Thank you woodpusher. I'll include CDR Kerchner in my response.

In Perkins v. Elg, 99 F. 2d 408 - Court of Appeals, Dist. of Columbia Circuit 1938 the Court of Appeals noted as part of the basis for their decision that...

...United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890. When the Constitution was adopted the people of the United States were the citizens of the several States for whom and for whose posterity the government was established. Each of them was a citizen of the United States at the adoption of the Constitution, and all free persons thereafter born within one of the several States became by birth citizens of the State and of the United States.

It appears the Supreme Court in Elg (1939) agrees.

What matters is what the ratifiers of the Constitution considered a natural born citizen (NBC) was. Again, the Constitution is properly applied as written and ORIGINALLY UNDERSTOOD and intended.

Thus, Vivek should be considered an NBC.