Posted on 09/21/2019 11:38:36 PM PDT by zeestephen
What we had in the two downed airplanes was a textbook failure of airmanship. In broad daylight, these pilots couldn’t decipher a variant of a simple runaway trim, and they ended up flying too fast at low altitude, neglecting to throttle back and leading their passengers over an aerodynamic edge into oblivion. [Extreme length]
(Excerpt) Read more at msn.com ...
“No amount of “airmanship” can overcome a fatally flawed software system which intercedes in control of the aircraft to disastrous consequence. The only ‘fix’ in these circumstances is to disable those computer systems.”
In Boeing FBW system, pilot inputs over ride the computers.
In Airbus FBW system, pilot inputs do not.
It used to be that a majority of airline pilots were former military pilots. So not only did they have the military ethos of how to handle all things in life but also incredible airmanship experience including combat. Much different mindset and skills than pilots who come up purely through civilian channels.
True, but they also had the stall warning blaring. I believe that most pilots would consider a stall to be a more immediate concern than over speed and the corrective actions are basically the exact opposite of an over speed.
It is almost impossible for a stall and an over speed to occur simultaneously. In order for this to occur, the plane would have to pull more than 9 Gs.
Competent pilots would recognize they had an AOA malfunction.
True, but they also had the stall warning blaring. I believe that most pilots would consider a stall to be a more immediate concern than over speed and the corrective actions are basically the exact opposite of an over speed.
...
The stick shaker was activated which was a stall warning.
But the pilots retracted the flaps, which shouldn’t be done when there is a stall warning.
Had they left the flaps where they were then MCAS would not have been activated.
Strange. Boeing admits that they screwed up. And it sure is taking a long time to fix all of those screw ups. The list is long.
That is true, and US/UK pilots are experienced and have “air sense.”
It is often discussed how badly automation of the cockpit is harming piloting skills and judgment.
“The United States Navy manages to instill a sense of this in its fledgling fighter pilots by ramming them through rigorous classroom instruction and then requiring them to fly at bank angles without limits, including upside down.”
Air Force, too. And includes spin training during fighter UPT
Air Force does not really classify anything as acrobatic unless it exceeds 90-degrees of bank or nose high/low.
Civilians consider something like a 30-degree bank angle as borderline acrobatic. May be misinformed on that since its been decades since I flew civilian.
As a USAF pilot (A-10 and F-15E), anything less than 4-G’s and 90-degrees of bank while in the traffic pattern is considered weak.
blancolirio Full Playlist - Boeing 737-8-9 MAX crashes
7
Runaway trim is simple and easily handled by first world pilots.
Wow, that's a long interview. {:0)
Well stated (A-10/F-15E pilot) and yes, big difference as you point out.
;-)
The reaction that you prescribe -- pulling back on the throttle -- was not the intuitive or trained response to the deadly condition that the Ethiopian Air flight crew confronted. The initial malfunction of the MCAS system was potentially lethal and set in motion a series of events and crew reactions that led to the crash. A superior pilot and crew might have averted the disaster, but the 737 MAX is supposed to be flown by pilots and crews of ordinary experience and ability, not by a select few of extraordinary ability.
It seems that due to bad sensor inputs,
...
The stick shaker activated shortly after takeoff because of a bad alpha vane on the left side. At that point MCAS was not activated because the flaps were extended.
Competent pilots would have taken one of two actions.
The could believe the stick shaker and taken action to prevent a stall. This would include leaving the flaps extended. They did not do that.
They could believe the stick shaker was wrong due to a bad sensor. In that case they could compare the left and right side instruments with the backup instruments. That would have told them there was a bad sensor on the left side. The fix was to simply switch both the left and right instruments to the sensors on the right side. Had they done that, MCAS never would have activated and they could have flown back to the airport.
These incompetent pilots took neither action and they crashed the plane.
Long read but very interesting.
Re: Well, I guess there would be no reason for them to lie about that.
Glad we can agree on something.
The plane flew for two years in North America, Europe, and in the wealthy Asian countries.
Zero crashes, zero close calls, and, as far as I know, zero incident reports about the software or the equipment that allegedly caused the fatal accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia.
Bottom Line...
Third World pilot error or Islamic terrorism.
IMHO, Islamic terrorism did not play a part.
In addition to Third World pilot error, I would add:
Third World aircraft maintenance
Third World pilot qualification
Third World pilot training
My bottom line...I will never fly on a Third World airline...ever!
Note: this topic is from . Thanks zeestephen.
What we had in the two downed airplanes was a textbook failure of airmanship. In broad daylight, these pilots couldn’t decipher a variant of a simple runaway trim, and they ended up flying too fast at low altitude, neglecting to throttle back and leading their passengers over an aerodynamic edge into oblivion.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.