Posted on 05/29/2018 11:15:47 AM PDT by zeugma
COLLINS v. VIRGINIA
292 Va. 486, 790 S.E. 2d 611, reversed and remanded.
Opinion [Sotomayor]
Concurrence [Thomas]
Dissent [Alito]
Syllabus
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Collins v. Virginia
certiorari to the supreme court of virginia
No. 16-1027. Argued January 9, 2018-Decided May 29, 2018
During the investigation of two traffic incidents involving an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame, Officer David Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in the possession of petitioner Ryan Collins. Officer Rhodes discovered photographs on Collins' Facebook profile of an orange and black motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house, drove to the house, and parked on the street. From there, he could see what appeared to be the motorcycle under a white tarp parked in the same location as the motorcycle in the photograph. Without a search warrant, Office Rhodes walked to the top of the driveway, removed the tarp, confirmed that the motorcycle was stolen by running the license plate and vehicle identification numbers, took a photograph of the uncovered motorcycle, replaced the tarp, and returned to his car to wait for Collins. When Collins returned, Officer Rhodes arrested him. The trial court denied Collins' motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that Officer Rhodes violated the Fourth Amendment when he trespassed on the house's curtilage to conduct a search, and Collins was convicted of receiving stolen property. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed. The State Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment 's automobile exception.
Held: The automobile exception does not permit the warrantless entry of a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein. Pp. 3-14.
(a) This case arises at the intersection of two components of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and the protection extended to the curtilage of a home. In announcing each of the automobile exception's justifications i.e., the ready mobility of the automobile and the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390, 392 the Court emphasized that the rationales applied only to automobiles and not to houses, and therefore supported their different treatment as a constitutional matter. When these justifications are present, officers may search an automobile without a warrant so long as they have probable cause. Curtilage - the area immediately surrounding and associated with the home is considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6. Thus, when an officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a Fourth Amendment search has occurred and is presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant. Pp.3-6.
(b) As an initial matter, the part of the driveway where Collins' motorcycle was parked and subsequently searched is curtilage. When Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle, it was parked inside a partially enclosed top portion of the driveway that abuts the house. Just like the front porch, side garden, or area outside the front window, that enclosure constitutes an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of home life extends.' Jardines, 569 U.S., at 6, 7.
Because the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself, it did not justify Officer Rhodes' invasion of the curtilage. Nothing in this Court's case law suggests that the automobile exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. Such an expansion would both undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and 'untether' the exception from the justifications underlying it. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, ___. This Court has similarly declined to expand the scope of other exceptions to the warrant requirement. Thus, just as an officer must have a lawful right of access to any contraband he discovers in plain view in order to seize it without a warrant see Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 and just as an officer must have a lawful right of access in order to arrest a person in his home - see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-590 so, too, an officer must have a lawful right of access to a vehicle in order to search it pursuant to the automobile exception. To allow otherwise would unmoor the exception from its justifications, render hollow the core Fourth Amendment protection the Constitution extends to the house and its curtilage, and transform what was meant to be an exception into a tool with far broader application. Pp.6-11.
(c) Contrary to Virginia's claim, the automobile exception is not a categorical one that permits the warrantless search of a vehicle anytime, anywhere, including in a home or curtilage. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251; Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, distinguished. Also unpersuasive is Virginia's proposed bright line rule for an automobile exception that would not permit warrantless entryonly of the house itself or another fixed structure, e.g., a garage, inside the curtilage. This Court has long been clear that curtilage is afforded constitutional protection, and creating a carveout for certain types of curtilage seems more likely to create confusion than does uniform application of the Court's doctrine. Virginia's rule also rests on a mistaken premise, for the ability to observe inside curtilage from a lawful vantage point is not the same as the right to enter curtilage without a warrant to search for information not otherwise accessible. Finally, Virginia's rule automatically would grant constitutional rights to those persons with the financial means to afford residences with garages but deprive those persons without such resources of any individualized consideration as to whether the areas in which they store their vehicles qualify as curtilage. Pp.11-14.
292 Va. 486, 790 S.E. 2d 611, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
You will find full the opinion listed as Collins vs. Virgina at the Supreme Court website - https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/17
You might also be interested in reading through the Oral Arguments before the court. You'll find that here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-1027_p4k8.pdf.
I tried to get rid of most of the funky characters from this, but I might have missed some.
RBG?......................
It’s interesting that probable cause didn’t enter into this.
But now that I think about it, he was not SURE it was the stolen bike. Rather, he was just “pretty sure”. He wasn’t sure until he entered the enclosed area and ran the title. That is the same as seeing, through the window of a house, a plant in the window that, though severely obscured, may be a pot plant. You would need a warrant unless it is OBVIOUSLY a pot plant.
He needed a warrant.
If he saw the stolen motorcycle on Facebook why is that not probable cause?
Note to self - always keep stolen motorcycles under tarps!
Could have probably used that fakebook entry to get a warrant, but he decided he didn't need one.
LOL. Yes, it didn't work in that case.
The cop should have said, “A big gust of wind came up and blew the tarp off!”......................
He should have gotten the warrant first.
It’s not like he didn’t know where the bike was kept.
So the cop was right about the motorcycle.
It’s always interesting to see when Supreme Court justices with very different political philosophies about the Constitution, and their own roles, concur on a case centered on a fundamental Constitutional right.
So what?
Yes. We're all so much safer when the police can lie with impunity.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution exists for a reason.
That’ll part right out.
Just sayin’.
Alito’s ‘Originalist’ dissent:
” Since the First Congress sent the Bill of Rights to the States for ratification, we have often looked to laws enacted by that Congress as evidence of the original understanding of the meaning of those Amendments. See, e.g., id., at 150–151; Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 7–8); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S. 579, 585–586 (1983); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 616–617 (1977). Carroll itself noted that the First Congress enacted a law authorizing officers to search vessels without a warrant. 267 U. S., at 150–151. Although this statute did not expressly state that these officers could cross private property such as wharves in order to reach and board those vessels, I think that was implicit. Otherwise, the statute would very often have been ineffective. And when Congress later enacted similar laws, it made this authorization express. See, e.g., An Act Further to Prevent Smuggling and for Other Purposes, §5, 14 Stat. 179. For this reason, Officer Rhodes’s conduct in this case is consistent with the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, as explicated in Carroll. “
So what happens now that they know where the stolen MC is and who stole it? Does the thief get to keep it?
thanks for posting
Ironically he probably could have waited for the guy to get home (which he did anyway) just walked up to him in the driveway and said “I’d like to talk to you about that stolen motorcycle.” The thief would probably have just given up. Police are allowed to lie.
Get a warrant! It’s not that hard. If it is time sensitive, judges are available for TELEPHONIC warrants.
The CONSTITUTION is pretty clear on this (look at the broad range of Justices that agreed). This was what I would call bad (lazy or inexperienced officer) police work.
Oldplayer
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