Posted on 02/16/2018 3:01:42 AM PST by lowbuck
The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan falls short of the strategic imperative.
In 1961 President John F. Kennedy challenged the nation with a great goal: “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth.”
“Before this decade is out.”
This nation used to be able to do great things in a short period of time, when it thought it was important. This past week the U.S. Navy, with its 30-year shipbuilding plan, fell short of the standard of national greatness. To be sure, the plan has some strong points. Its adds 54 ships to the battle force over the next five fiscal years, raising the battle force from its present 280 ships to 324. This will take some strain off the fleet as it attempts to defend the nation’s vital national interests by maintaining approximately 108 ships forward deployed at all times, but it falls far short of the 355 ships required to meet the nation’s minimum requirements. In addition, the plan envisions a massive falloff in the ship count a decade from now, during the 2025–35 “maximum danger” era, and does not achieve the statutory goal of 355 ships until the 2050s. The plan fails due to an abundance of caution and a lack of adherence to the nation’s strategic goal of achieving a balance between capabilities and capacity.
There is a lot of hand-wringing in the 30-year plan about stable funding lines for ship construction and a decline in the nation’s shipbuilding capacity. Navy leaders rightly call out political leaders for their over reliance on continuing resolutions to support the military, and the harmful effects of inconsistent funding on shipbuilding practices, but it is not the Department of the Navy’s job to plan for such occurrences, no matter their likelihood. Naval leaders ought instead to plan for regular order and then testify openly and critically when it breaks down. Rather than a gathering of gallant sailors in a budgetary planning effort, we observe Churchill’s admonition, “the sum of their fears,” in this 30-year plan.
There are also concerns about the defense industrial base, specifically the nation’s shipbuilding capacity. The 30-year plan reports that 14 shipyards have closed over the past generation, leaving only a handful, and three others have shifted from defense to commercial shipbuilding. From this vantage, Navy leaders express concern that the industrial base is incapable of ramping up production quickly, but the question then becomes: Whose fault is that? For nearly 30 years, the Department of Defense has quietly encouraged the defense sector to seek economies and consolidate, turning a blind eye to the strategic implications of defense corporate mergers. Rather than stimulating industrial expansion, as the president himself has called for, this plan attempts to manage shipbuilding within current margins, bypassing a strategic opportunity to help guide the reexpansion of the industrial base.
Perhaps the greatest cause for disappointment within the 30-year plan is its mistaken emphasis. Despite language within the President’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy that directs the services to pursue a balance between high-end (and expensive) cutting-edge capabilities and expanded capacities (growth in platform numbers), the initial ship procurements over the next five years are largely directed at high-end platforms such as the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, procuring them at a rate of three a year. Meanwhile, low-end platforms such as littoral combat ships and the new guided-missile frigate, where the Navy has the easiest path to expand its numbers, are bought in lots of one and two ships during the same time period. If the Navy were to subtract one of its destroyers and add two frigates to its shipbuilding plan in its place (a less expensive option), resulting in four low-end combatants bought per year, the Navy could expand its fleet more quickly. Navy leaders express concern that the industrial base is incapable of ramping up production quickly, but the question then becomes: Whose fault is that?
The Navy, however, says that it needs ever more of the high-end ships, shifting its programmed goal for large surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers) from 88 to 104 within its overall 355-ship construct while holding its small surface combatant (littoral combat ships and frigates) steady at 52. This actually runs counter to historical fleet architectures, which place greater emphasis on small combatants for naval-presence, anti-submarine, anti-surface, and convoy-escort missions. If anything, the Navy should revert to its 88-ship large surface combatant inventory goal and expand its small surface combatant total to around 75 ships, which would be in keeping with historical norms. If the Navy pursued this route aggressively, it could achieve and hold a 355-ship inventory before another decade is out.
That it is not, is troubling. While it is true that the Navy recognizes that 355 ships represents the “Navy the nation needs,” it does not seem aware that it needs it now. Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy recognize that the nation is once again in an era of great-power competition, much as it was when Kennedy issued his moon-landing challenge. We actually have been in a new Cold War for some time, but eight years of “lead from behind” facile foreign policy sought to mask this condition. The bottom line is that China and Russia, sensing weakness and possible American decline, have cast their lots and are charging hard to establish authoritarian spheres of influence in Europe and Asia and the waters that surround them, and they have shipbuilding plans of their own. Russia plans to dramatically improve the capabilities of its navy, and China plans for a large-capacity, 500-ship fleet. The decade spanning the years 2025 to 2035 represents a new period of maximum danger, when rising competitors are most likely to press for their grand strategic goals and create authoritarian spheres on their borders, fracturing the world. The United States’ only hope to sustain its position of leadership within the broader global economic and mutual-security system lies in a commitment to achieving the right balance between capabilities and capacity within a 355-ship navy “before this decade is out.”
As an old "Navy hand" I have an interest in what happens to our Navy. I have seen it go through many cycles. I went to it as a junior office just after the Vietnam era and watched it rise under President Reagan.
Left on a high note and it seems it has been downhill ever since.
If you are interested in why a strong Navy is needed to project power and more importantly protect our sea lanes of communication (read commercial ships) I commend to you Arthur Herman's book "To Rule the Waves". It is a terrific read about the rise and fall of the Royal Navy and gives one a good perspective of what is at stake with our Navy and where our national interest goes.
Interesting.
I thought we had decommissioned all of our frigate-class ships because they were so limited in mission-scope, but this makes sense - you don't need the punch of a destroyer for escort and interdiction missions, a cheaper (and cheaper to operate) frigate is the more sensible option.
My thoughts:
1. Take the LCS concept as currently implemented by the Navy out back and shoot it. Adopt the Saudi contract configuration, reduce the number contracted for and send them back to their original limited mission instead of trying to use them as destroyer and frigate replacements.
2. Accelerate the FFG(X) program *again* and do whatever it takes to get these modified off she shelf designs in the water ASAP.
3. Since Zumwalt class is an expensive, 3 ship max class and will never go into mass production, shelve it. We don’t have time to design a new class from scratch. Call the UK up and license the Type 45 destroyer - even offer to have them build some right away. Refit with American weapons systems or license the Brit ones with no direct equivalent. Start cranking those things out.
4. Once you have FFG(X) and the new destroyers in production *then* you can figure out where to go after that.
I thought the Internet got rid of the need for a navy?
Add to that the fact that modern frigates are the size of some recent destroyers and damn near as capable now the capability gap is less than you’d think.
What constitutes the enemy has been evolving from nation states to wide-spread, non-nation ideologies. Other nations are still a danger and, while maintaining a strong navy is still important, the threat posed by nations is also evolving. Drones, hyper-velocity missiles, AI, and space are the new threats.
A time comes in the development of a weapon when the paradigm in which it acts changes. For example, weapons and armor evolved together over time. In the final evolution of plate armor it was elaborate, heavy and expensive. It was, in the end, completely useless. Mountains of treasure had been spent on it only to prove a waste of resources.
I think the same is happening across all weapons platforms. The main battle tank, which remains the best protection on the battlefield, is totally dependent on air superiority and a huge logistics tail, both of which are vulnerable to tiny drones too small to spot. Stealth is overcome by networking of radars, true the signature will remain small, but a small signature traveling at five hundred miles per hour will call attention to itself. Also, widely distributed independent AI systems will evolve quickly and the huge cost of stealth will limit the number and use of such weapons.
Massive ships costing billions are vulnerable to super-fast and comparatively cheap missiles. When the target is rich and worth the expense, any number of these will deployed to get the job done.
We can’t rely on technological superiority as technology is spreading fast. Likewise every few years we’ll have a President Clinton or Obama who will give it away or allow it to fall into our enemies hands.
I don’t have a solution, just a caution that perhaps building more of what once worked well may turn out to be a bad decision.
Why was that, as they are a much-cheaper option for lesser roles? I understand that they cannot really operate independently and are under-gunned for major combat, but did they not still have a place at the table?
What is "the Saudi contract configuration"?
Why not just refurbish some ships from the mothball fleet for a quick and dirty boost?
Actually, I think *tactical* stealth will stay around - i.e., making it difficult for a missile to lock on and pursue an aircraft or tank. Strategic stealth, like the intended capability of the B2 or the DDG1000 to avoid detection in the first place, is probably soon to be a thing of the past.
Tanks (and other vehicles) are developing ever more effective organic air defense systems and area defense systems to prevent interference by drones or missiles.
They were retired because most of them had worn out hulls and were becoming absurdly expensive to maintain. Some of them actually had hulls worn so thin (remember, this class was basically unarmored) that at the time they were decommissioned you could dent the hull with your fist or punch through it with a screwdriver. The shortest service life of one was about 15 years and they weren’t designed to take tech upgrades either.
“Tanks (and other vehicles) are developing ever more effective organic air defense systems and area defense systems to prevent interference by drones or missiles.”
My point on tanks was that the tank can more effectively be neutralized by using drones to take out the tankers that supply fuel. Yeah, US main battle tanks are pretty safe on the battlefield.
Saudi config: https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/saudi-arabia-is-buying-the-littoral-combat-ship-the-u-s-1737749488
Basically, they’re dumping the failed “mission modules” modular capability approach and fitting capabilities to the ship permanently. The Navy LCS has *no* area air defense capabilities, where the Saudi version does. It also has a 16 cell VLS that our version lacks and they have SeaRAM for close in air defense - which our version also lacks. And our ‘upgun’ upgrade proposal doesn’t have either.
As for mothball fleet ships - this isn’t WW2, it’s not just a matter of pulling out a reserve ship, upgrading the guns and radios, slapping a radar set and a fresh coat of paint on and sending it out. If you don’t want it to be just another floating target and you do want it to be able to fight and contribute to battle group defense, you have to upgrade pretty much *all* of the electronics and retrofit modern missile systems so a ship can fight with its cohorts. And you have to do this with ships that were not necessarily designed to take upgrades on hulls that are going to have a very limited life span. Such retrofits could be more expensive than buying a new ship and often are.
Also, we’ve sold much of the mothball fleet for scrap or just sold the ships to other nations that don’t need modern capability.
They’re developing anti-drone and anti-munition protection for fuel tankers as well. Israel has noticed the same thing and has adapted versions of Trophy to protect their supply and support vehicles.
Ahh, that would explain why they weren't sold to foreign navies like the Knox-class frigates.
On the other hand, the Constitution-class frigate is still afloat....
Type 45 has BIG problems. How many have been built, and how many are now operational?
Also, FYI, as of three days ago we’re *finally* getting anti-missile systems on the M1 - looks like the Army is no longer going to wait for Raytheon’s Quick Kill vaporware system and is buying 261 Trophy systems for M1s.
I suspect the stunning performance of the Russian Konkurs missiles in Syria versus ex-German Army (so top of the line when made) Leopard 2A4s operated by the Turks has been a bit of a wakeup call. NATO has long ignored active missile defense for tanks.
Same answer - six of each. Propulsion system has been the main problem, mostly hot weather performance. However, that can be resolved prior to actually building a US version as the problem is well known and the solution already exists.
However, the Type 45 is a design available now with semi-stealth characteristics and superb anti-air *area* defense capability. Many rate it as the best in the world right now. While we make expensive DDG1000s with guns that can’t be fired because we didn’t buy any of the special ammo, computer systems that don’t work and missiles that can’t be launched.
That is a very thoughtful, perceptive, and well written reply.
Well done.
Every US Navy ship can operate independently, they’re designed that way.
You know nothing about Naval warfare. Stick to terra firma.
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