Posted on 02/11/2012 2:07:27 AM PST by U-238
After a decades-long streak of troubled weapon acquisitions, the Air Force is looking to get off on the right foot as it seeks to buy a new intercontinental stealth bomber.
The Pentagon’s new budget proposal gives the Air Force the green light to begin designing a new bomber with a target date for starting production in the mid-2020s. The goal is to acquire up to 100 new aircraft at a cost of about $55 billion.
But skeptics already are casting doubts on the plan. They consistently point to the B-2 batwing stealth bomber as a cautionary tale. The Pentagon spent hundreds of billions of dollars on that program only to end up with 21 aircraft, each with a $2 billion price tag. That is the reason, critics contend, why the Cold War era B-52 bomber — conceived in 1946 — is still flying and is projected to stay in operation until 2040.
The Air Force has learned tough lessons from past programs and is not about to repeat the mistakes, said Gen. Norton Schwartz, Air Force chief of staff. “We are not going to do the B-2 again. … That is not in the cards,” he said Feb. 9 following a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The downfall of the B-2, experts have said, was its cost and overstated design. Also, because the Northrop Grumman production line was shut down early in the production, the price per unit soared as the cost was spread over 21 aircraft, instead of 132, as originally planned.
Schwartz said the new bomber should be less ambitious. “We are going to make our best effort to not overdesign an airplane,” he said. “We are not intent on delivering a capability that is extravagant.”
(Excerpt) Read more at nationaldefensemagazine.org ...
“B-52’s did get murdered going into Hanoi for the reasons you stated. Air crews were refusing to fly because they were getting murdered.
15 shot down, 5 heavily damaged (1 crashed in Laos) out of 207 planes (and crews) is pretty close to 10% in my book.
You think the crews felt any better because it was only 2% losses calc’d on a ‘mission count’?”
Not a military affairs writer, are you? “By mission” is how you calculate loss rate, because in each mission the crew is exposed once again to those defenses, and believe me, that is what the crews count, not metal aircraft.
Once again, you have lost your focus. The point is that the B-52s completely brought down all air defenses in North VietNam in an 11-day campaign with the resulting loss of just 15 aircraft. And that loss could have been ZERO had there been a better strategy of how to attack Hanoi.
You are the one who lost focus. Crews were refusing to fly because the losses were so bad and EW against the ‘latest threats’ did’t save them. Losses weren’t worse simply because the NV’s ran out of SAMs.
Operation Linebacker II was an unmitigated disaster from a crew standpoint. Maybe you would have a different perspective if you had been in ‘em instead of just debriefing.
“Does that price tag per plane equal the total cost of development, manufacturing, and materials divided by the total number of planes?”
In the context of programs, yes.
You are in La-La land my friend — and you keep making statements that are not backed up by facts and history. The NVN ran out of SAMs towards the end of the 11-day campaign.
And no crews refused to fly, because none were brought up on charges, none were court-martialed; which is what would have happened had they refused. The ill feelings caused by the 15 losses were in fact assuaged when the attack strategy was changed.
Don’t denigrate my service as a briefer/debriefer by implying that I didn’t have heavy emotional involvement in the crew-loss.
Unmitigated disaster from a crew viewpoint? You are simply wrong. Crew opinions were all over the place. Opinions also changed quite a bit in February ‘73 when the POWs were released. And BTW, even with the massive B-52 carpet-bombing, no POW facilities had been hit — B-52 accuracy was legendary.
Operation Linebacker II was an unmitigated disaster.
You are the one who is in La-La land my friend.
Here’s what your “reliable source” (Military Corruption.com)said on that link:
“Instead of being overwhelmed, however, the North Vietnamese SAM missile crews initially shattered the B-52 force. They were knocked out of the sky, one-by-one. Yet, despite the staggering losses, the surviving B-52s kept coming.”
In the space of two sentences, your source manages to use the words “shattered” (BS) and staggering (BS). Totally, utterly UNTRUE.
Let’s review:
— 729 Missions in 11 days, 1,240 SAMs fired, just 15 aircraft lost.
— Enemy air defenses totally torn down.
— Enemy brought back to the negotiating table.
— POWs released.
Gee, I wonder why “the U.S. hadn’t lost a B-52 in combat prior to Linebacker 2” ? Could it be that the B-52s had never prior to Linebacker-2 gone straight in to bomb the most heavily defended area in the world?
What kind of Freeper would quote a website like “Military Corruption.com”, anyway?
You show me absolutely nothing. You don’t deserve to participate here.
Remember, this is only an estimate.You also need to factor in any cost over runs.
BTW--I added the qualifier "in combat" deliberately. 1972 was a very different situation from today. Back then our aircraft flew all kinds of sorties against operational SAM systems--so our intel was very good. SAM technology was a lot easier to spoof back then, but the NV operators were also highly experienced. Luckily, the BUFFS had Wild Weasels to help with SEAD. Even so, there were BUFF losses; they were far from invulnerable.
Of course, EW defensive systems are kept up to date. But they are only as good as the intelligence and exploitation available--and those are never perfect. In Schwartzkoph's autobiography ("It Doesn't Take a Hero"), he made the comment that B-52's were invulnerable due to the EW packages. If someone told him that they were either naive or lying. Lucily, Sadaam mostly had the older stuff.
EW countermeasures are just a part of a package, including SEAD and tactics. A smart crew views them as a tool of last resort--nothing more.
The B-52s back then were awesome in their EW not so much because of flying against operational SAM systems (there was some of that); their EW systems were already pretty much “set” before the time of Linebacker 2. No, they were good because they had been designed and then practiced to penetrate the Soviet Union, and there was no doubt in my mind that they would have reached their Russian targets. The BUFF losses were not in the least due to any lack of raw EW power, which is difficult to describe fully, but because NVN was able to use the certainty of B-52 timing and altitudes of the all too predictable ingress and egress, firing dozens of missiles to detonate at the right altitudes and coordinates. The radars and missiles were absolutely not able to function normally in a predictive sense.
As far as Sadaam having the “older stuff”, the B-52s also had EW upgrades for the “newer stuff”; it really didn’t matter to the B-52s, they were loaded for bear.
EW countermeasures a tool of last resort? Maybe for a fighter, who can use evasive maneuvers, but this is simply not true for the B-52. SEAD? B-52s were designed to penetrate the Soviet Union, and guess what, there was not going to be SEAD on that fateful day.
Actually, I misspoke a little when I said last resort. I meant that in terms of the jamming—not the Radar Warning Recievers (RWRs).
Day One - 129 B-52's participate. 3 B-52's shot down. 2 heavily damaged.
Day Two - 93 B-52's participate. No B-52's shot down. 1 heavily damaged.
Day Three - 72 B-52's participate. 6 B-52's shot down. 1 severely damaged. 3 B-52's were lost in the first wave. The 2nd wave was aborted because of the heavy losses in the first wave. The 3rd wave lost 3 more B-52's.
Day Four - 30 B-52's participate. 2 B-52's shot down.
Day Five - No attack on Hanoi.
"Linebacker II cost SAC 15 B-52s shot down and nine damaged. These figures are based on USAF records and should be accepted with caution. The USAF has a track record, going back to the Korean conflict, of hiding aircraft and pilot losses."
Resume your denial, oh ye who alone considers themself worthy of determining who may participate.
ping
Too expensive? Compared to a $55 billion new bomber program?!?
Firstly, let’s posit a few things. Size of projectile: a rod twice the size of a crowbar. Rods have ablative materiel on the tips and rudimentary guidance fins. Size of projectile housing: Say a cylinder slightly bigger than a garbage can packed with a number of rods. Housing has a deceleration charge so as to de-orbit the rods in a chosen direction, accounting for necessary plane changes. Each can-full-o-rods weighs under 1000 lbs.
Pack 2 Cans-Full-O-Rods onto a SpaceX Falcon 1e, and you have a couple of unbeatable artillery platforms in LEO for $100 million each. (Lower prices available with volume discount!) At the quoted price of the New Bomber, that’s 2750 launches!
As to the worries of retaliation, alarm, consider that such a weapon is unlikely to be used against rational actors. Also, the typical ballistic orbital track of an ICBM is not utilized by this weaponry, so the decision time for such a massive retaliatory strike is nil. Such a system keeps deranged actors (like Iran) in check.
The old saw still applies: si vis pacem, para bellum.
Says you!
“you have a couple of unbeatable artillery platforms in LEO for $100 million each.”
Cost-Benefit: not there. One time usage of a $100 million weapon. Delivery of a thousand pounds to one target. Bombers = multiple numbers of sorties, to multiple targets. I’ve done strategic cost-benefit, tied to M&S, and you are not even beginning to touch the factors that are involved.
No stealth fighters were lost over Baghdad at all, a heavily defended area. I expect the same over any countries except Russia and China.
So, you have a great weapon and you will not use it against a “rational actor”? Limited one-time usage weapon, then. Plus, who is rational, exactly? All you guys are the same: “Iran has great new weapons, we can’t hope to penetrate against them.” At the same time, you say that Iran can’t see this new weapon coming. Can’t have it both ways. They’ll see it coming, and launch against Israel or the U.S. in a fit of “use it or lose it.” I’ve done M&S on these weapons, and regardless of high speed, there is time to see it coming and still launch. No one is going to believe it is conventional.
“you have a couple of unbeatable artillery platforms in LEO for $100 million each.”
Cost-Benefit: not there. One time usage of a $100 million weapon. Delivery of a thousand pounds to one target. Bombers = multiple numbers of sorties, to multiple targets. I’ve done strategic cost-benefit, tied to M&S, and you are not even beginning to touch the factors that are involved.
No stealth fighters were lost over Baghdad at all, a heavily defended area. I expect the same over any countries except Russia and China.
So, you have a great weapon and you will not use it against a “rational actor”? Limited one-time usage weapon, then. Plus, who is rational, exactly? All you guys are the same: “Iran has great new weapons, we can’t hope to penetrate against them.” At the same time, you say that Iran can’t see this new weapon coming. Can’t have it both ways. They’ll see it coming, and launch against Israel or the U.S. in a fit of “use it or lose it.” I’ve done M&S on these weapons, and regardless of high speed, there is time to see it coming and still launch. No one is going to believe it is conventional.
Sure, sure, the AF lies...
Be sure to document that somewhere.
Day 5 was against heavily-defended Haiphong Harbor. No losses. Few strategic targets were left in Hanoi.
Day 6 to Day 11: 4 losses, almost 400 bomber sorties.
No strategic targets left. 500 rail interdictions had taken place, 372 pieces of rolling stock and three million gallons of petroleum products were destroyed, and 80 percent of North Vietnam’s electrical power production capability had been eliminated.
NVN had been forced to return to negotiations; all POWs were released in Feb 1973.
The claim was documented within the article.
That’s what those little numbers are...
You are excluding one very important point from your cost-benefit analysis, and another secondary follow-on benefit.
The first: Time. Presently, if it is decided that a target absolutely, positively has to be blown up tonight, then somebody has to get on the horn to Whiteman (or Guam) and get the ground crews to work. That’s a couple of hours. Get the crews out and strapped in, platforms rotated up and out, and settle in to fly for 12-18 hours to target. Oh, and, better hope it’s dark over target for your mission profile...
With our orbiting garbage can full of rods, the ordnance is already there. Depending on the amount of cans in orbit, you could annihilate your target before the first bomber ground crewman gets to work.
While it is indeed true that the Stealth platforms have learned the secret Ninja art of not being seen, they still have the logistical trail of any other conventional platform.
Secondly, that kind of launch schedule gets a lot of boosters flying. This tends to (unless you’re working with NASA) drive the cost of such launches down. Additionally, you are learning about your launchers, equipment and figuring out how to make them better. With cheaper and better access to LEO, a lot of avenues open up.
As to use, the mere existence of such an operational system would cause a mass outbreak of rationality. Weapons do not necessarily have to be used to be effective...
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