Posted on 05/26/2009 9:15:52 AM PDT by freedomwarrior998
Syllabus
At a preliminary hearing required by Louisiana law, petitioner Montejo was charged with first-degree murder, and the court ordered the appointment of counsel. Later that day, the police read Montejo his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and he agreed to go along on a trip to locate the murder weapon. During the excursion,he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim’s widow. Upon returning, he finally met his court-appointed attorney. At trial, his letter was admitted over defense objection, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. Affirming, the State Supreme Court rejected his claim that the letter should have been suppressed under the rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, which forbids police to initiateinterrogation of a criminal defendant once he has invoked his right tocounsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding. The court reasoned that Jackson’s prophylactic protection is not triggered unless the defendant has actually requested a lawyer or has otherwise assertedhis Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and that, since Montejo stoodmute at his hearing while the judge ordered the appointment ofcounsel, he had made no such request or assertion.
Held: 1. Michigan v. Jackson should be and now is overruled. Pp. 3–18.
(a) The State Supreme Court’s interpretation of Jackson would lead to practical problems. Requiring an initial “invocation” of theright to counsel in order to trigger the Jackson presumption, as thecourt below did, might work in States that require an indigent defendant formally to request counsel before an appointment is made, butnot in more than half the States, which appoint counsel without request from the defendant. Pp. 3–6.
(b) On the other hand, Montejo’s solution is untenable as a theoretical and doctrinal matter. Eliminating the invocation requirement entirely would depart fundamentally from the rationale of Jackson, whose presumption was created by analogy to a similar prophylacticrule established in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, to protect the Fifth Amendment-based Miranda right. Both Edwards and Jackson are meant to prevent police from badgering defendants into changing their minds about the right to counsel once they have invoked it, buta defendant who never asked for counsel has not yet made up his mind in the first instance. Pp. 6–13.
(c) Stare decisis does not require the Court to expand significantly the holding of a prior decision in order to cure its practical deficiencies. To the contrary, the fact that a decision has proved “unworkable” is a traditional ground for overruling it. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827. Beyond workability, the relevant factors include the precedent’s antiquity, the reliance interests at stake,and whether the decision was well reasoned. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. ___, ___. The first two cut in favor of jettisoning Jackson: the opinion is only two decades old, and eliminating it would not upset expectations, since any criminal defendant learned enough to order his affairs based on Jackson’s rule would also be perfectly capableof interacting with the police on his own. As for the strength of Jackson’s reasoning, when this Court creates a prophylactic rule to protect a constitutional right, the relevant “reasoning” is the weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs. Jackson’s marginal benefits are dwarfed by its substantial costs. Even without Jackson, few badgering-induced waivers, if any, would be admitted at trial because theCourt has taken substantial other, overlapping measures to exclude them. Under Miranda, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation must be advised of his right to have a lawyer present. 384 U. S., at 474. Under Edwards, once such a defendant “has invoked his [Miranda] right,” interrogation must stop. 451 U. S., at 484. And under Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146, no subsequent interrogation may take place until counsel is present. Id., at 153. These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. On the other side of the equation, the principal cost of applying Jackson’s rule is that crimes can go unsolved and criminals unpunished when uncoerced confessions are excluded and when officers are deterred from even trying to obtain confessions. The Court concludes that the Jackson rule does not “pay its way,” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 907–908, n. 6, and thus the case should be overruled. Pp. 13–18.
2. Montejo should nonetheless be given an opportunity to contend that his letter of apology should have been suppressed under the Edwards rule. He understandably did not pursue an Edwards objection, because Jackson offered broader protections, but the decision here changes the legal landscape.
06–1807 (La.), 974 So. 2d 1238, vacated and remanded. SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KENNEDY, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined, and in which BREYER, J., joined, except for n. 5. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Just askin'
I don’t know.
mark for later
And people think MIRANDA RIGHTS are great. WRONG. It is more difficult to put truly guilty people in jail. Do your research and history folks, and realize the truth.
This is America, you are free to disagree with the courts anytime you wish, however if a cop does it he could be looking at losing his job and/or going to jail. If you disagree with the decision in this case fine with me but this one is settled.
The Miranda rights don’t tell cops they can’t ask any further questions.
As a matter of fact, since it tells the person charged that they have a right to have an attorney present at any questioning, it seems kind of presumed that there will be more questioning.
If the person waives their right to that, that is their business.
That could have well been weeks or months before; in addition, the suspect--who was interrogated and given Miranda--is now a defendant, who has been arraigned and assigned a lawyer. He may well not know that his lawyer is entitled to be present at these interrogations, or that he's entitled anything else than to be assigned an attorney, as he was at the arraignment.
Anyhow, I think it's bad policy but it appears, at least for the time being, I'm on the losing end of this argument. It troubles me, however, to see such a low-cost rule that helps protect the rights of the accused jettisoned for little reason.
You can say what was before this case all you wish, it will not change what they just decided.
Better advice would be never rob and murder elderly people.
Never talk to police.
Er, what do you mean “expanding police powers”? All the Supreme Court did was affirm the existing law. It expands nothing.
In fact, IMHO, it appears this was bogus argument in the first place and should never had been heard. If taken to its logical conclusion, the result would be that anything a defendant says in the absense of an attorney is inadmissable. I would say that would put a serious impediment in the way of convicting admitted felons—you know murderers, child rapists and the like.
I’m curious, Publius, do you think criminal law should err on the side of protecting society or the individual—especially individuals who confess to horrible crimes and then decide to recant on the basis of advice given by a clever lawyer?
Personally, I’m more concerned with what’s going in The Usurper’s administration, with respect to curtailing individual rights, than that frivolous lawsuit.
What makes you think this? The Court overturned the holding in Michigan v. Jackson. This is about as far from maintaining the status quo as we can get.
If taken to its logical conclusion, the result would be that anything a defendant says in the absense of an attorney is inadmissable.
No, it just means that the police cannot initiate an interrogation once a defendant has requested an attorney. If the defendant wants to freely confess to the crime in the absence of a lawyer, that's his business, and nothing under the old rule prevented that.
I’m curious, Publius, do you think criminal law should err on the side of protecting society or the individual—especially individuals who confess to horrible crimes and then decide to recant on the basis of advice given by a clever lawyer?
Individual.
You are correct on numbers on the Supremes. HOWEVER, at this time, any action in that area would be for the socialists to ADD more for their benefit. The stupid republicans will not get back in power for years. I seriously doubt that we will have another republican president in my life time. I am 60. I just think that with the adding of all the illegals voting in the future and all the give away programs, people are going for the free stuff and to hell with the country.
In Canada, not so long ago, the Conservative party was reduced to two members of parliament out of 265. They now form the government. Don't despair, people will realize what they have done, the kind of man they have elected. The 2010 election will be very interesting. This too shall pass.
If you would like to be added or dropped from the Michigan ping list, please freepmail me.
I didn't say he was innocent, but that the facts might result in a conclusion of actual innocence, and that there were many irregularities. Did you notice that the presence of his DNA was consistent with the story he told the cops. It's not like he claimed he was never with the guy. There was also an absence of DNA in places one would have expected if he was the killer.
And BTW, please cite my entire statement when questioning it. What you did was intellectually dishonest. Then again, maybe you are a LEA or prosecutor.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.