Slow-motion Tet

Somebody should send this article to Al Qaeda’s press agents, Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi.

Ping

Clearly clowns like Reid and Pelosi are either deliberatly ignoring what really is going on in Iraq, and or they are actually in treason mode.
They seem to be to ignorant to realize Iraq and Afghanistan are to battle fronts currently be carried out within the GWOT over all operation.
The two fronts are no different then activities that take place daily within US borders to thwart any internal attacks by al Qaeda and other Islamo groups on US targets.
They and a number of other dimwits in congress and elsewhere are at best frigen fools and at worst seditionist.

Somebody should send this article to Al Qaeda’s press agents, Harry Reid and Nancy Pelosi.

How about to the West Wing? This Administration keeps fighting this war like pussies. Bush won't even kill Al Sadr for pete's sake!

Or maybe GWB is more like LBJ than we realized.

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NEVER FORGET

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Letting a new TET Offensive fool us into ABANDONING another Free People’s fight for its own Freedom would bring another sad repeat of:

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Pictures of a vietnamese Re-Education (SLAVE LABOR) Camp

http://www.Freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1308949/posts

http://www.JourneyFromTheFall.com

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Starting this time around, perhaps, with 12 million suddenly missing Iraqi purple voting fingers on our TV and Internet Screens..?

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NEVER FORGET

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This Administration keeps fighting this war like pussies

Really? This is not a made for TV movie, where the hero saves the day and rides off into the sunset all in 90 minutes (commericals included), there is no Tivo, no pause button, no fast forward button...this is done in real time. I sorry if this is not going as fast as you'd like (tagline: History takes time. It is not an instant thing)

And what does this have to do with them fighting this like pussies? In WWII, we killed 100,000 Tokyo civilians on a single night, without benefit of a nuke. There was no concern with winning the "hearts and minds" of the "Japanese Street". No one talks about us being "welcomed as liberators" of Tojo. How absurd to even consider nonsense such as that. When MacArthur commanded postwar Japan, he had over 900 Japanese executed, some for no more than distributing Communist leaflets. In Iraq, Al Sadr killed Americans and mutilated their charred bodies live on Al Jazeera. Bush allowed him to live, even though he came and went openly from his mosque for 4 days afterwards. Al Sadr denounced the U.S. repeatedly and led anti-American demonstrations. Again, nothing. It is a joke.

We sent our boys door to door in Fallujah like Avon ladies, instead of cordoning it off, filtering through those who flee, and turning the rest to ashes. We killed several thousand French civilians during combat in WWII, via mistaken identity, loss of discipline, or faulty intelligence, yet not a single man was charged. Our Marines mistakenly kill civilians in Haditha, and we charge them as murderers. I repeat: Al Sadr the murderer goes scot free, and U.S. soldiers are charged as murderers. What the hell does that have to do with your "pace of the war" comment? It is just ass-backwards leadership. Waiting won't help.

Iran is proven to be supplying the IEDs that are killing our men, but again we do nothing. Not a single strike on Iranian border troops or internal camp as a warning. Nothing. So much for the Bush Doctrine regarding anyone who supports the enemy being treated the same as the enemy themselves. All forgotten with Iran. A bunch of pussies. That is what this White House and Pentagon are.

Here we go again...or should I say “Still”. WWII was a conventional war, the GWOT (including Iraq) is a guerilla war. You do not fight one the same way as the other. Until people understand, I mean really really understand the type of war this is they are destined to go around saying irrelevant things like “? In WWII, we killed 100,000 Tokyo civilians on a single night, without benefit of a nuke. There was no concern with winning the “hearts and minds” of the “Japanese Street”.” and “We sent our boys door to door in Fallujah like Avon ladies, instead of cordoning it off, filtering through those who flee, and turning the rest to ashes. We killed several thousand French civilians during combat in WWII, via mistaken identity, loss of discipline, or faulty intelligence, yet not a single man was charged.”

Fighting the War on Terror
A counterinsurgency strategy
James S. Corum

page 26
Counterinsurgency Theories
(snip)
The American and British counterinsurgency experts outlined the following basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare
1 The civilian population is understood as the center of gravity in an insurgency. One cannot fight insurgents effectively without winning the support of the population. Ideally the counterinsurgency strategy should be geared to driving a wedge between the population and the rebels.

2 Successful counterinsurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military, political, and economic action. Since insurgencies grow out of large scale dissatisfaction with the government, the means must be found to address the social, political, and economic problems that provide the fuel for insurgency.

3 There needs to be a unity of effort by government forces, that is close coordination between the military and civilian agencies at every level.

4 Effectively fighting the insurgents, who usually live among and draw support from the civilian population, requires good intelligence. Military and police action without good intelligence is largely a wasted effort. To fight the insurgent one has to find him.

5 Military and civic action campaigns need to proceed simultaneously and be coordinated with each other.

6 The government needs to wage an effective media campaign to reassure the population and undermine support for the insurgent.

7 Military and police powers needs to be applied carefully and with discrimination. A heavy handed approach is wasteful and can cause discontent among the population.

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In addition to the British/American theory of counterinsurgency some officers in the French army developed their own theory
(snip)
The French view, expressed by French army Colonel Roger Trinquier and published as Modern Warfare in 1961 was widely read in both French and English editions. The French model differed considerably from the British/American model. Trinquier, who had long experience in counterinsurgency, outlined some very useful tactics in dealing with urban rebellion, including discussions of how to seal off a city district, collect comprehensive data on the population and register the whole population as a means to identify the insurgents from outside the area, and limit the ability of the insurgents to move within the country.
Trinquier’s theory differed enormously from the Anglo-Saxon model on several key points.
First he saw counterinsurgency primarily in military terms. For Trinquier, establishing military presence and crushing the insurgents by force was the first priority. In contrast with the British and America view that military action had to be carried out simultaneously with civic action programs, Trinquier argued first for military action to crush the insurgents. While civic action programs were important, they would be carried out only after the insurgency had been crushed by force.
Whereas British and American theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s believed that building up a legitimate government and supporting indigenous institutions were the key elements of counterinsurgency strategy, there is little of this in Trinquier’s work. Essentially, Trinquier believed in strong arming the population into compliance with French rule.

Trinquier’s approach could bring short team success. The most notable example was Algeria, where the French army essentially broke the back of the insurgent movement by 1960. However in the long run, by ignoring the need to build public support for the government, the French approach led to strategic failure. One illustration of the French approach’s lack of political considerations was to policy of torturing and abusing insurgent prisoners in Algeria. Trinquier advocated the widespread use of such means’s of obtaining intelligence information, although he did not advocate the widespread use of such means. He failed to understand the breakdown in army discipline that occurs when moral and legal boundaries are crossed
(snip)

This is not WWII, when you get past the global scope of the two wars the similarities drop off rather rapidly.

You quote from a textbook to refute my assertions? Come on. Also I disagree with many of the theories therein, including that Iraq is an "insurgency" at all. By permitting thousands of foreign fighters into Iraq and permitting Iran to arm them without consequences, we have permitted the enemy to create and maintain a well-oiled insurgency almost like entrepreneurs. It is also very naive for people to ignore the role of oil in all of this. If not for oil, Israel would be fighting alongside us in Iraq. If not for oil, the Bushies would not be walking on eggshells over the "Arab street"--and undermining our resolve. But you miss my main point. What is missing in Iraq is the ruthlessness we had in WWII. This is even more critical when dealing with a culture which historically respects only the use of brutal force. Showing "sensitivity" to Islam is counterproductive, and only makes us look weak. I don't know if the overall feminization of Western culture is to blame for this lack of remorseless will, but it is most disconcerting and will be our downfall in the end if it not reversed.