A Cure Worse than the Disease

Reuel Marc Gerecht provides a provocative analysis of the Iran problem that continues to bedevil U.S. foreign policy. Iran would be at or near the top of a list of countries Americans would least like to see have nuclear weapons, and the reason for apprehension has deepened dramatically in the past year with the emergence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ultimately, though, Gerecht's policy prescription--preventive military action to eliminate (or more accurately, to delay) Tehran's nuclear program is a classic case of a cure that is worse than the disease.

It is somewhat surprising (and gratifying) that Gerecht distances himself from the favorite panacea of other neoconservatives somehow orchestrating an overthrow of the clerical regime without an extensive U.S. military role. Unfortunately, he attributes the limitations of that approach to the alleged lack of enthusiasm for pro-democracy covert operations on the part of the CIA and other government agencies rather than to the inherent impracticality of the scheme. Enthusiastic proponents of regime change, such as Gerecht's colleague at the American Enterprise Institute Michael Ledeen, have no such doubts. According to them, there is so much Iranian public opposition to the mullahs that a U.S. propaganda offensive combined with financial and logistical assistance to prospective insurgents would be sufficient to topple the regime.

Such a thesis might seem more plausible if we had not heard similar arguments in the years leading up to the Iraq war. Those arguments were quietly buried when the time for action arrived. Saddam Husseinâ€™s overthrow was carried out by a massive application of U.S. military power. If the United States adopts a strategy of regime change in Iran, it is likely that an even greater military effort would be required.

Gerecht's strategy of preemptive air strikes against Iran's nuclear installations may be more practical than the chimera of easy regime change, but it is also more dangerous. Proponents of preventive military action typically cite the successful Israeli strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 as a model. There are numerous problems with that approach, however. Osirak was one easily identified, above-ground site. There are numerous nuclear-related sites in Iran€“many of which are in or near major population centers, maximizing the probable number of civilian casualties in an attack. Indeed, thousands of innocent Iranians would perish in U.S. air strikes.

Moreover, there is no certainty that we have identified all of the relevant targets. There could be many other covert facilities, since Tehran has had nearly three decades to pursue its nuclear activities. Worst of all, some of the installations may be in reinforced, underground locations. Taking out such sites with conventional weapons would be problematic at best. Although some ultra-hawkish types have mused about using nuclear €"bunker busters"€ for the required strikes, crossing the nuclear threshold is a momentous step that could come back to haunt the United States in multiple ways.

Even launching conventional strikes would be extremely dangerous. At the very least, Tehran would be tempted to cause even more trouble than it is already doing for U.S. and British occupation forces in Iraq. The infiltration of a few thousand dedicated Revolutionary Guards could accomplish that goal. The Iranian regime would also be tempted to unleash its terrorist ally, Hezbollah, on American targets throughout the Middle East. And there is always the risk that an attacked and humiliated Iran might do something incredibly rash, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching attacks against Israel, triggering a massive regional crisis.

Finally, there is the probable impact on the rest of the Muslim world. If the United States attacks yet another Muslim country (which would make three in the last five years), there will not be a Muslim from Morocco to Malaysia who will not believe that Washington is out to destroy their culture and religion. America's troubles with the Islamic world do not yet constitute a war of civilizations, but Gerecht's strategy could well produce that result. The military option is one that no rational U.S. policymaker should consider.

Gerecht is correct that the current round of diplomacy led by the EU-3, and now finally joined by the United States, will probably not produce a solution to the nuclear problem. The most discussed alternative, UN-mandated economic sanctions, holds out little prospect of success either. Even if Russia and China ultimately go along with meaningful sanctions (and that is not likely), sanctions have a dismal historical record when it comes to getting regimes to abandon high-priority policies. And acquiring a nuclear arsenal appears to be a high-priority policy for Tehran. That leaves two other options.

The first is to accept a nuclear-armed Iran and rely on a policy of containment and deterrence. Gerecht is skeptical of that approach, but it is a policy that has a good track record.

Admittedly, the presence of Ahmadinejad makes the deterrence option more nerve-wracking. It is worth remembering, though, that Iran's political system is fairly diffuse, and Ahmadinejad is only one actor among many. Indeed, despite his lofty title of president, he had to submit several candidates before he induced the parliament to approve his nominee for oil minister. Iran, under Ahmadinejad, is not a tightly centralized system like Germany under Hitler and the Soviet Union under Stalin where one man's decision could plunge the nation into war.

The experience of dealing with Stalin is pertinent in another way. The United States has successfully deterred other repugnant and bizarre regimes. Stalin was a genocidal psychopath, yet he was never so reckless as to attack a nuclear-armed America or even U.S. allies in Western Europe.

Washington's experience with China in the 1960s and early 1970s is perhaps even more pertinent. China became a nuclear power under Mao Zedong, a leader who exceeded even Stalin's record of genocide. His publicly enunciated views on nuclear warfare also were alarming in the extreme. His boast that China could outlast the United States in a nuclear war of attrition so disturbed the other communist giant, the USSR, that Soviet leaders hastened to assure their American counterparts that such thinking in no way reflected the Kremlin's views.

China also emerged as a nuclear power on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. China during that orgy of fanaticism makes today's Iran look like a normal, even sedate, country. U.S. policymakers were understandably very uneasy about China joining the ranks of nuclear-weapons states. Yet they rejected the advice of those inside and outside government who advocated military action to take out Beijing's nuclear program. Given the constructive changes that have taken place in China, and the important relationship that has grown up between Washington and Beijing in the past three decades, history has vindicated a policy of restraint.

A similar policy of caution and deterrence may also pay off with Iran. It is not an easy or comfortable course to advocate, but it is more realistic and less dangerous than launching another preventive war.

Containment and deterrence is not the optimal strategy, however. We should make a serious diplomatic effort to get Iran to give up its quest for nuclear weapons“and that means going substantially beyond the scope of the current EU-3-led negotiations. Washington should propose a grand bargain to Tehran. That means giving an assurance that the United States will not use force against Iran the way we did against such nonnuclear adversaries as Serbia and Iraq. It also means offering restored diplomatic relations and normal economic relations. In return, Iran would be required to open its nuclear program to unfettered international inspections to guarantee that the program is used solely for peaceful power-generation purposes.

It is possible that Tehran would spurn a proposed grand bargain, since the Iranian political elite seems divided about whether to seek a rapprochement with the United States. Indeed, Iran may be unalterably determined to join the global nuclear weapons club. But we will never know for certain unless we make the offer.

If Iran turns down the proposal, Washington's fall-back position should be to rely on deterrence. The one thing we should not do is start yet another war.

Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.

URL to article: http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/07/11/ted-galen-carpenter/a-cure-worse-than-the-disease/

I'm glad to see that you read my long post.

It was my pleasure. I like your first iteration as well, which was a tad more succinct. But the further elaboration was a good read.

I still hope that Bush will walk the walk before his term is up.

I emphatically do too. This is our country at stake. This isn't about politics. Unfortunately, the politics of the internal enemy within are being weighted too heavily in his calculations by all signs. I could be wrong, but it appears as far as waging a "global" WOT, W has given up. Not realizing that as a "quitter" the verdict of history against him will be profoundly more grave...

So it's likely you will see this posted idea again and again as I've been hoping to start a Meme that will lead to action.

I commend you. That is a good idea. But you will need to make for something a little more than the odd post here and there around the web. I suggest a Blog or web site with the idea in summary form, and then with a fleshed out series of proposed PDD's for the President to implement...and then to give it some urgency and "push" how about having a Petition Drive as part of it? Get about 50,000 signatures, and present it to the White House.

What do you think of my strategic bombing idea? If we bomb Iran's oil industry out of existence, and put Iranians on foot and in the dark, they will have a hard time being a threat.

Totally spot-on...this is undoubtedly the most sensible way to proceed. But it shouldn't be dithered on to have maximal effect. And I am leery of this Administration, as above, doing anything let alone this. Look at how they pulled the rug out from under Israel, when the IDF had only just started getting seriously effective after Hezbollah...as the more profane Freepers would say...WTF??!

And when we have cleaned up Iraq enough to free up troops, it should be easy to do a regime change.

Possibly. But we need to do it right this time. We need to be willing to see massive internal bloodshed. Adhmanejad undoubtedly would have another "insurgency" strategy to try and counter that reprise of Iraq. Hence, I would instead advocate arming an Iranian-Dissident-Only set of battallions...and back them up the way we did the Afghan militias to take down the Taliban. Let them fight it out amongst themselves. With our backing...it would be quick work. And since there is not a history of militias balkanizing the country as in Afghanistan...it is more likely to have a much better final outcome for a peaceful united society.

"Possibly. But we need to do it right this time. We need to be willing to see massive internal bloodshed. Adhmanejad undoubtedly would have another "insurgency" strategy to try and counter that reprise of Iraq. Hence, I would instead advocate arming an Iranian-Dissident-Only set of battalions...and back them up the way we did the Afghan militias to take down the Taliban. Let them fight it out amongst themselves. With our backing...it would be quick work. And since there is not a history of militias balkanizing the country as in Afghanistan...it is more likely to have a much better final outcome for a peaceful united society."

I agree, part of what I have been posting, is this suggestion: "I believe that the mullacracy will take awhile to collapse. So at the same time America starts the war it announces that a New Iranian Army will be trained, Paid, and equipped in Iraq and Afghanistan, to take over Iran as soon as it is ready and Iranians in and out of the country are encouraged to apply. If we did this US Army forces may never be needed in Iran, or if they are just for a few Thunder Runs to topple the Mullahs, with the New Iranian Army mopping up and taking over. Done this way we could write the Iranian constitution and have the new army swear to it before they are allowed to join, this would make starting a new government much quicker."

Also, by using leaflets over Iran, as well as advertising on the ex-patriot Iranian TV, and Radio stations, we gain a propaganda dimension to the campaign, that the Iraqi campaign has never had.

By writing the Constitution for them we can establish the separation of church and state, which I see as the worst problem in the Iraqi and Afghani constitutions. As well as save the year or two it would take for a constitutional convention to be established and to write a constitution which then needs to be voted on. In addition we obviously would use as a basis of the new constitution, the most successful constitution in history, 'the constitution of the United States of America'. We can establish that the clerics are ineligible to serve in office, setting a precedent for the entire region. If this is objected to, and it will be as being dictatorial. It need be only stated that we see this as the most effective and efficent way of doing the job, and "he who pays the piper gets to pick the tune".

Unemployment in Iran is high and the ex-patriot population is large and wealthy. We could end up with a large new American trained army. Especially if we open it up to anyone, even non Iranians, with the understanding that they will receive Iranian citizenship after serving for a certain period of time. It's become obvious that the US has to small of an infantry force. With our deployments in Iraq and else where, our ground forces are stretched, we literally can not support a ground offensive any where else at the moment. By training, equipping, and funding a foreign light infantry army, the US can strengthen its weakness in ground forces, and do it relatively cheaply.

"Look at how they pulled the rug out from under Israel, when the IDF had only just started getting seriously effective after Hezbollah...as the more profane Freepers would say...WTF??!"

I just watched a video report of an Israeli Brigade that went into a town in Lebanon. The number and severity of the mistakes that this unit made was incredible. I have to say from this and other reports that the Israeli army has been gutted. It is poorly trained, incompetently led, and poorly equipped. The Brigade (1,000 men?) in question failed in its mission to take the town, and was repulsed by 3 terrorists who failed to kill a single Israeli soldier. I don't think letting the Israeli army fight longer would have accomplished much. Israel would be wise to request experienced American help in retraining its army, and its officers should be sent to serve as observers with American units in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Given the constructive changes that have taken place in China, and the important relationship that has grown up between Washington and Beijing in the past three decades, history has vindicated a policy of restraint."
History isn't "over" yet...

No kidding it isn't. The "Constructive Changes" are subject to a healthy load of salt..i.e., China's economy has not achieved full marketization because that was never part of the CCP's plan. Rather, economic reformers such as former Premier Zhu Rongji and current Premier Wen Jiabao intended to produce a leaner and more competitive -- and thus stronger -- state sector by exposing a select group of SOEs to the discipline of international and domestic market forces under the watchful eye of a sophisticated and professional regulatory bureaucracy. The prices of key commodities and factors of production (such as energy, rail transport, and, as Pei points out, labor, real estate, and credit) remain under the state's control. It is true that tens of thousands of weak state enterprises have closed or gone private since the beginning of the Deng era, but the state has selected about one thousand of the strongest and most strategically placed SOEs to receive as much state help as they need to succeed, not only domestically but in some cases globally. And although some banks have allowed foreign companies to buy minority stakes, they remain state-owned and continue to support both the state-subsidized "pillar" SOEs and state-prioritized infrastructure projects.

In short, the regime never intended to let globalization wash away either its political or its economic power. Globalists may believe that Beijing's plans are irrelevant because they fly in the face of Western theories about the inevitability of marketization and democratization. But proving that an authoritarian regime can prosper through modernization is exactly what is at stake in the Chinese experiment, which is why dictatorships from Kazakhstan to Iran are keenly watching its progress. The thesis of a "trapped transition" implies a teleology that the Chinese leadership does not accept -- and that needs to be defended rather than assumed.

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