Posted on 06/16/2006 4:08:29 PM PDT by SandRat
BAGHDAD, June 16, 2006 The new lead terrorist in Iraq is a founding member of al Qaeda in Iraq and had a close relationship with the now-killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, coalition officials said.
Officials revealed yesterday that Abu Ayyub al-Masri succeeded Zarqawi following the Jordanian terrorist's elimination June 7 in a precision-bomb attack on his safe house in Iraq. They said Masri fully bought into Zarqawi's bloody tactics that have left thousands of innocent men, women and children across Iraq dead or maimed.
Al-Masri - which means "the Egyptian" - is another foreign fighter who trained in Afghanistan like Zarqawi, coalition officials said. No one knows his real name.
The terrorist is said to be about 38 years old and got his beginning in Egypt, where he joined the Islamic Brotherhood. He fled from Egypt and moved to Afghanistan, where he trained in explosives at the al-Faruq Al Qaeda camp. There he met Zarqawi, officials said.
After the fall of the Taliban, Masri escaped to Iraq and set up with the Jordanian-born Zarqawi. The Egyptian specialized in vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. He helped establish the Baghdad cell of Al Qaeda in early 2003, officials said.
Later he worked the "rat line" down the Euphrates River Valley supplying suicide bombers via Syria. Officials said he probably directed that operation from Fallujah.
Following Zarqawi's death, Masri issued a statement on a terrorist web site that threatened massive retaliation against Iraqi and coalition targets. Officials believe the terrorist is in the vicinity of Baghdad.
Coalition officials said the death of Zarqawi and subsequent operations have severely disrupted Al Qaeda in Iraq operations. However, they expect Masri to continue the same tactics that Zarqawi followed. They also said it is a mistake to concentrate on one individual, and said many other terrorist leaders are in their sites.
and in the F-16 squadron briefing room: Your target tonight is al-Masri! Send Him to Hell boys!
"Masri Now Leads Iraq Al Qaeda, Coalition Officials Say"
For now......
Very cunning..
Not to be underestimated, including his ability to evade us.
He won't last long -
Abu Ayyub al-Masri: I just call him "fool" for short...
We will be taking a giant sh$t on you real soon Al-Masri.
Love,
Jarhead
Ha!... Iraqis are bound to be much less afraid of al-Qaeda now than they were a couple of weeks ago, what with Zarqawi dead and hundreds more key al-Qaeda dead, too, or in custody, or on the run. Even though al-Masri's reward is a lot less than Zarqawi's, more people should be tempted to cash in on it and drop a dime on him. I'd be surprised if he makes it to year's end.
These guys morph and learn from their mistakes. You can bet this guy wont be on any video out of doors since someone in media said they were able to identify where Zarkman shot the infamous machine gun slot.
He's also got his start in the Muslim Brotherhood a nasty anti-semitic bunch of fascists that backed Hitler in WW2. And he apparantly is friends with Dr Zawahiri, Bin Ladins #2. Hey at least this ought to put to bed the myth there is no connection between Al Queda and Iraq, even though this group has gone by Al Queda in Iraq for sometime.
I have tagged him Abu al Bullseye!
Around the same time the Democrats drop their traditional stink bomb of lies and/or exagerations timed to be too close to the Fall elections for Republicans to be able to respond would be good timing.
Those are the guys I'm rooting for.
Sorry, I cannot link as subscription site. _________________________________________________________
Cut from:
stratfor.com
TERRORISM INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The Web of Jihad: Strategic Utility and Tactical Weakness
By Fred Burton
With the death last week of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the world has been focused on the future of his al Qaeda in Iraq organization. And while that is an important question, particularly as it relates to the security situation in Iraq, it is fitting also to reflect on the history and impact of al-Zarqawi's violent movement. The group has been, of course, well known for conducting frequent suicide bombings in Iraq and the simultaneous suicide strikes at three hotels in Jordan last fall, but its brutality is not necessarily what made al-Zarqawi a household name. That came about largely because of al Qaeda in Iraq's skillful use of the Internet. It has embraced technology in a way heretofore unprecedented for any jihadist group.
In addition to posting shocking videos of decapitations to the Web, the "information wing" of al-Zarqawi's group routinely posted statements (often several in a single day), videos of suicide operations and ambushes and eulogies praising and glorifying suicide operatives. It even published a monthly Web magazine. The information wing of al Qaeda in Iraq has been able to put a slick, professional face on the cause of the larger al Qaeda organization -- while also documenting achievements on the battlefield, inculcating readers with the theology of jihadism and enticing new recruits to join the jihadist struggle.
This use of technology has played into the evolution of the jihadist movement and may now be helping to foster new incarnations of al Qaeda. But just as significantly, use of the Internet has certain drawbacks. There is only so much that can be done in cyberspace. Tactical realities and operational security concerns mandate that some activities must be conducted in the physical world -- and it is at this juncture, in making the transition from virtual to actual reality, that newer actors well could be at their most vulnerable.
...the use of the Web by jihadist groups far predates al Qaeda in Iraq. With the launch in 1996 of the Azzam.com Web site -- so named in honor of bin Laden's mentor -- jihadists had a professional-looking "store front" that allowed them to provide inspiration, news and instruction to adherents and potential recruits, and which became a channel for others to initiate contact with jihadist groups. Azzam.com became an important mechanism through which funds for jihadist groups could be raised and willing volunteers could find ways to link up with groups conducting jihad in places like Chechnya and Bosnia. It also provided tips on steps to take in order to attend militant training camps run by organizations like al Qaeda.
From a tactical perspective, there are some things that simply cannot be done over the Internet -- either for practical reasons or in light of operational security considerations. For example, recruiting a new member into a cell can be a very risky activity under any circumstances -- and even more dangerous in the "virtual world." At any point, a jihadist or organized crime group might find it has opened itself up to someone who can't keep a secret, whose loyalties are suspect or who can be bought for the right price. These risks go up considerably in cyberspace. People on the Internet are not always who they portray themselves to be (just ask anyone who's had a bad online dating experience). For the jihadist recruiter, then, it can be extremely difficult to determine if the person at the other end of the keyboard is indeed a real jihadist, or a potential infiltrator attempting to penetrate the group.
Another reason that the transition phase is so dangerous for aspiring militants has to do with the legal system in the United States and elsewhere. For example, in the United States, Britain and Canada, freedom of speech holds sway as long as suspects don't actually go so far as to encourage or order others to carry out attacks, or threaten to conduct such attacks themselves. The same thing goes for conspiracy cases (at least in the United States.) A group can conspire to carry out a violent attack as much as it wants; until an overt act is made in furtherance of that conspiracy, the suspects cannot be charged with a crime. The point at which militants leave the cyber-world and begin to take action in the real world is where they begin to make overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy, and it is then that law enforcement agencies have the legal elements they need to make arrests, conduct searches and bring criminal charges.
For example, in the Canada 17 case, the suspects allegedly had connections to separate cells in Britain and the United States. By working together, the British, Canadian and U.S. governments were able to mass their resources and leverage or share information. As has often been the case with investigations of organized crime groups, authorities in different jurisdictions had different pieces of the puzzle; alone, the information meant little, but when cooperating services sat down together to discuss and share information, a bigger picture emerged. In the Canada 17 case, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has said publicly that it moved against the suspects at just such a critical moment: The alleged cell attempted to buy materials that could be used to manufacture explosives. To paraphrase an RCMP spokesman, the threat the suspects were believed to pose to the public, at that point, no longer was acceptable.
It is not yet clear what the future will hold for al-Zarqawi's organization in Iraq, but for the evolving generation of jihadists as a whole, past could be prologue. Ultimately, the dot-com terrorists might learn the same lessons as the dot-com entrepreneurs of the 1990s: There is no "new paradigm" in their industry. The most successful militants have recognized all along that certain basic rules -- and operational practices -- still apply. And for those who fail to grasp that reality, there will be a painful winnowing.
I wonder if we can match the Israeli promptness for whacking the newly named leaders of their terrorist antagonists?
Some didn't last more that a week or two, before getting visited by a major Israeli explosive gift....
Semper Fi
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