Posted on 04/26/2006 5:48:20 AM PDT by SJackson
The great mystery of the 2003 war in Iraq - What about the WMD? has finally been resolved. The short answer is: Saddam Husseins persistent record of lying meant no one believed him when he at the last moment actually removed the weapons of mass destruction.
In a riveting book-length report issued by the Pentagons Joint Forces Command, Iraqi Perspectives Project, American researchers have produced the results of a systematic two-year study of the forces and motivations shaping Saddam Hussein and his regime. Well written, historically contexted, and replete with revealing details, it ranks with Kanan Makiyas Republic of Fear as the masterly description of that regime. (For a condensed version, see the May-June issue of Foreign Affairs.)
It shows how, like Hitlerian Germany or Stalinist Russia, Saddamite Iraq was a place of unpredictably distorted reality. In particular, Saddam underwent a change in the mid-1990s, developing a delusional sense of his own military genius, indeed his infallibility. In this fantasy land, soldiers faith and bravura count far more than technology or matériel. Disdaining the U.S. military performance from Vietnam to Desert Storm, and from Somalia to the Balkans, the tyrant deemed Americans a cowardly and unworthy enemy.
Also about this same time, Saddam began insisting on only good news, further isolating himself from often harsh realities. As ever-fewer underlings dared contradict the bosss perceptions, his determined self-deception wreaked havoc outward from the presidential palace to the entire Iraqi government and beyond. The lead author of Iraqi Perspectives Project, Kevin M. Woods, and his four co-authors note that, By the mid-1990s, most of those near the regime inner circle recognized that everyone was lying to everyone else. Deceits were reinforced and elaborated; in the words of an air defense officer, One [officer] lied to another from the first lieutenant up, until it reached Saddam.
That no one really knew what was going on was symbolized by the widespread credence in the wartime nonsense spouted by the Iraqi minister of information (mockingly dubbed Baghdad Bob by Western reporters) as he regaled the world with glowing accounts of Iraqi victories; from the point of view of Iraqs leaders, Baghdad Bob was largely reporting what they were hearing from the front. A militia commander confessed to being absolutely astonished on encountering an American tank in Baghdad.
The same situation extended to the military-industrial infrastructure. First, the report states, for Saddam, the mere issuing of a decree was sufficient to make the plan work. Second, fearful for their lives, everyone involved provided glowing progress bulletins. In particular, scientists always reported the next wonder weapon was right around the corner. In such an environment, who knew the actual state of the WMD? Even for Saddam, when it came to WMD there was always some element of doubt about the truth.
Iraqs strategic dilemma further complicated matters. Realizing that perceptions of Iraqi weakness could invite attack, from Iran in particular, Saddam wanted the world to think he possessed WMD. But eventually he realized that to fend off the coalition, he needed to convince Western states that his regime no longer possessed those very weapons. As coalition forces geared up for war in late 2002, Saddam decided to cooperate with the United Nations to establish that his country was clean of WMD, as he put it, so as not to give President Bush any excuses to start a war.
This lucid moment, ironically, fell victim to his long history of deceiving the U.N.; Iraqi steps to comply with the inspections regime had the paradoxical effect of confirming Western doubts that the cooperation was a ruse. For example, intercepted orders to remove all traces of previous WMD programs were misinterpreted as yet another ploy, and not the genuine effort they really were.
Saddam's belated attempts at transparency backfired, leading to what the report authors call a diplomatic and propaganda Catch-22. Monumental confusion followed. Captured senior Iraqi officials continued for many months after the 2003 war to believe it possible that Iraq still possessed a WMD capability hidden away somewhere. Coalition intelligence agencies, not surprisingly, missed the final and unexpected twist in a long-running drama. Neither those agencies nor Western politicians lied; Saddam was the evil impostor whose deceptions in the end confused and endangered everyone, including himself.
The problem with this interpretation is that the Pentagon's declassified documents now have HUNDREDS of reports of "special weapons" handling; that HUNDREDS of people saw them, in one form or another; and that EVERY intelligence agency on the planet was "fooled" if this interpretation is right. I don't buy it. Lincoln said you can fool all the people some of the time . . . but not for 10 years.
It is slightly counterintuitive to assume the premise of this article against the great lengths that the Iraqis went to to infiltrate the UN inspection teams to learn their agendas in advance. What was so important then?
Then why has the White House been saying for a couple of years now that their WMD intel was botched? Why do they apparantly believe there were no WMD after all? They went from saying there was WMD stockpiles, to saying there were WMD programs, to saying there were WMD capabilities, to working on getting the capability, and finally, to democracy democracy democracy blah blah, the intel was wrong. If the WH doesn't even believe it, why should I? That's what I don't get.
This all seems wrong-headed. Saddam wasn't trying to be transparent at all. He blocked all efforts to find out the truth.
This sounds like the establishment,s 'Warren Report'. There has been a lot of effort to convince everyone that WMD's never existed. I believe that they did, however.
Unless the "revealing details" include all the data from the released and unreleased Iraqi memos, it's incomplete.
As Robert Novak said last week..."President Bush is not a skilled politician."
reference bump.
"Then why has the White House been saying for a couple of years now that their WMD intel was botched? Why do they apparantly believe there were no WMD after all? They went from saying there was WMD stockpiles, to saying there were WMD programs, to saying there were WMD capabilities, to working on getting the capability, and finally, to democracy democracy democracy blah blah, the intel was wrong. If the WH doesn't even believe it, why should I? That's what I don't get."
Very simple answer. Be a RAT politician for a moment. If we found WMD you would run to the NY Times and say, "How do we know that we found them all? How do we know Al Queada also found WMD and are planning to move it through our porous borders and ports? George Bush allowed terrorists to have WMD and based on that he cannot protect us."
Ok, that's a stretch. However, if you were the President, would you want that on your head or, "There are no WMD in Iraq." Bush IMHO knows what the polls really say and isn't playing to public opinion like his predecessor. He is trying to protect us from terrorists.
Now we need to look at what Colin Powell did at the UN, the Duelfer reports and Intelligence from around the world. Did everyone lie? I don't think so. I think the Russians actually took the stuff out of there because that crap could very easily wind up in Chechens hands and it would be embarrassing to find out it was produced in Russia.
I think this is the only rational explanation for the (lack of) WMD in Iraq.
Saddam was part delusional, part still wanting everyone to think he was still a bad ass with WMD. He did this to keep his own people in check, he did it to keep Iran and the Kurds at bay, he did it so that the US military would think twice about invading.
But he didn't want to get caught with actual WMD by the weapon's inspectors because he ultimate aim was to (first to stay in power as all dictators do) but also get the UN sanctions lifted so that could rebuild his military and WMD.
The Iraqi generals were shocked when told at a meeting just before the start of the war, that there wasn't any WMD to throw back at the US.
So maybe Saddam didn't have any WMD. But then who would let a complete nutjob dictator with 100 billion barrels of oil under his control have WMD in the first place. Last time he had it, he used it. He would have used it again if given the chance.
I've read a lot of the report and two things are clear: That Sadaam was a real threat and that he respected only the use of overwhelming force. He considered all diplomatic and even military maneuvering short of all-out war, to be a sign of weakness. So much for the idea of using diplomacy and sanctions on these types.
I suspected this years ago. Saddam was sure he had WMDs and/or the capability to mass produce them in short order. And why not? His sons were told by scientists that they were there and ready. The scientists could have shown Uday a jar of flour and told him it was weapons grade anthrax. Mix in some cyanaide and let Uday test the anthrax on some political prisoner and tell his Daddy, "This stuff works great. We must not let the UN find it." The scientist puts the unused flour back in his pantry and uses it to bake a cake the next day.
If the scientist had said anything different, Uday would have had him beaten, imprisoned, hand removed and wife raped. Now apply this little antedote across the country.
tag for later
ping
Assuming Saddam did not have WMD, the fact that Saddam's generals thought they did have them makes it preposterous to expect that our intelligence services could get behind that and determine the truth of the matter before hand.
Saddam's weapons are in Syria. We have photos of large convoys moving from Iraq into Syria before we went in. You do the math.
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