Saddam Regime Document: Iraqi Intelligence met with Bin Laden in 1995 (Translation)

In the Pentagon/FMSO document ISGZ-2004-009247 there is a clear report about the relation between Iraq and Bin Laden that dated back to 1995. This document contains a 9 page report from the Iraqi Intelligence Apparatus and it is titled “The Saudi Opposition and Achieving the Relation and Contact With Them”. In the report they talk about there meeting with Osama Bin Laden and that Bin Laden in 1995 and how to establish relations wiht him. In the meeting Bin Laden asked the Iraqis for joint operations with them against the Foreign forces (US military) in the land of Hijaz (Saudia or Saudi Arabia).

Lead by the Saudi Osama Bin Laden who belongs to a wealthy Saudi family with her roots go back to Hadramoot and connected strongly with the ruling family in Saudia, and he is one of the leaders of the Arab Afghan who volunteered for Jihad in Afghanistan, and after the expulsion of the Soviets he moved to stay in Sudan in the year 1992 after the arrival of the Islamists to power in Sudan.

And because of his stands against the Saudi Royal family because of the foreign presence inside it, the Saudi authorities made a decision to withdraw his Saudi citizenship, and we moved toward The Comission from our side and through the following:

A. During the visit of the Sudanese Dr. Abrahim Al Sanoosi to the country and his meeting with Mr. Uday Saddam Hussein on 13/12/1994 and with the presence of the respectful Sir the Director of the Apparatus he indicated that the opposition person Osama Bin Laden who is staying in Sudan and who was cautious and fears that he will be accused by his opponents that he became an agent for Iraq, is ready to meet with him in Sudan (The results of the meeting were written to the Honorable Presidency according to our letter 872 on 17/12/1994).

B. The approval of the Honorable Presidency was granted to meet with the opposition person Osama Bin Laden by the Apparatus according to letter 128 on 11/1/1995 (attachment 6) and the meting with him was completed by Mr. M.A ex-4th Directory in Sudan and with the presence of the Sudanese Dr. Abrahim AL Sanoosi on 19/2/1995 and a discussion occurred about his organization, and he requested the broadcasting of Sheikh Sleiman AL Awada (who has influence in Saudia and outside since he is a known and influential religious personality) and dedicate a program for them through the station directed inside the country and make joint operations against the forces of infidels in the land of Hijaz ( the Honorable Presidency has been notified with the details of the meeting according to our letter 370 in 4/3/1995 attachment 7).

C. The approval of Mr. President the Leader God protect him was granted to dedicate and program for them through the station directed and we leave to develop the relation and cooperation between the two sides what open in front of it in discussion and agreement through other cooperation doors. The Sudanese side was informed about the approval of the Honorable Presidency above through the representative of the respectful Sir the Director of the Apparatus our ambassador in Khartoom.

D. Due to the latest conditions in Sudan and accusing her harboring of supporting and harboring terrorism it was agreed with the opposition person the Saudi Osama Bin Laden to leave Sudan to another place where he left Khartoom in the month of July 1996 and the information indicate that he is Afghanistan at the present moment. There is stil relation with him through the Sudanese side and we work in the present moment to activate this relation with him through a new channel in light of the current place where he stays.

Just checking on the other Blogs and I find this:

An Army of Analysts
Collective analysis of captured Iraqi documents may produce much more than just answers about pre-war Iraq.
by Michael Tanji

*******************AN EXCERPT****************************

It is perhaps coincidental, but certainly apropos, that at the start of "Sunshine Week"--an annual promotion of openness and transparency in government--we receive word from Director of National Intelligence Negroponte that documents captured in Iraq will be released to the public for review and analysis. As someone who spent the last several years exploiting captured media for the U.S. government, I am keenly aware of the staggering scope and scale of the current effort. To be frank: Uncle Sam needs all the help he can get.

The significance of what can be uncovered by an external and independent analysis of captured media was recently illustrated by the Combating Terrorism Center at the Military Academy at West Point. The Center's 100-plus page analysis of just 28 declassified Iraqi documents provided some unique insights into the terrorism problem. That's 28 documents out of at least two million.

Recently, the New York Times reported on the publication of a report on the state of Iraq prior to and immediately after the start of Iraqi Freedom. This effort was a fusion of 600 captured documents, interviews, and interrogations of former regime members. It is not known if those interviewed were presented with copies of their own work written at the time Saddam was still in power, though given the state of Iraq immediately after shock and awe it is unlikely. As I have written previously, there is really only one way to re-create the information systems used by the senior leadership in Iraq prior to

the war. A more comprehensive analysis of pre-war Iraq would include such an effort because even under the friendliest of circumstances (interviewees were reportedly "wined and dined"), for some there will always be cause to be taciturn.

Both of the aforementioned efforts received a certain amount of intelligence community support, which meant the imposition of a pre-publication review requirement. Releasing documents to the public precludes the imposition of such a restriction, so in the interest of preventing an adversary from aggregating intelligence (piecing together an essentially classified picture by assembling unclassified and seemingly innocuous data points) some form of pre-release review is probably prudent. This may add some time to the starting point of any collective analysis, but it also means that the speed at which analytical findings are released are limited only by the effort put forth by the assembled analysts.

From a traditional intelligence perspective, a group analysis effort is something of a new concept. Intelligence "Community" projects are occasionally called for, but these are more collegial bouts over the odd debatable point--most analysts agree on 80 percent of any given issue area--than thorough and original examination of a given problem by any interested parties. Collective projects like the one analyzing documents on Guantanamo Bay detainees have produced encouraging preliminary results. Whether you call it a blog-swarm, the "wisdom of the crowds," or an "Army of Davids," the general concept is the same: the more determined individuals that are set on a problem, the better the result.

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