Drug war trumps port safety

The Denver Post ^ | 03/12/2006 | Mike Krause

[JTN]

The top objective of the U.S. Coast Guard's anti-terrorism strategy is to protect what's called the "U.S. Maritime Domain," including American ports.

But it is hard to take seriously the idea that ports are being effectively protected when the Coast Guard spent more tax dollars last year fighting the war on drugs than has been spent in total on port security since Sept. 11, 2001.

Since becoming part of the Department of Homeland Security in early 2003, the Coast Guard reports interdicting at sea some 340 tons of cocaine bound for the United States.

For 2005 alone, it was 150 tons, shattering all previous annual seizure records.

This record-breaking drug interdiction takes place mostly in the "transit zone," 6 million square miles of water that includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean, as well as the territorial waters of cooperating nations.

Monitoring all that ocean keeps valuable Coast Guard assets busy far away from any American port.

The Coast Guard's budget was increased 9 percent to $6.3 billion by the Department of Homeland Security Act of 2005. A 13 percent request for drug interdiction pushed the agency's drug-war spending to $650 million in 2005, an increase of more than $100 million in the last couple of years.

That same Homeland Security Act also provided a little over $100 million for implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), enacted by Congress in 2002 to establish a counterterrorism program for America's 361 ports, and for which the Coast Guard is the lead agency.

The Wall Street Journal recently reported that while the United States has spent billions on other security measures since Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, "it has spent just $630 million to improve security at the nation's ports."

Of course, coastal security does not just mean ports. Recent news reports described the Coast Guard intercepting a suspect ship bound for the United States some 200 miles off the East Coast.

This is an excellent example of combining intelligence with long- range assets to "push out the border" and meet potential threats before they get to America's shores.

The 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, which federal drug czar John Walters recently introduced in Denver, brags about how the Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton and its embarked MH-68 helicopter "dominated" parts of the eastern Pacific on drug patrol in 2005. Hamilton, among other things, busted a go-fast boat "some 300 miles west of Ecuador," and "searched for a trafficker speedboat in the remote areas north of the Galapagos Islands."

Needless to say, Coast Guard ships chasing dopers around the Galapagos Islands are obviously unavailable to meet a potential threat approaching the American coast.

The National Drug Control Strategy claims that thanks to "successes in our overseas market-disruption strategy," the U.S. retail price of cocaine rose 19 percent to $170 per gram in 2005.

This is part of the rationale for expanding Coast Guard transit zone drug patrols, at the expense of port and coastal security, in 2006 and beyond.

But even a casual look shows that allowing the drug war to trump counterterror can hardly be called a "success."

Writing on the recent spike in cocaine prices, Ted Galen Carpenter from the Washington, D.C.-based Cato Institute notes: "For the past 12 years, street prices of cocaine have fluctuated between $120 and $190 per gram. Clearly, a price of $170 is well within that 'normal' range."

What the seizure statistics and the massive range of cocaine flow estimates (between 325 and 675 metric tons of cocaine a year in the transit zone) - along with price and availability of cocaine in the U.S. - suggest is that more cocaine is getting through than ever before.

So not only does cocaine interdiction distract the Coast Guard from its port security mission, cocaine interdiction itself is failing.

Most disturbing is that Congress, the Coast Guard and the drug czar all seem fine with this - and, in fact, want even more of the same.

Mike Krause is a veteran of the Coast Guard, and participated in numerous joint-agency drug patrols in the Caribbean Sea. He directs the Justice Policy Initiative at the Independence Institute, a think tank in Golden.

[JTN]

Ping

[Marine Inspector]

This story is BS. The Coast Guard is only 1 part of the port security pie, and they are not even the biggest piece.

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http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/trade/securing_us_ports.xml

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Securing U.S. Ports
Updated 03/09/2006

Port security has been dramatically strengthened since 9/11.

• Funding has increased by more than 700 percent since September 11, 2001.
• Funding for port security was approximately $259 million in FY 2001.
• DHS spent approximately $1.6 billion on port security in FY 2005.

Following 9/11, the federal government has implemented a multi-layered defense strategy to keep our ports safe and secure. New technologies have been deployed with additional technologies being developed and $630 million has been provided in grants to our largest ports including $16.2 million to Baltimore; $32.7 million to Miami; $27.4 million to New Orleans, $43.7 million to New York/New Jersey; and $15.8 million to Philadelphia.

Who Secures the Ports:

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): CBP’s mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States by eliminating potential threats before they arrive at our borders and ports.

  CBP uses intelligence and a risk-based strategy to screen information on 100 percent of cargo before it is loaded onto vessels destined for the United States. All cargo that is identified as high risk is inspected, either at the foreign port or upon arrival into the U.S.

• Coast Guard: The Coast Guard routinely inspects and assesses the security of U.S. ports in accordance with the Maritime Transportation and Security Act and the Ports and Waterways Security Act. Every regulated U.S. port facility is required to establish and implement a comprehensive security plan that outlines procedures for controlling access to the facility, verifying credentials of port workers, inspecting cargo for tampering, designating security responsibilities, training, and reporting of all breaches of security or suspicious activity, among other security measures. Working closely with local port authorities and law enforcement agencies, the Coast Guard regularly reviews, approves, assesses and inspects these plans and facilities to ensure compliance.

• Terminal Operator: Whether a person or a corporation, the terminal operator is responsible for operating its particular terminal within the port. The terminal operator is responsible for the area within the port that serves as a loading, unloading, or transfer point for the cargo. This includes storage and repair facilities and management offices. The cranes they use may be their own, or they may lease them from the port authority.

• Port Authority: An entity of a local, state or national government that owns, manages and maintains the physical infrastructure of a port (seaport, airport or bus terminal) to include wharf, docks, piers, transit sheds, loading equipment and warehouses. Ports often provide additional security for their facilities.

  The role of the Port Authority is to facilitate and expand the movement of cargo through the port, provide facilities and services that are competitive, safe and commercially viable. The Port manages marine navigation and safety issues within port boundaries and develops marine-related businesses on the lands that it owns or manages.

A Layered Defense:

• Screening and Inspection: CBP screens 100 percent of all cargo before it arrives in the U.S using intelligence and cutting edge technologies. CBP inspects all high-risk cargo.

• CSI (Container Security Initiative): Enables CBP, in working with host government Customs Services, to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States. In addition to the current 43 foreign ports participating in CSI, many more ports are in the planning stages. By the end of 2006, the number is expected to grow to 50 ports covering 82 percent of transpacific maritime containerized cargo shipped to the U.S.

• 24-Hour Rule: Under this requirement, manifest information must be provided 24 hours prior to the sea container being loaded onto the vessel in the foreign port. CBP may deny the loading of high-risk cargo while the vessel is still overseas.

• C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism): CBP created a public-private and international partnership with nearly 5,800 businesses (over 10,000 have applied) including most of the largest U.S. importers -- the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT, CBP and partner companies are working together to improve baseline security standards for supply chain and container security. (We review the security practices of not only the company shipping the goods, but also the companies that provided them with any services.)

• Use of Cutting-Edge Technology: CBP is currently utilizing large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo. Presently, CBP operates over 680 radiation portal monitors at our nation’s ports (including 181 radiation portal monitors at seaports), utilizes over 170 large scale non-intrusive inspection devices to examine cargo, and has issued 12,400 hand-held radiation detection devices. The President’s FY 2007 budget requests $157 million to secure next-generation detection equipment at our ports of entry. Also, over 600 canine detection teams, who are capable of identifying narcotics, bulk currency, human beings, explosives, agricultural pests, and chemical weapons are deployed at our ports of entry.

U.S. Recommended Standards for Container Security Initiative (CSI)

The Container Security Initiative consists of four core elements. These are: (1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they arrive at U.S. ports; (3) using technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers; and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers.

In order to be eligible to participate in CSI, the Member State’s Customs Administration and the seaport must meet the following three requirements:

1. The Customs Administration must be able to inspect cargo originating, transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country.

2. Non-intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment (including gamma or X-ray imaging capabilities) and radiation detection equipment must be available and utilized for conducting such inspections. This equipment is necessary in order to meet the objective of quickly screening containers without disrupting the flow of legitimate trade.

3. The seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to ports in the United States.

As part of agreeing to participate in CSI, a Member State’s Customs Administration and the seaport must also:

4. Commit to establishing a risk management system to identify potentially high-risk containers, and automating that system. This system should include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting decisions and identifying best practices.

5. Commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management information with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection in order to do collaborative targeting, and developing an automated mechanism for these exchanges.
6. Conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities.

7. Commit to maintaining integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity.

	see also:
	on cbp.gov:
	Anti-Terrorism Initiatives

[Bones75]

They should use RICO to bust up the DEA.

[thoughtomator]

Terminal Operator: Whether a person or a corporation, the terminal operator is responsible for operating its particular terminal within the port. The terminal operator is responsible for the area within the port that serves as a loading, unloading, or transfer point for the cargo. This includes storage and repair facilities and management offices. The cranes they use may be their own, or they may lease them from the port authority.

Erm... I thought that the terminal operators have no role in port security? Can someone in on this UAE/DPW arrangement please clarify?

[stuartcr]

You were't supposed to notice that part...

[Prokopton]

The terminal operators have now and always have had responsibility for security of there terminal. They hire guards, do perimeter security like fences, gates and video surveillance, do checks on those entering or leaving the facility, do background checks on employees, and generally have responsibility for all containers after they have been unloaded from a ship until they are loaded on a truck.
Homeland security has given millions of dollars in grants for terminal operators to increase their security.
If you've ever been to a terminal you know they are not crawling with Coast Guard or Customs officials but you may see a number of private security guards.
The canard that "terminal operators have no role in security" has always been false. They have an important role as do the Federal and State agencies.

[freepatriot32]

I'm sure the WODies will be on here soon saying how this is a good thing and its better if a thousand dirty bombs get through to america as long as no coke or heroin or weed does because the evil demon weed is far more destructive then any bomb in the hands of terrorists (better hundreds of thousand of people die then one white woman has sex with even one negro jazz musician dont you know)

The History of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937

Libertarian ping.To be added or removed from my ping list freepmail me or post a message here

[freepatriot32]

ping

[freepatriot32]

Is there a "War on Drugs" PING I can get in on?

I have a Libertarian ping list that i ping almost all of the war on drugs threads to would you liketo get onthat ?Its not exclusively about the war on drugs there area lot of non war on drugs threads I ping that list to also

[Marine Inspector]

I thought that the terminal operators have no role in port security?

They don't. They do have a role in "Terminal Security".

"Terminal Security" is not "Port Security" and "Port Security" monitors "Terminal Security".

[thoughtomator]

I'm a bit confused... trying to wrap my brain around a terminal being part of a port, but terminal security not being part of port security. What am I missing here? Why would the terminal operator be listed under "Who secures the ports" in the list in post 6 if they are not part of port security?

[freepatriot32]

At the risk of being labeled a "libertarian," (most of whom are jerks), I wish to subscribe to this PING list of yours. Where do I send the check?

I added you to the list its freeof charge but if you stillwant to send me a check i wont stop you :-)

[Marine Inspector]

The port has many terminals. Each terminal is leased to a terminal operator.

The terminal operators hire guards to guard their terminals. They install electronic surveillance and have the guards stand post and walk patrols, but only in/on their terminals.

The port operator, has security also. They have guards that watch the port and monitors the terminals. They have electronic surveillance that monitors the port and the terminals.

It's a layered security system. The terminal operators have guild lines set down by the port operators and have to maintain that security at their terminals only, not else where at the port.

The port security monitors everything at the port.

Most of this whole argument is a play on words.

Those against the deal say that since the terminal operators run the security at their terminals, they have a role in port security. Those for the deal and those of us that work at ports, make the distinction that the terminal operators only secure their terminals but have no involvement in overall port security matters.

The bottom line is, the guards and workers are the same, reagardless of who leases the terminals. They are all American Citizens.

[Supernatural]

"price and availability of cocaine in the U.S. - suggest is that more cocaine is getting through than ever before".


In spite of billions of dollars being spent on the "War on Drugs", it looks like it ain't working.

So what to do now? Throw even more money into the fray? Put more and more users in jail, wasting cells that could be used to put real criminals in?

I have a lot more questions than I do answers.

[Mojave]

This story is BS.

It's an excuse for promoting legalized dope. They don't care that it's BS.

[NoCurrentFreeperByThatName]

This story is BS. The Coast Guard is only 1 part of the port security pie, and they are not even the biggest piece.

Yeah, but they toot their horn the loudest. CBP bump.

[A CA Guy]

Since there seems to be more than a little connection between drug money and terrorism, seems looking for drug dealers and drugs is still a priority.