Posted on 03/04/2006 12:31:35 PM PST by FairOpinion
Fact Sheet: Securing U.S. Ports
The Administration has dramatically strengthened port security since 9/11.
Funding has increased by more than 700% since September 11, 2001. Funding for port security was approximately $259 million in FY 2001. DHS spent approximately $1.6 billion on port security in FY 2005.
Following 9/11, the federal government has implemented a multi-layered defense strategy to keep our ports safe and secure. New technologies have been deployed with additional technologies being developed and $630 million has been provided in grants to our largest ports, including $16.2 million to Baltimore; $32.7 million to Miami; $27.4 million to New Orleans, $43.7 million to New York/New Jersey; and $15.8 million to Philadelphia.
Who Secures The Ports:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): CBP’s mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States by eliminating potential threats before they arrive at our borders and ports.
CBP uses intelligence and a risk-based strategy to screen information on 100% of cargo before it is loaded onto vessels destined for the United States. All cargo that is identified as high risk is inspected, either at the foreign port or upon arrival into the U.S.
Coast Guard: The Coast Guard routinely inspects and assesses the security of U.S. ports in accordance with the Maritime Transportation and Security Act and the Ports and Waterways Security Act. Every regulated U.S. port facility is required to establish and implement a comprehensive security plan that outlines procedures for controlling access to the facility, verifying credentials of port workers, inspecting cargo for tampering, designating security responsibilities, training, and reporting of all breaches of security or suspicious activity, among other security measures. Working closely with local port authorities and law enforcement agencies, the Coast Guard regularly reviews, approves, assesses and inspects these plans and facilities to ensure compliance.
Terminal Operator: Whether a person or a corporation, the terminal operator is responsible for operating its particular terminal within the port. The terminal operator is responsible for the area within the port that serves as a loading, unloading, or transfer point for the cargo. This includes storage and repair facilities and management offices. The cranes they use may be their own, or they may lease them from the port authority.
Port Authority: An entity of a local, state or national government that owns, manages and maintains the physical infrastructure of a port (seaport, airport or bus terminal) to include wharf, docks, piers, transit sheds, loading equipment and warehouses.
Ports often provide additional security for their facilities.
The role of the Port Authority is to facilitate and expand the movement of cargo through the port, provide facilities and services that are competitive, safe and commercially viable. The Port manages marine navigation and safety issues within port boundaries and develops marine-related businesses on the lands that it owns or manages.
A Layered Defense:
Screening and Inspection: CBP screens 100% of all cargo before it arrives in the U.S.- using intelligence and cutting edge technologies. CBP inspects all high-risk cargo.
CSI (Container Security Initiative): Enables CBP, in working with host government Customs Services, to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States. In addition to the current 42 foreign ports participating in CSI, many more ports are in the planning stages. By the end of 2006, the number is expected to grow to 50 ports, covering 90% of transpacific maritime containerized cargo shipped to the U.S.
24-Hour Rule: Under this requirement, manifest information must be provided 24 hours prior to the sea container being loaded onto the vessel in the foreign port. CBP may deny the loading of high-risk cargo while the vessel is still overseas.
C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism): CBP created a public-private and international partnership with nearly 5,800 businesses (over 10,000 have applied) including most of the largest U.S. importers -- the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT, CBP and partner companies are working together to improve baseline security standards for supply chain and container security. (We review the security practices of not only the company shipping the goods, but also the companies that provided them with any services.)
Use of Cutting-Edge Technology: CBP is currently utilizing large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo. Presently, CBP operates over 680 radiation portal monitors at our nation’s ports (including 181 radiation portal monitors at seaports), utilizes over 170 large scale non-intrusive inspection devices to examine cargo, and has issued 12,400 hand-held radiation detection devices. The President’s FY 2007 budget requests $157 million to secure next-generation detection equipment at our ports of entry. Also, over 600 canine detection teams, who are capable of identifying narcotics, bulk currency, human beings, explosives, agricultural pests, and chemical weapons are deployed at our ports of entry.
UAE/Dubai Ports World Acquisition
DP World will not, nor will any other terminal operator, control, operate or manage any United States port. DP World will only operate and manage specific, individual terminals located within six ports.
The recent business transaction taken by DP World, a United Arab Emirates based company, to acquire British company Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) does not change the operations or security of keeping our nation’s ports safe. The people working on the docks also will not change as a result of this transaction. This transaction is not an issue of controlling United States’ ports. It is an issue of operating some terminals within U.S. ports. DP World will operate at the following terminals within the six United States’ ports currently operated by the United Kingdom company, P & O: o Baltimore - 2 of 14 total o Philadelphia - 1 of 5 (does not include the 1 cruise vessel terminal) o Miami - 1 of 3 (does not include the 7 cruise vessel terminals) o New Orleans - 2 of 5 (does not include the numerous chemical plant terminals up and down the Mississippi River, up to Baton Rouge) o Houston – 4 of 12 (P&O work alongside other stevedoring* contractors at the terminals) o Newark/Elizabeth – 1 of 4 o (Note: also in Norfolk - Involved with stevedoring activities at all 5 terminals, but not managing a specific terminal.) *Stevedoring – provides labor, carries physical loading and unloading of cargo.
P&O and DP World made a commitment to comply with current security programs, regulations and partnerships to which P&O currently subscribes, including: o The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT); o The Container Security Initiative (CSI); o The Business Alliance on Smuggling and Counterfeiting (BASC); and, o The Megaports Initiative MOU with the Department of Energy.
All P&O security arrangements will remain intact, including cargo security cooperation with CBP, compliance with USCG regulations (ISPS and MTSA) regarding port facilities/terminals, and foreign terminal operations within CSI ports.
Dubai was the first Middle Eastern entity to join the Container Security Initiative (March 2005). As a result, CBP officer are working closely with Dubai Customs to screen containers destined for the U.S. Cooperation with Dubai officials has been outstanding and a model for other operation within CSI ports.
U.S. Recommended Standards for Container Security Initiative (CSI)
The Container Security Initiative consists of four core elements. These are: (1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they arrive at U.S. ports; (3) using technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers; and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers.
In order to be eligible to participate in CSI, the Member State’s Customs Administration and the seaport must meet the following three requirements:
The Customs Administration must be able to inspect cargo originating, transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through a country. Non-intrusive inspectional (NII) equipment (including gamma or X-ray imaging capabilities) and radiation detection equipment must be available and utilized for conducting such inspections. This equipment is necessary in order to meet the objective of quickly screening containers without disrupting the flow of legitimate trade. The seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic to ports in the United States.
As part of agreeing to participate in CSI, a Member State’s Customs Administration and the seaport must also:
Commit to establishing a risk management system to identify potentially high-risk containers, and automating that system. This system should include a mechanism for validating threat assessments and targeting decisions and identifying best practices. Commit to sharing critical data, intelligence, and risk management information with the United States Customs Service in order to do collaborative targeting, and developing an automated mechanism for these exchanges. Conduct a thorough port assessment to ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s infrastructure and commit to resolving those vulnerabilities. Commit to maintaining integrity programs to prevent lapses in employee integrity and to identify and combat breaches in integrity.
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"Has FR been invaded?"
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Based on the posts and responses to the occasional polls, my guess is that about 10% of the posters are not conservatives, but anti-conservatives who stay just enough under the radar, to avoid being banned.
(On a different, but related topic, see my tagline. I started to use that, because there are some posters who post on the CA threads, that it's better to get a leftist Dem governor, than a Republican, all the while telling us how conservative they are)
Would you have preferred Kerry or Gore?
Is this the same DHS lawyer leader that thinks open borders and immigration is a great idea, and a border fence is bad idea?
Ya...I thought it was the same guy...
Guess no one can venture to say why the DHS itself is putting out the "P&O/DPW operating ports" language, instead of saying it will manage *some* TERMINAL operations where it leases those terminals.
I do see that DHS is only counting *public* terminals in its listing. For what reason, I don't know. It makes me a little nervous to think that the DHS thinks only the public terminals are under its auspices. There are many, many more privately owned, leased and operated terminals in each of these ports than publicly owned ones--not to mention that there are many more US ports where DPW will have operations.
Also strange is that it included the Port of Houston in its statement at all, since DPW doesn't lease any terminals or other facilities at this port; it simply contracts its services throughout the port. It will not be managing any terminal activities at all in Houston and thus the Port of Houston was not listed in the original six ports in *question.*
I'm hoping it was gubmint misspeak or tunnel vision, OR this pertains somehow to just the Dubai portion of DPW's management, and not the "new" US division which will help to satisfy the congressional questions.
Yes, and the loyal opposition know we're right. Must be quite a predicament for them.
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http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Nov/UF-US_Customs.htm
A recent report by a Congressional watchdog agency, the Government Accountability Office, for example, criticizes the quality of CBP’s detection equipment and asserts that staffing imbalances have prevented the agency from inspecting many U.S.-bound shipments.
As a result of this system, CBP officers in Baltimore scan only about 14 to 15 percent of the containers passing through their port, Shannon said. “We wouldn’t want to scan all of the containers on a ship,” he said. “That would be a waste of time.”
Once CSI is implemented in 50 ports, approximately 90 percent of all trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific cargo imported into the United States will be subjected to pre-screening.”
This system—developed under a $9 million, four-year contract awarded in 2003 to SETA Corporation, of McLean, Va.—uses risk-based analysis to decide which containers should not be loaded aboard the vessel at the foreign port, which need to be inspected at either the foreign or the U.S port, and which are low-risk and can shipped without further review.
An April 2005 report by the GAO labeled these efforts as “promising,” but raised concerns about CBP’s “ability to achieve its ultimate goal of improved cargo security.”
Richard Stana, director of GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team, told the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that CBP had been unable to target all U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports because of staffing imbalances. “As a result, 35 percent of these shipments were not targeted [for] overseas inspection,” he said.
In addition, Stana said, CBP has not established minimum technical requirements for the detection capability of inspection equipment used as part of CSI. Participating ports use various types of equipment to inspect containers, and the capabilities of such equipment can vary, he noted.
“Given these conditions, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist weapons of mass destruction,” Stana said.
In response, CBP said it agreed with the GAO’s findings and proposed to reconsider
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/043005_zenko.htm
You are quoting an oped.
Let me repeat. You are taking the word of editorials and the MSM over the official statement of the DHS.
It should be prosecutable for any elected official to highlight and describe weaknesses in our defense systems-especially in a time of war.
"You really believe this? Amazing. "
Hell yes, I do.
A couple of months ago,Biden gave the exact time and route of his Amtrak train and said it was ripe for a terror attack.
Hillary did the same thing in regards to the NYC subway system and ports.
I don't understand why it is necessary to signal to the enemy exactly how many cargo holds are examined and how.
Both of them have the luxury of calling the White House and other agencies to express their concerns-in private.
Holding press conferences and describing in detail the specific vulnerablities of our nation, only helps one group-the terrorists.
Which, I have no doubt, is the aim of the Democrats and the media.
There's a balance to be struck. The best defense is a strong offense -- on that we may agree.
Both this post and post 87 were from April of last year and the data used for the analysis is at least 11 months old. How much progress has there been since then?
That's posts 87 and 88.
I have been a critic, and I really don't think the critics have drowned out the valuable info here. I've been looking for facts. Facts will change my mind more than a high and mighty attitude. That is why I thanked FO for the post. It contained some good info that made me feel a little more secure. When all is said and done, that is my main concern.
OK, just so we're clear.
No elected official should now ever discuss our border problem, our ports security, or in any other way publicly point out ANY deficiencies in our national security.
That's insane, and a recipe for fascism - jailing anybody who questions the government.
You got this port deal correct. Let me describe the deal by using the airline industry. For example, British Airlines flys into Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas and docks at their terminal. The airport owns the terminal and British Airlines is leasing the terminal. Bye the way, all security is performed by Americans. Along comes UAE and buys out British Airlines. Nothing changes because British Airlines stills flys into Bush Airport except the ownership of British Airlines is now UAE. This is the same for the port deal.
For everyone crying and whining about the budgets they should remember the "700%" increase in funding for I'm assuming the ports alone.
Tax cuts that everyone wanted plus security we all need add in Iraq and everything else most want and there you go.
"Tax cuts that everyone wanted plus security we all need add in Iraq and everything else most want and there you go."
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Excellent point. People "want to have their cake and eat it too" and don't realize that "there is not such thing as a free lunch".
"OK, just so we're clear "
Apparently we're not.
I'll try again.
Elected officials should not be discussing, in public, the specifics of vulnerabilities.
The operative word is specifics.
If you're asking City Hall for more police protection in your neighborhood, do you also publicly annnounce that you don't have a security system ,your back window is broken and the house is empty every day from 8 until 6 ?
July 28, 2004
Biden: ..We have 101 nuclear power plants in the United States.
None of them have federal protection.
We’re in a situation where today if you got on an Amtrak Train from Boston to New York, you’d hit New York, there’s more people in the tunnels that were built in 1917 with no ventilation,
no escape and no lighting underneath that New York City as we speak today,
sitting in car seats of trains than there are in five packed 747’s.
May 6,2004
Representative Stephen F. Lynch, Democrat of Massachusetts, after describing the lack of security at Boston's South Shore train station , added that it was the busiest in the country and all the employees he spoke to at the station " don't know what they are supposed to do in case of a terrorist attack."
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