Posted on 11/25/2005 6:38:53 PM PST by LS
Here at Free Republic there were some pretty heated debates about Fallujah. Some were convinced Bush had started to "pull an LBJ," interfering with the soldiers on the ground; others argued that the Marines (who took over for the 82nd Airborne in March 2004) knew what they were doing in hesitating before going in, guns a-blazing.
It turns out that at one time or another, almost all Freepers were right.
Former Marine Bing West, who co-authored the excellent story of the Marine Expeditionary Force in Operation Iraqi Freedom in his book The March Up provides something of a sequel in No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (Bantam, 2005).
West details the twists and turns of American policy from late March 2004 until November 2004 when the final offensive ended the radicals' stranglehold on the city. Fallujah was, as Obi-Wan Kenobi said of the Moss Eisley Spaceport, a "wretched hive of villany" and, even in the Saddam days, a city equivalent to Compton, California in its capacity for pure thuggery. For several months, four separate American forces attempted to apply classic counterinsurgency doctrine: win the hearts and minds of the people. Unfortunately, they had little money, got even less support from the local Sunni leaders, and when they applied overwhelming force, "despite their good intentions, [it] caused resentment" noted West.
In March 2004, four American contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated at what the Americans called the "Brooklyn Bridge." President George Bush was outraged, ordering the Marines to "go get those responsible." There was one small problem: The Marines disagreed with his order. Among other concerns. the Marines were hesitant to destroy an internet cafe known to be a hangout for insurgents because they wanted to seize the computers and e-mails to use in counterinsurgency; and when it was suggested to blow up the bridge, they argued that would destroy the ability of their own convoys to get across.
Instead, the Marines sent back a counterplan: give us a few weeks to pick off the ringleaders, then take the city when they least expect it. But the Joint Task Force HQ in Baghdad wanted immediate action for "political symbolism." Thus began a series of offensives, stalls, sieges, then, finally, offensives that yielded control of Fallujah.
The 82nd Airborne had controlled Fallujah prior to the Marines' arrival. Although they had the will, the 82nd had only 900 men for a city of 240,000; they didn't know who (if anyone) supported them in the city; and they received no support from Iraqi "police" or security officials. "Work with the Americans, you die," said one in resignation.
Instead, Special Operations came to Fallujah, and identified enemy leaders, slipping into the city at night to grab or kill them. "Some nights," said one Special Ops interpreter, "we'd search their houses and not even wake up their kids. We got that skilled." Still, by the time the 82nd turned over the city to the Marines, they had little to show for their efforts to control the city. Americans could only go inside with armored convoys, fully armed, and expecting a fight, every time.
When the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) took over in March, under Lt. Gen. James Conway and Maj. Gen. James Mattis (who headed 1st Division), the Marines intended to change the whole approach from the Army's. "The enemy will try to manipulate you into hating all Iraqis," Mattis told his men. "Do not allow the enemy that victory." He emphasized marksmanship---one shot, one kill. Then came the incident at Brooklyn Bridge.
Gen. Sanchez and Ambassador Paul Bremer wanted an immediate response (as did Bush) and rhetoric flew: "U.S. troops will go in. It's going to be deliberate; it will be precise; and it will be overwhelming." But underneath, there was no plan. What was "seizing" the city to accomplish? How were the Marines to find the perps?
Gen. Abizaid, as well as Sanchez, Conway, and Mattis all thought it important to put an "Iraqi face" on the offensive, but the only unit available at that time was the 2nd Iraqi Battalion---700 recently trained men who were ill-disciplined and unreliable, despite hard work from American advisors. But when the Iraqi convoy entered the city, it was immediately tied up in traffic and shooting broke out everywhere. The Iraqis broke down completely, and some 100 mutinied.
West points out that key to the Fallujah developments were the simultaneous uprisings in Ramadi and Sadr City. This threatened to deplete U.S. forces a multiple points. At the same time, Al-Jazeera slipped a TV crew into Fallujah, providing a Jane Fonda-esque propaganda stream for the enemy. The few American strike missions into the city had been complete tactical successes, but Al-Jazeera was reporting that the Americans were killing children and bombing hospitals.
At that point, politics indeed intervened. Several Iraqi Council members threatened to resign, likely causing the complete collapse of the new Interim Government, if the Fallujah offensive went ahead as planned. Conway claimed that the Marines held 30% of the city and that the enemy was short of ammunition. Communications between the Joint Task Force, the diplomats like Bremer, the Iraqis, and the Marines at Fallujah broke down. In truth, the Marines didn't need but a few days to complete the operation, they thought, but the JTF thought that they would take weeks, and that the political propaganda of leveled buildings would cause the new government to topple. "The IGC has threatened to resign," wanred Abazaid. "We need time to get it politically right."
Making matters worse still was the "feel good" PR message that was coming from the administration and the Pentagon, and even Bremer. On the day the Marines were ordered to halt, Bush said in his radio address they were moving ahead, block by block. West argues that the circuitous chain of communication from Bush to Rumsfeld to Bremer to Abazaid to Sanchez to Conway utterly failed to appraise the President of the views of the Marines in the field. Rumsfeld, for example, was urging Abizaid to resume the attack at the very time Bush told Bremer and Abizaid he wanted "options" as to the total flattening of Fallujah. Marine assurances that they did not have to utterly destroy the city to rout the "insurgents" was not getting through to the President.
Perhaps. But the fact remains that a "photo event" of the Iraqi Governing Council resigning over Fallujah would have been a disaster, and would have in the long run cost far more lives than it saved. And West points out there was another factor in the halt: the British. Tony Blair, convinced that an offensive would cost the Coalition what little world support it had left, leaned on Bush to find another way. Without the Iraqis or the British, Bush did not think he could order the assault. His view that "options" existed came from constant claims by Iraqi "negotiators" that they could gain the U.S. access to the city essentially bloodlessly, and get the citizenry to "give up" the terrorists. (West notes that all this also took place amidst the explosive revelations about Abu Ghraib, further reducing Bush's political capital).
Unable to advance, the Marines settled in for what would be a six-month siege. At Ramadi and in other cities where the uprisings started, the Coalition stomped the "insurgents" badly. Suddenly, carping from Baghdad grew quieter.
At that point, Iraqi "strongmen" such as Colonel Mohammad Latif and Gen. Suileman stepped forward to argue that they could guarantee peace and control the insurgents. The "Fallujah Brigade" would be able to go into the city and open the door for U.S. money, jobs, and start to pry away the non-ideological unemployed youths who supported the "insurgents" because they had no other income. However, the MEF did not receive any orders from the JTF on the "Fallujah Brigade." Instead, the MEF sent a notification up to the JTF, which sent ripples back to Rumsfled and Paul Wolfowitz at the Pentagon. "Have we turned over Fallujah to the old regime?" Wolfowitz asked. Quickly the Iraqi leaders turned out to be posers or frauds. They disappeared inside Fallujah and holed up in compounds, accomplishing nothing. By the end of June, the city was "a nest of vipers" and the frustrated Marines could only take solace in the fact that at night their snipers were, at a phenomenal rate, taking out enemy fighters.
Then, in late September and early November, several things broke in the Americans favor. First, Sadr's revolt was crushed, leading many of the Iraqi Governing Council members to gain confidence in a military solution. Second, Bush won reelection, and now was at his absolute safest political point, a newly-elected 2nd term President. Third, the Brits had grudgingly agreed Fallujah needed to be cleaned out, and they supplied the Black Watch to replace Marines for the offensive. Fourth, three Iraqi battalions---this time, genuine army units, well-trained, and, the Americans thought, reliable, were ready. The new assault on Fallujah would feature 13 battalions advancing on a city-wide front. Beginning at night, using Predators and other drones, the snipers began "attriting" the enemy ferociously. Key objectives were taken immediately on Nov. 8, and while West does a credible job of describing the combat, it was over quickly. By November 12, the city was back in American hands.
While criticizing the command structure (Bush and Bremer) for ordering the Marines in, then halting them, a Marine offensive in April could have achieved its objectives---but it just as easily could have destroyed the infant Iraqi government before it could get its legs; alienate the British; and, if there were any errors, produced Al-Jazeera footage of unimaginable propaganda value.On the other hand, it is not evident at all that the "insurgents" gained anything from the delay, except possibly to recruit a few more fighters for the Marines to kill. Untrained in city defense, and unskilled in the "western way of war," all the terrorists gained from the operational halt was time, not an ounce of strategic or tactical value. Even West admits that had Mattis and Conway continued their advance in April, the Americans would have controled the highways, but the insurgents still would have controlled the marketplace. But, he admits, either way, the result was the same in other respects: other cities got the message, particularly Ramadi.
West rightly faults the two separate chains of command for denying Bush accurate information from the commanders on the ground. But West also criticizes Abazaid for insufficient knowledge of the situation in Fallujah, and, more important, for being too Baghdad-oriented. The worst mistake, West argues, was in making bellicose statements in April without first discussing with the Marines what the response should be.
In April, when Bush wanted fast action, the Marines wanted to wait, plan, and proceed efficiently and in order. By June, that was no longer politically possible, and while they became frustrated, Bush had to fight a war, not a battle. This book explores all the various factors that swirl around battles in a war that requires maintenance of coalitions and which, in the end, must be fought and won by the Iraqis. As it turned out, the battle for Fallujah may have gone a long way toward making that reality possible.
INteresting.
Thanks for the post. This is a must read book. And thank you for your excellent review.
Excellent summary of the book. I look forward to reading it.
The British sending in the Black Watch to replace the Marines south of Baghdad represents only one battalion. If the ability to launch the offensive depended on the arrival of one battalion - and there was not one more U.S. battalion available in the Army or Marines - it represents ammunition for the McCain/Kerry thesis that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq.
Great review, LS. There was much puzzlement when we backed off Fallujah. IT seemed pretty clear there had to be complications, but there was not enough coordinated information to figure it out. This book seems to do that. The dispersed communication lines are troublesome and, one hopes, have been resolved.
Methinks this book gives too-big of a wide-screen lens on the political mountain over the Marine's hil.
I also recommend reading Americas's Secret War by George "Stratfor" Friedman.
I read it a month ago after hearing the author Bing West on John Batchelor's radio show on WABC. Great book with greater insights into our dealings with Iraq and how screwed up of a situation it is. It's not as bad as the media makes it, but 100x more convoluted than it seems.
I am reading it now, it is an excellent book, mostly done aploitical, but slams libs a few times...I like it a lot!
I read it already. The Marines asked specifically for the Black Watch, there were other troops available. They also asked for a specific Army unit - the same unit also. This is unusual, but not unheard of. McCain was and is full of himself. The ability to mount the op was in no way limited by available troops. You have to understand Fallujah in relation to Hue City where the Marines were the defender, not the attacker. The Marines know their history. They knew it was going to be nasty, and asked for the the best to go in with them.
BTS. must get the book
Good example of the multiple things Bush has to deal with at once while those at home, especially on FR, are screaming close the borders, just do it!, give us a real conservative judge so we can go to battle with the Dems!, slap China down!, why haven't we caught bin Laden, eliminate the Patriot Act!, and on and on, while at the same time the Dems are trying to impeach him and accusing him of lying. Through it all, he just plods on doing the right thing.
bttt
Not having read the book yet and relying on memory, I believe that the Army unit was the 2nd of the 7th Cav.
Also, for those who want another perspective of the April assault, Robert Kaplan concludes his excellent Imperial Grunts with his on the spot report while with the 1st of the 5th during that assault.
Just finished it, an excellent read. These days it seems that the "Fog of War" envelops Washington more than the battlefield.
"The Marines asked specifically for the Black Watch, there were other troops available."
Wouldn't this operation have been planned at the level of CentCom or General Casey? They would have determined the order of battle, not the Marines.
The Black Watch was deployed south of Baghdad, not anywhere near Fallujah. It replaced a Marine unit sent to Fallujah.
Not really. I just didn't want to go door-to-door with the narrative. There is more than enough combat---but honestly, it gets way lost without proper maps, and I mean detailed maps of the blocks the Marines were operating in.
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