Able Danger warned of attack on USS Cole

NORRISTOWN - Senior Pentagon officials were warned not to let the USS Cole dock in Yemen two days before terrorists attacked the ship five years ago killing 17 sailors, according to Congressman Curt Weldon, who said the crucial intelligence was gleaned from the former secret defense operation, "Able Danger."

Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, revealed the information in a House speech last Wednesday evening that blasted the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) attempts to discredit Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a DIA employee who worked as a liaison with the "Able Danger" team. In June, Shaffer told The Times Herald during an interview on Capitol Hill that the now-defunct data mining operation had linked Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta to an al-Qaida cell in Brooklyn in 2000 - more than a year before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The military's Special Operations Command ran the high-tech dragnet that searched for terrorist linkages. The terrorist associations were mapped out on large charts, according to Shaffer and other of "Able Danger" colleagues, during the program that operated between 1999 and 2001. However, following Shaffer's attempts to broker an arrangement that would draw the FBI into the operation, the program was shut down. Weldon and Shaffer believe "Able Danger" intelligence may have disrupted - or even prevented - the Sept. 11 attacks if it had continued. In August, Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott and James D. Smith, a defense contractor, corroborated Shaffer's story. On Wednesday, Weldon again criticized the Pentagon for dragging its feet in its probe of the defense program's history, and continued his criticism of the CIA, which he said tried to protect its own intelligence turf from other government intelligence agencies. "What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not being able to do what the Able Danger team did," he said. Besides claiming to identifying Atta from a grainy photograph prior to Sept. 11, the intelligence team also tried to warn the Pentagon not to allow the USS Cole to make a refueling stop in Yemen five years ago, Weldon said. On Oct. 12, 2000, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed into the side of the USS Cole as the ship refueled in port at Aden, killing the 17 Navy personnel. "(Able Danger members) also identified the threat to the USS Cole two weeks before the attack, and two days before the attack were screaming not to let the (ship) come into the harbor at Yemen, because they knew something was going to happen," he said. The "Able Danger" group operated at the Army's former Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA), in Ft. Belvoir, Va. After LIWA's intelligence gathering capability impressed Weldon, he tried to pitch the idea of a collaborative intelligence center to the CIA in 1999, but was rebuffed. Also in his speech, Weldon accused the DIA of trying to smear Shaffer rather than come clean on why "Able Danger" was shut down. Shaffer, who was awarded a Bronze Star for his service in Afghanistan, had his top-secret security clearance suspended in 2004 allegedly because of disputes over travel expenses and phone bills. But his supporters suggest Shaffer is being made a scapegoat for going public with the "Able Danger" revelations in August. Two days before he was set to testify about the program before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 21, the Reserve officer's secret clearance was revoked, and the Defense Department barred him, Phillpott and Smith from testifying at the hearing. Also in August, Pentagon officials told reporters at a press conference that "Able Danger" data had been deleted from computers. A former Army intelligence officer, Erik Kleinsmith, confirmed this at the Judiciary Committee hearing, testifying he was ordered to destroy information. During the life of the program, the operation's team members created charts linking terrorists. However, during the recent investigation, none have been found. The Pentagon, which claimed it is restricted from retaining intelligence on United States citizens and foreign residents living in the U.S., so-called "U.S. persons," for more than 90 days. However, Weldon has previously said most of the program's data was open source information and not classified. According to guidelines in Army Regulation 381-10, intelligence data can be kept indefinitely if it was culled from open sources. An unnamed "Able Danger official," Weldon said, was told by a Pentagon lawyer that it's okay to extend the time intelligence information is stored. A Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Col. Chris Conway, said recently that Defense Department officials worried that any public testimony given about "Able Danger" risked revealing classified information. "Prior to any testimony, we expressed our security concerns with Congress," Conway said. "We said in discussing Able Danger, (it) could inadvertently reveal classified information." Defense officials said they would allow military personnel to testify about the program behind closed doors. Previously, Shaffer said that Atta, an Egyptian, had been linked to the El Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, N.Y., a hotbed of anti-American sentiment once frequented by Sheik Omar Ahmed Abdul Rahman, know as the "Blind Sheik." Rahman is also Egyptian. Atta was not believed to be in the U.S., however, when he came to the attention of the team. In 1995, Rahman was convicted of plotting to bomb various sites in New York City. Four of Rahman's associates were convicted in 2002 of conspiring with him to commit terrorist acts while he was in prison. Though Shaffer was not allowed to give testimony at the Sept. 21 committee hearing, his attorney, Mark Zaid, did testify. As a sobering reminder of "Able Danger's" unfulfilled promise, Zaid said the missing charts showing terrorist links likely still contained "several dozen" individuals yet to be captured. "There are terrorist on the chart who may still be out there and planning attacks," Zaid said.

Another article on this? We have known this for a long time. Google Kie Fallis. Oh well, at least it is still making the news. From my files:

Vice Adm. Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote to all DIA personnel this week to explain the protest resignation of a DIA analyst in October. The analyst, Kie Fallis, quit the day after the USS Cole was attacked by suicide bombers in Aden, Yemen. Mr. Fallis charged that a report he had written on the threat of a terrorist attack in Yemen was suppressed by senior DIA officials.
Mr. Fallis' resignation letter stated that he had "significant analytic differences" with DIA superiors over a terrorist threat assessment produced in June.
U.S. intelligence officials said there were warnings, but they arrived too late. The National Security Agency issued a report shortly after the Cole was bombed warning of attacks in the region —too late to be useful.
Adm. Wilson said he asked the Pentagon inspector general (IG) to investigate Mr. Fallis' charges. In an awkwardly worded statement, the three-star admiral said on Wednesday the IG "found no evidence to support the public perception that information warning of an attack on Cole was suppressed, ignored or even available in DIA." What about the private perception?
The admiral's statement drew smirks from several intelligence officials. It relied on a dodge often used by intelligence analysts to dismiss unwelcome information. Saying there is "no evidence" —like that presented to a court of law — is often used to mask the fact there is lots of intelligence to the contrary that spooks would rather not talk about in public.
Source

Mr. Fallis also uncovered terrorist info related to 9/11:

One piece of the puzzle that Mr. Fallis uncovered was an intelligence report about a secret meeting of al Qaeda terrorists in a condominium complex in Malaysia in January 2000.
Information obtained after September 11 identified two of them as Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who would be on American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon. They met with a former Malaysian army captain, Yazi Sufaat, described by Malaysian authorities as a key link in Southeast Asia for al Qaeda, who later would be tied to the bombing of the Cole.
What alarmed U.S. intelligence at the time was that Malaysian security officials traced the men to the Iranian Embassy there, where they spent the night.
Source

HERE IS SOME HELP WITH FORMATTING:

NORRISTOWN - Senior Pentagon officials were warned not to let the USS Cole dock in Yemen two days before terrorists attacked the ship five years ago killing 17 sailors, according to Congressman Curt Weldon, who said the crucial intelligence was gleaned from the former secret defense operation, "Able Danger."

Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, revealed the information in a House speech last Wednesday evening that blasted the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) attempts to discredit Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a DIA employee who worked as a liaison with the "Able Danger" team.

In June, Shaffer told The Times Herald during an interview on Capitol Hill that the now-defunct data mining operation had linked Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta to an al-Qaida cell in Brooklyn in 2000 - more than a year before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

The military's Special Operations Command ran the high-tech dragnet that searched for terrorist linkages. The terrorist associations were mapped out on large charts, according to Shaffer and other of "Able Danger" colleagues, during the program that operated between 1999 and 2001.

However, following Shaffer's attempts to broker an arrangement that would draw the FBI into the operation, the program was shut down.

Weldon and Shaffer believe "Able Danger" intelligence may have disrupted - or even prevented - the Sept. 11 attacks if it had continued.

In August, Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott and James D. Smith, a defense contractor, corroborated Shaffer's story.
On Wednesday, Weldon again criticized the Pentagon for dragging its feet in its probe of the defense program's history, and continued his criticism of the CIA, which he said tried to protect its own intelligence turf from other government intelligence agencies.

"What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not being able to do what the Able Danger team did," he said.

Besides claiming to identifying Atta from a grainy photograph prior to Sept. 11, the intelligence team also tried to warn the Pentagon not to allow the USS Cole to make a refueling stop in Yemen five years ago, Weldon said.
On Oct. 12, 2000, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed into the side of the USS Cole as the ship refueled in port at Aden, killing the 17 Navy personnel.

"(Able Danger members) also identified the threat to the USS Cole two weeks before the attack, and two days before the attack were screaming not to let the (ship) come into the harbor at Yemen, because they knew something was going to happen," he said.

The "Able Danger" group operated at the Army's former Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA), in Ft. Belvoir, Va. After LIWA's intelligence gathering capability impressed Weldon, he tried to pitch the idea of a collaborative intelligence center to the CIA in 1999, but was rebuffed.

Also in his speech, Weldon accused the DIA of trying to smear Shaffer rather than come clean on why "Able Danger" was shut down.

Shaffer, who was awarded a Bronze Star for his service in Afghanistan, had his top-secret security clearance suspended in 2004 allegedly because of disputes over travel expenses and phone bills.

But his supporters suggest Shaffer is being made a scapegoat for going public with the "Able Danger" revelations in August.

Two days before he was set to testify about the program before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 21, the Reserve officer's secret clearance was revoked, and the Defense Department barred him, Phillpott and Smith from testifying at the hearing.

Also in August, Pentagon officials told reporters at a press conference that "Able Danger" data had been deleted from computers. A former Army intelligence officer, Erik Kleinsmith, confirmed this at the Judiciary Committee hearing, testifying he was ordered to destroy information.
During the life of the program, the operation's team members created charts linking terrorists. However, during the recent investigation, none have been found.

The Pentagon, which claimed it is restricted from retaining intelligence on United States citizens and foreign residents living in the U.S., so-called "U.S. persons," for more than 90 days.

However, Weldon has previously said most of the program's data was open source information and not classified. According to guidelines in Army Regulation 381-10, intelligence data can be kept indefinitely if it was culled from open sources.

An unnamed "Able Danger official," Weldon said, was told by a Pentagon lawyer that it's okay to extend the time intelligence information is stored.

A Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Col. Chris Conway, said recently that Defense Department officials worried that any public testimony given about "Able Danger" risked revealing classified information.

"Prior to any testimony, we expressed our security concerns with Congress," Conway said. "We said in discussing Able Danger, (it) could inadvertently reveal classified information."

Defense officials said they would allow military personnel to testify about the program behind closed doors.
Previously, Shaffer said that Atta, an Egyptian, had been linked to the El Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, N.Y., a hotbed of anti-American sentiment once frequented by Sheik Omar Ahmed Abdul Rahman, know as the "Blind Sheik." Rahman is also Egyptian. Atta was not believed to be in the U.S., however, when he came to the attention of the team.
In 1995, Rahman was convicted of plotting to bomb various sites in New York City. Four of Rahman's associates were convicted in 2002 of conspiring with him to commit terrorist acts while he was in prison.

Though Shaffer was not allowed to give testimony at the Sept. 21 committee hearing, his attorney, Mark Zaid, did testify.

As a sobering reminder of "Able Danger's" unfulfilled promise, Zaid said the missing charts showing terrorist links likely still contained "several dozen" individuals yet to be captured.

"There are terrorist on the chart who may still be out there and planning attacks," Zaid said.

In addition to Calpernia's post, see my post #5 on this thread as well. Yes they did have that info. This also ties into what Sandy Bergler stole. From my files:

We already know exactly what Berglar took and why...pay close attention to the last para on the Clarke/Kerrick memo. From Ashcroft's testimony:

The NSC's Millennium After Action Review declares that the United States barely missed major terrorist attacks in 1999 — with luck playing a major role. Among the many vulnerabilities in homeland defenses identified, the Justice Department's surveillance and FISA operations were specifically criticized for their glaring weaknesses. It is clear from the review that actions taken in the Millennium Period should not be the operating model for the U.S. government.

In March 2000, the review warns the prior Administration of a substantial al Qaeda network and affiliated foreign terrorist presence within the U.S., capable of supporting additional terrorist attacks here. [My note: Able Danger info]

Furthermore, fully seventeen months before the September 11 attacks, the review recommends disrupting the al Qaeda network and terrorist presence here using immigration violations, minor criminal infractions, and tougher visa and border controls.

Post #745

It falls directly into the AD timeline. In that same post, I note that what Sandy Berger stole was the versions of the after action report:

The missing copies, according to Breuer and their author, Richard A. Clarke, the counterterrorism chief in the Clinton administration and early in President Bush's administration, were versions of after-action reports recommending changes following threats of terrorism as 1999 turned to 2000. Clarke said he prepared about two dozen ideas for countering terrorist threats. The recommendations were circulated among Cabinet agencies, and various versions of the memo contained additions and refinements, Clarke said last night.

Therefore, they were never provided to the Commission, as evidenced by the Commission Report footnotes (#769):

46. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick,“Timeline,”Aug. 19, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). We did not find documentation on the after-action review mentioned by Berger. On Vice Chairman Joseph Ralston’s mission in Pakistan, see William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For speculation on tipping off the Taliban, see, e.g., Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003).
And to what does footnote (46) refer? On p. 117, Chapter 4, we find this:

Later on August 20, Navy vessels in the Arabian Sea fired their cruise missiles. Though most of them hit their intended targets, neither Bin Ladin nor any other terrorist leader was killed. Berger told us that an after-action review by Director Tenet concluded that the strikes had killed 20–30 people in the camps but probably missed Bin Ladin by a few hours. Since the missiles headed for Afghanistan had had to cross Pakistan, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was sent to meet with Pakistan’s army chief of staff to assure him the missiles were not coming from India. Officials in Washington speculated that one or another Pakistani official might have sent a warning to the Taliban or Bin Ladin. (46)
How about that? How many times have we heard Clinton say that he missed Bin Ladin by just a few hours? Yet the after-action report is missing, so the Commission relied on Sandy Berger's testimony.

Then the Clarke/Kerrick memo peaked my interest and I found this (#784):

Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible. He wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin's having met with Iraqi officials, who "may have offered him asylum." Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein's service, and it would be "virtually impossible" to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke declared.

Kerry and crew could not afford to have this info come out before the election.

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