The Secret History of Able Danger

From my files...We already know exactly what Berglar took and why...pay close attention to the last para on the Clarke/Kerrick memo. From Ashcroft's testimony:

The NSC's Millennium After Action Review declares that the United States barely missed major terrorist attacks in 1999 — with luck playing a major role. Among the many vulnerabilities in homeland defenses identified, the Justice Department's surveillance and FISA operations were specifically criticized for their glaring weaknesses. It is clear from the review that actions taken in the Millennium Period should not be the operating model for the U.S. government.

In March 2000, the review warns the prior Administration of a substantial al Qaeda network and affiliated foreign terrorist presence within the U.S., capable of supporting additional terrorist attacks here. [My note: AD info?]

Furthermore, fully seventeen months before the September 11 attacks, the review recommends disrupting the al Qaeda network and terrorist presence here using immigration violations, minor criminal infractions, and tougher visa and border controls.

Post #745

It falls directly into the AD timeline. In that same post, I note that what Sandy Berger stole was the versions of the after action report:

The missing copies, according to Breuer and their author, Richard A. Clarke, the counterterrorism chief in the Clinton administration and early in President Bush's administration, were versions of after-action reports recommending changes following threats of terrorism as 1999 turned to 2000. Clarke said he prepared about two dozen ideas for countering terrorist threats. The recommendations were circulated among Cabinet agencies, and various versions of the memo contained additions and refinements, Clarke said last night.

Therefore, they were never provided to the Commission, as evidenced by the Commission Report footnotes (#769):

46. NSC email, Clarke to Kerrick,“Timeline,”Aug. 19, 1998; Samuel Berger interview (Jan. 14, 2004). We did not find documentation on the after-action review mentioned by Berger. On Vice Chairman Joseph Ralston’s mission in Pakistan, see William Cohen interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For speculation on tipping off the Taliban, see, e.g., Richard Clarke interview (Dec. 18, 2003).
And to what does footnote (46) refer? On p. 117, Chapter 4, we find this:

Later on August 20, Navy vessels in the Arabian Sea fired their cruise missiles. Though most of them hit their intended targets, neither Bin Ladin nor any other terrorist leader was killed. Berger told us that an after-action review by Director Tenet concluded that the strikes had killed 20–30 people in the camps but probably missed Bin Ladin by a few hours. Since the missiles headed for Afghanistan had had to cross Pakistan, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was sent to meet with Pakistan’s army chief of staff to assure him the missiles were not coming from India. Officials in Washington speculated that one or another Pakistani official might have sent a warning to the Taliban or Bin Ladin. (46)
How about that? How many times have we heard Clinton say that he missed Bin Ladin by just a few hours? Yet the after-action report is missing, so the Commission relied on Sandy Berger's testimony.

Then the Clarke/Kerrick memo peaked my interest and I found this (#784):

Clarke was nervous about such a mission because he continued to fear that Bin Ladin might leave for someplace less accessible. He wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin's having met with Iraqi officials, who "may have offered him asylum." Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein's service, and it would be "virtually impossible" to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke declared.

Kerry and crew could not afford to have this info come out before the election.

ABLE DANGER

Representative Curt Weldon: 21 September 2005

The following is a transcript of the interview of Representative Curt Weldon (R, PA) by talk radio show host Michael Savage on 21 September 2005. This is only a partial transcript that begins after the first series of breaks.

Congressman Weldon: Great to be with you again, Michael.

Michael Savage: Well, look, I know what you’re facing here. I have some idea what you’re facing. I think that this is a gigantic story. I have a fear that it’s bigger than Watergate. The headlines are all over the place. They’re being obfuscated by the hurricane coverage. Pentagon nixes 9-11 hearing testimony. That’s the Associated Press. Specter wants answers about Able Danger, that’s Fox News. Did Army project identify September 11th ring leader, that’s CNET news. Congressman, what’s going on here? What do the people have to know?

Congressman Weldon: The people have to know that today’s hearing was an outrage. That our Dept. of Defense, which I’m a strong supporter of as the Vice Chairman of our Armed Services Committee, basically gagged four witnesses who simply wanted to tell the truth. A 23 year Army decorated Bronze Star recipient, a 23 year Navy commander of one of our destroyers were basically told you’re not allowed to testify. In addition a contractor who was involved in providing this information to our Special Forces Command was told that he couldn’t speak. And a woman who works for the FBI and set up meetings to transfer information Mohammad Atta and Able Danger and Al Quaeda from the military to the FBI one year before 9-11 was told she couldn’t speak. This is not America, this is wrong and it’s outrageous.

Michael Savage: Wow. That’s a pretty heavy story and yet it’s not getting any coverage in the new media. We had to find the hearings on C-SPAN 3. Even they had buried the story. Is this a bipartisan coverup Congressman?

Congressman Weldon: I don’t know if it’s bipartisan or not. But I can tell you there were 6 Senators at the hearing today, and everyone from Arlen Specter to the Chairs of the committee to Joe Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, to conservative Republicans like Charles Grassley and Jeff Sessions were as outraged as I am, that the military would not allow these people to come forward and simply tell the truth. No spin, just tell the truth. Just basically tell what they know, when they found out, what information they knew about Al Quaeda and whether or not it would have helped us to understand 9-11 before it occurred. In fact one of our witnesses, a fellow who was allowed to testify, a former military officer who now works for Lockheed Martin Corporation, testified that every night he goes to sleep, he wonders why, this information that he had in 1999 and 2000 couldn’t have been transferred. And he’s convinced it would have altered the course of the 9-11 attack against us. In fact he said in one statement, that it could have prevented 9-11 from ever occurring.

Michael Savage: Congressman, I took note when you said that even Democrats on the committee were equally outraged. Senator Biden, you said, had the same degree of concern as others? He was not trying to soft pedal this situation?

Congressman Weldon: No, Joe Biden, who is in fact a friend and an associate of mine, knew about this in advance. I had traveled with him to Iraq and told him about it. And he said that in the Senate hearing. He said, I have talked to Curt about this, I trust Curt’s integrity and we need to have answers. We need to know what’s going on here. We need to know why this data was collected and not transferred to the FBI. We need to know who made that decision. We need to know why the 9-11 Commission never even bothered to comment in any aspect on Able Danger in their final report. We need to know what people were involved in destroying data, 2.5 terabytes of data about Al Quaeda, which is equal to ¼ all the printed material in the Library of Congress. Material that still could have been useful.

Michael Savage: Let’s pause on that, equal to one-quarter of all the material in the Library of Congress, that’s been deleted?

Congressman Weldon: Yes. When I heard it was 2.5 terabytes of data, I figured I’d call the Library of Congress and see what is that really? They said, well, Congressman, it’s equal to ¼ all the printed material that the Library of Congress has in its collection. You know that the Library of Congress is the largest library in the world. So we’re talking about a massive amount of data. It’s not about 1 chart, it’s not about 1 photograph, it’s about a massive amount of data, about the largest and most aggressive international terrorist organization in the world. And it was destroyed. And on top of being destroyed, the customer for that data, a Special Forces general, General Lambert, was never consulted before the data was ordered to be destroyed. And he was livid when he found out that his data had been deleted and had been destroyed by the gentleman who testified today.

Michael Savage: This is a gigantic story Congressman. I have to ask you, why isn’t major media covering this story to the extent that it should be covered? What’s going on in your opinion?

Congressman Weldon: Well I’ve learned, Michael, not to try to predict the American media. They have their own agenda. In fact if the New York Times hadn’t run this story a month after I first gave this speech on the House floor, most of the major networks would never have bothered to even check into it. Because this story was not a new story in August. I actually told this story from the House floor in the end of June in a floor speech for 45 minutes on June 27th. The New York Times didn’t pick up the story until August 2nd. But when they ran it front page above the fold, and then for 3 straight days they followed up with stories it became the national and international news story in every major print paper and on all the major networks worldwide. What we’re fighting here is both the Pentagon and the 9-11 Commission who are trying to spin this story away, and say it’s much ado about nothing, it really didn’t matter. The 9-11 Commission called it historically insignificant. And that’s why this 23 year career Navy commander, an Annapolis graduate, said I’m not going to have my work labeled as historically insignificant. So he risked his entire career to come out in the public, in the open and say that he would swear on his entire career and his life that in January and February of 2000 his team and Able Danger identified Mohammad Atta and 3 of the other terrorists in the New York Al Quaeda cell. And he tried to get that data to the FBI and consistently, 3 times was refused.

Michael Savage: Unbelievable, this is a gigantic story. Do you believe, well we won’t know until tomorrow, if the New York Times will pick up the hearings today and run with it, because if so perhaps they’ll stop the hurricane coverage for a megabyte of time and let the people understand what’s going on here. There’s big news happening here. And this is news that the people would want to hear about. I mean this is not a trivial story, Congressman. Moreover, I have to say this, I think you’ve put your entire career on the line with this. They’ve tried to smear you, I watched this over the whole summer. They were trying to dismiss you. They were to marginalize you. Isn’t that true?

Congressman Weldon: Absolutely. Slade Gorton, the former Senator came out and actually had the audacity and the stupidity to say that we’ve concluded this never existed. I mean the Pentagon itself has acknowledged that they now believe totally credible people within the Pentagon, 5 of them who have testified that they identified Mohammad Atta before 9-11 occurred. So even the Pentagon now admits, yet Slade Gorton had the audacity and I think the stupidity to come out and say that this never really happened. The fact is…

Michael Savage: I remember that, Congressman. First the 9-11 Commission said that this never happened. Then they were forced to say that maybe it happened, but there was nothing significant. Then they’re saying it happened but you’re not going to hear from anybody who knows what went on. How long can they hold the dam together?

Congressman Weldon: Well they changed their story 4 different times. First they said they were briefed, but never knew about Mohammad Atta. Then we come out with a military officer who stated on the record that he did brief them about Mohammad Atta. Then they went back and they reversed themselves a fourth time and said, well yeah, he did brief us but it was in July, it was right before our report came out and it was too late. The fact is that the 9-11 Commission, which I voted for and which I along with the rest of the American people, spent $15M to fund 80 staff positions to get to the bottom of what happened in the run up to 9-11. It did not do its job. This story deserves to be fully investigated. Not by 1 member of Congress and 1 staffer. But by every possible resource that this country had to understand what occurred, what could have been prevented, what possibilities were out there that could have impacted 9-11. None of that was done, and as a result, the 9-11 story has not been completed.

Michael Savage: Can Secretary Rumsfeld make this process more transparent?

Congressman Weldon: I would hope so. You know, I trust Don Rumsfeld. Again I am a strong supporter of the military. I’ve supported them through thick and thin and been over in the theater with the troops on a number of occasions. I told the Pentagon and Congressional Affairs leader last night, who reports right to Rumsfeld, I said, you know, you made a fundamental mistake. By deciding at the 11th hour to gag these people, you’re creating a scandal, a scandal that never should have occurred. The real problems in this story occurred largely in 1999 and 2000, before 9-11 occurred. And for the life of me, I don’t understand why this administration would not want these people to testify about what is largely open source information. We’re not talking about highly classified information. We’re talking about open source information. The same kinds of data that the Democrat and Republican parties use to target people for voting on election day. I mean, unless it was because of the potential embarrassment of one of Rumsfeld’s top deputies, Steve Cambone, who I found out this past week was briefed on Able Danger on March of 2001. Unless there was some concern about that, I do not understand why they would have been prohibited to testify. This flies in the face of everything that America stands for.

Michael Savage: The people listening to this show are gripped by your testimony today. Your appearance on this show and C-SPAN which we are going to play and have been playing. What can the average listener or voter in America do to get a little more truth out of this situation?

Congressman Weldon: Michael one thing I’ll say about your show is that you have a lot of power. When I was on your show in the past I got literally hundreds and hundreds of emails and phone calls and letters from all over this country. They were probably in the thousands, I never bothered to count them. But that’s what it’s going to take. That’s what it takes in America, to shake up the system. The bureaucracy thinks that they can just out last any criticism. That they can CYA until eventually this story goes away. The American people, in this case, the families of the 9-11 victims, who by the way, were there today…

Michael Savage: Oh, they were, my God, this is even bigger.

Congressman Weldon: Yeah, they were there. They were there and they were outraged. A couple of them came up to me after the hearing was over. Your people have tremendous power because in America democracy still works, outrage still works. If they will use their voices to make phone calls, to do emails to the Whitehouse, the Secretary of Defense, to their members of Congress and their Senators, I guarantee you that the system will respond. But that’s what it takes. It takes the American people to shake this system by the neck and say, we demand answers, we want to know the facts. We don’t want anymore CYA, we don’t want anymore cover-ups. We want to know what happened, what could have been done, why this information was destroyed, and why it wasn’t transferred to the FBI. How can we learn from that so we never repeat it again, and how can we get to the bottom of what we could have done to perhaps have even prevented 9-11 from ever occurring. As both Arlen Specter, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and one of our witnesses, Mr. Kleinsmith, stated today, they both said the same thing. If this effort, in fact, had been allowed to go forward, and this information been transferred to the FBI, this could have stopped 9-11 from ever occurring.

Michael Savage: My God, that’s what’s at stake here. It’s as though we’re going back in time, we’re saying the government knew that Pearl Harbor was coming, somebody tried to alert America to the Japanese attack and he was blocked by lawyers. It has the same exact meaning as that, perhaps even more so because Pearl Harbor is over, Japan is not our enemy, but we have enemies not only outside our gates but inside our gates who want to do it again. And if the bureaucracy refuses to acknowledge its own failings history is liable to repeat itself, Congressman. And that’s really what’s at stake here. We’re all Americans at the end of the day. Some of the same men at the Defense Dept. who may be blocking this for career reasons, should recognize that they have wives, children, maybe grandchildren. Don’t they care about them? That’s what’s at stake here. I understand that sometimes the career will come before everything else, but what you’re saying today is simply as refreshing as cold waterfall on a hot day. Representative Weldon, can you please stay with us for one more segment. I’d like to ask you a few other questions for the American people, such as, is there a conspiracy to bury this story, what will be the outcome of this story, and in your mind what was a comparable cover-up in past history in America, what was its outcome. Please stay with us, I’ll be right back on the Savage Nation.

Michael Savage: Congressman Weldon, welcome back to the Savage Nation. What can the people in America who are interested in getting to the truth so that we can prevent the next 9-11 from happening, what can they do?

Congressman Weldon: Michael, they can scream their outrage through emails, through phone calls, through letters and call their Representatives and Senators. And they can say, this is not America, this is not what this country is about, 3000 of our citizens were brutally murdered and we deserve to have the answers, if there’s somebody who’s going to be embarrassed so be it. We need to learn and prepare for the next attack. The American people need to understand that government works when they make it work. It’s not always perfect, but when they’re involved, when they’re engaged, when they speak out, when they should, when they speak out their concern and demand answers, members of Congress will respond. Members of Congress are basically good people, they want to do the right thing. The people that listen to your show have got to demand their attention. They’ve got to demand their response and their respect on behalf of the future of this nation. That’s what your people have done in the past and that’s what they can do today.

Michael Savage: Well today the lawyer for the defense department, Paul Swiergosz said that nobody can testify, he said there’s nothing more to say than that, it’s not possible to discuss the Able Danger program because there are security concerns. Well I’d like to know what kind of security concerns trump the true security concern which is who did this. Who caused this to happen through their inefficiency or worse, that’s really the issue here isn’t it?

Congressman Weldon: That’s absolutely the issue and Arlen Specter confronted that and said, wait a minute, there’s no security issue here, has there been any classified information discussed and the lawyer said no. Specter said, then why would you think that this information could not be shared. And the lawyer actually said, well I really can’t answer that Congressman, I don’t know. The fact is, the Pentagon will respond, but the Pentagon’s only going to respond when the American people rise up and shout out and demand that we know the true facts, what happened? What were the shortfalls? What were the shortcomings? What did we do that was wrong? Who made the decision not to transfer information? Why were the efforts of Tony Shaffer and Scott Philpott not listened to? Why was this data not transferred to the FBI. This American government belongs to the American people. It doesn’t belong to that lawyer from the Pentagon. It doesn’t even belong to Don Rumsfeld. The government belongs to the American people and the American people are the stakeholders and the shareholders of this government need to demand that they get results and get answers. And if they do that, I guarantee you the system will work.

Michael Savage: Well, you’re a believer in a certain way beyond me. I’ve become somewhat cynical and jaded. I wish to God that I believed that even a million emails would produce the results that we need. But Congressman, after seeing what went on here with the illegal alien problem, and I don’t want to drag you into that one, the people have been screaming for years and it’s gotten worse, not better. So I’m not quite sure that we can pry this can of sardines open no matter how many emails we send. It certainly can’t hurt to try. I would think, having listened to you that emails to Secretary Rumsfeld might have the most effect. What do you think? Where should they be directed?

Congressman Weldon: I think that’s an excellent start. Rumsfeld and members of the House and members of the Senate. But I would say that your efforts on the issue of immigration are having an impact. The Congress is disagreeing with the Whitehouse. The House Homeland Security Committee authorized an additional 2000 border agents. That happened not just because it’s logical. It happened because people like those listening to your radio station and your radio program rose up and demanded action. And so…

Michael Savage: Congressman, I hate to interrupt you, but President Bush didn’t fund those positions. He only appointed 200 of the 2000, remember that?

Congressman Weldon: But when the bill finally becomes law, which it hopefully will become before the end of the fall session, then that authorization will occur and the President will then have the responsibility to implement the policies as outlined by the Congress.

Michael Savage: I see.

Congressman Weldon: But I’m confident we will achieve…

Michael Savage: Wow. Congressman, I tell you, you are our only hope. I know you don’t want to hear it because it will probably embarrass you, but there are only a few lone rangers left out there for us. Many of us are very cynical and jaded, and withdrawn from the process of participatory democracy, but in this case I’ve watched this very carefully. I’ve seen what they’ve tried to do with your name, and I don’t want to go into Slate Gordon, but I cannot believe what he has said about you. I can’t believe what they are saying about Able Danger, and truthfully, I’m very impressed with you. And anything that we can do to help you in your quest for the truth, I’m encouraged by Senator Biden. I’m encouraged by Senator Specter. A good bipartisan focus on the truth is what the American people not only demand, but God help us all if we don’t get it. Because 9-11 will happen again unless we do Congressman.

Congressman Weldon: Well, Michael, you’re absolutely right. I was born the youngest of 9 kids into a poor blue collar family.

Michael Savage: Well Congressman, we’re out of time, but we’re not out of the truth. God bless you.

WELDON TESTIFIES BEFORE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON ABLE DANGER

WASHINGTON, Sep 21 - Congressman Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), Vice Chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, gave the following testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee on intelligence sharing issues, and particularly Able Danger - a Department of Defense planning effort to identify and target the linkages and relationships of Al-Qaeda worldwide.

(Congressional Testimony Prepared by CQ Transcriptions)

Statement of The Honorable Curt Weldon Representative

Committee on Senate Judiciary

September 21, 2005

"I would like to thank you Chairman Specter and Ranking Member Leahy. I wish that a hearing such as this did not have to take place. Unfortunately, that is not the case. It is important that we - the House and Senate as the oversight bodies of the Executive Branch - not rush to move forward from the failures that led to September 11, 2001. The only way to move forward with new policies is to go back and really understand what went wrong - even if it means reexamining old territory. However, it is regretful that all of the Able Danger team members are not allowed to speak today. The victims and families of 9-11 and the Country deserve better.

I have served in the House of Representatives for 19 years. Currently, I am Vice Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the Homeland Security Committee. The story that I will outline today is extremely troubling to me, and has raised significant questions that need to be answered.

In 1999, while serving as the Chair of the Research and Development Subcommittee, I had the responsibility of overseeing approximately $35 billion of the Defense budget that funded all military R&D. This included all funding for each of the military services` (USN, USMC, USA, UASF) information dominance centers that were being stood up to monitor and prevent hackers from penetrating classified and unclassified systems.

The Army`s Information Dominance System, located at Fort Belvoir, was one of the most capable. Known as the Land and Information Warfare Analysis Center (LIWA), this Center was doing much more than just information dominance. Through several site visits and briefings, I witnessed the LIWA`s state of the art facility and initiatives, which included massive data mining, data collaboration and data analysis. I was so impressed with this capability that I increased funding authorization for the LIWA. It was because of the great work at LIWA, that I felt it was important to raise the capababilites of LIWA to the attention of Dr. John Hamre, then Deputy Secretary of Defense. Equally impressed after getting briefed on LIWA`s capabilities, Dr. Hamre tasked them with doing an analysis of proliferation of sensitive military technologies. The provocative outcome would later prove harmful to the LIWA.

In the spring of 1999, I had an opportunity to personally witness the amazing capability of the LIWA. Two weeks after the United States commenced the bombing of Belgrade, I was contacted by leaders of the major political factions within the Russian Federation. They were extremely concerned that our bombing of Serbia was premature causing the Russian people to distrust the United States. The Russians believed that this conflict could be avoided if they were asked to play a role in dealing with Milosevic.

Leaders of Russia`s major political parties suggested that I put together a bi-partisan congressional delegation to travel to Belgrade with a similar one from the Russian Duma to meet with Milosevic directly. They were convinced that, with Russia`s help, the ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses could be stopped.

Working with Steny Hoyer, we arranged a meeting with Strobe Talbot at the State Department to review the Russian offer. In our meeting Talbot expressed concern with any trip to Belgrade, because he was worried that it might send an adverse message. He did agree, however, to sending a bi-partisan Congressional Delegation to meet with the Russian leaders in Vienna. By the end of the week, I assembled an eleven member Congressional Delegation to meet with five Russian political leaders in Vienna. The Russians had informed me that they were bringing along a Serbian citizen who could establish and maintain contact with Milosevic. I was concerned that the Serb might be a part of the Milosevic regime and I also wanted to know more about this individual before agreeing to meet with him.

I asked then CIA Director George Tenet for a profile the Serb who would join the Russians. The next day I received a call from Tenet saying that the CIA did not know much - he only provided me with two sentences about this Serb. I made the same request from the Army`s LIWA, who, within a matter of hours, provided me with multiple pages of information about the Serb and his family. I shared this information with my colleagues on the military flight to Vienna, which proved to be very useful and enabled the delegation to be better prepared.

Our meetings in Vienna were extremely successful - so much that we developed a two page document that laid the foundation for a final and peaceful resolution to the conflict. In fact, while in Vienna, Milosevic offered us travel by bus to Belgrade, at which time he would embrace the framework and release three American POW`s to the Congressional Delegation. However, after consultation with both the White House and the State Department, I decided that we would not travel to Belgrade and return to Washington.

On May 17, 1999, approximately two weeks after returning from Vienna, the FBI requested to be debriefed on the Serb whom my delegation had met in Vienna. I immediately scheduled a meeting for that following Monday, May 24, 1999, at 3:30pm. On the Friday before the FBI briefing, the CIA requested to be briefed as well. I was informed that the State Department had tasked the CIA to brief our Ambassador who was negotiating the final terms of the agreement to end the war in Kosovo. I convinced the CIA to join in the FBI briefing. That Monday, I briefed four agents in my office. Following the briefing, I asked the agents if they knew where I had obtained this information on the Serbian. They said the information either must have been provided by the Russians or the Serb himself. I told the agents they were wrong, and that I had obtained the information on the Serb from the LIWA before I left Washington. The agents indicated to me that they did not know what the LIWA was. It was then that I knew our government had a serious problem on it hands of stove-piped intelligence agencies, insufficient information sharing and redundant classified systems. It was also during that time I learned that the CIA, and much of the intelligence community, was not using open-source information in developing their intelligence estimates and profiles.

Following these events, I convened an adhoc group of intelligence officials to strategize on the creation of a national collaborative center modeled after the LIWA proto-type. This effort led to the development of a nine-page brief entitled NOAH - National Operations and Analysis Hub. I briefed the NOAH concept to Dr. John Hamre, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, who expressed interest in developing this initiative. In fact, he said that DOD could provide funding for such a Center, but that he would need my support in convincing the FBI and CIA to participate - noting that their participation was critical. At Hamre`s suggestion, I convened a meeting in my office on November 4, 1999 to brief DOD, CIA and FBI on the NOAH concept. Senior officials from each agency were in attendance. At the conclusion of the brief, the CIA official said that the NOAH was unnecessary.

Despite the reluctance of the CIA, I continued to press for a national collaborative center in three successive Defense Authorization Bills, and also delivered speeches and presentations on the topic around the country. The FY01 Defense Authorization Bill required the CIA to provide the House Armed Services Committee with a Report on a National Collaborative Capability, in which the CIA responded that, the ``overarching collaborative solution addressing the totality of the requirement is not practical.`` Not only was it practical, but it became a reality when President Bush announced the TTIC (now the NCTC) in January of 2003. It should not have taken this long, considering Congress had called for this capability in prior years.

During 1999 and 2000, I was aware that the LIWA was providing massive data mining and analysis for a number of extremely important intelligence and anti-terrorism initiatives - including international drug cartels; corruption in Russia and Serbia; terrorist linkages in the Far East; proliferation activities both within and against the United States; as well as an extensive global analysis of Al Qaeda.

In fact, in the weeks following 9/11, I was provided an extensive analysis chart of Al Qaeda, which I immediately took to the White House and personally delivered to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley. Mr. Hadley was extremely interested in the chart and said that he would take it to the President.

I continued to vigorously support the concept of data mining and analysis, particularly when the TTIC was announced.

In the spring of 2005, I attempted to re-create the chart that I had presented to Hadley in 2001, so I queried my contact from LIWA. It was then that I received a brief to create a new expanded data mining and analysis capability known as Able Providence (which I would like to submit for the record). Able Providence was an initiative that would be supported through the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Navy was so enamored with getting Able Providence up and running that they even provided my Chief of Staff with the appropriate budget line number to direct any additional congressional funds.

It was during the briefings on Able Providence that I was provided additional information about Able Danger. I was told that Able Danger had amassed significant data about Al Qaeda and five worldwide cells - one of which had linkages to Brooklyn and has been referred to as the Brooklyn cell. I was told that Able Danger identified the Brooklyn cell - to include Mohammed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers - more than one year before September 11, 2001. Additionally, I was informed of an effort to share specific information with the FBI about Al Qaeda in September 2000 - one year before 9/11 - and that three meetings for that purpose were abruptly cancelled hours before they were scheduled to take place.

This new information was startling, and caused me to review the 9/11 Commission Report to see if any reference to Able Danger was contained therein. Realizing that no such reference existed, I asked my Chief of Staff to personally contact the 9/11 Commission and determine if they had been briefed about Able Danger. On May 18, 2005, the 9/11 Commission Deputy Staff Director Chris Kojm said that the staff had been briefed, but had decided ``not go down that route``. Still puzzled that no mention of Able Danger had been made, I raised this question with 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer during a meeting in my office on May 23, 2005. He told me that he had never been briefed on Able Danger. 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman said the same thing during a lunch on June 29, 2005. He expressed dismay and suggested that I pursue the issue further.

How could it be possible that two 9/11 Commission staffers received two briefs, by two different members of Able Danger, in two different countries, on the same subject, yet no such information was brought to the level of a Commissioner. One is left to wonder if there was a similar information sharing problem within the commission.

On June 27, 2005, dismayed by the fact that Able Danger was omitted from the 9/11 Commission Report, I took to the floor of the House of Representatives to outline the entire Able Danger story for my colleagues and the American people. In the weeks following that speech, I methodically briefed the Chairs of House Armed Services, Intelligence, Homeland Security and FBI Appropriations Oversight Committee.

The New York Times picked up the story in August and ran three straight days of stories. On each day, the 9/11 Commission changed their story.

-- First, they said that they were never briefed.

-- Second, they said that they were briefed and that there was never a mention of Mohammed Atta.

-- Third, they said they were briefed, Atta was mentioned, but they found Able Danger to be `historically insignificant``.

As someone who had supported the creation of the 9/11 Commission and their recommendations, even though more then half were already recommended by the Gilmore Commission, I was incensed by this cavalier attitude. Along with my Chief of Staff, we pursued the operatives involved in Able Danger throughout the months of July and August. We identified five officials who confirmed the facts of Able Danger, as well as knowledge of massive data and materials tied to the effort. We identified an FBI agent who played a role in arranging meetings to share information on U.S. persons that were abruptly cancelled. We also identified a technician who did Able Danger analysis and an individual who admitted to destroying Able Danger data - up to 2.5 terabytes. This data contained information on U.S. persons with ties to terrorism that could have helped prevent 9-11 and possibly even be used to track terrorist movements today. The person who destroyed this data has also spoken about how Major General Lambert, the J3 at U.S. Special Operations Command, was extremely upset when he learned that his data had been destroyed without his knowledge or consent.

On at least four occasions, I personally tried to brief the 9/11 Commissioners on: NOAH; integrative data collaboration capabilities; my frustration with intelligence stovepipes; and Al Qaeda analysis. However, I was never able to achieve more than a five-minute telephone conversation with Commissioner Tom Kean. On March 24, 2004, I also had my Chief of Staff personally hand deliver a document about LIWA, along questions for George Tenet to the Commission, but neither was ever used. [I would like to submit for the record.] Had the Commission been more thorough, I would have provided all of the leads that I recently pursued on my own. In the end I was ignored by the Commission. In fact, on the day the Commission provided the first brief for House Members in the Cannon Caucus Room, I attended and was the first to be recognized. I asked the Commission why they did not meet with Members who had worked intelligence and security issues prior to 9/11, and Lee Hamilton told me that ``the Commission did not have time to meet with every Member who had information to share.``

I have never alleged any wrong doing, conspiracy or cover-up. However, I have been bewildered by the response to Able Danger - both by the 9-11 Commission and the Pentagon.

Fundamental questions need to be answered - 1. Why was Able Danger a historically insignificant event even thought we knew that Al Qaeda was responsible for

1993 Bombing on World Trade Center

Khobar Towers

Embassy Bombings in Africa

USS COLE

2. Who ordered the destruction of 2.5 terabytes of data about Al Qaeda and why?

3. Any why wasn`t the customer at SOCOM ever consulted or briefed?

4. Who stopped the meetings between the FBI and Able Danger personnel in September 2000 and why?

5. What was the extent of the 3 hour brief provided to General Shelton in January 2001 regarding Able Danger?

6. Why did the 9/11 Commission change their response several times when queried about Able Danger and attempt to spin Able Danger based on misinformation?

7. Why have threats been made to Able Danger witnesses who were simply telling their stories?

As it stands now, the 9/11 story has not been fully examined and told. The families of the victims and the American people deserve answers and we must not stop until we get them."

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