Ex-Adviser to Clinton to Plead Guilty to Taking Documents (Berger)

WASHINGTON, March 31 - Samuel R. Berger, the former national security adviser to President Bill Clinton, has agreed to plead guilty to a criminal misdemeanor charge and give up his security clearance for three years after removing classified material from a government archive, the Justice Department and associates of Mr. Berger said today.

A well-respected figure in foreign policy circles for many years, Mr. Berger has also agreed to pay a $10,000 fine as part of an agreement reached with the Justice Department in recent days after months of quiet negotiations, the associates said.

He is expected to enter his plea Friday afternoon in Federal District Court here, capping an embarrassing episode that reverberated in last year's presidential campaign.

Mr. Berger had been a senior policy adviser to Senator John F. Kerry's presidential bid - and initially was mentioned as a possible secretary of state if Mr. Kerry were to win. But he was forced to quit the campaign abruptly last July after accusations first surfaced that he had inappropriately removed classified material from a secure reading room at the National Archives, and the case became a political tempest.

The material involved a classified assessment of terrorist threats in 2000, which Mr. Berger was reviewing in his role as the Clinton administration's point person in providing material to the Sept. 11 commission. Officials with the archives and the Sept. 11 commission ultimately determined that despite the incident, the commission had access to all the material needed in its work.

When the issue first surfaced last year, Mr. Berger insisted that he had removed the classified material inadvertently.

But in the plea agreement reached with prosecutors, he is expected to admit that he intentionally removed copies of five classified documents, destroyed three of them, and misled staff members at the National Archives when confronted about it, according to an associate of Mr. Berger who is involved in his defense but who spoke on condition of anonymity because the plea has not yet been made formal in court.

The Justice Department, without discussing details of the plea agreement, acknowledged that Mr. Berger had agreed to plead guilty to a single misdemeanor count for the unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents.

Mr. Berger, 59, was unavailable for comment this evening. In a statement, his lawyer, Lanny Breuer, said Mr. Berger "has cooperated fully with the Department of Justice and is pleased that a resolution appears very near."

"He accepts complete responsibility for his actions, and regrets the mistakes he made during his review of documents at the National Archives," Mr. Breuer said, adding that Mr. Berger "looks forward to putting this episode behind him very soon and continuing his career of public and private service to this country."

It is unclear what long-term impact the case will have on Mr. Berger's once-flourishing career in government.

While the plea agreement requires Mr. Berger to give up his secret security clearance for three years, it also allows him to have his clearance reviewed and restored within that time if the government were to ask him to serve on a panel or in another position with access to sensitive material, associates said.

But some political analysts said the case against him - which Republican leaders seized on last year in accusing him of imperiling national security - may have made him unemployable in government in the short term. He is currently chairman of a global business strategy firm.

The criminal charge stems from Mr. Berger's removal of documents from the National Archives on two separate occasions during his review of material for the Sept. 11 commission.

On Sept. 2, 2003, during an hours-long review of documents, Mr. Berger took a copy of a lengthy White House "after action" report that he had commissioned to assess the government's performance in responding to the so-called "millennium" terrorist threat prior to the 2000 new year, and he placed the document in his suit pocket, the associate said. A month later, during another session at the archive, he removed four more copies of other versions of the report, the associate said.

Mr. Berger's intent in removing the documents, the associate said, was to be able to compare the different versions of the 2000 report side by side and trace changes.

"He was just too tired and wasn't able to focus enough, and he felt like he needed to look at the documents in his home or his office to line them up," the associate said. "He now admits that was a real mistake, which he regrets."

Mr. Berger admits compounding the mistake after removing the second set of documents on Oct, 2, 2003, the associate said. In comparing the versions of the report at his office later that day, he realized that several were essentially the same, and he cut three copies into small pieces with a scissors, the associate said. He also admitted improperly removing handwritten notes he took at the archives, the associate said.

Two days later, staff members at the National Archives - who had grown suspicious about Mr. Berger's possible removal of documents - confronted him, and he now admits to misleading the archive about what had happened. He indicated that the removal was inadvertent and, while he returned the two remaining copies of the report to the archive, he said nothing about the three copies he had destroyed, the associate said.

This is a vanity article I posted last summer when this story first broke. I make the point through personal experince with classified data, that Berger's claims of an 'honest' mistake is an absolute lie.

As with the Clintonistas' Modus Operandi in the past, they count on the media not asking the difficult questions. Also, they count on those in the public with no personal experience or knowledge to know any difference when they lie. My goal with this article is to pose the difficult questions and to inform those without personal knowledge of how classified data is handled how the circumstances posed by Berger and his defenders is a lie.

I called our local Clear Channel station the night after this story broke and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...

1) A person who wishes to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.

2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.

3) A quick sidebar on program access and document marking. The term "Access" refers to the concept of "Need to Know". The fact you have a clearance that matches the level required to have access to the material does not establish your "need to know". It must be determined by someone like a program manager or security personnel that your job function requires access to certain information. If you are granted access, you may be required to go through another level of investigation. Some levels of access (at least the ones I was exposed to) are known as "Special Need to Know" or SNTK (pronounced Snick) and "Special Access Required" or SAR. Programs with these designations require special prominent markings on each page of a classified document along with the classification level. Believe it or not, after all the markings (top and bottom) there usually is enough room for the content of the page.

4) I should also mention that each paragraph of the document starts with a designation indicating the classification level of that paragraph. This would look like (U), (C), (S), (S/SAR), (S/SNTK), (TS) or (TS/SAR). Every page is marked top and bottom based upon the highest level of any paragraph on that page. ie. it's possible to have an unclassified page in a top secret document. And as you might think, the overall classification of the document is classified at the highest level of any single page.

5) This next point is especially important in light of the current investigation. Every page is marked "Page x of y Pages". For example page 13 of a 32 page document would be clearly marked in the banner section of the page "Page 13 of 32 Pages". This is done for obvious reasons - if any page is missing, it can be accounted for. The page count is also part of the document's registration in the security catalog.

6) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.

7) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual dispensation (i.e. when the material is designated to destruction if applicable).

8) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.

9) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.

10) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.

11) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.

12) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.

13) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".

14) As the NSA for the Clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.

15) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.

16) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the Clinton administration changed things during his 8 years.

That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) the night after the story broke.

I should have added another issue that may pertain to the current case. The concept of "Working papers". This would be scratch material that is never intended to end up in a document being prepared. For example, preliminary drafts, graphics with various scales, handdrawn sketches, ... etc. Usually, this kind of material is kept in a folder or envelope which is marked as a regular document would be. This folder falls under the same criteria as a regular document ie locking up when not being used ... etc. Usually, this material is collected on a regular basis when the work is finished and tossed into a "burn barrel". The burn barrel is emptied periodically by cleared personnel and either burned or processed through an approved shredder (ends up as dust).

The latest word I have heard is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.

So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extraordinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly Mr. Clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.

Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the Clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.

I should stress that I'm no security expert - but I did work in that environment for nearly 12 years as an engineer in the aerospace industry (stealth technology). Amongst my duties, I was also the secured computer contact person during our department's audits with "The customer" and the FBI. This included things like proving procedures were being followed concerning the registering, cataloging and tracking of classified storage media, secured networks, hardcopy audit trails ... etc. It was not very exciting work - very boring but also needed.

Because of this work, I have a good idea of what that part of the world looks like. Who knows though after #42 and his crowd. I remember how O'leary (spelling) turned the DoE upside down with her wacky ideas of security. Remember the classified media supposedly found behind the copy machine during the Wen Ho-Li case? I have a friend who works for a private computer consulting firm that is contracted by the DoE and I think the DoD to perform inspections at government and contractor facilities. He told me the rules changed significantly during Clinton's years (to the worse) but I have no first hand knowledge

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