Posted on 02/18/2005 5:36:56 PM PST by average american student
The United States and six members of the Organization of American States have signed new agreements on trade and the environment.
The agreements are aimed at strengthening environmental protection and creating a Secretariat for Environmental Matters to help implement the environmental provisions of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).
The accords were signed in Washington D.C. Friday by senior representatives of the governments of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the United States.
Your tax dollars at work in foreign nations--part of the CAFTA agreement:
Strengthening Trade-Related Information Systems and Regulatory Practices
· USAID will purchase, install, and provide training on compatible software to manage trade data.
· The U.S. Department of Commerce will provide assistance through its Good Governance
Program to develop joint private/public sector initiatives to promote better business practices.
· USAID will provide assistance to improve and make more transparent commercial laws and
regulations in Guatemala.
· In Honduras, USAID will fund a computer systems analyst to help the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce evaluate their computer and information needs. In addition, USAID will purchase
equipment (e.g., 6 computers, scanner, printer, and server) for the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce.
· USAID will support Nicaragua’s fiscal reform process, including funding studies of policy options for
alternative revenue sources.
More money gone per CAFTA....(are you wondering why the USDA, the EPA, US Department of Commerce are in South America spending US taxpayer dollars on foreign country infrastructure?)
USAID and USDA, drawing on experts in other U.S. agencies, will provide training and technical
assistance to improve food safety and animal health.
· USAID will provide intellectual property rights (IPR) workshops and outreach events.
· USAID will provide training in government procurement.
· With the assistance of U.S. Justice Department and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, USAID
will provide training on antitrust law and competition policy.
· In El Salvador, USAID will also provide assistance to private sector for compliance with U.S. food
safety and animal health regulations.
Practical Assistance to Complete the Agreement
· USAID will fund a training course for new government negotiators in each U.S.-CAFTA
negotiation area, drawing on historical experiences of past trade agreements (e.g., the NAFTA,
the GATT, the WTO, the Canada-Chile FTA).
· Training courses and workshops for Nicaraguan negotiators and technical officials on several
complex, specialized issues, such as customs valuation, rules of origin, and dispute settlement
will be provided by USAID.
Investment in the Environmental
· Access to the Chemicals Information and Exchange Network (CIEN) is being provided by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with assistance from USAID. This network promotes
sound management of chemicals through better communication of information. Government
agencies, non-government organizations and the private sector stakeholders concerned with
chemicals management are trained to use electronic resources and the internet to locate
information on chemicals. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s (USTDA) planned
conference on chemicals standards for labeling and composition in Central and Latin America,
which is to take place later this year, will provide additional benefits.
Building on current efforts, with the assistance of USAID, EPA is providing on a regional basis,
through the Central American Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD):
· The Program of Training for International Environmental Law – UNITAR correspondence courses
are being translated to Spanish and will be provided to the five countries for training government
and private officials in effective implementation of international agreements. Modules address
general themes, such as International Environmental Negotiations, or issues that arise out of
specific agreements.
· EPA, with the Central American Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD), is
training environmental compliance inspectors in Central America. The training will strengthen the
regional environmental enforcement networks and will result in better enforcement of
environmental laws in each country. Course material based on local best practice and “train the
trainer” efforts will ensure that training is effective and continues to spread throughout the region
after the EPA efforts are concluded.
· EPA personnel provide expertise in the region, through national Centers for Cleaner Production, in
promoting cleaner production approaches and implementation of other environmental
management systems.
So, we're going to have other countries setting our enviornemental policies?
Trade agreements presuppose to set up adjudication mechanisms that are capable of dictating changes in US law, and thus function as treaties. Neither the President nor the Congress are empowered by the Constitution to agree to treaties or trade agreements that exceed the powers granted by the Constitution. Such we have already seen. It is unconstitutional delegation of legislative and adjudicative powers tantamount to an amendment of the Constitution itself.
The use of international law and the courts to dilute Constitutional protection of citizens' rights was cleary that document's most egregious flaw. The method of treaty ratification was the principal tool, as was carefully papered over by Hamilton in Federalist 75.
The whole secretariat thing is part of a government structure exactly like the Soviet Union had, and was reborn in the United Nations. The OAS, is a subsidiary organization to the UN, so what just happened? An agreement was signed to give authority over the US to an agency within an agency that is a subsidiary to the UN.
Secretariats and ministers (e.g. trade minister) are not part of constitutional government in the United States.
No, it can only get worse. The game plan is for globalization for the world.
The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA):
Challenges for Sub-Regional Integration Summary
On May 28, 2004, the United States signed the U.S.-Central America Free TradeAgreement (CAFTA) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In addition, the Dominican Republic concluded a similar bilateral free
trade agreement (FTA) with the United States on March 15, 2004, which is expected to be signed in July 2004 and integrated with CAFTA to be considered as a single
legislative package. Enacting the agreement requires the U.S. Congress to pass implementing legislation and that similar action be undertaken in the other countries.
As required under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation (P.L. 107-210), prior to any congressional consideration of implementing legislation, the Bush
Administration is required to send to Congress supporting materials within 60 days of entering into the agreement.
CAFTA was negotiated, in part, as a regional agreement in which all parties would be subject to the “the same set of obligations and commitments,” but with each country defining its own separate schedules for market access on a bilateral
basis. The flexibility of this framework allowed Costa Rica to negotiate longer, and for a slightly different arrangement than the other four Central American countries,
each of which also negotiated separate schedules. It also allows for the Dominican Republic to be added at a later date. CAFTA is a comprehensive and reciprocal trade
agreement, which distinguishes it from the CBI unilateral preferential arrangement between the United States and these countries. It defines detailed rules that would
govern market access of goods, as well as services trade, government procurement, intellectual property, and investment.
Under CAFTA, more than 80% of U.S. consumer and industrial exports and over half of U.S. farm exports to Central America would become duty-free immediately. To address asymmetrical development and transition issues, CAFTA
specifies rules for lengthy tariff phase-out schedules as well as transitional safeguards and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for sensitive goods. Although many goods would attain
immediate duty-free treatment, others would have tariffs phased out incrementally so that duty-free treatment is reached in 5, 10, 15, or 20 years from the time the
agreement takes effect.
Duty-free treatment would be delayed for the more sensitive products, and in some cases, the tariff reductions would not begin until 7 or 12 years into the agreement. CAFTA is controversial and faces political uncertainty. Supporters hope that CAFTA can be part of a policy foundation supportive of both improved intraregional trade and long-term social, political, and economic development. Concerns remain, however, over the negative effects on certain sectors and employees of the
U.S. economy, and that a balanced outcome may be difficult to achieve if the FTA fails to accommodate sufficiently the adjustment costs also facing certain Central
American workers, small farmers, and other groups. The history some CAFTA countries have of poor labor rights enforcement raises questions over whether the
labor provisions will adequately promote social development.
On May 28, 2004, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert B. Zoellick and trade ministers from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA),
formally concluding the negotiation phase (see Appendix 1, Chronology of CAFTA Negotiations). Enacting the agreement requires that the U.S. Congress pass implementing legislation, and that parallel action be undertaken in the legislatures of the other countries. Prior to congressional consideration of implementing legislation, the Bush Administration is required under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation (P.L. 107-210) to send supporting materials to Congress within 60 days of entering the agreement.
These include a description of changes to existing laws necessary to bring the United States into compliance with CAFTA, the final legal text, a draft implementing bill, statement of administrative action, and an explanation of how it will meet congressional negotiation objectives set out in TPA. In addition, the Dominican Republic concluded a similar bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States on March 15, 2004, which is expected to be signed in July 2004 and integrated with CAFTA to be considered as a single legislative package. CAFTA is a complicated and controversial agreement and because of congressional resistence to it, the Bush Administration does not anticipate sending the agreement to Congress until after the November 2004 elections.
This update provides background and analysis on CAFTA, including new information on the Dominican Republic, and will continue to be updated periodically.
-snip-
Why Trade More Freely?
Countries trade because it is in their national economic interest to do so, a proposition long supported by theory and practice. Comparative advantage has been
recognized for nearly 200 years as a core principle explaining the efficiency gains that can come from trade among countries by virtue of their fundamental differences.
It states that countries can improve their overall economic welfare by producing those goods at which they are relatively more efficient, while trading for the rest. Intraindustry trade is the other major insight that explains trade patterns. Larger markets allow for benefits from exchange among countries to occur based on specialized
production, product differentiation, and economies of scale.
Many Latin American countries have liberalized trade policies recognizing the contribution that trade (and
related investment) can have on economic growth and development. As an important caveat, trade is at best only part of a broad development agenda, which must also
CRS-2
1 The role of trade is summarized well in: Rodrik, Dani. The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work. The Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C. 1999. p. 137 and Bouzas, Roberto and Saul Keifman. Making Trade Liberalization Work. After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America. Kuczynski, Pedro-Pablo and John Williamson, eds. Institution for
International Economics. Washington, D.C. March, 2003. pp. 158, 165-67.
2 This case differs from the standard intra-industry case between two developed countries
in which goods, such as automobiles, are exchanged based on product differentiation and economies of scale and where differences in wage levels are not a central factor.
3 For the theoretical foundation, see Krugman, Paul. Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1), William C. Brainard and
George L Perry, eds. 1995. pp. 327-76 and for the case in Central America, see Hufbauer, Gary, Barbara Kotschwar, and John Wilson. Trade and Standards: A Look at Central
America. Institute for International Economics and the World Bank. 2002. pp. 992-96.
4 Note that this trend has not been a driving force in the aggregate unemployment rate of the
United States, but does affect the distribution of employment among sectors of the economy. It is also important to emphasize here that wage levels are only part of the issue. Lower wages correlate closely with lower productivity, hence an abundance of low-skilled (low
productivity) workers attracts these types of jobs. For a recent overview of the methodology of measuring the effects of changes in trade policy, see Rivera, Sandra A. Key Methods for Quantifying the Effects of Trade Liberalization. International Economic Review. United States International Trade Commission. January/February 2003. include promotion of political freedom, macroeconomic stability, sound institutions, and adequate levels of savings and investment, among many other factors.
1 Comparative advantage and perhaps intra-industry trade provide the rationale for U.S.-Central American (and Dominican Republic) trade. Comparative advantage is at the heart of exchange between developing and industrialized countries, such as
Central America trading fruit and coffee for U.S. grains, cereals, and capital goods. Intra-industry trade (e.g. goods within the same harmonized tariff system (HTS) code
number) is based on specialized production, but in this case relies in large part on differences in wages, skills, and productivity.
2 Certain specialized jobs have
developed in Central America (and other developing countries), where they frequently reside in production sharing (maquiladora) facilities. Economists have
come to refer to such specialized production as “breaking up the value added chain” and it accounts for why products (and particularly parts thereof) as diverse as
automobiles, computers, and apparel are often made or assembled in Central America and other countries in partnership with U.S. firms.
3 This relationship, discussed in more detail later, provides the basis for much of the labor policy debate on CAFTA, and FTAs more generally.
4
Measuring the benefits of freer trade is another difficult issue. There is a tendency to count exports, imports, and the oft-misrepresented importance of the trade balance as indicators of the fruits of trade. This approach often gives undue weight to exports at the expense of understanding benefits from imports, where the gains from trade are better understood by their contribution to increased consumer
selection, lower priced goods, and improved productivity. For example, high-tech intermediate goods imported from developed countries are the basis for future,
-end snip-
http://usembassy.or.cr/Cafta/crstlc.pdf
You forgot to add the huge loop holes allowing for unlimited immigration.
I don't know if this had a stipulation for it, but I know the trade agreements that they signed last year did (I think for Chile & Singapore).
You can say that again.
And from the "conservative" "republican" so many on this site mindlessly adore.
From past experience, I'm sure we'll be hearing that this is all part of a super secret plan and that the White House is about to outfox the opposition again.
Unfortunately, I'm no longer sure who the opposition is. I'm beginning to think that it's us.
Another 100,000 jobs just went south of the border too.
Better USAID spending money than US Marines spilling blood. How many more dozens of times do we want to intervene militarily in Central and South America? Note that the money is going to building economic infrastructure, the kind that will encourage and enable, for instance, greater influx of investment capital. Governments then have to protect that capital from fleeing their countries by business friendly practices, ensuring the rule of law, transparent accounting, and so on. It's the most effective inoculation against bad governance and thuggery, and the best way of limiting opportunities for regional rouges like Chavez and Castro.
Furthermore I'd a hell of alot rather have, as in this case, the United States decide where our foreign aid goes and what it's spent on than the United Nations. (They sure won't spend it on computerizing stock markets!)
Excellent! Wringing low productivity labor and capital allocations out of our economy will clearly create more jobs here, on net, and at higher wages.
Very interesting. Thanks for the post.
Not quite. One good thing about the bilateral trade agreements is that they have not a thing to do with the United Nations. Any agreement that corrupt body can be left out of is better for it.
"...will clearly create more jobs here, on net, and at higher wages"
That's the double plus good lie that's being sold.
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