Saving the U.S. Air Force

New York Post ^ | Feb. 11, 2005 | Ralph Peters

[tang-soo]

The B2 proved its worth before it ran it first mission. It was the significant tool that forced the Soviets into economic collapse. The B2 made their long range radar (that cost significnat amount of their GNP) obsolete.

[Rokke]

Hmmm. Where to start. First, if you could support your opinions with facts or evidence, you may have a stronger case. But if the AH-64 is an example of the "Army settling for what it can get", I can't imagine what it actually asked for. The AH-64 is an incredibly capable killing machine, and very effective CAS platform. As evidenced by the performance of the MUCH older and less capable AH-1's flown by the Marine Corps in Iraq, helicopters make outstanding CAS platforms. The fact that the Army chose to employ its aviation assets in a deep strike role only indicates the Army doesn't understand how to perform CAS or deep strike with aviation assets. As any Army aviator will tell you, they are the bastard step children of the Army, and remain largely misunderstood and underestimated. When the Army loses 30 of 32 aircraft on a strike that resulted in almost no enemy loses, they aren't exactly demonstrating an understanding of how to employ airpower. The fact that as V Corps rolled closer to Baghdad they encountered miles and miles of destroyed and abandoned armor, indicates that despite claims to the contrary, the Air Force did a damn good job of "shaping the battlefield".

While bashing the Air Force is a nice hobby, if you could back the bashing with facts it would probably be a little more effective.

[Veloxherc]

I agree with a lot of what he is saying. But, as far as the "shock and awe" he is way off target (no pun intended). I think everyone remembers the ground war started before the air war. Besides the shock and awe was for the consumption of Iran, North Korea, and so on, not for the U.S. or even Iraq.

As far as the F-22 goes I still think we need it, but not at the expense of air lift. The C-130J was canceled for FY 06 budget to pay for the F-22. Loose lips and all that , but as much as I dislike the J model (no Navigator and no Flight engineer) we needed to continue the J model program. We NEED MORE TAC air lifters. The C-130's that active duty have are getting OLD, most of them are from the 1960's. The C-130 flies down low where there is a lot of stress on the airframes, which adds to the need to replace them.

The air force is going to try and use the F-22 and the F-35 (JSF) to replace the mission of the A-10. The Air force is run by fighter pilots and the want there sexy go fast fighters, and seem to be willing to disregard the other missions of the AF to get them.

Also, I think the F-22 will be the last maned fighter. UCAV's will be taking over. If you do not believe this you are a fighter pilot, in denial, or both.

[Veloxherc]

I think he means AF Special ops Pilots, not ground pounders.

We are talking MC-130's Shadows and Talons, H-53 Pave Lows, H-60 Pave Hawk pilots.

Plus you do have AF SOF ground guys PJ's (Pararecuemen and CCT (combat controllers.)

[blanknoone]

But if the AH-64 is an example of the "Army settling for what it can get", I can't imagine what it actually asked for.

What it asked for and needs is a plane. But AF politics prevent that.

As for facts: helicopters are inherently inefficient platforms. They use horsepower rather than aerodynamics to stay aloft. The AH 64's payload is 1,700 pounds. The A-10's payload is 16,000 pounds. Their standby time is infinitely shorter. That is the difference between a helicopter and a plane.

That a 1980's era square peg is better than a 1960's era square peg doesn't make either fit into a round hole.

If the Army's deep strike capability is so obviously flawed (and I won't deny that mission was a disaster...their ORP was directly above an AAA position.) why didn't the AF do the mission? I can guarantee that the Army manuever commanders don't care who gets the mission done as long as it gets done.

If you are going to lecture me on Army Aviation you may want to familiarize yourself with them first. They see themselves as manuever assets, not CAS assets. And any claims that they are misunderstood is from the ground assets trying to get them to actually do CAS. And that failed mission is a prime example of them pretending to be manuever assets.

The people who talked to me (and I was in 3ID, although not at the time in went into Iraq) certainly weren't talking about how the AF destroyed all the Iraqi armor. I don't deny that the AF can shape the battlefield at the strategic level. They cannot at the operational and tactical level. That is missing...and that is what is needed. That is not a glamorous role. The AF didn't want to do it, so they didn't. The Army tried to get helicopters to do it, and they decided they didn't want to do it either. But the mission needs to be done. And we don't have the proper capability.

Claiming that people are 'bashing' the AF does not protect the AF from the truth. I have no complaints about their air-to-air. I have no complaints about their strategic bombing capabilities, or their logistics. But they are ignoring an important responsibility...and it is my life on the line when it doesn't get done. Accusing me of bashing doesn't get CAS done.

[Veloxherc]

"You are aware that the USAF won't allow their precious C17's actually land on primitive air strips? The planes were designed to do so, but if they actually did it it would seriously shorten the life of the airframe"

The reason the AF does not land the C-17's on dirt is cost. You FOD out a jet on that thing and yo just spent millions.

The C-130's turbo props cost 100's of thousand's not millions.

[Rokke]

"The Air force is run by fighter pilots and the want there sexy go fast fighters, and seem to be willing to disregard the other missions of the AF to get them."

Sigh. That statement would carry a little more weight if it weren't for the simple fact that the newest operational aircraft in the Air Force are all cargo planes and bombers. The last F-15C was purchased in 1986, but a majority were delivered in the late 70's and early 80's. I am currently flying an F-16 that was delivered 22 years ago. All the A-10's are older than that. If you want to talk airframe stress, take a look at a 20 year old fighter that is 3000 hours over its designed airframe limit. The F-22 is the first new fighter airframe to enter the inventory since the F-117 in 1982. So I'm not buying the AF disregarding other missions to buy "sexy, go fast fighters."

"UCAV's will be taking over. If you do not believe this you are a fighter pilot, in denial, or both."

I'm a fighter pilot, and I believe UCAV's are where our money should be going right now. No doubt about it. Based on the fact that I've already flown alongside UCAV's in combat, I'd say some high ranking folks (even fighter guys) in the Air Force would agree.

[Veloxherc]

"The last F-15C was purchased in 1986, but a majority were delivered in the late 70's and early 80's. I am currently flying an F-16 that was delivered 22 years ago."

I can beat that. I got to fly a C-130 built in 1961. I also flew one with over 20,000 hours. Up until recently the newest C-130 I have been on was a 1966.

Don't get me wrong I hate to see anyone fly old planes. I wish we could all fly brand new stuff.

[r9etb]

The Air Force needs to stop dreaming of the missions it wants and face the missions we’ve got. [you]: I think this just nailed the AF. Spot-on.

Mr. Peterson is guilty of that worst of military sins: fighting the last war. For some reason, he seems to be under the impression that because our previous couple of wars were "small," we will never fight a big war, ever again. And yet I see China out there....

Sure would hate to learn the hard way that Mr. Peterson is wrong.

[r9etb]

Errr... Peters, not "Peterson."

[Rokke]

"What it asked for and needs is a plane. But AF politics prevent that."

You give AF politics too much credit. They are hardly responsible for DoD policy reaching back to the late 40's.

"why didn't the AF do the mission? I can guarantee that the Army manuever commanders don't care who gets the mission done as long as it gets done."

Two reasons. First, the Army requested the mission. Second, the Army moved the Fire Support Coordination Line forward so quickly they outreached their own capability. Since they own the airspace inside the FSCL, the Air Force couldn't hit targets inside that line without direct coordination with army ground commanders. That wasn't possible, because the Army didn't have the assets to provide the required control that far forward of their actual leading edge.

"If you are going to lecture me on Army Aviation you may want to familiarize yourself with them first. They see themselves as manuever assets, not CAS assets."

Interesting that the Army ignores the CAS role. Perhaps it's not glamorous enough?

"And that failed mission is a prime example of them pretending to be manuever assets."

You've lost me here. Are they really CAS assets pretending to be manuever assets, or manuever assets that incorrectly get tasked as CAS assets?

"The people who talked to me certainly weren't talking about how the AF destroyed all the Iraqi armor."

Yet, did they describe great armor battles with the thousands of tanks of the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions. The fact is, what wasn't destroyed was abandoned before V Corps entered the scene. Obviously, it wasn't Army assets that did that.

"That is missing...and that is what is needed. That is not a glamorous role. The AF didn't want to do it, so they didn't."

You are so grossly ignorant on this point that I'm guessing you actually have no actual insight on the facts. The facts are that after the first week of the war, every single Air Force combat aircraft in theater was flying either in a CAS role or in a battlefield interdiction role in direct support of Army and Marine Corps ground maneuvers.

" Claiming that people are 'bashing' the AF does not protect the AF from the truth."

Except you are not speaking the truth. And you were not on the ground in Iraq. I was in a position with high visibility on what CAS was requested versus what was actually provided. The greatest problem the Navy and Air Force had in Iraq was getting enough requests to employ their ordinance.

[Rokke]

"I got to fly a C-130 built in 1961. I also flew one with over 20,000 hours. Up until recently the newest C-130 I have been on was a 1966."

When did you fly your C-130 built in 1961. And if you recently started flying C-130's newer than 1966, that would imply you got new equipment. How new? Also, 20,000 hours on an airlift airframe built for a life expectancy of 40,000 is different than a fighter built for 2000 hours that is now on its 5000th.

"I wish we could all fly brand new stuff."

I agree. But the only guys doing that right now are airlift guys.

[Richard Kimball]

A no-nonsense ground-attack aircraft to replace that splendid killing machine, the A-10. Ground-attack operations — especially in urban environments — are the wave of the future. The Air Force needs to stop dreaming of the missions it wants and face the missions we’ve got.

Brilliant article. I've been wondering for a while if the Air Force is necessary at all. Would it be more efficient to gut the Air Force and allow Army, Navy and the Marines to develop coordinated systems within their own branches of the service?

The Air Force, it seems to me, has been searching for a mission for years. Course, what I'd like to see is us go to remote controlled systems operated by ground personnel for most air combat missions. Without spending the weight for life support and seating for the pilot, it seems to me that the ships could be made lighter, faster, more maneuverable and less expensively.

[Veloxherc]

I do not think the C-130 was built for 40,000 hours.

Also most fighters are newer than most air lifters.

Yea OK the C-17's are new and there are a few C-130J's out there, but any new buying of the J was just CNX to pay for the F-22.

[AFPhys]

Mr Rogers; ghannonf18: you both said exactly the right things in your posts.

mark502inf: you apparently have no clue as to what you are talking about when it comes to Air Force.

We have the best AF in the world (as well as the best Army, Navy and Marines) because our procurement of machines looks ahead as much as possible and uses the highest technology we are able to harness to fight future battles. Men with machines trump men alone EVERY time - ask "Big Bad John". Do we have glitches in the procurement process? Sure! Name me one human activity that doesn't. Does it make sense to create a fleet of aircraft that can lift 100 tons worth of vehicles? Sounds like a debatable topic to me, and I won't weigh in on that here - maybe the Army should just make them fly by themselves. His other statements are just as questionable.

That Peters, whose work I have supported many times in the past, would make such sweeping statements against our military and procurement process is almost unconscionable to me. He has not been part of the meetings where these things have been hashed out, and his writings here can not be trusted.

[blanknoone]

You give AF politics too much credit. They are hardly responsible for DoD policy reaching back to the late 40's.

The Navy (with its own planes) wasn't objecting. And the Marine Corps (with its own planes) wasn't objecting. And the Army wanted it. So what stopped it, other than the AF's bruised ego? And in the late 40's the AF still had credible CAS capabilities. It is really in the last 30 years (not 60 years) that the AF really changed the way it saw itself.

Two reasons

I think it is somewhat backwards to say the FCSL was moved too fast and that the Army had to do it. The FCSL was moved forward so the Army could do it. But the whole point is one that you brought up not me...that was no where near a CAS mission (the topic I have been addressing). That would have been an interdiction mission, which I think the AF can do, when they want to.

Interesting that the Army ignores the CAS role. Perhaps it's not glamorous enough?

Yeah, that is a fight in the Army. I'm not just AF bashing. The Army aviation community doesn't do it either. Still doesn't change that it needs to be done, and doesn't change that a plane is the right vehicle to do it. The rotorheads can't do it particularly well (the particular problem is not so much the payload as that they can't wait around for the moment that the CAS is needed and the can't get to where it is needed fast enough.)

You've lost me here. Are they really CAS assets pretending to be manuever assets, or manuever assets that incorrectly get tasked as CAS assets?

Both. Army aviation was developed to do CAS. Once in place it developed its own institutionl biases and agenda and tries to do manuever. It really is hard to be the person who goes where someone else tells you to go and shoots what someone else tells you to shoot. Almost everyone wants to control their own destiny. So they like to plan when what and where they are going to do what they do rather than reacting to what the ground troops need.

You are so grossly ignorant on this point...

I was not specifically addressing GWII, and it takes some deliberate distortion to think I was considering I was addressing procurement priorities. But I am still not going to insult you. If you want to hear me say it, the AF did a fine job in Iraq. I am not worried about the last war, I am worried about the next war. And the bottom line is that the AF will always over prioritize, both in procurement and operations, air to air, and underprioritize air to mud...especially the CAS piece of it. In Iraq, where there was no significant air opposition, the AF, after a week, managed to do CAS. In a major war, say China, that important mission will be ignored. They aren't building anything dedicated to CAS. And everything multirole will be used to establish air superiority. And then it will be used to establish air supremacy. And then it will be used to establish air dominance. And only then will they consider actually helping out on the ground...if we haven't already been overrun. And that is my objection.

That is primarily about the allocation of the multi-role fighters. But that is not the only problem. They can capably do interdiction air to mud, but are not very effective at CAS. That capability is truly restricted to the A-10. And there really is no true replacement in the future...even the JSF looks to be a capable interdiction aircraft, but not a CAS aircraft.

And there is a difference. I have worked with F16 in CAS, A-10 and AH64's (although not technically CAS, it is techinically fire coordination...because they are a manuever branch) It is exceedingly difficult for F16's to clearly identify what is going on on the ground. Distinguishing who and where the good guys are, who and where the bad guys are, and which bad guys we want you to hit just proves extremely hard for F16s. I can assume that it is because of minimum speed differences, but I won't say that as a fact. Maybe it is simply a problem of pilot training...that CAS is hard to do and A10 guys practice it more than F16 guys with much broader responsibilities but I doubt that too. All I can say is that there are significant and important differences. And you can't call that AF bashing. I have nothing but good things to say about the pig drivers.

You are very focused on Iraq. I'm not. I'm focused on future mission needs and capabilities. And there is a hole in CAS. And the Army has a problem with it too....although I think there problem is less on the procurement end (the AH64 is about as capable as a modern helicopter can be for the role) but there is a definite institutional perspective problem. But there is a hole in CAS, even if the last war did not highlight it. And that is the truth.

[Rokke]

"Also most fighters are newer than most air lifters."

I don't think that is true anymore. For example, the average age of the active duty C-130 is 25 years old, and the average age of the Guard/Reserve C-130 is 15 years. C-141's have almost completely disappeared replaced by C-17's that are still rolling off the production line, and C-5's make up a relatively small portion of the airlift fleet.

Conversely, the newest F-15C was built 19 years ago with an average age of 25 years, the average age of the F-16 fleet is 17 years, and the average age of the A-10 is 25 years old.

The bottomline is, our aircraft are old. We are building new airlifters, and with the introduction of the F-22, we will finally have a new fighter.

[Tallguy]

The reason the AF does not land the C-17's on dirt is cost. You FOD out a jet on that thing and yo just spent millions.

Are you saying that Short Field Operations don't inherently involve more shock to the basic structure of the airframe? I hear what you're saying about FOD's but engines can be repaired/replaced; airframes are another matter involving major overhauls.

[Tallguy]

If C17s can't land on 'austere' strips without falling apart ('seriously shortening the life of the airframe') than they weren't properly designed to do so. And if they weren't properly designed to do so, they should not have been tauted as such.

C17's were, in fact, designed to be used on unimproved strips. The USAF doesn't do it much because they don't want to cut the airframe life by a significant percentage. That's the end-user's decision and not necessarily a design flaw.

The Navy projects the airframe life of their carrier borne aircraft in terms of the number of "traps" or arrested landings. Dropping a laden cargo jet onto a short field is going to have similar effects on the wing box, landing gear assemblies, and so forth. It's all about metal fatigue.