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Hmmm. Where to start. First, if you could support your opinions with facts or evidence, you may have a stronger case. But if the AH-64 is an example of the "Army settling for what it can get", I can't imagine what it actually asked for. The AH-64 is an incredibly capable killing machine, and very effective CAS platform. As evidenced by the performance of the MUCH older and less capable AH-1's flown by the Marine Corps in Iraq, helicopters make outstanding CAS platforms. The fact that the Army chose to employ its aviation assets in a deep strike role only indicates the Army doesn't understand how to perform CAS or deep strike with aviation assets. As any Army aviator will tell you, they are the bastard step children of the Army, and remain largely misunderstood and underestimated. When the Army loses 30 of 32 aircraft on a strike that resulted in almost no enemy loses, they aren't exactly demonstrating an understanding of how to employ airpower. The fact that as V Corps rolled closer to Baghdad they encountered miles and miles of destroyed and abandoned armor, indicates that despite claims to the contrary, the Air Force did a damn good job of "shaping the battlefield".

While bashing the Air Force is a nice hobby, if you could back the bashing with facts it would probably be a little more effective.

But if the AH-64 is an example of the "Army settling for what it can get", I can't imagine what it actually asked for.

What it asked for and needs is a plane. But AF politics prevent that.

As for facts: helicopters are inherently inefficient platforms. They use horsepower rather than aerodynamics to stay aloft. The AH 64's payload is 1,700 pounds. The A-10's payload is 16,000 pounds. Their standby time is infinitely shorter. That is the difference between a helicopter and a plane.

That a 1980's era square peg is better than a 1960's era square peg doesn't make either fit into a round hole.

If the Army's deep strike capability is so obviously flawed (and I won't deny that mission was a disaster...their ORP was directly above an AAA position.) why didn't the AF do the mission? I can guarantee that the Army manuever commanders don't care who gets the mission done as long as it gets done.

If you are going to lecture me on Army Aviation you may want to familiarize yourself with them first. They see themselves as manuever assets, not CAS assets. And any claims that they are misunderstood is from the ground assets trying to get them to actually do CAS. And that failed mission is a prime example of them pretending to be manuever assets.

The people who talked to me (and I was in 3ID, although not at the time in went into Iraq) certainly weren't talking about how the AF destroyed all the Iraqi armor. I don't deny that the AF can shape the battlefield at the strategic level. They cannot at the operational and tactical level. That is missing...and that is what is needed. That is not a glamorous role. The AF didn't want to do it, so they didn't. The Army tried to get helicopters to do it, and they decided they didn't want to do it either. But the mission needs to be done. And we don't have the proper capability.

Claiming that people are 'bashing' the AF does not protect the AF from the truth. I have no complaints about their air-to-air. I have no complaints about their strategic bombing capabilities, or their logistics. But they are ignoring an important responsibility...and it is my life on the line when it doesn't get done. Accusing me of bashing doesn't get CAS done.