You give AF politics too much credit. They are hardly responsible for DoD policy reaching back to the late 40's.
"why didn't the AF do the mission? I can guarantee that the Army manuever commanders don't care who gets the mission done as long as it gets done."
Two reasons. First, the Army requested the mission. Second, the Army moved the Fire Support Coordination Line forward so quickly they outreached their own capability. Since they own the airspace inside the FSCL, the Air Force couldn't hit targets inside that line without direct coordination with army ground commanders. That wasn't possible, because the Army didn't have the assets to provide the required control that far forward of their actual leading edge.
"If you are going to lecture me on Army Aviation you may want to familiarize yourself with them first. They see themselves as manuever assets, not CAS assets."
Interesting that the Army ignores the CAS role. Perhaps it's not glamorous enough?
"And that failed mission is a prime example of them pretending to be manuever assets."
You've lost me here. Are they really CAS assets pretending to be manuever assets, or manuever assets that incorrectly get tasked as CAS assets?
"The people who talked to me certainly weren't talking about how the AF destroyed all the Iraqi armor."
Yet, did they describe great armor battles with the thousands of tanks of the Iraqi Republican Guard divisions. The fact is, what wasn't destroyed was abandoned before V Corps entered the scene. Obviously, it wasn't Army assets that did that.
"That is missing...and that is what is needed. That is not a glamorous role. The AF didn't want to do it, so they didn't."
You are so grossly ignorant on this point that I'm guessing you actually have no actual insight on the facts. The facts are that after the first week of the war, every single Air Force combat aircraft in theater was flying either in a CAS role or in a battlefield interdiction role in direct support of Army and Marine Corps ground maneuvers.
" Claiming that people are 'bashing' the AF does not protect the AF from the truth."
Except you are not speaking the truth. And you were not on the ground in Iraq. I was in a position with high visibility on what CAS was requested versus what was actually provided. The greatest problem the Navy and Air Force had in Iraq was getting enough requests to employ their ordinance.
The Navy (with its own planes) wasn't objecting. And the Marine Corps (with its own planes) wasn't objecting. And the Army wanted it. So what stopped it, other than the AF's bruised ego? And in the late 40's the AF still had credible CAS capabilities. It is really in the last 30 years (not 60 years) that the AF really changed the way it saw itself.
Two reasons
I think it is somewhat backwards to say the FCSL was moved too fast and that the Army had to do it. The FCSL was moved forward so the Army could do it. But the whole point is one that you brought up not me...that was no where near a CAS mission (the topic I have been addressing). That would have been an interdiction mission, which I think the AF can do, when they want to.
Interesting that the Army ignores the CAS role. Perhaps it's not glamorous enough?
Yeah, that is a fight in the Army. I'm not just AF bashing. The Army aviation community doesn't do it either. Still doesn't change that it needs to be done, and doesn't change that a plane is the right vehicle to do it. The rotorheads can't do it particularly well (the particular problem is not so much the payload as that they can't wait around for the moment that the CAS is needed and the can't get to where it is needed fast enough.)
You've lost me here. Are they really CAS assets pretending to be manuever assets, or manuever assets that incorrectly get tasked as CAS assets?
Both. Army aviation was developed to do CAS. Once in place it developed its own institutionl biases and agenda and tries to do manuever. It really is hard to be the person who goes where someone else tells you to go and shoots what someone else tells you to shoot. Almost everyone wants to control their own destiny. So they like to plan when what and where they are going to do what they do rather than reacting to what the ground troops need.
You are so grossly ignorant on this point...
I was not specifically addressing GWII, and it takes some deliberate distortion to think I was considering I was addressing procurement priorities. But I am still not going to insult you. If you want to hear me say it, the AF did a fine job in Iraq. I am not worried about the last war, I am worried about the next war. And the bottom line is that the AF will always over prioritize, both in procurement and operations, air to air, and underprioritize air to mud...especially the CAS piece of it. In Iraq, where there was no significant air opposition, the AF, after a week, managed to do CAS. In a major war, say China, that important mission will be ignored. They aren't building anything dedicated to CAS. And everything multirole will be used to establish air superiority. And then it will be used to establish air supremacy. And then it will be used to establish air dominance. And only then will they consider actually helping out on the ground...if we haven't already been overrun. And that is my objection.
That is primarily about the allocation of the multi-role fighters. But that is not the only problem. They can capably do interdiction air to mud, but are not very effective at CAS. That capability is truly restricted to the A-10. And there really is no true replacement in the future...even the JSF looks to be a capable interdiction aircraft, but not a CAS aircraft.
And there is a difference. I have worked with F16 in CAS, A-10 and AH64's (although not technically CAS, it is techinically fire coordination...because they are a manuever branch) It is exceedingly difficult for F16's to clearly identify what is going on on the ground. Distinguishing who and where the good guys are, who and where the bad guys are, and which bad guys we want you to hit just proves extremely hard for F16s. I can assume that it is because of minimum speed differences, but I won't say that as a fact. Maybe it is simply a problem of pilot training...that CAS is hard to do and A10 guys practice it more than F16 guys with much broader responsibilities but I doubt that too. All I can say is that there are significant and important differences. And you can't call that AF bashing. I have nothing but good things to say about the pig drivers.
You are very focused on Iraq. I'm not. I'm focused on future mission needs and capabilities. And there is a hole in CAS. And the Army has a problem with it too....although I think there problem is less on the procurement end (the AH64 is about as capable as a modern helicopter can be for the role) but there is a definite institutional perspective problem. But there is a hole in CAS, even if the last war did not highlight it. And that is the truth.
I've some friends in the 3rd ID who would take a lot of issue with that statement.