Weighing the options: U.S. faces closing window of opportunity to stop Iran's nukes
|
||
Bolton has concluded that Teheran no longer fears a showdown with the international community. John Bolton
|
With Iran surviving another session of the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors meeting, Bolton has concluded that Teheran no longer fears a showdown with the international community. Bolton has been pressing the Bush administration to adopt a plan of action combining diplomacy with a healthy dose of interdiction and military measures.
Last week, the United States lost another battle at the IAEA's board of governors meeting in Vienna. The 35-nation board rejected a U.S. effort to set a deadline for an end to Iran's uranium enrichment program. Instead, the board set a Nov. 25 deadline to review Iran's nuclear program and called for the suspension of Teheran's uranium enrichment activities.
The Sept. 18 resolution called for a halt to a range of Iranian nuclear activities and expressed concern over Iran's intention to introduce 37 tons of yellowcake, a milled uranium oxide that is the first element in the process to enrich uranium. But the resolution did not threaten any measures against Teheran.
"Iran [should] immediately suspend all enrichment-related activities, including the manufacture or import of centrifuge components, the assembly and testing of centrifuges," the resolution stated. The resolution "calls again on Iran, as a further confidence-building measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water."
The U.S. intelligence community has significantly revised its forecast of an Iranian nuclear weapon. Without much fanfare, the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency have determined that Teheran has set 2005 as the year when Iran achieves indigenous nuclear capability. A minority view in the intelligence community is that Iran has already acquired at least three nuclear weapons on the black market from the former Soviet Union.
 |
| Bolton has been pressing the Bush administration to adopt a plan of action combining diplomacy with a healthy dose of interdiction and military measures. |
The IAEA resolution failed to set an automatic trigger that would send the Iranian nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions. The agency, over U.S. objections, also insisted that the resolution contain a clause reiterating Iran's right to administer a civilian nuclear program.
For his part, IAEA Director-General Mohammed El Baradei said inspectors have not found evidence that Iran was producing nuclear weapons. But the IAEA's latest report said inspectors required further study of Iran's nuclear program, including such issues as enriched uranium contamination, the scope of the P-2 centrifuge program and the timeframe of Iran's plutonium separation experiments.
Bolton's job is trying to figure out what the administration should do.
He sees Iran's nuclear weapons program as being closely linked to the Shihab-3 intermediate-range program, a missile expected to be launched over the next few days as part of the Ashura military exercise. Iran has succeeded in acquiring a warhead suitable for a nuclear payload and is even undergoing tests of this during 2004.
A nuclear Iran would spark a nuclear race throughout the Middle East.
The most likely candidates include largely Arab allies of Washington and signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Here's the lineup: Algeria already has a major nuclear research center suitable for fissile material production and guarded by anti-aircraft batteries.
Egypt has been busy building a nuclear infrastructure, including a large nuclear desalinization plant and is suspected of receiving nuclear technology from Libya.
The list goes on. Iraq has the nuclear know-how and experience under Saddam Hussein. Saudi Arabia has been discussing with Pakistan the lease of nuclear weapons. Syria has been acquiring Chinese and Russian help. Turkey possesses the nuclear network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
Currently there is little stomach in the Bush administration for a U.S. military conflict with Iran. The Pentagon knows Iran could retaliate with a massive attack on U.S. troops in neighboring Iraq. Teheran could order a sustained Shi'ite insurgency targeting the U.S. military presence throughout Iraq and a Hizbullah offensive in the Middle East.
Still, the Pentagon has expressed its assessment that Washington has a window of opportunity in stopping Iran's nuclear weapons program. With about 200,000 U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf, the United States could not only strike a range of Iranian nuclear weapons sites but could respond to any massive retaliation by Teheran. In other words, Pentagon circles say, "If there is a showdown, let it be now, while we have the troops, the assets and the motivation."
There are serious difficulties with this option. First, officials said, U.S. air strikes would not make a dent in eliminating the underground Iranian nuclear facilities. Even nuclear bunker-busters won't work.
Moreover, the United States does not have enough troops in the region for a real land invasion of Iran. A series of simulations conducted by the CIA and DIA determined that any limited U.S. military strike against Iran would quickly turn into a full-scale war.
The State Department, particularly Secretary of State Colin Powell, has been against the military option. Powell does not believe the United States could identify nuclear weapons targets in Iran and agrees with a CIA assessment that Teheran has long duplicated nuclear weapons facilities in military bases throughout the country.
Instead, Powell prefers an accelerated diplomatic route that seeks to bring the Iranian nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council in a move that would lay the groundwork for any future military confrontation with Iran later in the decade. Meanwhile, the State Department has promoted the idea of a "grand bargain," allowing Iran to keep civilian nuclear facilities if it ends uranium enrichment.
Nobody expects Iran to accept the deal, but Teheran's rejection could win the European Union and Arab League states to Washington's desire for heavy sanctions on Iran. Officials said that with an Iranian economy 90 percent dependent on oil exports, sanctions could be a serious option.
Both the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom believe that Iran, bolstered by North Korea's nuclear and missile expertise, will be the leading rival to the United States in the Mideast over the next 20 years. But they envision a collapse of the Islamic regime in Teheran as ruling mullahs are swallowed up by the rapid growth of secular urban young people. A military invasion of Iran would only bolster the mullahs.
Bolton's position appears to be somewhere in the middle. Unlike the Pentagon, Bolton wants to wait another few months until the international community has had a chance to see the IAEA assessment of Iran's nuclear program. He also wants a serious discussion of the implications of a nuclear Iran at the review conference of the NPT in May 2005.
Bolton believes that the deadline to deal with Iran is the end of 2005. Until then, he and his colleagues hope Washington could draft support for a military option in cooperation with Britain, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Iran is not working in a vacuum. The U.S. intelligence community has determined that China has been supporting Iran's nuclear weapons program.
China has used North Korea as a conduit for such help. Iran has paid handsomely for North Korean help and Pyongyang has used the money to develop its own nuclear weapons. Much of that money was used to acquire components from the Khan's Pakistani network. Islamabad has refused to cooperate with the IAEA's investigation of Iran.
Another option is for the United States to bolster its support for Iranian opposition groups, including the Mujahadeen Khalq. The Mujahadeen has little support in Iran but is disciplined and deadly and could be used to attack Iranian nuclear sites without an open U.S. military attack.
Officials could also support the royalist opposition as a counterweight.
Most officials don't believe the administration will decide on the Iranian debate until early 2005. The timeframe includes the U.S. presidential elections in November, the IAEA board of governors meeting later that month and the Iraqi elections in January 2005. After that, the attention of the U.S. intelligence and military establishment will be on Iran.
Copyright © 2003 East West Services, Inc. All rights reserved.
