Posted on 09/13/2004 5:05:00 PM PDT by johnny7
During the 1999 Kargil crisis, Clinton's forceful diplomacy pulled Pakistan back from the nuclear brink
On the brink of a catastrophe: Indian artillery pound Pakistani infiltrators in the Kargil region of Kashmir. Pakistan was reported to be readying its nuclear weapons until President Clinton intervened
WASHINGTON: During the first week in June [1999], just as Milosevic was acceding to NATO’s demands over Kosovo, Clinton turned his own attention to India and Pakistan. In letters to Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee, the president went beyond the studied neutrality that both prime ministers were expecting—in Pakistan’s case with hope, and in India’s with trepidation. Clinton made Pakistan’s withdrawal a precondition for a settlement and the price it must pay for the U.S. diplomatic involvement it had long sought. Clinton followed up with phone calls to the two leaders in mid-June emphasizing this point. The United States condemned Pakistan’s “infiltration of armed intruders” and went public with information that most of the seven hundred men who had crossed the Line of Control were attached to the Pakistani Army’s 10th Corps.
In late June Clinton called Nawaz Sharif to stress that the United States saw Pakistan as the aggressor and to reject the fiction that the fighters were separatist guerrillas. The administration let it be known that if Sharif did not order a pullback, we would hold up a $100 million International Monetary Fund loan that Pakistan sorely needed. Sharif went to Beijing, hoping for comfort from Pakistan’s staunchest friend, but got none. Pakistan was almost universally seen to have precipitated the crisis, ruining the promising peace process that had begun in Lahore and inviting an Indian counteroffensive. On Friday, July 2, Sharif phoned Clinton and pleaded for his personal intervention in South Asia. Clinton replied that he would consider it only if it was understood up-front that Pakistani withdrawal would have to be immediate and unconditional. The next day Sharif called Clinton to say that he was packing his bags and getting ready to fly immediately to Washington—never mind that he had not been invited. ..He warned Sharif not to come unless he was prepared to announce unconditional withdrawal; otherwise, his trip would make a bad situation worse. The Pakistani leader did not accept Clinton’s condition for the meeting—he just said he was on his way. “This guy’s coming literally on a wing and a prayer,” said the president.” That’s right,” said Bruce Riedel [NSC aide], “and he’s praying that we don’t make him do the one thing he’s got to do to end this thing.”
It was not hard to anticipate what Sharif would ask for. His opening proposal would be a cease-fire to be followed by negotiations under American auspices. His fallback would make Pakistani withdrawal conditional on Indian agreement to direct negotiations sponsored and probably mediated by the United States. Either way, he would be able to claim that the incursion had forced India, under American pressure, to accept Pakistani terms. After several long meetings in Sandy Berger’s office, we decided to recommend that Clinton confront Sharif with a stark choice that included neither of his preferred options. We would put before him two press statements and let Sharif decide which would be released at the end of the Blair House talks. The first would hail him as a peacemaker for retreating—or, as we would put it euphemistically, “restoring and respecting the sanctity of the Line of Control.” The second would blame him for starting the crisis and for the escalation sure to follow his failed mission to Washington.
On the eve of Sharif’s arrival, we learned that Pakistan might be preparing its nuclear forces for deployment. There was, among those of us preparing for the meeting, a sense of vast and nearly unprecedented peril. When Clinton assembled his advisers in the Oval Office for a last minute huddle, Sandy told him that overnight we had gotten more disturbing reports of steps Pakistan was taking with its nuclear arsenal. Clinton said he would like to use this information “to scare the hell out of Sharif.” Sandy told the president that he was heading into what would probably be the single most important meeting with a foreign leader of his entire presidency. It would also be one of the most delicate. The overriding objective was to induce Pakistani withdrawal. But another, probably incompatible, goal was to increase the chances of Sharif’s political survival. “If he arrives as a prime minister but stays as an exile,” said Sandy, “he’s not going to be able to make stick whatever deal you get out of him.” We had to find a way to provide Sharif just enough cover to go home and give the necessary orders to Musharraf and the military. The conversation had already convinced Clinton of what he feared: the world was closer even than during the Cuban missile crisis to a nuclear war. Unlike Kennedy and Khrushchev in 1962, Vajpayee and Sharif did not realize how close they were to the brink, so there was an even greater risk that they would blindly stumble across it. Adding to the danger was evidence that Sharif neither knew everything his military high command was doing nor had complete control over it. When Clinton asked him if he understood how far along his military was in preparing nuclear-armed missiles for possible use in a war against India, Sharif acted as though he was genuinely surprised. He could believe that the Indians were taking such steps, he said, but he neither acknowledged nor seemed aware of anything like that on his own side.
Clinton decided to invoke the Cuban missile crisis, noting that it had been a formative experience for him (he was sixteen at the time). Now India and Pakistan were similarly on the edge of a precipice. If even one bomb were used…Sharif finished the sentence: “. . . it would be a catastrophe.” [Clinton] returned to the offensive. He could see they were getting nowhere. Fearing that might be the result, he had a statement ready to release to the press in time for the evening news shows that would lay all the blame for the crisis on Pakistan. Sharif went ashen. Clinton bore down harder. Having listened to Sharif’s complaints against the United States, he had a list of his own, and it started with terrorism. Pakistan was the principal sponsor of the Taliban, which in turn allowed Osama bin Laden to run his worldwide network out of Afghanistan. Clinton had asked Sharif repeatedly to cooperate in bringing Osama to justice. Sharif had promised to do so but failed to deliver. The statement the United States would make to the press would mention Pakistan’s role in supporting terrorism in Afghanistan—and, through its backing of Kashmiri militants, in India as well. Was that what Sharif wanted?
Clinton had worked himself back into real anger—his face flushed, eyes narrowed, lips pursed, cheek muscles pulsing, fists clenched. He said it was crazy enough for Sharif to have let his military violate the Line of Control, start a border war with India, and now prepare nuclear forces for action. On top of that, he had put Clinton in the middle of the mess and set him up for a diplomatic failure. Sharif seemed beaten, physically and emotionally. He denied he had given any orders with regard to nuclear weaponry and said he was worried for his life. When the two leaders had been at it for an hour and a half, Clinton suggested a break so that both could consult with their teams. The president and Bruce briefed Sandy, Rick, and me on what had happened. Now that he had made maximum use of the “bad statement” we had prepared in advance, Clinton said, it was time to deploy the good one. ..Clinton took a cat nap on a sofa in a small study off the main entryway while Bruce, Sandy, Rick, and I cobbled together a new version of the “good statement,” incorporating some of the Pakistani language from the paper that Sharif had claimed was in play between him and Vajpayee. But the key sentence in the new document was ours, not his, and it would nail the one thing we had to get out of the talks: “The prime minister has agreed to take concrete and immediate steps for the restoration of the Line of Control.” The paper called for a cease-fire but only after the Pakistanis were back on their side of the line. It reaffirmed Clinton’s longstanding plan to visit South Asia.
The meeting came quickly to a happy and friendly end, at least on Clinton’s part.
Adapted from Strobe Talbott's "Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb" (Brookings Institution Press).
Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State is the President of the Brookings Institution.
Copyright © 2004, The Brookings Institution.
Aha!! The Cuban Missle Crisis... brilliant Billy... just fu_kin' brilliant!
Jeez... don't even remember this huge moment in history... musta' been in a coma or something. But hey, he saved the world by pounding on the table... kinda like Von Ribbentrop woulda' done.
Brilliant... just brilliant!
And all lived happily ever after.
Clinton is really something else. I'll bet he is using this and his heart surgery to try to sway the Nobel Peace Prize Committee again. The guy is despirate to find a legacy, besides Monica and Pardon-gate.
In all seriousness, why should I care if Pakistan gets rubbed out. What does that have to do with my life?
Same for India. They have a Billion people. Certainly 950 million would survive. Why are we the ones acting panicked?
He could cure freakin' cancer and he'd still be the lowest form of life that was ever President of the United States.
Great big gob of chewy chewy gopherguts. YUK (to both).
Just guessing here, but ... he did know about Osama and it couldn't/wouldn't be too difficult to make the Pakistan association needed in the future to get to the Taliban in Afghanistan (Because God knows he wasn't going to do anything .. ).
I know we welcome all points of view here, but reprinting a piece by Strobe Talbott is kind of stretching the envelope. If the Soviet Union were still in business, Strobe would probably be over there kissing Big Brother's toes instead of here kissing Pharaoh Bubba's toes.
Clinton had worked himself back into real anger—his face flushed, eyes narrowed, lips pursed, cheek muscles pulsing, fists clenched.
This probably wasn't too difficult for Clinton. He only had to imagine he was about to sexually violate another woman.
On top of that, he had put Clinton in the middle of the mess and set him up for a diplomatic failure.
This is the main reason I wanted to reply to this thread. Okay, here's a man who we all know is major kiss-up to Clinton and yet he drops this seemingly innocent statement in the middle of this puff piece about how Clinton single-handedly saved the world from nuclear annihilation. This sentence is just so wrong. The world was supposedly on the brink of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan and all Strobe can think about is poor Bill Clinton and how he got mixed up in middle of this mess. No mention of the American people. No mention of the rest of the world. Just Bill Clinton. Poor, poor Bill Clinton. Clinton's fear of bad press is why his legacy is going to be the Been There, Did Nuthin' President.
I'm done. I'm rambling...
10,000 people set to leave Indian city before arrival of "unholy war criminal" Clinton 03/13/2000
Less than 3 weeks prior to Clinton visit, India jacks up Defense spending an unprecedented 28% 02/29/2000
And on this page, near the bottom you find Clinton calls Vajpayee, praises Indian restraint.
Another fun trip into the FR Archives.
bttt
Too bad his "forceful diplomacy" also gave China our most sensitive nuclear sectets.
The 20th Century's worst act of treason.
Say what?
Even the ultra liberal, Clinton butt boys at Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting (fair.org) condemned the bombing of civilian targets.
To wit, "At the beginning of the bombing of Yugoslavia, NATO was stressing the idea that Milosevic alone was responsible for the war," said a July/August 1999 special report ("Legitimate Targets? How U.S. Media Supported War Crimes in Yugoslavia") at
http://www.fair.org/extra/9907/kosovo-crimes.html
but things changed. The special report criticizes other Clinton butt boys supporting the change. Here's a quote from one of the "boys":
"New York Times foreign affairs columnist Thomas Friedman wrote on April 6 that 'people tend to change their minds and adjust their goals as they see the price they are paying mount. Twelve days of surgical bombing was never going to turn Serbia around. Let's see what 12 weeks of less than surgical bombing does. Give war a chance.'"
So Milosevic was [NOT] acceding to NATO’s demands. He was acceding to civilian demands -- civilians were acceding to NATO bombs. Thank you, Mr. Clinton, Mr. Talbott, et al.
So I do not have time to google the Indian press to find the truth about India and Pakistan and I sure don't have time to read Talbott's tall tales.
Care to read the China angle into all this,then ul get the seriousness-if nuclear war happened,the Chinese would come onside of the Pakis & God knows what would have followed & don't forget the Arabs too(Israel was the only nation,along with Russia & South Africa to rush military systems to India).
What Strobe Talbott is saying is pretty much the facts,though he's trying to paint Clinton as the all round hero here.The Indians were desperate to end the war quickly as there was rising anger in India over bodybags,given they couldn't cross into Pakistani territory-hence by mid June,the army deployed it's armoured corps along the Rajasthan & Punjab borders(the Kargil war was fought on the LOC ,which is not an internationally valid border) & Indian naval & air forces were minutes away from striking Pakistani facilities.US satellites picked up the Indian deployments for an allout invasion & this along,with the assessment of nukes,forced Clinton's hand.Moreover,most of the world ,including surprisingly the Arabs had turned against Pakistan & asked it to withdraw while the Russians & Israelis stepped up armsales to India on a contingency basis.
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From an Indian
Thank you for the summary.
Strobe Talbott ?!?!?! .... oh gawd, what agitprop BS ... this is the Liberals "INVENTING HISTORY" for us.
Ya'll aren't really expecting me to believe this tripe .. are you ..??
I don't! I could be true .. but I just don't trust the people who are telling the story. Too many previous lies.
1.Indian missile boat attack on Karachi(Dec ,1971)-first landward attack using seaborne missiles,20 yrs b4 the Tomahawk.
http://www.1971war.com/Dec05/Art01.htm
2.THE INDIAN NAVY AT WAR: 1971
Blockade from the seas
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/Banerjee.html
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