Posted on 09/10/2004 3:46:54 AM PDT by carton253
That is just one of many questions that remain unanswered from the Battle of Gettysburg. First the novel, Killer Angels, then the movie, Gettysburg, has currently painted a distorted picture of Lee’s real strategy, as has many of the books written on this subject. The standard story they all tell is one that has General Ewell failing to take Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill the evening of July 1st. On July 2nd, General Lee then attacked both flanks of the Union Army. Ewell again attacking Culp’s Hill, and General Longstreet attacking the Round Tops. When those attacks failed, General Lee abandoned the flank attacks to desperately march 15,000 men against the Federal center on Cemetery Ridge. This telling of the events, over 140 years old, has left many questions about those three days unanswered.
The first of those questions would be General Hood’s order to attack up the Emmittsburg Road. Let’s look at that order and the remarks that were made during the morning of July 2nd. Lee’s strategy was a simple one. He wanted to converge his forces upon Cemetery Hill…the salient of the Federal position. He did not want to attack the Round Tops. He saw no value in them. It is important to note that this was not the first time Lee had used this strategy in battle. He used it during the Seven Days Battles, during the Battle of Second Manassas, and finally at Chancellorsville, where he sent Jackson marching around the Union flank to push the Union Army into the waiting other wing of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Longstreet disagreed with Lee’s pincher strategy. During the morning meeting, when Lee positioned McLaws on the Emmittsburg Road at right angles to the Peach Orchard and ordered him to gain the orchard, Longstreet chose to direct McLaws parallel to the turnpike. Lee replied, “No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road.” McLaws’ Division was to aid Hood in an oblique attack on the left flank of the Federal Line in order to force it toward Gettysburg, toward Cemetery Hill, toward Ewell’s waiting corps, who was to make a demonstration against Cemetery and Culp’s Hills until the opportunity came for an attack.
There were many hindrances to Lee’s attack. Over the course of time, history has turned these hindrances into Lee’s overall strategy. The first hindrance came when General Sickles moved the III Corps away from the Round Tops because the ground was untenable. He understood that the high ground was the ridge where the Peach Orchard was based. General Lee shared Sickles eye for good ground. The Peach Orchard was Hood’s objective. Lee planned to use the Peach Orchard as a artillery base to shell Hancock’s flank on Cemetery Ridge. When Sickles moved forward, he extended his line. Meade had no choice but to reinforce the line with over 20,000 soldiers. Soldiers, who were not there when Lee reconnoitered the line earlier that morning.
Another hindrance was the presence of Gregg’s cavalry to the rear and east of Ewell’s position. What this did was force Ewell to position the Stonewall Brigade on Brinkerhoff Ridge to hold the cavalry in check along the Hanover Road. This was a loss of one of the best fighting brigades in the Army of Northern Virginia.
The last hindrance was the early wounding of Hood. This break in leadership caused the course of the attack to drift right – to the Round Tops rather than up the Emmittsburg Road. Since the entire Confederate Line was dressing off one another, when the lead elements of Hood’s Division drifted right, so did Laws’s division. Colonel Oates of the 15th Alabama was so intent on attacking the Round Tops that he refused General Laws direct order to wheel left and continue up the Emmittsburg Road. Hood’s division could not attack Little Round Top and remain attached to the Emmittsburg Road. Neither could Laws. Lee’s Line was already seven miles long and couldn’t afford this diversion away from the planned attack “up the Emmitsburg Road.” The attack failed.
In his official battle report, General Lee wrote, “The general plan was unchanged.” On July 3rd , he still planned to converge both his wings on Cemetery Hill. He did not abandoned his objectives to wage a rash battle to break through as history teaches today. A careful look at the day shows that Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s, and Trimble’s brigades were not sent on a desperate mission to do the impossible. Cemetary Hill was the key to the battle. Gettysburg was a point of strategic importance. Ten to twelve roads concentrated at Gettysburg. An army could easily converge to or diverge from this point. By being at the heart of the crossroads, Cemetery Hill was the most advantageous ground from the beginning. Both Lee, Reynolds, and Hancock recognized the importance of Cemetery Hill.
In his memoirs, Longstreet writes, “I was disappointed when Lee came to me on the morning the 3rd and directed that I should renew the attack against Cemetery Hill.” Longstreet still wanted to move to the right around the Federal Army and get between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. Lee said no, “I am going to take them where they are on Cemetery Hill, I want to take Pickett’s Division and make the attack.”
With the arrival of JEB Stuart’s cavalry, Lee was able to relieve the Stonewall Brigade, who returned to the line at Culp’s Hill. Furthermore, JEB Stuart did something that most historians do not understand. He fired two cannon shots and announced his presence on the field. Why? If one understands that Lee was seeking to converge his two wings on Cemetery Hill, one suddenly understands why JEB Stuart seemed to tell the Union Calvary where he was. His job was to clear Ewell’s rear of Union Calvary and allow Ewell to concentrate all his forces on an attack on Culp’s Hill. JEB Stuart summoned. The Union Calvary answered.
Pickett’s charge bears many resemblances to Hood’s attack up the Emmittsburg Road. What Pickett’s charge did different from Hood’s attack was move the thrust of the oblique battle closer to the mark of the Cemetery Hill. Lee also reinforced Ewell's positions by 6,000 men during the early morning of 7/3. This was not by accident. He fully expected both the II and III Corps to join the battle and attack Culp's Hill. It was to be 2nd Manassas all over again.
General Winfield Scott testified to Congress, “When the columns of the enemy appeared, it looked as if they were going to attack the center of our line (Hancock’s line on Cemetery Ridge and on Cemetery Hill) but after marching straight out a little distance they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Cemetery Hill, which I have no doubt was their intention.”
Looking at drawings that appeared in leading Northern periodicals right after the battle, one can clearly see that the Confederate Line oblique movements put them perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road and not parallel. What changed Pickett’s line was the overwhelming flank fire. It forced the line to the left. When the left collapsed, Pettigrew’s division bore to the right to compensate. They were supposed to dress right to assure a connection with Pickett, but that maneuver is far different from the one that actually took place in the assault’s final stages. It was never Lee’s plan to place the weight of the entire charge in front of the copse of trees. The line ended there as the natural result of the terrible flank fire, and Pickett’s Division movement to the left in order to avoid it.
Of course, such analysis does not change what happened those three days in Gettysburg. But it does allow serious students to understand what Lee intended to accomplish. If one could picture how Pickett’s Division was aligned, one would see that the men were marched toward Cemetery Hill and Ridge at a forty-five-degree angle to the Emmittsburg Road rather than parallel to it. It also causes serious students to see that Lee had a strong objective in the battle and not the three difference objectives as modern history tells us.
I think that Lee understood all those things, like any good general would. But he also knew that there wasn't a damned thing he could do about it. I believe that, like Yamamoto in WWII, Lee in 1863 and later fought because it was his duty to fight, not because he believed the south could win.
That's a very reasonable proposition. "Why did they do that?" is always one of the issues that interests me most. After all, it's not as if any of our discussions changes anything ... they're all still dead, bless their hearts.
And of course, with Civil War and earlier, and even some later engagements, there often a question of "What actually happened?" The facts we thought we knew continually have to be checked against newly-discovered or newly-published information. And then we have to ask whether the new information is any more accurate than the old ... keeps life interesting!
A confederate victory anywhere would have left Lee with the problems I mentioned earlier. He would be hundreds of miles behind Union lines, low on ammunition, and with his supply train loaded with thousands of wounded. Lee couldn't maneuver towards Baltimore or DC or anywhere else without abandoning them. And that doesn't solve the question of munitions. Where were those to come from? Unlike the Union armies in northern Virginia, Lee had no supply line back home. He was on his own. Go North, fight a battle, come home. Those were his only options, and not ones that you win a war on.
When Lee sent his engineers out to reccointer the ground... Sickles hadn't advanced into the Peach Orchard...and Meade hadn't found it necessary to reinforce the line with 20,000 soldiers.
It's obvious that Lee told Longstreet to march up the Emmittsburg Road. He even corrected Longstreet when Longstreet tried to reposition McLaws division. Lee told Longstreet, “No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road.”
In all the histories of Gettysburg which I have read nowhere is this movement up the Emmitsburg road mentioned.
Netherless, Lee told Longstreet to march up the Emmittsburg Road. Hood protested and that became the well known event entitled "Hood's Protest." The movie Gettysburg captures the protest very well. That just wasn't movie dramatics...
the peach orchard area is almost equidistant from both the round tops and seminary ridge. I have stood on that ground....and it is not good ground. It is exposed and would be difficult to resupply and defend.
Both General Lee and General Sickles disagree with you.
I am saving your tour. See my 61.
What are the credentials of the author?
Fine. Still an impossible task. 3 corps (one of which was already badly mauled and one division which was not up yet) were not going to take seven corps (even if one or two were damaged). After fighting through the Peach Orchard, his troops would have been under enfilade fire from both the Round Tops and from the Cemetery Hill line.
Agree. I don't think he could have "TAKEN" the ridge, merely occupied a small part long enough to be annihilated.
Lee was screwed. It is a good example of how he is less brilliant a commander than has been argued. No one was going to "roll up" seven corps, and certainly not Meade's corps.
You left out 600,000 dead people. An unbelievable number of permanently disabled and a country that took decades and decades to heal. And whether it was all worth it. That's what's left to know.
Well bless my soul if it isn't my favorite cross-dressing confederate, DorisKearnsGoodwad? I had heard that you were dead, I'm glad to see that the rabies are in remission. Now don't you worry your little heart about me, dearie. Just sit back, wipe the foam off your mouth, take your meds, and relax. I'll be good. I promise.
Food was the least of Lee's problems. The Army of Northern Virginia lived better living off the people of Pennsylvania in the few short weeks of the campaign than they had in the months before in Virginia. But you can't shoot a loaf of bread, and Lee had just shot off most of his munitions at Gettysburg. Lee had thousands of wounded. He wasn't in friendly territory, like he was after Second Bull Run. He couldn't send them to safety, he had to either abandon them or take them with him. WIth his column loaded with wounded, and not enough ammunition for another major engagement, Lee could not continue in the North.
I don't know about that... He had done a pretty fine job up to that point...rolling up the Federal Line and sending them running back to Washington.
Who? Lee? After serious casualties on Day 1 against two brigades of cavalry and, ultimately, a couple of late-arriving divisions. Sorry, there was no way he could win that battle after the morning of July 1.
Longstreet's memoirs discuss Jackson's performance in that battle. Basically, he wore himself and his troops to a frazzle and left something like a third to a half of his strength straggling behind in his lightning march down from the Shenandoah Valley. He achieved his aim of arriving in the field before the opponent discovered his march, but the march destroyed his troops' ability to fight, and his to think: the evening he arrived was the time he fell asleep with food in his mouth (you'll have heard of that incident). He was getting an oral briefing over a plate of chow and just fell asleep sitting up with his fork in his hand.
The next two days in the field, Longstreet comments on the seeming lethargy of Jackson's Corps, which was partly Jackson's being fogged with fatigue and partly his troops' being asleep on their feet and slow in evolutions.
Now, if only Grant and Meade had said that! ;^D
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