Posted on 07/24/2004 10:41:13 AM PDT by USMCVIETVET
KERRY UNFIT FOR COMMAND IN VIETNAM = PROVEN
Analysis of John Kerry's Fitness Reports . Context
John Kerry's campaign representatives quote a few words from one of his best Navy fitness reports to support their misleading claim that Kerry's military evaluations were those of a top-flight officer. They carefully ignore the existence of several other reports that range from mediocre to substandard, thereby presenting an inaccurate picture of Kerry's service record.
There are also gaps in the documentations made public to date by the Kerry campaign, where no fitness reports are provided at all. Here we present an analysis of the available record.
An Introduction to Navy Fitness Reports
Navy officer fitness reports ("FITREPs") are of vital importance. Selection boards use them to promote the officer. Assignment officers use them to “sell” the officer into his or her next assignment. Only truly outstanding officers get the best jobs (or “billets”). Officers with adverse or spotty records are unsalable for anything but the most backwater assignments.
To read and understand FITREPs correctly, there are several crucial things to understand.
Dings and RAPs
First and foremost, a FITREP is a relative picture. You are not reading absolutes. If an officer is graded, say, as “outstanding,” it is meaningful only if he is ranked ahead of his contemporaries and the rest of the FITREP contains no glaring negatives.
Second, what matters most are marks or grades above and especially below the norm. Marks below the norm may fall under a very positive word (e.g., “excellent”) and appear positive to the casual reader, but no matter: any mark to the right of the norm is a strong, clear sign to both promotion boards and assignment officers (e.g., “detailers”) that there is a performance shortfall. A mark to the right is a “ding.” You don’t want a ding in your FITREP.
Third, what is not said in the narrative section is just as important as what is said. The truly superlative officer should be “RAPped,” meaning "Recommended for accelerated promotion." If Block 21 says only "Recommended for promotion" this is faint praise. It means that the officer should be considered for promotion along with the rest of his year group (all those commissioned in a given fiscal year constitute a “year group”). In the context of other marks and remarks, a “Recommended for promotion” mark means that the officer may just be average, called a “pack player.”
NOTE: An officer “Not Recommended for Promotion” is an officer in deep trouble. In a combat zone, failure to recommend for promotion may be indicative of problems in conduct, not just performance.
Key: Would His Commander Want Him to Command?
Fourth, if the officer is an Unrestricted Line Officer, he or she is in line for operational command (of a ship, an aviation squadron, etc.). Thus, one the most important marks on a FITREP for a line officer is “desirability for command,” referred to in the shorthand of selection boards and detailers as “command.” Thus, for a seagoing officer, a “ding in command” is big trouble. Likewise with the skill of “seamanship and ship handling”: a ship-driver “dinged in ship handling” is in big trouble.
As a footnote, line officers must win qualification as a Officer of the Deck for formation steaming [“OOD(F)”] that officer who stands watch on the bridge and is responsible for ship movement (and, frankly, everything that happens on that ship) while “formation steaming” or steaming in company with other ships. Officers must first qualify as OOD while in port [OOD(P) and subsequently for independent steaming [OOD(I)]. The quicker the climb to OOD(F) the better.
Also, Unrestricted Line Officers aboard ships (now called “Surface Warfare Officers”) must strive to be recommended for Navy Destroyer School which prepares the junior officer for his pivotal tour as a Lieutenant or Lieutenant (j.g.) -- a department head tour aboard a destroyer. A recommendation in a FITREP for Destroyer School is meaningful, however, if and only if the officer has qualified as OOD(F). The CO must qualify the officer as OOD for in-formation steaming; otherwise a Destroyer School recommendation is empty.
Thus, for the junior officer aboard ship, the number one performance goal is: qualify as OOD(F) and get recommended for Destroyer School. The unwritten rule is, don’t leave your first ship without the OOD(F) qualification.
Language and Other Signals
Fifth, FITREP language tends to be positive for officers who perform at a reasonably satisfactory level. That way, the FITREP tends to be a motivational tool to keep the officer on the right performance track. Thus, when COs feel the need to convey a signal to selection boards and detailers about performance that is lackluster, they will use code words. “Potential” is one of the key negative code words. Genuinely excellent officers should be performing; if they merely demonstrate “potential,” even “great potential,” this is read as a clear signal from the Commanding Officer that they are not performing.
Another signal is “trend of performance.” Unless it’s a “first report,” all good officers should be marked as “improving,” never “consistent” and certainly not “declining.”
Still another signal, particularly for line officers, is the broad categories of content in the narrative. A line officer’s FITREP should be glowing in praise of his or her ship handling and leadership abilities. Selection boards want to know how this officer performs on the bridge, not in some significantly less important collateral duty (e.g., public affairs officer). A CO who emphasizes performance in collateral duties is signaling that there is something lacking on the bridge.
Sixth, there can be no gaps. There must be one continuous thread of fitness reports in an officer’s jacket.
Seventh, it’s the operational tours that count. As long as the officer passes the school and stays out trouble, FITREPs from school commands don’t matter much.
Eighth, selection boards and detailers will examine the way the Commanding Officer grades his or her officers. Some of their considerations:
o They are looking for “good break-outs,” reports that clearly identify top-performers (called “water-walkers”) and distinguish them from “pack-plus” officers (above average performers) or “pack” officers (average). When a CO writes a “gift” FITREP (ranks everyone as top performers), boards and detailers tend to discount such “easy graders” and will look to a subsequent report for a clearer performance picture from another CO.
o Glowing, end-of-tour FITREPs are often viewed as “swan song” FITREPs (the officer is usually ranked 1 of 1) and don’t matter nearly as much as in-tour FITREPs when the officer is ranked with his or her peers. (Of course, if an officer is smacked in an end-of-tour report, you can be assured that boards sit up and pay close attention.)
What Do the Kerry FITREPs Really Say?
Knowing the above, what do the FITREPs selectively released by the Kerry campaign say about John Kerry as a junior officer in the U.S. Navy?
Kerry’s FITREPs are awash in dings, and some of the reports border on the adverse, particularly his combat FITREPs. The FITREPs convey significant performance problems and suggest problems in conduct, so much so that it is surprising that the campaign chose to release them. This may suggest that the FITREPs held from public view are even more adverse.
In what would customarily be an opportunity for a glowing “swan song” FITREP, the Commanding Officer of USS Gridley (DLG-21) tacitly blasts Kerry on his departure for Swift Boat duty by ranking him significantly below the norm in desirability for virtually every Navy assignment possible -– command, staff, whatever. He is a ship handler who is dinged in ship handling. He is in line for command, but his CO doesn’t want him near the bridge. He is slammed in all performance areas –- most notably and significantly in initiative and reliability. The “nice” narrative emphasizes performance in collateral duties, but in the grades and marks, the CO is telling the selection board and detailer loud and clear that this officer is lazy, unreliable and not suited for command. 3 SEP 68 (W.E. HARPER).
Another “swan song” opportunity is lost when Kerry departs a brief tour of duty as an Aide. Kerry is dinged in staff desirability, management and military bearing by Rear Admiral Walter Schlech (2 MAR 70 Schlech) while Kerry served as Schlech’s Aide. The Admiral makes considerable mention in the narrative section about Kerry’s ambition to run for Congress, and no doubt the glowing words were meant as a parting gift to someone who might become a member of Congress. The narrative notwithstanding, any detailer or selection board would consider the FITREP a bad one. Had Kerry remained in the Navy, it would be difficult to “sell” him to a new Aide assignment when his last boss, an Admiral, had dinged him in precisely those attributes indispensable for Aides.
The real performance problems are evidenced in FITREPs for his operational tours.
Because it is a FITREP that only covers about a month, LCDR Grant Hibbard’s first FITREP on Kerry should simply be marked “not observed” all the way down the line -– no grades, marks or narrative. Significantly, LCDR Hibbard chooses otherwise. Hibbard detects a personal behavior problem – a conduct problem – and smacks him for it in the report. He also dings Kerry on initiative and cooperation, just like his last CO in Gridley. 17 DEC 68 (HIBBARD).
In his FITREP for his combat tour as Officer in Charge of a SWIFT Boat -– arguably the most important FITREP among those released by the Kerry campaign –- Kerry is not dinged but slammed in command, seamanship and ship handling and in all major leadership traits (28 JAN 69 ELLIOTT). To Kerry and perhaps to other junior officers, it is an okay FITREP. To detailers and selection boards, it is a negative fitness report that borders on the adverse. LCDR Elliott ranks him well below the norm in traits essential for command: force, industry, analytical ability, judgment and more.
The PCF squadron commander, LCDR Elliott has 15 officers in his command, and his report (28 JAN 69) offers an excellent breakout. Elliott ranks his officers in two groups, the top and the bottom, and Elliott ranks Kerry among the top group. Or does he? Just like Hibbard, Elliott “red flags” Kerry in conduct by downgrading him significantly in judgment and personal behavior. When viewed in the context of the total FITREP, it is very clear to a detailer or selection board that Kerry probably ranks 7 of 15. He’s a “pack player” at best, but this is a worrisome FITREP to detailers and selection boards, because the significant flaws Elliott finds are in two critical areas: leadership traits and personal conduct. Moreover, because personal conduct issues have been raised by past commanders, detailers and selection boards would certainly conclude that the officer has exhibited major flaws in leadership and conduct over a sustained period of time that limit both his promotability and his salability to positions of responsibility.
---------- The fitness reports for John Kerry released to date by the Kerry campaign are available here.
Last Updated Saturday, July 24 2004 @ 07:11 AM PDT
I am a CAPT, USNR, and have recently sat on several promotion boards and selections boards ...
The write-up is extremely accurate!! I need to dig into it myself and see what other gems I can come up with .. but just the clip that was posted from LTJG Kerry fitrep on the USS Gridley is interesting. PAO?? PAO?? Only untrustworthy junior officers are given the job of PAO. They can't be trusted with being given a real division officer job (Electrical, Asst. Weapons, IC, or many of the other billets that can be held by CAPABLE Ensigns or LTJGs.) A selection board would view a fitrep as a PAO as someone who can't handle more responsible jobs. (Now ...if it was a collateral duty on top of other more responsible jobs .... not a problem!!) A good fitrep would have stated "He is highly recommended for early promotion." or "PROMOTE NOW!!" ... or something similar. But a "He is recommended for promotion." is really a "promote him if you don't have someone else available with a pulse..." (does the phrase "damned with faint praise.." mean anything?),
Thanks for posting this ... now to get the word out.
But ultimately, the missing FITREPS and the missing documents to justify the various awards of Purple Hearts, Bronze Star and Silver Star should also be provided to allow everyone a chance to analyze the full story!
Mike
PING
PAO = Public Affairs Officer.
I don't want to disparage those officers who have the Restricted Line Designator of PAO .. there are special qualifications for the job, and they are usually outstanding at what they do. These guys are very good! (And you might have a LCDR or CDR assigned as PAO on an aircraft carrier ...with 1 or 2 junior officers and lots of enlisted staff working for the PAO.)
Nor do I want to disparage the junior guy who reports on-board a ship, is a line officer, and while getting qualified as OOD, and earning his SWO pin, is given the job to be a PAO ... but the PAO job is not where top junior officers who have gotten qualified are assigned.
(I just wanted to give a little clarification ... so I don't get flamed by someone who has had the job or collateral duty of PAO as part of an overall excellent career.)
Mike
"John Kerry's service in Vietnam lasted 4 months and 12 days, beginning in November 1968 when he reported to Cam Rahn Bay fora month of training. His abbreviated combat tour ended shortly after he requested a transfer out of Vietnam on March 17, 1969, citing Navy instruction 1300.39 permitting personnel with three Purple Hearts to request reassignment. So far as we are able to determine, Kerry was the only Swift sailor ever to leave Vietnam without completing the standard one-year tour of duty, other than those who were seriously wounded or killed.
It is clear that at least one of Kerry's Purple Heart awards was the result of his own negligence, not enemy fire, and that Kerry went to unusual lengths to obtain the award after being turned down by his own commanding officer.
John Kerry has long insisted that using the three-injury loophole to leave combat early was his own idea, but Kerry's fellow Swift officer Thomas Wright, who served on occasion as the OIC (Officer in Charge) of Kerry's boat group, contradicts that claim. Wright reports that he "had a lot of trouble getting Kerry to follow orders," and that those who worked with Kerry found him "oriented towards his personal, rather than unit goals and objectives." He therefore requested that Kerry be removed from his boat group.
After John Kerry qualified for his third Purple Heart, Thomas Wright and two fellow officers informed him of the obscure regulation, and told him to go home. Wright concluded, "We knew how the system worked and we didn’t want him in Coastal Division 11."
===
To me, that's pretty much it, in a nutshell, right there, from the link. Not to mention his traitorous behavior once he came back to the USA. That really boils my blood!
Sorry I missed seeing that; it's always fun though, ain't it?
Well that would torpedo him right there. Not gunnery officer, not sonar officer, not main propulsion assistant but public affairs??????
This is probably why JF'K's been hiding his boat, the Scaramouche from reporters.
Here's a link to the registration: Scaramouche
"The timing of this leak is suspicious to me."
What did Bush know and when did he know it? How is Halliburton involved? And what role did Darksheare play?--since we know he was at fault, we just don't know how. . .
Thanks for the "useful artwork"
I can neither confirm nor deny the allegations of ninjahood into file cabinets.
He just wants a Purple Heart, not get killed. Splinters qualify if you whine enough.
Ninja: the invisible office assistants. . .
He Purple Hearts weren’t even for splinters!
"Don't laugh; check out the Communist Part of the USA website (cpusa.org) and you will find they fully support Kerry..."
Do you remember (or did you see) the moveon.org hard link on the cpusa.org website last year? It was removed back in November (or somewhere about that time)...getting too much attention on conservative websites like FR, I guess!
Tay-ray-zuh told the story in an interview of how she was awakened in the middle of the night by screaming and shouting the first time she stayed over night at his apartment. His daughter siad not to worry, that it was just dad. Apparently he did that regularly.
I think we should demand full physical and mental medical records from his service days, as well as afterwards.
He never shows up for work, he's a habitual lyer, he was a womanizer and may still be. I think he's a nut case -- not only not fit to command, but not fit to have his finger on the button.
Bump for some interesting info.
Re: Marfan Syndrome -- I think you're on to something.
LOL!
An office presentation going on, and a flurry of activity says there's others in the room but no-one sees them..
One thing that was mentioned was the trend of "dings" from command to command. What wasn't mentioned is that the authors of those FITREPS don't have access to the previous FITREPS, but subsequent commanders independently observed the same flaws.
In contrast to most office presentations where there's visible people but no visible activity :)
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