Posted on 07/23/2004 9:17:10 AM PDT by zook
Edited on 07/23/2004 9:27:01 AM PDT by Admin Moderator. [history]
flasher on
"On December 4, 1999, the National Security Council?s counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, sent Mr. Berger a memo suggesting a strike in the last week of 1999 against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Reports the commission: ?In the margin next to Clarke?s suggestion to attack Al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote, "no." ?
The NY Sun story is on Drudge, top right article. Same thing.
< Gomer Pyle voice > Well, surpriiiiiise, surpriiiiise, surpriiiiiise... < /Gomer Pyle voice >
Ouch. I bet that leaves a (skid)mark in his Top Secret Document Transportation Undies...
LOL. (Being at work makes it more of a "snort, snort, snort.")
Thanks. The article takes a while to load...
Some people are blaming the distraction called impeachment on the reason why Clinton didn't/couldn't get OBL. That is mentioned in the article.
This is the kind of thing Democrats arrange to be reported on Friday.
Let us not forget who was President during that time. If "no" was written on Berger's papers it was because Clinton told him "no"
Dear God, please don't let the Demopuke liberal anti-war head-in-the-clouds unable-to-see-reality crowd get back in the White House. AMEN!
This article seems to quote the report on all the instances mentioned. Therefore not the smoking gun we hoped for.
The Boldness of the President
Reading the report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, we couldnt help thinking of Justice Scalias great dissent in Morrison v. Olson. Its the case in which the Supreme Court upheld the idea of an independent prosecutor. Justice Scalia warned of the danger that unleashing an uncontrollable prosecutor against a president could shake his courage. Perhaps the boldness of the President himself will not be affected though I am not so sure, he warned.
Well, look now to what the 9/11 report has to say about the man to whom President Clinton, under attack by an independent counsel,delegated so much in respect of national security, Samuel Sandy Berger. The report cites a 1998 meeting between Mr. Berger and the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, at which Mr. Tenet presented a plan to capture Osama bin Laden.
In his meeting with Tenet, Berger focused most, however, on the question of what was to be done with Bin Ladin if he were actually captured. He worried that the hard evidence against Bin Ladin was still skimpy and that there was a danger of snatching him and bringing him to the United States only to see him acquitted, the report says, citing a May 1, 1998, Central Intelligence Agency memo summarizing the weekly meeting between Messrs. Berger and Tenet.
In June of 1999, another plan for action against Mr. bin Laden was on the table. The potential target was a Qaeda terrorist camp in Afghanistan known as Tarnak Farms. The commission report released yesterday cites Mr. Bergers handwritten notes on the meeting paper referring to the presence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 60-65 casualties.According to the Berger notes, if he responds, were blamed.
On December 4, 1999, the National Security Councils counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, sent Mr. Berger a memo suggesting a strike in the last week of 1999 against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Reports the commission: In the margin next to Clarkes suggestion to attack Al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote, no.
In August of 2000, Mr. Berger was presented with another possible plan for attacking Mr. bin Laden.This time, the plan would be based on aerial surveillance from a Predator drone. Reports the commission: In the memos margin,Berger wrote that before considering action, I will want more than verified location: we will need, at least, data on pattern of movements to provide some assurance he will remain in place.
In other words, according to the commission report, Mr. Berger was presented with plans to take action against the threat of Al Qaeda four separate times Spring 1998, June 1999, December 1999, and August 2000. Each time, Mr. Berger was an obstacle to action. Had he been a little less reluctant to act, a little more open to taking pre-emptive action, maybe the 2,973 killed in the September 11, 2001, attacks would be alive today.
From the article:
On December 4, 1999, the National Security Councils counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, sent Mr. Berger a memo suggesting a strike in the last week of 1999 against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Reports the commission: In the margin next to Clarkes suggestion to attack Al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote, no.
It's a bad day for Democrats and the timing couldn't be worse for their convention.
If it wasn't for the threat of impeachment Clinton wouldn't have paid attention to Bin Ladin at all - they weren't called Monica Missiles for nothing (because nothing is what happened every other time except that one instance)
it's all berger's fault
In June of 1999, another plan for action against Mr. bin Laden was on the table. The potential target was a Qaeda terrorist camp in Afghanistan known as Tarnak Farms. The commission report released yesterday cites Mr. Bergers handwritten notes on the meeting paper referring to the presence of 7 to 11 families in the Tarnak Farms facility, which could mean 60-65 casualties.According to the Berger notes, if he responds, were blamed.
On December 4, 1999, the National Security Councils counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, sent Mr. Berger a memo suggesting a strike in the last week of 1999 against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Reports the commission: In the margin next to Clarkes suggestion to attack Al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote, no.
In August of 2000, Mr. Berger was presented with another possible plan for attacking Mr. bin Laden.This time, the plan would be based on aerial surveillance from a Predator drone. Reports the commission: In the memos margin,Berger wrote that before considering action, I will want more than verified location: we will need, at least, data on pattern of movements to provide some assurance he will remain in place.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Nice goin', Sandy.
Huh? Had you ever heard before that Berger nixed a plan to attack OBL?
On December 4, 1999, the National Security Councils counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, sent Mr. Berger a memo suggesting a strike in the last week of 1999 against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Reports the commission: In the margin next to Clarkes suggestion to attack Al Qaeda facilities in the week before January 1, 2000, Berger wrote, no.
In August of 2000, Mr. Berger was presented with another possible plan for attacking Mr. bin Laden.This time, the plan would be based on aerial surveillance from a Predator drone. Reports the commission: In the memos margin,Berger wrote that before considering action, I will want more than verified location: we will need, at least, data on pattern of movements to provide some assurance he will remain in place.
In other words, according to the commission report, Mr. Berger was presented with plans to take action against the threat of Al Qaeda four separate times Spring 1998, June 1999, December 1999, and August 2000. Each time, Mr. Berger was an obstacle to action. Had he been a little less reluctant to act, a little more open to taking pre-emptive action, maybe the 2,973 killed in the September 11, 2001, attacks would be alive today.
But according to the article, it's already there.
what was Rush saying yesterday? I didnt hear his show...
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.