Missile kills Pakistan tribal head

CNN ^ | Friday, June 18 | Syed Mohsin Naqvi

[AdmSmith]

ISLAMABAD (CNN) -- A tribal leader accused of harboring Al Qaeda militants in Pakistan's western border region was killed Thursday night in a targeted missile strike, according to Pakistan intelligence sources. The Associated Press quoted an army spokesman Friday as identifying the tribal leader as Nek Mohammed, a former Taliban fighter.

He was killed late Thursday at the home of another tribal chief, the spokesman said.

"We were tracking him down and he was killed last night by our hand," Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan told The Associated Press.

[AdmSmith]

kidnapped a tribesman after killing his driver

What is the difference between a "tribesman" and "his driver"?

How many trucks does it take to move a battery of towed artillery, with personnel and support?

I anticipate thet they used a simple Type 59-1 Towed Artillery



Type 59-1 is a Chinese copy of Russian M-46. However it has some modifications and advancements. One of the major differences is its more maneuverable that Russian M-46. It has a long, thin tube with a cylindrical, perforated pepperpot-type muzzle brake and a hydropneumatic recuperator and a recoil cylinder located above and below the tube, respectively. It can be towed by a 6x6 truck when in travel position, the tube is withdrawn from battery to reduce the overall length of the weapon, and the recuperator above the tube may then be hidden from sight by the rearward-angled, winged shield. Type-59-1 has night direct fire sights IR and/or passive in nature. The gun is mounted on a two-wheeled split trail carriage with large sponge-filled rubber tires on each of the single wheels.

The T-59-1 is an accurate and very effective indirect fire weapon with high muzzle velocity and extended range. Due to its ability to fire multiple types of ammunition it is also considered as an effective antitank weapon with impressive armor penetration capability. However its tactical role usually is counter-battery. It has a crew of 8 which is provided limited frontal protection by frontal V-shaped shield which is approximately 7 mm thick.

It also fires enhanced range projectiles like the MP-130 RAP that weighs 33.4kg with a maximum range of 34,360m and an ERFB-HE that weights 32.7kg with a maximum range of 30km. ERFB-BB that weighs 33.4 kg with maximum range of 38 km. ERFB boat tail that weighs 32.7 kg with maximum range of 30 km. ERFB-A that weighs 32.41 kg with maximum range of 32 km. ERFB-B that weighs 32.7 kg with maximum range of 30.7 km. Illuminating projectile that weighs 29.1 kg with maximum range of 25 km.Smoke projectile that weighs 32.47 kg with maximum range of 27 km.

More data http://www.pakistanidefence.com/PakArmy/Type59TowedArtillery.htm

[nuconvert]

"What is the difference between a "tribesman" and "his driver"? "

LOL

One rung on the ladder?

[nuconvert]

"What is the difference between a "tribesman" and "his driver"? "

One of them can say he has a driver?

[jeffers]

New map, not indexed or referenced elsewhere, so bookmark or download, 15 mile radius circles centered on known Pak firebases (red) and potentially useful sites for firebases (blue):

http://users.in-motion.net/~jefft/tech/Mapping/afghanistan/Arty.jpg

[AdmSmith]

Thanks Jeffers, nice map.

Here is another in the slammer earlier today:
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/arabtimes/breakingnews/view.asp?msgID=6953

Pakistan nabs Musharraf assassination plot suspect
ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Pakistani security forces have arrested a man suspected of involvement in a plot last year to kill President Pervez Musharraf and of links to the al Qaeda network, security officials said on Sunday.

Omar Rehman was detained with two relatives early on Sunday at his village home in North West Frontier province, about 150 km (95 miles) north of Islamabad, an intelligence official told Reuters.

Weapons including automatic assault rifles were seized from them, the official said. No other details were immediately available.

The arrests in the valley of Swat were the latest in a security swoop that has netted more than 70 Islamic militants linked to al Qaeda since the detention of a computer expert in July.

Musharraf, a key ally of the United States escaped two attempts on his life in December in which at least 15 people were killed.

Pakistani authorities have captured scores of people since the attacks including members of the armed forces but have yet to formally charge them.

The security forces have launched a massive crackdown against al Qaeda-linked militants since last month's arrest of computer expert Mohammad Naeem Noor Khan who provided crucial information about al Qaeda's operatives in Pakistan and its plans to launch attacks in Britain and the United States.

[AdmSmith]

Omar Rehman is a popular name among the terrorists, another OR was arrested in Hertfordshire earlier in August(Omar Rehman, 21, the son of a wholesale fishmonger) http://slate.msn.com/id/2104803/

[jeffers]

Update from Yahoo News indicates three Paks killed in the rocket attacks in Wana and Razmak.

My sources note that a well trained artillery battery, on arrival at an intended location, could go from road march to able to deliver accurate artillery fire in 30 minutes to one hour.

Construction a basic perimeter with three strands of wire, corner bunker/firing positions and perhaps one protective bunker would take 24 to 48 hours, possibly longer in hardpan soil or rock.

A fully established firebase with protected tube positions, ammunition storage, quarters, mess facilities and communication trenches could take a week to ten days.

Using 8 man crews, a six tube battery would require about 4 trucks per gun, for a total of 24. With multiple batteries requiring at least 50 trucks, the civilian reports of "dozens of trucks" probably refer to a single battery.

Note that with operational status of this firebase, interlocking and mutually supporting indirect fire coverage of the entire Shawal Valley is essentially complete.

[jeffers]

http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/30/top3.htm

Two soldiers killed in rocket attack

By Dilawar Khan Wazir and Pazir Gul


WANA/MIRAMSHAH Aug 29: Militants attacked security forces in the South and North Waziristan tribal region on Sunday, killing two soldiers and wounding 12
others, sources said.

Officials said that a soldier of the Northern Areas Regiment was killed and 10 were wounded when a paramilitary camp came under missile attack in South Waziristan
on Saturday night. The condition of the two wounded soldiers was stated to be critical. They were shifted to the Brigade Headquarters in the Zari Noor colony in
Wana.

Residents said the militants fired two short-range missiles on the South Waziristan Scouts Camp in Wana at about 2.20am. Projectiles hit a barrack that housed the
Northern Areas Regiment.

The security forces retaliated and fired about 50 artillery shells in different directions. Some residential areas in the adjoining localities are reported to have been hit.
The exchange of fire continued for more than one hour.

In North Waziristan, a sepoy of Shawal Rifles was killed and two others received injuries when militants blew up a paramilitary vehicle in the Razmak sub-division on
Sunday.

Unofficial reports said that the incident took place when a convoy of Shawal Rifles was heading from Shawal to Razmak, about 70 kilometres south of Miramshah,
the regional headquarters.

They said that the paramilitary convoy was blown up with a remote control device near Shinbaba in which three soldiers received injuries. The wounded were
identified as sepoys Zahidullah, Saeedullah and Nauroze. They were taken to hospital, where Saeedullah died.

Sources said the security forces also defused two landmines near the place of occurrence.Meanwhile, army troops have started movement towards Razmak
sub-division on Sunday which led to speculations about a likely operation in the areas near the Afghan border.

Residents said that more than 45 military vehicles were seen moving towards Razmak. The troops had killed four militants and captured two others during a raid on a
compound in Bangi Dar in the North Waziristan near the Afghan border on Aug 23. Three soldiers and a junior officer were also wounded in the operation."



Observations:

1. This report puts Zari Noor in or around Wana as a suburb or colony.

2. Sepoy = driver?

3. Several variants of "Shawal" as a placename, Shawal alone being more than a degree for Razmak, one in Afghanistan, one up towards Peshawar, Shawal Algad (my best guess), which is on the NE Quad map at the northern entrance to the Chaprai valley of death, or possibly Shawal Tangi at the other end of the valley of death. Latter doubtful as it implies a Pak presence more than 25km south of where expected.

4. If Shawal Algad is correct, then this is different engagement than that reported from Sar Narai (Sur Narai) where a tribesman's driver was killed and the tribesman kidnapped.

5. No joy on "Shinbaba" or variant, though the context makes it possibly near Bandi Dar. If so then the returning column would indicate that that operation has concluded.

6. It is not clear from this article that the column attacked with one vehicle exploded is the same as the column reported by civilians moving towards Razmak with 45 vehicles. Bottom line, the driver killed at Sar Narai, the IED between Shawal and Razmak, and the column moving on Razmak could be three seperate events, all one and the same, or some combination between these two extremes. My best guess says that the driver and tribesman incident is seperate from the column attacl, and that the two columns are different, as Shawal and Bangi Dar are in different directions from Razmak.

[AdmSmith]

Sepoy is from Urdu (sipahi) or from Persian Sipa = Army. Today it means soldier at the lowest rank, i.e. private, but 100 years ago it was a native of India employed as a soldier in the service of Britain.(Time to reread Kipling)

[AdmSmith]

http://www.geo.tv/main_files/pakistan.aspx?id=38053

5 injured in rocket attacks on civil population of Bannu

BANNU: Five rockets were fired on a residential area near Bannu cantonment resulting in five including three women wounded while in South Waziristan also two rockets were fired on Zalai Scouts Camp causing no damage.

According to Bannu police and eyewitnesses, unidentified miscreants fired five rockets near Bannu Cantonment, out of which, two fell in the Cantonment are but caused no damage while the other three hit the houses of Shah Hussain and Faridullah Khan of Mohalla Nawab near Cantonment wounding five including three women. The injured were admitted into Bannu Civil Hospital immediately.

On the other hand, Zalai Scouts Camp near Azam Warsak area of South Waziristan was also attacked firing two rockets, which fell outside the boundary of the Camp causing no damage. On retaliation from the Scouts, the miscreants fled away.

[AdmSmith]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FH25Df05.html

The reinvented, more youthful al-Qaeda
By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE - The arrest of several al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and Britain in recent months is reported to have provided US intelligence agencies with considerable information about al-Qaeda's structure and operations. The information, which reveals the immense resilience of al-Qaeda and its remarkable ability to reconstitute itself, negates yet again claims made by the administration of US President George W Bush that al-Qaeda has dispersed and is now on the run.

While it is true that al-Qaeda has lost several of its operational commanders, such as the masterminds of the September 11, 2001, attacks - Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah and Walid Muhammad Salih bin Attash, who have been captured - al-Qaeda has been able not just to survive this loss, but to thrive in difficult circumstances. This is because it has quickly adapted itself to the changed situation.

The recent arrests have revealed that there has been an infusion of young blood into al-Qaeda. At the same time, the younger operatives have strong links with the old guard. They are linked by blood and friendship to senior al-Qaeda members. For instance, Abu Musab Baluchi, who was captured in June, is a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and a cousin of Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Juliette Kayyem, head of the national-security program at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, has described the operatives arrested recently as "descendants of the old guard".

The most obvious feature of al-Qaeda's new operatives is that they belong to a younger generation. The original al-Qaeda network consisted of people in their 40s or 50s. That generation shares the experience of having fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This and personal acquaintance appear to have bonded them together. The new recruits - who seem to be rising fast in the hierarchy to occupy posts left empty by leaders arrested or killed - are in their 20s or 30s. Unlike their seniors, they do not seem to have acquired their fighting skills in one of the original al-Qaeda camps or cut their teeth on a common battleground. Their skills have been acquired on rather diverse battlegrounds - Chechnya, the Balkans, and now Iraq.

Writing in the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor, Sebastian Gorka, adjunct professor of terrorism studies at the George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany, points out that the younger operatives in al-Qaeda are "first and foremost an intellectual network". He argues that they "have shared experience at certain universities dotted across the Arab and Muslim world, universities that are home to the more virulent strains of the fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. Most often, these are establishments located in Pakistan."

A comparison of today's al-Qaeda with that which existed before September 11, 2001, shows that the group has transformed remarkably. In the past, shared experience was the most important glue that bonded the fighters. Today it is ideological - a fierce anti-American agenda draws them together. The network relies less on the person-to-person contact that was so evident in the original group.

The al-Qaeda operatives who carried out the September 11 attacks were largely Arab and from educated backgrounds. This was not so in the case of the Pakistani al-Qaeda operatives from that period. Even a couple of years ago, Pakistani al-Qaeda operatives were from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds, mainly educated in madrassas (religious schools). This has now changed. Pakistan's al-Qaeda operatives who were arrested recently are from middle-class backgrounds. They are highly qualified professionals and university graduates, what Zahid Hussain describes in an article in the Pakistani newsmagazine Newsline as "children of opportunity rather than deprivation".

Although terrorism experts and reports in the media have picked up on the "new face of al-Qaeda", counter-terrorism officials seem to be stuck in a time warp. Their perception of al-Qaeda and their response to it seem to be ignoring the immense metamorphosis that has taken place in al-Qaeda. For one, counter-terrorism strategists are still responding to al-Qaeda as a group or a network, when it has morphed into an ideological movement. Arrests weaken terrorist outfits, but not an ideology. Paul Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, points out: "Since September 11, al-Qaeda the group has been morphing into al-Qaeda the ideological movement, and although it is a relatively simple matter to arrest people, it is altogether another thing to arrest the spread of ideas."

Western counter-terrorism officials have also misinterpreted the growing autonomy of operatives in planning attacks as evidence of Osama bin Laden's diminishing control over al-Qaeda. While it is true that there is a visible decentralization in the planning of al-Qaeda operations, this must be seen as part of al-Qaeda's ability to adapt and thrive in difficult conditions.

Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, who heads the Rand Corp's Washington office, has drawn parallels between Osama and the chief executive officer of a multinational corporation. "He has implemented for al-Qaeda the same type of effective organizational framework adopted by many corporate executives throughout much of the industrialized world over the past decade. Just as large, multinational business conglomerates moved during the 1990s to flatter, networked structures, bin Laden did the same with al-Qaeda."

Drawing attention to bin Laden's "flexible strategy", Hoffman points out that he uses "both top-down and bottom-up approaches. On the one hand, he has functioned like the president or CEO of a large multinational corporation by defining specific goals, issuing orders, and ensuring their implementation. This function applies mostly to the al-Qaeda 'spectaculars' - those high-visibility, usually high-value, and high-casualty operations like [September 11], the attack on the USS Cole [Yemen, 2000], and the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.

"On the other hand, he has operated as a venture capitalist by soliciting ideas from below, by encouraging creative approaches and out-of-the-box thinking, and by providing funding to those proposals he finds promising."

Al-Qaeda's decentralization then is an asset in its effort to survive the "war against terrorism". Another al-Qaeda quality that counter-terrorism experts have failed to interpret correctly is its patience. To bolster their claim that al-Qaeda is severely weakened, Western counter-terrorism officials point to al-Qaeda's "failure to launch another September 11 attack" despite its periodic warnings of "another September 11". However, this is not so much because of al-Qaeda's inability to strike, but that it is biding its time.

Commenting on al-Qaeda's "patience", Bergen says it took al-Qaeda five years to plan the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and at least three years to plan the September 11 attacks. He argues that just because al-Qaeda has not struck in the United States since 2001, it does not mean that they are not plotting to do so. Drawing attention to the attack in Madrid, he said: "Al-Qaeda struck in Madrid at the time of its choosing - at a moment when it could cause the largest number of fatalities and create the greatest psychological effect."

The findings of the 9-11 Commission have prompted counter-terrorism experts to put forward recommendations - many of them touted as new and innovative responses - to tackle al-Qaeda. Several of the recommendations are in fact responses to the original al-Qaeda. It has morphed considerably since then. Unless the Bush administration admits, at least to itself, that its strategy has only contributed to the metastasis of al-Qaeda, the threat posed by the latter cannot be tackled.

Sudha Ramachandran is an independent researcher/writer based in Bangalore, India. She has a doctoral degree from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Her areas of interest include terrorism, conflict zones and gender and conflict. Formerly an assistant editor at the Deccan Herald (Bangalore), she now teaches at the Asian College of Journalism, Chennai.

[jeffers]

I'll buy the author's main premise, that eventually we have to shift the emphasis from attacking the terrorists to attacking their ideology, but I'm not at all willing to minimize the effects of our efforts to date.

If I get to choose my enemies, I'll go up against a 20 or 30 year old every single time before I'll pick an older, wiser person.

The differences are legion, finesse, patience, timing, subtlety, ruthlessness, judgement, delegation, logistics, analysis, leverage, all these qualities and more are enhamced with every additional day of life, experience, and learning from one's mistakes.

If Al Qaeda is getting younger, by our efforts, they in turn become less formidible, and open more vulnerabilities to our exploitation.

[AdmSmith]

It seems that the strategy is: Blame it on the foreigners, then take care of the terrorists. The terrorists are paid Rs 10,000 or about 167 USD/month. The cost of a camp is stated as around Rs0.4 million or about 6,700 USD per month. This can easily be collected at the mosques as charity. Expect a military build up in Balochistan after the September Surprise.

http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/31/top5.htm

'RAW camps in Balochistan' By Our Reporter

KARACHI, Aug 30: Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Mohammad Yusuf on Monday said that involvement of external elements, including the Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), in the current acts of terrorism in Balochistan could not be ruled out.

Speaking at the Meet the Press programme of Karachi Press Club, he defended the construction of Gwadar port and military cantonments, and blamed 'anti-Pakistan forces' for fomenting trouble in the strategically located Balochistan.

"Though dialogue for normalization is continuing, as long as Kashmir is not settled they will continue to create difficulties for Pakistan," said Jam Yusuf in an apparent reference to the Indian RAW.

In support of his contention with regard to foreign involvement, Jam Yusuf referred to various training camps in which, according to him, terrorists were being harboured and paid huge sums to create trouble.

He said that none of the Baloch wadera had the capacity to finance such an operation. He said that some of those involved in terrorist activities had fled to the Gulf. "Conspiracies are hatched against Balochistan by anti-Pakistan forces who do not want Gwadar port to become economic hub in the region," he said.

The Balochistan chief minister said that RAW was running terrorist camps in Iran and Afghanistan. "It has now set up 30 to 40 such camps in Balochistan, each with training facility for 30 people who are paid Rs10,000 monthly.

"The monthly expenses of each such camp are over Rs0.4 million. The money is being supplied from abroad," he alleged. He promised that names of the held terrorists would be disclosed once the ongoing investigations concluded.

He told a questioner that "Al Qaeda is not involved in these activities." He also accused terrorists, trained in Punjab, of causing sectarian violence in his province. He denied that any operation had been launched by the army in Balochistan but conceded that an 'operation cleanup' had been launched by the local administration with the assistance of Frontier Constabulary, Levies and the Navy.

"Several terrorists have been arrested in this operation and arms, ammunition, satellite phones, wireless sets, maps and anti-Pakistan literature recovered from their camps. Some terrorists have also given up voluntarily," he said.

Jam Yousuf said that nobody should object to establishment of army cantonments in Balochistan. Wherever felt necessary, cantonments would be established in the province, he said.

He pointed out that cantonments had existed at many places in the province before but no hue and cry was made. Replying to a question, he said China was a time-tested friend of Pakistan and didn't raise any unnecessary hue and cry over the killing of its engineers working on the Gwadar port project in last May.

"If US engineers were killed in Gwadar, it would have declared Pakistan a terrorist country," he added. He said that Gwadar port would become the hub of economic activity in the future and help the province in increasing revenue. He hoped that it would one day demand share in the NFC on revenue generation basis, as was being done by Sindh.

He advised the opponents of the mega project to "swallow the bitter pill" because some sacrifice had to be made for future development. He stressed that nobody would deprive the Balochis of their land but at the same time pointed out that people themselves had sold their land to investors.

Replying to a question, Jam Mohammad Yusuf maintained that he considered all Baloch politicians, including Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti as 'loyal Pakistanis' and urged them to play their role in the development of their province.

"Every Baloch is a nationalist and they love their land as much as any politician. Balochistan is not a personal property of anybody. The past governments did nothing for its development except making hollow promises.

He said that a dialogue with the opponents of mega projects had started with Baloch leaders and hoped that soon some positive outcome would emerge. "People of Balochistan want progress and development in their province but people from outside don't.

The president has given Rs5 billion for Gwadar Development Authority and assured that locals would be provided all possible opportunities. The Balochistan chief minister announced a donation of half a million rupees for the KPC.

[Boot Hill]

• “It seems that the strategy is: Blame it on the foreigners, then take care of the terrorists.”

I read your article a little differently...

• “The Balochistan chief minister said that RAW [the Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing] was running terrorist camps in Iran and Afghanistan. [And that RAW] has now set up 30 to 40 such camps in Balochistan...”

The chief minister also went on to suggest that this might explain the current spate of terrorist acts in Balochistan. However, this is just too preposterous an accusation to be considered anything more than a lame attempt to divert attention away from Balochistan's own dirty little secret. But why would the chief minister advance such patent nonsense? Here is what I believe the reason is.

Operations in FATA are making outstanding progress. Mushi has amazingly avoided a tribal uprising in the region, while at the same time cracking down extremely hard on the Taliban and al-Qa'ida forces hiding there (historically, this is a first, there is simply no precedent for anyone ever successfully invading and pacifying the Tribal Areas).

Operations there are now building to a crescendo and the chief minister of Balochistan sees the writing on the wall and knows that sooner or later Mushi will be able to free-up a good portion of his troops, who will then be sent to clean up the next Pakistani viper's nest. And guess who will find his butt in a sling when that happens?

When? My WAG says that by this time next year the ex-chief minister will be running a Quicki-Mart in Karachi. Anybody else like to offer a guess?

--Boot Hill

[Coop]

If Al Qaeda is getting younger, by our efforts, they in turn become less formidible, and open more vulnerabilities to our exploitation.

Amen to that!!

[Coop]

My WAG says that by this time next year the ex-chief minister will be running a Quicki-Mart in Karachi. Anybody else like to offer a guess?

I think he'll be one of those squeegee guys on a Karachi street corner.

[AdmSmith]

If you have an internal problem the recipe is to stir up external problems in order to divert the attention. It is safe to blame India for the terrorist problem as many buys the description and thus you play down that the ideology behind AQ, i.e. the type of Sunni Islam preached in this region is the reason.

This means that the hunt for AQ in Baluchistan in the Evening press will be a hunt for old spies, and terrorists under the pay from the archenemy, India. This will reduce the probability for any uprising.

I anticipate that both ISI and RAW during the years have been involved in this (i.e. supporting violent guys), but that they today have closed almost all of this type of operations.

Baluchistan is different from FATA and needs to be handled differently: More intelligence and police and less military.

[jeffers]

I agree with the consensus arrived at here, with the possible exception of "more cops, fewer shooters" and then, only in the outlying regions. That's a big empty place, not much in any of the three countries except mud walled villages, and the military is about the only entity that can operate under those conditions with organic support.

Already looking into a new set of maps, but it is a large area that spans two 90 meter per pixel SRTM tiles, and about 12 to 18 30 m per pixel 1 degree tiles. Probably looking at a 90m per pixel overview, with one degree tiles generated as events dictate.

Shooting for delivery date early in 2005, but will probably wait to see how the election turns out. Something tells me that both the carrot and the stick the US is plying will disappear if there's a break in leadership continuity here in the US.

[Boot Hill]

“Baluchistan is different from FATA and needs to be handled differently: More intelligence and police and less military.”

If you're right, that the mix will be different (and I suspect you are), then that presents a couple of interesting problems of operational control for Mushi to work out.

First, who controls the police? Are they controlled at the national level (Mushi) or by local officials? And second, if Mushi intends to rely upon his intelligence services (ISI) to spearhead this operation, there are still some serious questions lingering about just where their true loyalties lie.

Maybe Mushi has very quietly cleaned house there, after some of the more egregious examples of ISI's "split loyalties" were made public a couple of years back by U.S. intelligence. But if Mushi hasn't cleaned that house, I think you can count the ISI as a back-bencher in any Baluchistan operation.

--Boot Hill

[Stag]

Go Mushie....

(I am now ululating...blahblahblahblahblah)