I agree with the consensus arrived at here, with the possible exception of "more cops, fewer shooters" and then, only in the outlying regions. That's a big empty place, not much in any of the three countries except mud walled villages, and the military is about the only entity that can operate under those conditions with organic support.
Already looking into a new set of maps, but it is a large area that spans two 90 meter per pixel SRTM tiles, and about 12 to 18 30 m per pixel 1 degree tiles. Probably looking at a 90m per pixel overview, with one degree tiles generated as events dictate.
Shooting for delivery date early in 2005, but will probably wait to see how the election turns out. Something tells me that both the carrot and the stick the US is plying will disappear if there's a break in leadership continuity here in the US.
If you're right, that the mix will be different (and I suspect you are), then that presents a couple of interesting problems of operational control for Mushi to work out.
First, who controls the police? Are they controlled at the national level (Mushi) or by local officials? And second, if Mushi intends to rely upon his intelligence services (ISI) to spearhead this operation, there are still some serious questions lingering about just where their true loyalties lie.
Maybe Mushi has very quietly cleaned house there, after some of the more egregious examples of ISI's "split loyalties" were made public a couple of years back by U.S. intelligence. But if Mushi hasn't cleaned that house, I think you can count the ISI as a back-bencher in any Baluchistan operation.
--Boot Hill