Posted on 05/23/2004 3:53:42 PM PDT by Matchett-PI
Edited on 05/23/2004 5:21:43 PM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
Host Eric Shawn
Guest: John Loftus (the author of four histories about Intelligence operations, a consultant for CBS 60 MINUTES and ABC - PRIME TIME, among others. He was a prosecutor with the U.S. Justice Department Nazi hunting unit with unprecedented access to top secret C.I.A. and NATO archives)
Under discussion is this story in the NY Times today:
Excerpt transcribed by me from my videotape:
Eric Shawn: "John Loftus told us about it months ago right here on Inside Scoop. John, that's why we call it, 'Inside Scoop' - you beat the New York Times again. Congratulations!"
John Loftus: "Thank you very much."
Eric: "How do you do it?"
John: "Well, ummm, this little country lawyer used to have a Q clearance for nuclear weapons secrets and I was told about this amazing wiretap where British Intelligence overheard a call from North Korea to Libya saying, 'My god, if the Americans ever go into Iraq, they're going to find out about our nuclear program. And who's going to pay all the Iraqi nuclear scientists in Libya if Saddam falls?''"
Eric: "You're saying before the war there were Iraqi nuclear scientists working on a potential bomb in Libya before we launched this [war in Iraq]?
John: "Yeah. This was a treaty signed by a man called Ali Sobree (sp?). He was the foreign minister of Iraq. And he went to Khadafy and they worked out a whole protocol. Khadafy would donate a hollowed out mountain in Libya; Iraq would provide the nuclear scientists, and North Korea would provide the uranium. And they would literally make a factory for nuclear weapons. And once that factory was complete, we had lost the war on terrorism. People don't realize that even a small nuclear weapon can kill 300,000 people. That's one hundred 9-11's. So that's why we put [garbled] bin Laden on the back burner -- we were really focusing on getting the Ali Sobree protocol - we had to smash that ring."
Eric: "Now when you talk about Saddam and the war on terror - we've had conversations - your indication is that President Bush understood this after 9-11 and he was mostly concerned about a nuclear bomb from Libya or Iraq or Iran."
John: "Eric, that's EXACTLY it. Within a month after 9-11, British wiretaps showed that we had a MAJOR risk. Nuclear weapons in terrorist's hands would be devastating. And that's why the president said, 'OK, we're gonna shift the emphasis from Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden. We're gonna go into Iraq - that's where the evidence is - we have to capture Ali Sobree."
Eric: "Yeah, but critics say, 'Oh the war is about oil' - ' The war is about democracy'. You say there's someting else going on. ..."
John: "This is absolutely necessary, Eric. Had we not smashed the program, within the next 3 or 4 months - on the schedule they were on - Libya would have finished the nuclear factory - we couldn't touch it. We were designing nuclear bunker-busters to try and get into the mountain [but] even that wouldn't work. Once the Islamic bomb was finished - America - the rest of the western nations were finished. We couldn't stand city after city evaporating by nuclear weapons."
Eric: "In other words, going into Iraq, in your view, having Khadafy now basically give up and surrender everything to us, getting the connection to North Korea and Iran - was a major strategy in the war on terror?"
John: "It was THE major strategy. Khadafy has now confirmed he is going to hand the Ali Sobree protocols over to the United States. Sobree, himself, is now in US custody and he is already scheduled as one of the first three witnesses in the trial of Saddam Hussein.
Sadam's biggest crime? While he was starving his own people to death, his money and his scientists were hiding in Libya to make a factory for nuclear weapons to attack any major power in the world." ...
(Excerpt) Read more at foxnews.com ...
I think you're right, but GWB is famous for the 'rope-a-dope'.
I'd love to see him put the whole Libyan nuke thing out there, let it hit like a train, and then watch the alphabet networks explain why they chose not to cover it.
I'd love for there to be pictures of the Libyan facility, (We have the guy that wrote the protocol in CUSTODY!!), spectral analysis of the bombsite in North Korea, Iraqi scientists recruited to the west from NK (ala Operation Paperclip) testifying on live TV.
Just a nice, tight, case with evidence on prime time, and a note from GWB saying, "Sorry we had to keep this from you until now, but we had work to do in Libya, we had to get this Iraqi fella into custody, and we had to have enough hard evidence to make this fact rather than conjecture. Hope you understand that we have time to get OBL, but we had to put a stop to a terrorist nuclear bomb factory today. Enjoy the rest of Fear Factor, or whatever you were watching. See you at the polls."
I'd love to see Fox carry this exclusively, and let CNN interrupt what's her face in the middle.
Good points! After being burned by putting a few things out too early, I'm sure they want to dot all the "i"s & cross all the "t"s. If/when that's done, hopefully this'll be PART of an "October surprise".
Nice take. I like it.
Won't do maximum good yet. Wait for the Dem convention or a litle after. Wait maybe for the Sadam trial.
I'd love to see it happen that way.
Restored it where???
There are lots of replies to your question already, but let me see if I can add yet another one. I just read something interesting that's related to the Libya / Iraq connection. I'm wondering if the Pres. is going to create some breaking news tonight. Also, I just watched Brit Hume talking about the speech on Fox News and it piqued my interest. I think Brit said Bush is planning on giving a series of speeches, but I may have been mistaken.
I'm thinking that Bush is going to address something newsworthy tonight. Stranger things have happened.
Posted below is what I found earlier. How reliable is Yossef Bodansky? He and Jayna Davis had some type of contact regarding the OKC bombing investigation, but I don't remember much else about him off-hand. It's a long read, but it's worth it if someone is really interested in this thread.
Not for commercial use. Solely to be used for the educational purposes of research and open discussion.
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily
April 14, 2004Appendix: The 1998 Report to the US Congress
The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality
The following report, dated February 10, 1998, was written by Yossef Bodansky in his capacity as Director of the US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare. The report has subsequently appeared in the public domain.Nobody likes the idea of Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles capable of delivering their lethal warheads. The ramifications of their potential use in anger -- the numbers of fatalities and injured they might inflict -- are horrendous. However, as the US is getting ready to bomb in Iraq in order to address the challenge of that country's remaining WMD arsenal, one should examine dispassionately what might be conceivably accomplished, and what would be the ramifications of the massive bombing campaign the Clinton Administration is advocating.
Despite Baghdad's protestations, Iraq does have a small but very lethal operational arsenal of WMD and platforms capable of delivering them throughout the Middle East and even beyond. Although Iraq has been subjected to an unprecedented regimen of UN inspection and destruction of strategic military programs since the end of the Gulf War in the Spring of 1991, the international community has proven incapable of learning the entire scope of the Iraqi programs for fielding weapons of mass destruction, let alone eliminate these programs as mandated by the Security Council.
Significantly, the first major independent study of the possible magnitude of the Iraqi undeclared and concealed WMD arsenal was not conducted until the Summer of 1994. For this study, the BND (German Intelligence) relied on KNOWN Iraqi post-Gulf War illegal acquisitions of technology, sub-systems, and strategic materials in Western Europe (mainly Germany, Austria and Switzerland) to assess what could be done with these acquisitions. Even without taking into consideration such diverse inputs as Iraqi acquisitions from countries of the former Soviet Union, the PRC and Iran, as well as rumored but unproven acquisitions in Europe, the results of the BND study were startling for they pointed to several specific programs that not only had the UN inspectors been unaware of in mid 1994, but they have so far proven unable to discover and stop. For example, the Iraqi purchase of a special kind of igniter, with a short shelf-life, for SCUD-type warheads, strongly suggested that the Iraqis used these igniters for operational SCUD-type missiles, as they are capable of increasing the range. The BND thus concluded that it was "difficult to assess" the magnitude of the current Iraqi weapons program. There was no doubt that not only "some of the material equipment" was excluded from discovery and destruction by the UN, but certain projects were being revived and run clandestinely.
A new approach to studying the Iraqi WMD programs was adopted in the aftermath of the "defection" of Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamal in the Summer of 1995. Originated as an audacious ploy to destroy the anti-Saddam movement from within, the "defection" went sour when Baghdad panicked over reports of contacts between Kamal and the CIA in Amman. Consequently, Baghdad was compelled to surrender to the UN large quantities of material Kamal might have divulged while in Amman. Consequently, Kamal and his brother were lured back to Baghdad where they were promptly assassinated. Meanwhile, the entire perception of the extent of the Iraqi WMD program had to be reevaluated.
Most important was the realization that there is an on going Iraqi program the UN inspections team is highly unlikely to discover and stop. In January 1996, the assessment of the Israeli Military Intelligence was that within the next four years, Iraq would have ten SCUD launchers and some 150 SCUD-type missiles. Some of these missiles are to be equipped with warheads containing WMD. A major aspect of the Iraqi program as of the mid-1990s was the organization of a highly mobile transportation system for the operational elements. Thus, by late 1997, the Iraqis were capable of transferring a few thousand liters of biological materials to new concealed sites within two or three weeks without supervision. As far as Baghdad was concerned, once the materials were hidden, supervision may be permitted to resume as usual. Another indication of an anticipated expansion of Iraq's ballistic missile activities came in late 1997/early 1998 with the appointment of two senior officers -- Abd-al-Rizzaq Shihab of the Army and Muzahm Tassab al-Hassan of the Air Force -- as deputy heads of the Military Industries authority. Both generals held senior command positions of Iraqi missile forces during the Gulf War and are considered Iraq's leading experts in ballistic missile operations. Moreover, during 1997, Iraqi military units conducted several simulated deployments and launching of ballistic missiles of the type and range Iraq is not permitted to have.
Meanwhile, despite the ongoing presence of UN inspectors and the threat of resumed bombing, the Iraqi strategic arsenal continued to expand as the current British Government's threat assessment testifies. In early 1998, Iraq is known to possess 48 SCUD-type missiles and six launchers. (Gen. Wafiq Samarraj, the former chief of Iraqi Military Intelligence, knew of at least 45 SCUD-type missiles with range of over 600 km and several others being repaired at the time of his defection in 1994.) A large portion of the 45 BW warheads/bomb containers Iraq acknowledged constructing in the late 1980s are believed to have survived the Gulf War and still elude the UN inspectors. The British Government estimates that the Iraqis still have 30 warheads capable of carrying chemical and or biological weapons' material. For these warheads and other weapons, Iraq has at least 8,400 liters of Anthrax, as well as 600 tons of chemicals that are sufficient for the production of 200 tons of VX nerve gas -- where a single droplet can kill. (Samarraj reported that in 1994 Iraq concealed 200 containers with biological weapons, more than half of which are still considered in operational condition.)
And while public attention is focused on ballistic missiles, Iraq has even more effective and lethal platforms of the delivery of its weapons of mass destruction. In late December 1996, German intelligence confirmed that Iraqi weapons technicians developed a drone described as "the little guy's cruise missile." This unmanned aircraft is made of plastics and plywood -- simple and cheap to produce without any tell-tale equipment that can attract the UN inspectors. The drone has a range of about 700 kilometers and is equipped with a very accurate GPS navigation system illegally purchased in the West. Each drone can carry 30 to 40 kilograms of biological or chemical warfare agents to the intended target. It is almost impossible to detect this drone by radar because of its size, slow speed and lack of metal parts.
The BND's experts are most alarmed by the Iraqi fielding of a version of this drone that can be also launched from ships. Consequently, one cannot rule out the possibility of an Iraqi-controlled commercial ship suddenly launching these drones outside the coasts of Europe -- from where these missiles can reach and threaten London, Paris or Berlin -- as well as the Atlantic coast of the US.
Another type of chemical weapons known to be in the Iraqi arsenal is "Agent 15" nerve agent. According to British Government sources, Agent 15 is a non-lethal psychochemical nerve gas designed to stupefy enemy forces. It is a derivative of BZ. The agent can be disseminated in various forms -- from artillery and rocket warheads to pouring into water supplies. Depending on the concentration, Agent 15 can cause weakness, dizziness, disorientation, hallucinations and loss of co-ordination. At the level of concentration likely to affect unprotected troops on a battlefield, Agent 15 is expected to disorientate and disable soldiers for a relatively short time (measured in hours). Iraq is known to have experimented with BZ and various derivatives since at least 1985. The British learned that Iraq had built up large stocks of an operational version -- Agent 15 -- only in late 1997.
Thus, Iraq still has a small, diverse, but very deadly operational arsenal of WMD. If used operationally, the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction can cause heavy casualties among both civilian population and military forces not just in the Middle East, but even in the US. The key warhead and bomb components are very small and can be easily moved from one place of concealment to another. Furthermore, if the bulky protective measures of these components are removed, at a risk to the Iraqi troops and nearby population, the movement and concealment of these key warhead and bomb components becomes even more easy. Moreover, it is then virtually impossible to distinguish from afar between these warheads and comparable high-explosive systems -- say, artillery shells.
Assuming that the US located these clandestine WMD, it is still far from certain the US will be able to bomb and destroy all the Iraqi operational weapons. And this has nothing to do with the accuracy of aircraft or the penetrability of smart munitions. The problem lies in the ruthlessness of Saddam's regime and his desperate clinging to power. For example, what if the bulk of the chemical warhead components are stored in, say, the Baghdad Presidential Palace -- two miles southeast of the edge of the Baghdad West Airport. The eruption of any such warhead, let alone a larger storage container, as a result of bomb damage will devastate the heart of Baghdad -- killing countless innocent people. Is this a legitimate outcome of a US bombing campaign? The argument that Saddam is to be blamed for such a tragedy just because he had placed these weapons at the heart of Baghdad carries water only up to a certain point. Besides, Washington should dread the reverberations of such a justifiable act throughout the Muslim World. And what about an Iraqi "retaliation" against a US city using terrorists or a ship-borne drone?
Significantly, however, even if the US and its allies will have managed to destroy the bulk of Saddam WMD operational arsenal, this will provide only a short term solution. No bombing campaign against Iraq, and even an occupation of that country for that matter, is capable of destroying the hard core of Saddam Hussein's primary WMD development and production programs. The reason is that under current conditions these programs are run outside of Iraq -- mainly in Sudan and Libya, as well as Algeria (storage of some hot nuclear stuff). Thus, once the bombing campaign is over, the Iraqis can be expected to smuggle new weapons from Iraq's development sites and production lines - sites that remain untouched by allied bombing as well as unchecked by UN inspection teams. And, for as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, this charade called disarming Saddam will continue.
One should not be surprised by this sad state of affairs.
The transfer of Iraqi WMD overseas started even before the outbreak of the Gulf War. Back in late 1990, when Baghdad realized Iraq would be subjected to intense bombing, key sensitive elements were smuggled out. Then, in the Spring of 1991, once the extent of the post-War inspection regime became clarified, especially given the type and amount of data provided to the West by numerous defectors, a second round of hasty smuggling took place. Essentially, the core of the next-generation projects of the Iraqi WMD programs was moved to safe-havens. A lot of know-how and key subsystems were shipped out with the idea of building alternate production facilities in the host countries.
Most important are the programs transferred to Libya and Sudan -- two of Iraq's closest allies during the Gulf War that have strong aspirations for WMD of their own. Libya, long struggling to overcome embargoes and the cancellation of arrangements for the supply of technology and systems from Western Europe, has been looking for the Iraqi embargo-busting knowledge and for Iraqi proven solutions for Libyan problems. Sudan needs WMD in order to hit the Black rebels in the south and deter Western intervention against the Islamist terrorism empire.
Hence, Iraq found eager and willing partners for its efforts to circumvent the world's campaign against its WMD.
While the initial movements of WMD stuff were emergency measures or by-products of other considerations, Baghdad reexamined its posture by late 1993. By then, Saddam Hussein had already realized that the UN inspections were not going away, and that the US remained determined to continue the policy of containment and sanctions. Moreover, the US retaliation for the June 1993 narrowly averted attempt on the life of former President Bush by Iraqi intelligence convinced Baghdad that there would be no reconciliation with the US in the foreseeable future. Hence, Baghdad adopted a long term strategy to endure the global pressure.
In March 1994, Babil (a newspaper run by Saddam Hussein's eldest son Uday) declared that it would be "desirable for the leaders of Iraq, Libya and Sudan to hold a summit meeting ... and adopt a common stance" to meet the challenges facing the Arab World.
Meanwhile, Iraq was reviving the international support system for its WMD development and production programs. By late 1994, Iraq's secret purchasing system was completely restored. It was operating energetically not only to just restore previous capabilities but to support new projects -- mostly outside Iraq.
Anticipating that the sanctions would be lifted from Iraq, many European firms were rushing to grab a good share of what used to be a very lucrative market. Presently, the Iraqi-run system is made up of an endless and redundant web of Western firms and technology plants, liaison people, banks and financial institutes, secret merchants and middlemen -- so that it is virtually impossible to discover all components, let alone bring down the system. The procurement system of the Iraqi intelligence has been resurrected, it functions, and it feels good. The present system has not only arose on the ruins of the previous one, but it has learned and overcome all the errors of the system of the 1980s. Significantly, virtually all the firms and plants that had worked for Iraq before the Gulf War have already found their way into the fold of the new system. This time however, many support and sustain programs in Libya and Sudan, as well as in third countries from where the Iraqis ship the goods on their own. Thus, when Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamal "defected" in the Summer of 1995, he was bringing data of what was left behind in Iraq -- not on the wave of the future already being constructed in Sudan and Libya.
(snip long section about Sudan)Libya
Although ultimately decisive, the Iraqi involvement in the Libyan WMD program has been complex and at times contradictory. Back during the 1980s, the Libyans ran a massive development and production program of their own. For a while, the Libyans closely cooperated with both the Iranians and the Syrians -- both enemies of Iraq. At the same time, however, Libya relied on the same West European suppliers as Iraq did. Moreover, key middlemen, such as Ihsan Barbouti, served both the Iraqi and the Libyan WMD programs. During the mid-1980s, the Libyans were out-spending the Iraqis, and recruiters of Libyan intelligence were offering huge payments in effort to entice key Egyptian, Iraqi and European scientists working in Iraq to transfer to Libya. Baghdad was apprehensive about the Libyan practices.
By the time the Gulf Crisis erupted in 1990, several Iraqi researchers were already working in Libya as individuals, as were several foreign scientists who had worked in Iraq beforehand. Most were working on Chemical weapons projects, primarily in Rabta. At first Saddam reluctant to share with Qadhafi some of the unique achievements of the Iraqis. However, with pressure from UN inspections mounting, and with intelligence leaking from defectors, Iraq had no alternative but to transfer more and more sensitive projects to Libya as the sole venue for their continuation. Although Sudan was glad to receive anything Iraq had to offer, it had such an abysmal scientific-technological infrastructure that it could not sustain the more sophisticated Iraqi programs. Thus, with not too many takers of the Iraqi systems, Libya would have to do. Meanwhile, Qadhafi was most interested in receiving extensive help from Iraqi scientists for his own covert, biological, weapons program and conditioned his support for Saddam on cooperation in this field. Thus, since the early 1990s, Iraqi scientists have been working in Libya in order to continue the key Iraqi research and production programs into advanced and next generation CW and BW.
At first, Baghdad considered the cooperation with Tripoli a temporary necessity. For a while, in the early 1990s, Iraq did not transfer complete projects to Libya. Consequently, several scientists and engineers from the Iraqi military industries were commuting between Iraq and Libya via Amman. They were using new passports with false names and occupations. However, as the contacts were expanding and the Libyans were being exposed to a wider variety of Iraqi programs, Tripoli decided to formalize and expand the cooperation. A special committee of the Libyan defense establishment arrived in Baghdad and negotiated a comprehensive agreement on expanded cooperation in conventional, chemical and biological weaponry. In accordance with these agreements, the Libyans signed contracts with several Iraqi military industry experts. These contracts were drawn as if they were academic invitations for Iraqi professors to lecture in Libyan universities and institutions. At the same time, however, the key Iraqi program equipment, systems and elements remained concealed inside Iraq in anticipation for the end of the UN inspections so that WMD development and production can be resumed.
Meanwhile, Baghdad at first drew the line concerning the Iraqi nuclear program. Lingering doubts concerning Libya's long-term strategic cooperation with Syria and Iran prevailed, and Iraq would take no chances. In 1991-92, Iraqi intelligence feared a Libyan use of financial enticements as an inducement for defections of Iraqi nuclear scientists to the point of undertaking extreme measures to prevent such a trend.
For example, in July 1992, Iraqi agents shot and killed in Amman, Jordan, Muayad Hassan Naji Janabi -- an Iraqi nuclear scientist. Janabi worked for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission until 1986, when he was transferred to the Ministry of Military Industries. In 1992, Janabi was on vacation in Jordan. However, he was shot when on his way to pick up Tunisian visas for transit to Libya. He had been offered a "teaching position" at "an atomic institute" in Libya. Baghdad must have been worried because Janabi was supposed to return to Iraq a week earlier and rumors surfaced he had attempted to get to the UK and the US, and failed to get academic visas. By then, Saddam Hussein had banned key personnel in the military-industrial system from leaving Iraq without permission, and fearing that Janabi would not reveal Iraqi nuclear weapons program secrets, he was shot by two Iraqi agents. The two Iraqis were arrested for the assassination but quickly released and sent to Baghdad.
However, by the mid-1990s, Baghdad could no longer be selective in its cooperation with Libya. The BND's 1994 studies of the Iraqi procurement system in Europe was unsettling for it threatened Iraq's ability to revive key WMD programs just as the Iraqi system was being restored to its pre-Gulf War magnitude. Moreover, the UN inspection regime was beginning to grasp the complexity of the Iraqi challenge. Indeed, even before the Summer 1995 "defection" of Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamal, the UN was increasing its efforts to locate hidden stuff. As discussed above, Kamal's "defection" was prompted by Baghdad's apprehension that the UN was capitalizing on data provided by genuine defectors in order to zero in on Iraq's hidden WMD facilities. For example, Iraq's biological facilities were first subjected to a meaningful inspection in April 1995, on the eve of the "defection." Even though by then, Baghdad had already hidden its biological weapons cache and destroyed all evidence of its existence, the mere UN visit to the abandoned sites was too close for comfort.
Meanwhile, with the Iraqi-Libyan cooperation in chemical weapons development and production going well, Saddam authorized already in the Summer/Fall of 1994 the move of other weapons programs to Libya. Arrangements for closer cooperation were quickly made.
In January 1995, Iraq and Libya signed a major agreement whereby Iraqi specialists will work at a secret Libyan establishment on the development of a long-range ballistic missiles with range of about 1,000 km. A senior Iraqi Trade Ministry official, Hajem Attiya Salma arrived in Tripoli for final discussions with AbdAllah Hijazi, the head of Libya's Scientific Research authorities. In the agreement reached, Qadhafi agreed to pay the salaries of the Iraqi experts -- some $1,200 a month -- as well as finance the acquisition of Western technology. Moreover, the Iraqis were promised access to the Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean missile technology Libya had already acquired. Baghdad promised to share all the experience acquired in the Gulf War. Iraq did not have much alternative. Incapable of working, the Iraqi design teams built around experts trained at the best European and Russian establishments were falling apart. Now Qadhafi was offering to fund and provide cover for the revival of the al-Hussein and Badr missiles under the cover of the Libyan al-Fatakh program.
Meanwhile, the Libyans were most interested in the Iraqi experience with biological weapons, particularly the advanced stages of the militarization projects. In the ensuing negotiations, Baghdad acknowledged that Iraq still possessed several biological weapons and warheads for them. The Iraqis would share these technologies with the Libyans provided that Tripoli agreed to also sustain and fund the revival of the Iraqi military nuclear program. By 1995, some of the Iraqi nuclear materials were being held in Algeria while the key systems and design elements were being hidden all over Iraq in dormant state. Iraqi experts were apprehensive that the lack of proper maintenance and storage conditions under the sand in desert temperatures were destroying the sophisticated equipment. Hence, the Iraqi negotiators suggested that Iraqi nuclear fuel could reach Libya by sea within weeks after the signing of an agreement, and that Iraqi experts in Libya would then be able to begin enriching it after installing more small or medium-sized kilns/furnaces.
As expected by the Iraqis, the lure of nuclear weapons was irresistible for Qadhafi.
A high-level Libyan delegation led by Major Raad Bin-Id al-Daffi from the Libyan Engineering and Military Industrialization arrived in Baghdad on August 30, 1995. They negotiated with the Iraqis a comprehensive agreement that still serves as the cornerstone of the Iraqi-Libyan strategic and military cooperation. The agreement stipulated the extent to which Libya would go to assist Iraq in the expansion of the Iraqis' own WMD programs as well as in evading the UN stringent surveillance of Iraq's military plants.
The first step was the quick transfer to Libya of an Iraqi military nuclear project that numerous Arab and European experts described as being "in its final stages". By then, after Kamal's "defection" went sour, Saddam gave up on keeping the key elements of the WMD programs in Iraq and ordered their swift transfer to Libya before the UN closed in on them. Hence, several experts and equipment were immediately dispatched to Libya to prepare for the transfer of the nuclear program.
The main item Baghdad was adamant on saving was a limited quantity of semi-enriched nuclear fuel transferred to the Aba Agricultural and Scientific Research Center, east of Baghdad, under the direct supervision of Lt.-Gen Amir Rashid, director the Iraqi Military Industrialization Organization (MIO). The initial transfer was made possible by the suspension of UN surveillance of this center after the Iraqis had moved its equipment to Abu-Ghurayb region near Baghdad. In the meantime, Iraq was hiding the nuclear fuel in large underground storage facilities near the Aba center. After conditioning the nuclear material for transportation, it was sent by sea to Libya within weeks.
Meanwhile, a high-level MIO delegation headed by Dr Jafar Diya Jafar, one of Iraq's leading nuclear scientists, arrived in Libya in mid October 1995 to oversee the installation of the small nuclear furnaces. The Iraqi nuclear program would be located at Sidi Abu Zurayq in the desert 380 km southwest of Tripoli. By the end of 1995, the MIO experts began enriching the Iraqi nuclear material having successfully installed the small- and medium-sized kilns/furnaces there.
The most important indication of the intimate strategic cooperation between Baghdad and Tripoli was in Western Europe. Since the mid-1990s, Iraqi intelligence has been diverting purchases of dual-use and sensitive technologies in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland to Libya. In the process, Libyan intelligence was given access to the Iraqis' most secure shipment routes -- where exported goods are shipped to Bulgaria where local companies are identified as the end-users, and from where the goods are forwarded illegally to Iraq and now also Libya.
Furthermore, starting the mid 1990s, Iraqi intelligence has been assisting Russian and other ex-Soviet scientists to acquire third-country passports in Central and Latin America so they can travel to and work in Iraq. Following the new cooperation agreements, Iraqi intelligence began sending these scientists to Libya for work on the joint Iraqi-Libyan WMD projects. Honduras was the site of a major program in 1995-96. Additional Iraqi intelligence operatives, all experts in the procurement of high-technology, arrived in Germany in early 1996. They began a still ongoing effort to revive dormant relationships as well as establish new ones. However, the reorganized Iraqi procurement system is now diverting the bulk of the goods to Libya rather than Iraq.
The first results of the January 1995 ballistic missile agreement were already showing by the Summer of that year. Using Western-made systems and computers smuggled from both Iraq and Europe, the highly experienced Iraqis succeeded to make sense in the Libyan convoluted missile program -- integrating the inputs and technologies from the numerous and often incompatible foreign sources. In the second half of 1996, the Iraqi scientists and know-how provided such a boost to the Libyan ballistic missile program, that NATO's threat assessment had to be revised. The new assessment, NATO Report MC 161/96, concludes tha Libya could be in possession of medium-range ballistic nuclear missiles pointed at the NATO Mediterranean flank by the year 2006. The NATO study predicts that within a decade, Qadhafi's Libya will have medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of between 1,000 and 3,000 km that can be fitted with nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological warheads.
In late 1995, Saddam Hussein finally relented and authorized the transfer to Libya the secrets of Iraq's most sensitive armament programs -- particularly the biological weapons program, which Qadhafi's wanted most. With the UN inspections now expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future, Baghdad decided to retain in Iraq only the operational biological bombs and warheads, as well as the equipment required to sustain them in operational posture. In early 1996, Saddam ordered that the surviving sophisticated development and production systems as well as the extensive know how and related documentation would be transferred to Libya.
The large extent of the Iraqi biological warfare effort and the huge magnitude of the systems and documentation that have eluded the UN inspections can be deduced from the fact that it took the Iraqis more than a year to collect their material and prepare it for clandestine shipment to Libya. Only then, once Baghdad was ready to begin the transfer of the BW program to Libya, was Tripoli notified. The framework for the new deal between Libya and Iraq was signed in May during a visit to Baghdad by members of a Libyan industrialists' organization. Soon afterwards, high-level Libyan delegations arrived in Baghdad in mid-1997 to discuss the modalities of the upgrading of the Iraqi support for, and participation in, the Libyan WMD program. On the basis of these discussions, Baghdad and Tripoli finalized the signing of the May 1997 agreement that still dominates their expanding strategic cooperation.
Between late 1997 and early 1998, on the basis of this latest agreement, Iraq undertook two distinct moves that, once completed, would dramatically alter Libya's WMD capabilities.
First, starting late 1997, Baghdad moved to dramatically upgrade the Libyan Chemical Weapons programs. Senior Iraqi scientists with experience in CW production joined other Iraqi researchers some of whom have been in Libya since the 1991 Gulf War, working on CW projects first in Rabta and presently in the plant inside a mountain at Tarhunah, 60 km south-east of Tripoli. The Iraqis are experts in the production of nerve agents and other chemical weapons. The Iraqis' primary contribution is in expediting the move from the research and development phase to the mass production of operational weapons. Once integrated into the Libyan CW program, the Iraqi expertise will enable Libya to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of chemical weapons. Given the current pace of construction in the underground chemical production plant near Tarhunah, the plant can become operational by the year 2000.
The second move was providing Libya with the key to operational Biological Weapons. About a dozen Iraqi scientists involved in biological research arrived in Libya around the beginning of 1998, where special living quarters have been arranged for them. They are to help the Libyans develop a new biological warfare complex under the guise of a Tripoli-area medical facility called General Health Laboratories. The Libyan biological warfare program is believed to be codenamed Ibn Hayan. Since this program will be based in its entirety on the Iraqi covert program to develop biological weapons, the Iraqi experts are expected to reach the weaponization phase quite quickly. Libya is interested in bombs and missile warheads with anthrax and botulism agents. For the running of the Ibn Hayan project, Qadhafi established a special office within the Libyan Ministry of Defense that reports directly to him. The program has been given the highest possible priority by Qadhafi and both Libyan and Iraqi procurement operatives throughout the world have been told to spare no funds in order to expedite the purchase of the sub-systems the Iraqi experts require for the "weaponization" programs.
And so, the US is planning an instant-gratification bombing campaign that would neither destroy Iraq's WMD operational capabilities nor touch its main WMD production lines in Libya and Sudan.
At the same time, the strategic mega-trends in the Middle East, exacerbated by the current crisis environment, entice a dramatic breakout in the form of a regional war. Saddam Hussein is not the only local leader aspiring for war as the best way out of a political deadlock. In the case of Iraq, with the entire Iraqi Armed Forces -- from tanks and artillery pieces to aircraft, and from ammunition stockpiles to fuel dumps -- high on the US target list, Baghdad has a special incentive to "lose" them in heroic martyrdom -- say, spearheading and instigating a regional war with Israel -- rather than have them destroyed by US bombs and missiles. There are enough non-state entities -- from Arafat's pro-Iraq al-Fatah forces to the Islamist HAMAS, HizbAllah and Islamic Jihad -- who would gladly provide the spectacular and lethal provocation required to spark the cataclysmic eruption.
No WMD are required to set the Muslim World ablaze.
Meanwhile, the panic afflicting Israel only reduces Jerusalem's ability to make a realistic threat assessment, and formulate its strategy in a cool and calculated manner. And the US bombing campaign will only add some explosives and fuel to the flames.
You may (or may not) be interested in 127. Thanks for the thread. :-)
Wrong.
But I think he's a little bit like everyone in the region. 50% truth and 50% BS. The problem is figuring out which is which.
This is an extremely important factor in why we went into Iraq. This "axis of evil" stuff mentioned by the President was no joke. There were several people putting out the word that Syria, Libya and (unofficially Pakistan and Red China) also deserved to be in that axis and personally, I would have agreed with that take.
There is time to deal with these still, but I think we've managed in the interim to add a few rats: France and Germano and Canadio peaceniks along with the typical Demodogs.
Yes, and that's depressing: pretty soon we'll only be able to respect Australia. The rest of the planet apparently are filthy rats.
Very interesting......hope we soon hear more about this from the Bush Administration!
This information would might shut up the naysayers & 'hate America first' crowd!
I think the lefties would just move the goalposts once again!
The story makes no sense. If this was true, they should invaded Libya first since someone else could have paid Saddam's scientists like Libya itself. You attack the facility which produces nukes first not the country which just gives it some support.
Naji Sabri
"Naji Sabri Ahmad al-Hadithi!!"
"Naji Sabri Ahmad al-Hadithi
Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Ahmad al-Hadithi's primary role is leading Iraq's diplomatic efforts to weaken support for a possible U.S. military attack. He has continued to lobby permanent United Nations Security Council members as part of Baghdad's efforts to shore up international support, including visits to Russia and China. Sabri has also met with a delegation from India and the 22-member Arab League.
He has also spearheaded efforts to reach out to former enemies in an effort to find new allies against the U.S. During a five-day meeting in January 2002 in Iran, once Iraq's central foe, he told Iranian President Mohammad Khatami that U.S. behavior "is not just a threat to us, but a threat to the Islamic world." Sabri has been part of the ongoing high-level talks with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and chief U.N. weapons inspector Dr. Hans Blix. And it was Sabri, along with Arab League chief Amr Moussa, who delivered the letter in September from the Iraqi government to Annan saying Saddam Hussein would allow weapons inspectors back into Iraq.
Sabri was appointed Foreign Minister last year. A member of a historically powerful family, he holds a doctorate in English literature. During the Gulf War, he was Deputy Information Minister and, at one time, ran Iraq's press office in London. Before his appointment, he served as an ambassador to Austria. Sabri is considered more of a technocrat than a political leader. Some view him as an interim figure in the Hussein cabinet though he is said to be close friends with Saddam's younger son, Qusay.
-- By Raven Tyler, Online NewsHour
Interesting...MUD
bttt for reference
bttt
First, starting late 1997, Baghdad moved to dramatically upgrade the Libyan Chemical Weapons programs. Senior Iraqi scientists with experience in CW production joined other Iraqi researchers some of whom have been in Libya since the 1991 Gulf War, working on CW projects first in Rabta and presently in the plant inside a mountain at Tarhunah, 60 km south-east of Tripoli. The Iraqis are experts in the production of nerve agents and other chemical weapons. The Iraqis' primary contribution is in expediting the move from the research and development phase to the mass production of operational weapons. Once integrated into the Libyan CW program, the Iraqi expertise will enable Libya to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of chemical weapons. Given the current pace of construction in the underground chemical production plant near Tarhunah, the plant can become operational by the year 2000.
This mountain?
"Theories as to Qadhafi’s real motives in building his tunnel are legion. For example, people say that the diameter of the pipe is over twice that which would be necessary for an irrigation project. They wonder why the pipe hooks up to Libya’s chemical weapons facility located near a mountain called Tarhuna on the Mediterranean, and they cannot fathom why the chemical plant would need irrigation. They ask why the system has been so strongly reinforced, why it is big enough for tanks to roll through it and why is so deep that even some atomic weapons could not reach it, etc, etc. Military experts say that at the very least, it will give the Libyan military the ability to conceal their activities from satellite spy networks, or from just about anything else for that matter. Others say that the water storage facilities could be used to hold a company or more of troops and the food to feed them, along with the facilities to house them.
One of the most negative comments heard on the project comes from a world-class expert in the field, Paul Beaver, a reporter with Jane’s Defense Weekly, who said, "This is the first real evidence of something which has been suspected for several years. Qadhafi seems to have taken a leaf out of Kim IL Sung’s book and created a potential military arsenal underground." The fact that the general contractor on the job for the Libyan government is Dong Ah, a Korean company that has had numerous run-ins with the American government over illegally exporting items to Iran, makes a lot of people nervous. Dong Ah has already paid a $3 million fine for illegally exporting drilling equipment from the United States to Libya. They also bought anti-corrosive pipe chemicals in Texas for this project to be shipped to Libya, and they are under investigation for that matter, as well.
In the meantime, everyone who could be interviewed for information regarding Libya’s intent has been questioned, and there are few solid answers. For the moment, let us assume that Qadhafi has created a mixed-use pipeline that can be used for irrigation, along with the storage and transportation of war material and personnel. Whatever it is, it is certainly "the Mother of All Pipelines" and is large enough to hold two simultaneous titles, until we know better. It is the longest irrigation tunnel on the face of the earth, and it is the most expensive military installation ever created, or possibly neither.
http://www.chapmanspira.com/pov/Lybia/lybia.htm
Some more pieces to the puzzle:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/tarhuna.htm
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/index.html
http://www.fas.org/news/libya/971202-nyt.htm
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/dr_ibrahim_ighneiwa/tarhuna.htm
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/DeadlyArsenals/chapters%20(pdf)/18-Libya.pdf
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/speeches/2003/AEI-3-4-03.htm
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F97PS472PAPERS/HART.JOHN.LIBYA.HTML
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/black.htm
http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/stia/students/vol.01/reedk.htm
Libya timeline:
http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/libya.htm
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