Sarin Shell relatively *NEW* for Iraq - post 1996 development & previously unknown to UN

First, the shell was announced by BG Kimmitt, the CPA military spokesman, and he was reporting an announcement by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). During the press conference, he said ... that the round was an old binary shell, and described its function - two components contained within the shell that are mixed by the action of firing the shell, and that since the shell wasn't fired, but used in an IED, the mixing was not complete, only a small amount of sarin was produced, and a couple of soldiers (EOD) were affected. Field testing showed sarin, and not said by BG Kimmitt but later reported, higher level testing confirmed it.

This is a significant announcement, yes, because it is a chemical round, but more importantly, because of the technology it uses. That is the use of cells or canisters of separate components that mix in flight to create the sarin. This is big news because the Iraqis were not known to have this technology prior to the Gulf War. Yes, they had sarin. And yes, they did use binary chemicals (and a note, here, on something I missed before - the Iraqis never declared binary artillery shells, but UNSCOM did find some in 1996), but as this interview with Scott Ritter - yes, that Scott Ritter - conducted in 2000 shows that the technology was crude - it was not "mix in flight":

Ritter: They called them “binary,” but what that meant was that they had a warhead full of isopropyl alcohol and at the last second they mixed in the difluor. [32]

Ritter: It’s not even “mix-in-flight.” They mix it before they launch. [33] At the Muthana State Establishment, which was responsible for developing Iraq’s chemical weapons, whenever they would mix these things Iraqi workers would get up there and then pour the agent in and stir the Sarin by hand in the warhead. Invariably there’s an accident and you’ve got guys writhing, convulsing and dying because of the nerve agent. The Iraqis killed more of their own people loading the chemical agent into the warhead than they did with the warheads themselves.

The Iraqis didn't use binary because it was safer, obviously. They did it because of shelf life. As I understand it, Iraq had a problem with their production that made their sarin ineffective after 3 weeks. So they used this crude binary so it wouldn't sit and degrade. If this was a unitary sarin round from pre-Gulf War days, it wouldn't have had any effect on the soldiers.

In short, this type of artillery shell is one that the Iraqis never declared, and the UN inspection teams on the ground never discovered. It introduces something entirely new into the WMD story of Iraq. Here is the nub - this type of weapon has never been found in or attributed to Iraq before, where did this one come from? This isn't quite an airplane in King Tut's tomb, but it is highly significant. Was it produced in Iraq right under the noses of the inspection regime? Was it purchased from outside in violation of UN sanctions? Did it come in from some outside country after the fall of Hussein? I don't know the answer to those questions, but whatever the answer, it changes the narrative of the WMD story in Iraq.

Or it should. While this has gotten a lot of notice in the blogosphere, there is nothing moving in the mainstream media. Why is that? Some of the reason is that the mainstream media quite obviously are uninterested in changing the narrative. That the LA Times fabricates the assignment of the production of this weapon to the 1980's is a sign of that - BG Kimmitt never said it, yet the LA Times writes that he did. This is having the desired effect, in the comments over at Washington Monthly's blog (Kevin Drum's deal), some one writes "General Kimmitt claimed that the ordinance was of Gulf War vintage, meaning that the bomb had to be at least 13 years old." No, he didn't say that at all about the ordnance (ahem). So how did that notion get in this guy's head? I'm guessing from reading a story in the LA Times or the like that has decided not to spin this one, but to simply print untruths. Noone ever goes back to check the primary sources, right?

I have some problems with the vercaity of this individuals claims.

Here is an article that may be interesting for all to read:

The Guardian (London)

August 6, 1998

HEADLINE: Detective work has built up a picture of Iraq's remaining weapons, writes Julian Borger;
Saddam's game of cat and mouse fails to throw UN off scent

BYLINE: JULIAN BORGER

DURING the seven years that the United Nations Special Commission (Unscom) inspectors have sniffed and sifted their way across Iraq, they have grown wearily accustomed to Baghdad's attempted deceit.

Crucial documents have apparently disappeared in mysterious fires, or fallen off lorries. Last December inspectors were halted for 20 minutes and forced to look on from afar as computer hard-disk drives thought to contain information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were replaced.

Terence Taylor, a former inspector and now a strategic analyst, said: "I think its extraordinary that Unscom has found as much as it has, given the routine deception . . . The Iraqis will never admit to anything. You have to find it yourself."

Much of the available information has been wheedled out by detective work, such as analysing records of Iraq's imports of chemical and biological precursors in the 1980s. But arguably the most important breakthrough came in August 1995 with the defection to Jordan of Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamal. Before being lured back to Iraq and killed, he handed over details of an extensive biological weapons programme, which had long been denied by Baghdad.

The Iraqi government quickly led inspectors to Gen Kamal's chicken farm, where they found 700,000 pages of documentation. That led Unscom to the Al-Hakam germ warfare facility, south of Baghdad, which was systematically destroyed in 1996.

Some former weapons inspectors believe the crises in the past year were provoked by Baghdad whenever government officials feared Unscom was closing in.

Unscom officials said during the crisis early this year that they had been close to proving Iraq's ability to adapt VX nerve agent - a chemical weapon of devastating power - for use in bombs and missiles. Iraq has admitted experimenting with VX during the 1980-88 war with Iran, but claimed not to have found a way of "weaponising" its unstable ingredients.

The present crisis began soon after United States navy tests found traces of VX on fragments of Scud missiles which had earlier been destroyed and buried by the Iraqi army. Baghdad disputed the tests and called for a second examination in France and Switzerland - which it considers neutral.

The results are not due until late this month. If they confirm the US findings, Iraq's credibility will plummet before the international sanctions come up for their six-monthly review in October.

At the latest meeting in Baghdad with the Unscom chairman, Richard Butler, Iraq was also due to have handed over a document listing chemical warfare munitions held by its air force. Unscom inspectors found the document on July 18 but were prevented from taking it.

A second Iraqi tactic also backfired earlier this year. The government had called for independent experts to assess Iraq's progress. In February the expert panel on chemical warfare reported that Iraq had the means to manufacture up to 200 tonnes of VX nerve agent. Unscom has no proof of the government's claim to have destroyed 500 tonnes of VX ingredients or precursors.

More than 13,000 tonnes of chemical precursors essential for other weapons manufacture are also unaccounted for, as are at least 45 special missile warheads containing sarin toxin and binary chemical weapons, which Baghdad claims to have destroyed.

Unscom says there are similarly large gaps in Baghdad's account of its biological weapons programme. The government has admitted producing and weapons-testing anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and gangrene - enough to wipe out cities.

But Unscom inspectors uncovered import records for nearly 40 tonnes of "growth media" (a jelly of nutrients used to cultivate bacteria), suggesting a biological weapons project on a far larger scale. The quantities were far greater than needed for ordinary hospital use, as Iraq claims. Baghdad has insisted that it has destroyed all remnants of its biological weapons programme.

Mr Taylor said: "It has been a web of lies and deceit for seven years, and when things get too troublesome it's throw the inspectors out. They see no chance of getting sanctions lifted, so they create a crisis."

Diary of deceit

May 91: Unscom begins inspections, uncovering and destroying components of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.

August 95: Saddam's son-in-law, Lieutenant-General Hussein Kamal, defects with details of biological weapons programme.

June 96: Unscom blows up main biological weapons plant at al-Hakam.

June 96: Iraq admits manufacturing 3.9 tons of VX nerve agent "for research" but claims to be unable to "weaponise" it.

February 98: UN experts says Iraq probably capable of manufacturing up to 200 tons of VX.

April 98: UN experts conclude that Iraq concealed information on its chemical and biological weapons programmes. UN Security Council decides to keep economic sanctions in place.

June 98: US tests find traces of VX gas on Scud missile fragments - results disputed by Iraq. More fragments sent to France and Switzerland for analysis.

July 98: Talks break down in Baghdad on Unscom's proposals for an accelerated schedule of inspections before the next six-monthly review of sanctions.

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