A scholar argues that Bush's doctrine of preemption has deep roots in American history (good read)

Boston Globe ^ | 2/8/04 | Laura Secor

[Valin]

EVERY PRESIDENT makes foreign policy. Only a select few, over the sweep of history, design what scholars term grand strategy.

Grand strategy is the blueprint from which policy follows. It envisions a country's mission, defines its interests, and sets its priorities. Part of grand strategy's grandeur lies in its durability: A single grand strategy can shape decades, even centuries, of policy.

[wizardoz]

Bush also boldly rejected the constraints of an outmoded international system that was really nothing more than a "snapshot of the configuration of power that existed in 1945,"

Best description of the UN Security Council I've heard thus far.

[mewzilla]

Fascinating read. Thanks for the thread.

Here's a listing for the book over on amazon.com.

[jcb8199]

Awesome article.

[merry10]

ping

[GOPcapitalist]

He left out one of the most famous displays of preemption, though probably because it was also on the eventual losing side of that war. That was the seige of Fort Sumter in 1861.

Though it is seldom mentioned in the history books, the confederates opened fire on Fort Sumter only after gaining knowledge that Lincoln had a fleet of heavily armed warships steaming toward it. After being informed both in word and in action that the South Carolina militias would not allow any northern warship to enter Charleston Harbor, Lincoln assembled a fleet and sent it with instructions to fight its way in if denied. Knowing that the fleet's arrival was sure to spark an open battle in the harbor where casualties would probably be many, the confederates made the decision to open fire before it got there.

One of Lincoln's ships, the USS Harriet Lane, actually arrived at the rendevous point off of Charleston on the night before the battle. She also fired what was arguably the first shot of the war - a warning shot at a civilian steamer headed into the harbor. The rest arrived in the coming days, by which time the battle was nearing completion leaving them only to watch.

In the battle's sense, the preemption worked. Sumter surrendered, the fleet was immobilized by arriving late on the scene, and it all took place without a single battle casualty on either side. Of course Lincoln then used that preemptive strike as an excuse to launch the civil war, but that's another issue in itself.

[independentmind]

later

[jwalsh07]

bump

[Valin]

Who DA man! You DA man! :-)

And the timing couldn't be better, I'm down to only 4 books unread...I was becoming...concerned.

[bobjam]

This article leaves out a major phase of the grand strategy of American foreign policy. It was Theodore Roosevelt who saw that the key to protecting American security at the dawn of the 20th century lay in a first class, state of the art navy able to project power anywhere in the world. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, TR lobbied heavily for more modern battleships. After viewing Langley's flight experiements in the Potomac River, Roosvelt ordered further military research into flight- the first American official to comprehend what the airplane could do for the army and navy. When war with Spain loomed, TR supplied and positioned the fleet so that as soon as war broke out, the navy immediately bottled Spain's Alantic fleet up in Santiago harbor and, under the command of Commodore Perry, destroyed Spain's Pacific fleet. As President, TR continued strengthening the navy and deploying it to hot spots such as Venezuela and Morocco. He also aquired and began construction on the Panama Canal. His famous "Roosevelt Corrollary" summed up his grand strategy of foreign policy. That is that the United States assumes the authority to seize control of other American countries that are in danger of becoming financially or politically subservient to some European power.

[Dumb_Ox]

Bard College historian James Chace, author of an acclaimed biography of Dean Acheson, suggests that the 19th-century wars of expansion are only loosely classifiable as preemption.

I think this hones in on the weakest part of Gaddis' case.

[LS]

Good job. You just undercut all the Neo-Confederates' arguments that Lincoln launched a "pre-emptive war."

[LS]

Ironically, Gaddis seems to ignore the MOST APPLICABLE case of "pre-emptive" military action, that of Thomas Jefferson (1804-1808) and Madison (1809-10) wherein Jefferson, using almost the exact same process that Bush used, got a blank check for military action, whereupon he declared war (yep, there was a war declaration, based on the resolutions by this "small government" guy) on ALL of the "Barbary" states, including two that had NOT declared war on us!

He deployed the navy and military to eradicate these guys, using a JOINT RESOLUTION as the basis for pre-emptive strikes.

[GigaDittos]

Good point.

[JasonC]

If you haven't read it yet, another good recent book on the history of US foreign policy is "Special Providence" by Walter Russell Mead, who is mentioned in the article. It gives a fair overview of the various schools of thought in American foreign policy over the years, organized around the ideas and interests appealed to by Hamilton, Wilson, Jefferson, and Jackson. Worth reading.

[Verginius Rufus]

I think you meant Commodore George Dewey in the Spanish-American War, not Perry.

[bobjam]

That's right. It was Dewey and not Perry. TR pulled a few strings in the Senate so that Dewey would be in command of the Pacific fleet. The other officer who wanted the job was from an outdated school of thought and was either unwilling or unable to adapt to modern naval warfare whereas Dewey saw things Roosevelt's way. All this politicking went on while the Secretary of the Navy (TR's boss) was away on one of his many extended vacations. As soon as relations with Spain began deteriorating, TR ordered Dewey to sail to Hong Kong and to be ready to go into battle. Do these actions sound like our current Secretary of Defense?

[lainde]

bump for later

[Valin]

"Special Providence" by Walter Russell Mead

From Publishers Weekly
America is perceived as not having a foreign policy tradition, contends Mead (Mortal Splendor: The American Empire in Transition), a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. In fact, Mead contends, there are actually four contrasting schools of foreign policy: a "Hamiltonian" concern with U.S. economic well-being at home and abroad; a "Wilsonian" impulse to promulgate U.S. values throughout the world; a "Jeffersonian" focus on protecting American democracy in a perilous world; and a bellicose, populist "Jacksonian" commitment to preserving U.S. interests and honor in the world. As Mead's detailed historical analysis of the origin and development of these schools shows, each has its strengths and faults if Wilsonians are too idealistic, Jacksonians are too suspicious of the world but each keeps the other in check, assuring no single school will dominate and that a basic consensus among them will be achieved, as was the case during the Cold War. As the Cold War ended, however, and the world became more complex, consensus ended. Hamiltonians and Wilsonians saw the opportunity to mold the economy and morality of the world in the U.S. image, but Jeffersonian doubt about foreign action in places like Bosnia, and Jacksonian popular suspicions of organizations like the WTO soon challenged such grandiose plans. Mead worries that U.S. foreign policy is too unfocused today and suggests we could learn much from the interactions in the past of the four schools, a complex history he ably unfolds. 8 pages of photos not seen by PW. (Nov. 8) Forecast: With foreign policy at the forefront after September 11, this could help shape discussions of U.S. response; expect serious interest.

Thanks. I'll take a look at it. Looks really interesting.

The problem is there are just too many books I want to read and not enough time to read them all.