Al Qaeda again threatens America (Thread 3) Daily Terror Threat

>>>Flying Pigs, what are you drinking?

Kathy feeds me too much coffee.

Sounds like there is a swamp in Dubai that needs to be drained.

I was bumping the idea. I didn't realize we would be sent to time out....er....Chat.

>>>Kinda checking out Liberty Post.org right now

*shivers* JP, please make sure you shower before returning.

>>>For the last year or so (maybe more), AQ and other jihadi types have been interested in bringing in "white" people especially "professionals" whom can be useful to the cause.

I thought they already did? Isn't that what our State Officials are for?

>>>>hotdog=dog?! mayhaps?!

Interesting.

Don't forget the Executive Order in Re: Food.

>>>>Computer firm in Dubai was hub for black market nuke network

Dubai is notorously known for 'washing' money. Daniel Pearl wrote lots of articles showing how smuggling in the M.E. has lots of ties to Dubai. No one should ever forget anything Daniel wrote. Otherwise, he died in vein.

Sample of one of his articles:

November 16, 2001

Much-smuggled gem aids al-Qaida
Bought, sold by militants near mine, tanzanite ends up at Mideast souks

By Robert Block and Daniel Pearl
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MERERANI, Tanzania, Nov. 16 — In the shadow of Mount Kilimanjaro, miners with flashlights tied to their heads crawl hundreds of feet beneath the East African plain, searching for a purple-brown crystal that will turn into a blue gem called tanzanite. Many of the rare stones chipped off by the spacemen, as the miners are called, find their way to display cases at Zales, QVC or Tiffany. But it’s a long way from these dusty plains to U.S. jewelry stores, and the stones pass through many hands on their journey. Some of those hands, it is increasingly clear, belong to active supporters of Osama bin Laden.

A TRADE GROUP called the Tanzanian Mineral Dealers Association denies that bin Laden’s al-Qaida has any role in the tanzanite trade. But in the bars and cafes that dot the streets of Tanzania’s mining community, the radical connections are no secret. According to miners and local residents, Muslim extremists loyal to bin Laden buy stones from miners and middlemen, smuggling them out of Tanzania to free-trade havens such as Dubai and Hong Kong.

“Yes, people here are trading for Osama. Just look around and you will find serious Muslims who believe in him and work for him,” says Musa Abdallah, a Kenyan who has worked as a tanzanite miner for six years.

EMBASSY BOMBINGS

Many details of the trade remain murky, such as whether its main role is to earn money for the militants or simply to help them move funds secretly about the world. Still, William Wechsler, a former National Security Council member in charge of counterterrorism under President Clinton, says there is little doubt that bin Laden’s links to gemstones, including tanzanite, have been used at times to help fund his terror activities. Al-Qaida’s dealings in tanzanite in the 1990s were detailed at length during the recent federal trial that convicted four bin Laden men in connection with the U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.

Alex Magyane, a Tanzanian government official actively investigating the tanzanite trade, says he has recently traced bin Laden-linked smuggling of rough stones through Kenya to bazaars in the Middle East. “Beyond any doubt, I am 100 percent sure that these Muslim gem traders are connected to Osama bin Laden,” the official says.

Tanzanite is so rare it is mined in only one place on earth, a five-square-mile patch of graphite rock here in northeastern Tanzania. Legend has it that Masai tribesmen discovered the gem when a bolt of lightning set fire to the plains, and some crystals on the ground turned blue. In 1967 an Indian geologist identified the stone as a rare form of the mineral zoisite and determined that it turned a velvety blue when heated to 400 degrees Fahrenheit. Tiffany & Co. named it “tanzanite” and promoted it as “the most important gemological discovery in 2,000 years.” Tanzanite became a U.S. marketing phenomenon, second in popularity only to sapphire among colored stones.

HEART OF THE OCEAN

Its popularity soared when movie fans learned that the sapphire heart-shaped pendant Kate Winslet hurled into the sea in the movie “Titanic” was actually tanzanite. By then, the U.S. was selling $380 million of tanzanite jewelry a year.

Yet Tanzania’s official exports of uncut tanzanite crystal totaled a mere $16 million last year. Rampant smuggling spirits as much as 90 percent of the production out of the country, Tanzanian government statistics show. Local traders often buy plastic bags full of rough stones, paying cash and exchanging none of the paperwork that would trigger a 3 percent export duty. And in faraway places where the rough tanzanite is cooked, cut and polished, such as the Indian city of Jaipur, dealers say they don’t question suppliers closely about sources.

Mererani, which is a 30-minute drive from the mines along a treacherous dirt road, is reminiscent of a Gold Rush town, with shacks, bars, brothels and hordes of young men hoping for a strike. Besides a few big mechanized mining operations, hundreds of individuals hold tiny, 50-yard-square claims that they mine as best they can. Working with the “spacemen” who descend the tunnels are “snakes,” the term for boys who sift piles of grit on the surface and sometimes wriggle into the crevices too small for adults. Restaurants play on the dreams of prosperity, taking names like New York and The Big Apple. But alongside the dreams and the decadence, a religious radicalism is brewing.

Tanzania’s Muslims, who make up about 40 percent of the populace, have long practiced a “soft” Islam, tolerant of drinking, revealing dress and their many Christian neighbors. But Muslim radicalism began to rise in the early 1990s, fueled by poverty and financial support from Islamic charities abroad. It included the al-Qaida cell that bombed the U.S. embassy in Tanzania three years ago.

In Mererani, a new mosque called Taqwa has brought an openly radical Muslim presence to the tanzanite district. Taqwa’s imam, Sheik Omari, has issued edicts that Muslims miners should sell their stones only to fellow Muslims. The diktats breed resentment. “The fundamentalists have established a mafia to dominate the trade,” says Abdallah, the Kenyan spaceman. “Even if non-Muslims offer better prices for our stones, we are harassed by the fundamentalists not to sell to anyone but them. Many Muslim miners obey because they are scared of them.”

The Taqwa mosque is still under construction on a dusty side street. Inside a temporary prayer hall of wood and corrugated metal, miners are taught the importance of avenging the “arrogance” of America and defending Afghanistan from “U.S. oppression.” Support for bin Laden is a duty, miners are told. The faithful of Taqwa often address one another as Jahidini, a Swahili word that means Muslim militant. Some routinely greet one another as “Osama.”

After prayers, the mosque’s courtyard becomes an open-air gem-dealing space, where Sheik Omari and other mosque leaders trade tanzanite with small-time miners. In between haggling, the elders preach the virtues of suicide attacks as a way to defend their faith.

‘TICKET TO PARADISE’

“Remember, Islam teaches us that your body is a weapon,” Sheik Omari tells a group of young men in Swahili. “But if you die, you should take as many of your enemy with you as you can. This will be your ticket to paradise.”

Asked if he works with or belongs to al-Qaida, Sheik Omari gives a vague answer, as do others at the mosque. ” ‘Al-Qaida’ means ‘base.’ I don’t know any base. But Islam says we must support our brothers and sisters and those who defend Islam from its enemies,” Sheik Omari says.

The mosque traders, who aren’t licensed as dealers but act as informal middlemen, make clear the gem business must serve their militant brand of Islam. “We as Muslims must unite in dealing in gemstones to help one another and to generate funds to defend Islam from those who want to destroy it,” says Aman Mustafa, a Kenyan gem broker and teacher at the mosque, who says he has studied Islamic law in Sudan.

U.S. investigators of al-Qaida’s business say that it is designed to create self-sustaining networks and cells. Here in Mererani, some proceeds from the tanzanite trade are plowed back into expanding Taqwa’s influence. “This mosque is being built with tanzanite,” Sheik Omari says. “Our Islam is stronger with our efforts to create a Muslim force in this gemstone.”

KENYAN CONNECTION

Magyane, whose government title is regional mine officer, says some of the stones bought by the Muslim militants are smuggled through “rat routes” to the Kenyan city of Mombasa. That city is a stronghold of al-Qaida sympathizers and was a base for the 1998 embassy bombings.

Throughout the embassy-bomber trial this year in New York, several bin Laden associates or former ones, both state witnesses and defendants, referred to dealings in tanzanite in the mid-1990s. Testimony described how the stones moved through Kenya to Hong Kong via one of two al-Qaida companies, Tanzanite King or Black Giant, set up by defendant Wadih el Hage, a gem dealer and former personal secretary to bin Laden. El Hage is serving a life sentence for his role as the bombers’ financial facilitator.

Bin Laden supporters trading tanzanite today face no interference from Tanzanian authorities. “We have no proof they are involved in terrorist activities,” says the mining area’s regional governor, Daniel Ole Njoolay.

Adadi Rajabu, head of Tanzania’s counterterrorism police, adds that “before 1998, we never knew there were people smuggling gemstones on behalf of a terrorist group. But it is not an area we have looked at carefully. Most of our attention since 1998 has been focused on operatives who were likely to be engaged in activities like bombings, not business.”

ROAD TO DUBAI

Sheik Omari and Mustafa say they sell their stones to a prominent local dealer, Abdulhakim Mulla, who Mustafa says sends some of the gems on to Dubai. The dealer denies the Dubai connection. In any event, on a recent day Sheik Omari could be overheard telling miners to bring perfect stones to the mosque, because “our market in Dubai only wants perfect stones.”

To Westerners in the gem business, mention of Dubai raises alarms. For one thing, the emirate is known as a center of money laundering and the underground cash-transfer system known as hawala, much-favored by bin Laden. Dubai also has no gem-cutting industry. It lies far outside normal channels for the trade in rough gemstones, most of which go to Jaipur, to Bangkok or to a few other traditional centers of cutting and polishing.

“Dubai is the kind of place that should throw up a flag that something is definitely askew,” says Cap R. Beesley, president of American Gemological Laboratories in New York, which tests colored stones. “When you see any rechanneling through nontraditional destinations like Dubai, it means someone is finding some financial incentive not to play by the book.”

U.S. law-enforcement officials have identified Dubai as a haven for al-Qaida business interests. The FBI and the Treasury Department are currently trying to help the United Arab Emirates, of which Dubai is a part, to crack down on the abuse of Dubai’s free-trade zones by terrorists and criminals. While this effort mainly focuses on gold smuggling, the U.S. also has reports that al-Qaida uses tanzanite as a way to move funds around the world, says a U.S. government investigator familiar with Dubai.

Out of more than 12,000 pounds of official tanzanite exports from Tanzania last year, a mere 13 pounds were sold to Dubai dealers. But Magyane estimates that a hundred times that amount actually made its way to Dubai, through smuggling.

CASH BUSINESS

In Dubai, on a strip of small jewel shops along a creek, Africans often go door to door trying to sell plastic bags full of unrefined gold and sometimes uncut gemstones for cash. D.B. Siroya, an Indian dealer based in Dubai for two decades, says he has sometime acquired rough tanzanite in Dubai on behalf of Indian friends, buying from sellers he knows.

The cash element is part of what makes the gem trade attractive to al-Qaida, according to Wechsler, the former U.S. counterterrorism official. He says the gem business is also attractive because it is tiered, with many layers of brokers, traders, cutters, polishers and wholesalers between miner and consumer.

A U.S. government-funded report last year for Tanzania’s mining industry noted that the country’s gem industry was “subject to abuse by money launderers, arms and drug dealers.” Afgem Ltd., a South African mining company, has been trying to change that. It advocates branding tanzanite stones with tiny laser-etched logos and bar codes, plus other regulations to discourage smuggling. But its plan last year ignited clashes with small miners, who, Tanzanian intelligence claims, were funded by foreigners with a stake in the current loose system.

The many tiers in the business make it possible for unsavory players to get in and out without leaving much of a trace. In the U.S. jewelry industry, which consumes nearly 80 percent of tanzanite gems, many participants say they have heard industry reports of tanzanite links to al-Qaida only recently, and tend to discount them.

QVC Inc. says it has met with its seven tanzanite vendors to make sure they comply with its ethics code, which says QVC won’t knowingly deal in gemstones “that originate from a group or a country which engages in illegal, inhumane or terrorist activities.” Darlene Daggett, executive vice president of merchandising, says that if tanzanite “definitively can be linked to terrorist activities, we will not continue to sell it.”

Zale Corp. says it has heard “bits and pieces” about such a link, but not enough to know if it needs to change procedures. “It comes down to knowing who we do business with and knowing where they get their stones,” says spokeswoman Sue Davidson. “But all we really know is what they’re telling us. Without some kind of gemstone authorization, certification and tracking system in place, we cannot guarantee that no stone has been smuggled.”

Zale CEO Robert DiNicola adds: “If it came to light that there is a problem with tanzanite, we wouldn’t deal with it.”

Jewelers of America, a retail jewelers’ trade group, says it has been focusing on the “far more significant consequences to human life” of “blood” diamonds, those whose sale helps to fuel African conflicts. “I’m not suggesting we are not willing to look at other connections,” but “we need more information,” says the group’s chief executive, Matthew Runci.

Ann Zimmerman contributed to this article.

Alliance on the rocks: Saudis rejecting U.S. in favor of China

The Saudi Oil Ministry left the United States out of the recent round of lucrative multi-billion dollar energy deals. The winners were companies from China, the European Union and Russia. But it is China that represents the most ambitious aspect of the new Saudi policy.

Uh oh.

I have NO sympathy for enemy combatants. That is what he is, an enemy combatant. I think they are more dangerous then domestic criminals.

But a freeper got banned last night for 'advocating violence' for posting similar words you just did. AND it was a poster that helped us with the Pro Military news.

I have no idea what is on the minds of the Moderators these days. Just wanted to give you a heads up FWIW.

US to hit Syria with sanctions
Jerusalem Post ^ | 2/12/04

A precursor to going into Syria?

Correct link to US to hit Syria with sanctions

jihadi types have been interested in bringing in "white" people especially "professionals

The ones with blue eyes could also be Russians, not Americans. Just a possibility.

Posting for NM_AZ_Granny. More info to file on Smallpox Vaccines:

> Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2004 18:27:47 -0500 (EST)
> To: promed-edr@promedmail.org
> From: ProMED-mail promed@promed.isid.harvard.edu
> Subject: PRO/EDR> Smallpox vaccination,
> secondary/tertiary transfer
>
>
> SMALLPOX VACCINATION, SECONDARY/TERTIARY TRANSFER
>

> A ProMED-mail post
> http://www.promedmail.org
> ProMED-mail is a program of the
> International Society for Infectious Diseases
> http://www.isid.org
> Date: Thu 12 Feb 2004
> From: ProMED-mail promed@promedmail.org
> Source: Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2004; 53(05): 103-5 Fri
> 13 Feb [edited]
>
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5305a3.htm
>
>
> Secondary and tertiary transfer of Vaccinia virus
> among US military
> personnel; US and worldwide, 2002-2004
>

> In December 2002, the Department of Defense (DoD)
> began vaccinating
> military personnel as part of the pre-event
> vaccination program (1).
> Because vaccinia virus is present on the skin at the
> site of vaccination,
> it can spread to other parts of the body
> (autoinoculation) or to contacts
> of vaccinees (contact transfer).
>
> To prevent autoinoculation and contact transfer, DoD
> gave vaccinees printed
> information that focused on handwashing, covering
> the vaccination site, and
> limiting contact with infants (1,2). This report
> describes cases of contact
> transfer of vaccinia virus among vaccinated military
> personnel since
> December 2002; findings indicate that contact
> transfer of vaccinia virus is
> rare. Continued efforts are needed to educate
> vaccinees about the
> importance of proper vaccination-site care in
> preventing contact
> transmission, especially in household settings.
>
> DoD conducts surveillance for vaccine-associated
> adverse events by using
> automated immunization registries, military
> communication channels, and the
> Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS).
> Contact transfer cases are
> defined as those in which vaccinia virus is
> confirmed by viral culture or
> polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays. Other cases
> are classified as
> suspected on the basis of lesion description and
> reported linkage to a
> vaccinated person 3 to 9 days before lesion
> development.
>
> During the period Dec 2002 to Jan 2004, a total of
> 578 286 military
> personnel were vaccinated; 508 546 (88 per cent)
> were male, and 407 923 (71
> per cent) were primary vaccinees (received smallpox
> vaccination for the 1st
> time). The median age of vaccinees was 29 years
> (range: 17 to 76). Among
> vaccinees, cases of suspected contact transfer of
> vaccinia were identified
> among 30 persons: 12 spouses, 8 adult intimate
> contacts, 8 adult friends,
> and 2 children in the same household. These cases
> were reported from
> Colorado (4), North Carolina (4), Texas (4), Alaska
> (2), California (2),
> one in each of Connecticut, Kansas, New Jersey,
> Ohio, South Carolina,
> Washington state, West Virginia, and overseas (7).
> The sources of suspected
> contact transfer were all male service members who
> were primary vaccinees.
> Except for 6 male sports partners, all infected
> contacts were female.
>
> Vaccinia virus was confirmed in 18 (60 per cent) of
> the 30 cases by viral
> culture or PCR. Sixteen of the 18 confirmed cases
> involved uncomplicated
> infections of the skin; 2 involved the eye (3). None
> resulted in eczema
> vaccinatum or progressive vaccinia. 12 of the 18
> confirmed cases were among
> spouses or adult intimate contacts. The observed
> rate of contact transfer
> was 5.2 per 100 000 vaccinees overall or 7.4 per 100
> 000 primary vaccinees.
> Among 27 700 smallpox-vaccinated DoD health-care
> workers, no transmission
> of vaccinia from a vaccinated health-care worker to
> an unvaccinated patient
> or from a vaccinated patient to an unvaccinated
> health-care worker has been
> identified.
>
> 2 of the 18 confirmed cases of transfer of vaccinia
> virus resulted from
> tertiary transfer. One involved a service member,
> his wife, and their
> breast-fed infant; the other involved serial
> transmission among male sports
> partners.
>
> Case reports
>

> Case 1
> ------
> In early May 2003, a service member received his
> primary smallpox
> vaccination. About 6 to 8 days after vaccination, he
> experienced a major
> reaction (an event that indicates a successful take;
> is characterized by a
> papule, vesicle, ulcer, or crusted lesion,
> surrounded by an area of
> induration; and usually results in a scar) (4). The
> vaccinee reported no
> substantial pruritus. He slept in the same bed as
> his wife and kept the
> vaccination site covered with bandages. After
> bathing, he reportedly dried
> the vaccination site with tissue, which he discarded
> into a trash
> receptacle. He also used separate towels to dry
> himself, rolled them so the
> area that dried his arm was inside, and placed them
> in a laundry container.
> His wife handled bed linen, soiled clothing, and
> towels; she reported that
> she did not see any obvious drainage on clothing or
> linen and had no direct
> contact with the vaccination site.
>
> In mid-May, the wife had vesicular skin lesions on
> each breast near the
> areola but continued to breastfeed. About 2 weeks
> later, she was examined
> at a local hospital, treated for mastitis, and
> continued to breastfeed. The
> same day, the infant had a vesicular lesion on the
> upper lip, followed by
> another lesion on the left cheek (5). 3 days later,
> the infant was examined
> by a pediatrician, when another lesion was noted on
> her tongue. Because of
> possible early atopic dermatitis lesions on the
> infant's cheeks, contact
> vaccinia infection with increased risk for eczema
> vaccinatum was
> considered. The infant was transferred to a military
> referral medical
> center for further evaluation. On examination, the
> infant had seborrheic
> dermatitis and no ocular involvement. Skin lesion
> specimens from the mother
> and infant tested positive for vaccinia by viral
> culture and PCR at the
> Alaska Health Department Laboratory and at Madigan
> Army Medical Center.
> Because both patients were stable clinically and the
> lesions were healing
> without risk for more serious complications,
> vaccinia immune globulin was
> not administered. Neither patient had systemic
> complications from the
> infection.
>
> Case 2
> ------
> In July 2003, a service member who had been
> vaccinated was wrestling with
> an unvaccinated service member at a military
> recreational function when the
> bandages covering the vaccination site fell off. The
> unvaccinated service
> member subsequently wrestled with another
> unvaccinated service member. 6
> days later, both unvaccinated service members had
> lesions on their
> forearms, neck, and face. Skin lesion specimens from
> both men tested
> positive for vaccinia virus by PCR and viral culture
> at Tripler Army
> Medical Center's microbiology laboratory.
>
> (Reported by: TW Barkdoll, MD, Okinawa, Japan. RB
> Cabiad, Fort Richardson;
> MS Tankersley, MD, JL Adkins, MD, Elmendorf Air
> Force Base; B Jilly, PhD, G
> Herriford, Alaska Public Health Laboratory. AC
> Whelen, PhD, CA Bell, PhD,
> Tripler Army Medical Center, Honolulu, Hawaii. MP
> Fairchok, MD, LC Raynor,
> MD, VA Garde, MD, VM Rothmeyer, SD Mahlen, PhD,
> Madigan Army Medical
> Center, Fort Lewis, Washington. RJ Engler, MD, LC
> Collins, MD, LL Duran,
> Vaccine Healthcare Center Network, Walter Reed Army
> Medical Center; MT
> Huynh, MD, RD Bradshaw, MD, Bolling Air Force Base,
> Washington, DC. JD
> Grabenstein, PhD, Military Vaccine Agency, U.S. Dept
> of Defense.)
>
> MMWR editorial note
>

> The findings in this report indicate that the
> primary risk for secondary
> transfer of vaccinia was among persons who shared a
> bed; 12 of the 18
> confirmed cases were spouses or adult intimate
> contacts. However, the
> majority of vaccinated DoD personnel who shared a
> bed did not transfer
> vaccinia virus to their contacts. The frequency of
> contact transfer in the
> military vaccination program is comparable to rates
> observed during the
> 1960s, although persons are less likely to be immune
> to vaccinia today and
> thus are more susceptible to contact transfer (1).
>
> The 1st case of tertiary transfer described in this
> report underscores the
> need for breastfeeding mothers with household
> contact with vaccinees to
> take precautions to prevent inadvertent transmission
> of vaccinia to their
> infants. Direct contact is presumed to be the major
> mode of transmission,
> but clothing and bed linen might act as vectors for
> secondary transmission.
> Tertiary transmission, although rare, is facilitated
> when the secondary
> infection is not recognized. Programs that educate
> health care workers,
> vaccinees, and contacts should note that new
> vesicles or pustules that
> appear 15 days after the vaccinia scab falls off
> from the vaccination site
> might be vaccinia infections. Although an infant
> living in the home is not
> a contraindication to vaccination of a family member
> in a non-outbreak
> setting, measures to prevent transmission include
> having vaccinees launder
> their own linens and towels and change their
> bandages away from other
> household members.
>
> During the 1960s, the rate of unintentional
> infection with vaccinia in
> secondary contacts was 2-6 cases per 100 000 primary
> vaccinees (4,6,7).
> During that period, 2/3 of reported contact
> infections occurred among
> children, typically siblings. Such spread could
> manifest as an inadvertent
> infection or, in more severe fashion, as eczema
> vaccinatum or progressive
> vaccinia. Infections of the skin predominated, with
> rarer ocular
> involvement posing a risk for scarring or keratitis.
> In the current DoD
> smallpox vaccination program, no cases of eczema
> vaccinatum have occurred,
> although the population of atopic dermatitis
> patients might have increased
> substantially since the 1960s (8). During the 1960s,
> eczema vaccinatum
> resulted in deaths, and 2/3 of such cases were
> related to contact transfer
> of vaccinia virus (6). In the current DoD smallpox
> vaccination program,
> careful screening of DoD vaccinees and their
> household contacts for skin
> diseases along with targeted education likely
> contributed to both screening
> out vaccine candidates with personal or
> close-contact contraindications and
> educating vaccinees about proper infection-control
> measures.
>
> Health care workers and the public should report
> suspected cases of contact
> transfer of vaccinia virus to their state or local
> health departments and
> to VAERS at http://www.vaers.org, or by telephone
> 800-822-7967. Viral
> culture or PCR assays, important for confirming
> vaccinia virus, are
> available from the majority of state public health
> laboratories.
>
> References
>

> (1) Grabenstein JD, Winkenwerder W Jr. US military
> smallpox vaccination
> program experience. JAMA 2003; 289: 3278-82.
> (2) CDC. Recommendations for using smallpox vaccine
> in pre-event
> vaccination program: supplemental recommendations of
> the Advisory Committee
> on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare
> Infection Control
> Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC). MMWR 2003;
> 52(RR-7).
> (3) CDC. Smallpox vaccination and adverse events:
> guidance for clinicians.
> MMWR 2003; 52(RR-4).
> (4) Garde V, Harper D, Fairchok M. Tertiary contact
> vaccinia in a
> breastfeeding infant. JAMA 2004; 291: 725-7.
> (5)Neff JM, Lane JM, Fulginiti VA, Henderson DA.
> Contact
> vaccinia---transmission of vaccinia from smallpox
> vaccination. JAMA 2002;
> 288: 1901-5.
> (6)Sepkowitz KA. How contagious is vaccinia? N Engl
> J Med 2003; 348: 439-46.
> (7)Engler RJ, Kenner J, Leung DY. Smallpox
> vaccination: risk considerations
> for patients with atopic dermatitis. J Allergy Clin
> Immunol 2002; 110: 357-65.
>
> --
> ProMED-mail
> promed@promedmail.org
>
> [see also:
> Smallpox vaccination and breastfeeding
> 20040212.0465
> 2003
> ---
> Smallpox vaccination adverse events - USA (12)
> 20030712.1716
> Smallpox vaccination, adverse events - USA
> 20030301.0515
> Smallpox vaccination, adverse event monitoring - USA
> 20030206.0324
> 2002
> ---
> Smallpox vaccination hazards (03)
> 20021017.5571
> Smallpox vaccine hazards
> 20020817.5080
> Smallpox vaccine, criticism of choice - UK
> 20020730.4892
> Smallpox vaccine, ACIP recommendations - USA (02)
> 20020621.4560]
>
> .....................cp/pg/sh
>
>
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Good morning all. Friday the 13th proved to be Friday the 13th for this guy.

Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Chechen rebel leader, is shown in this 1995 file photo during a press conference in Grozny. Former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev died Friday, Feb. 13, 2004, after a reported car explosion in the Qatari capital of Doha, a doctor said. The doctor told The Associated Press that Yandarbiyev died from his injuries on the way to the hospital. (AP Photo/File)

Ex-Chechen President Yandarbiyev Killed

By JABER AL-HARMI, Associated Press Writer

DOHA, Qatar - Former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, wanted in Russia for terrorist ties and linked to al-Qaida, died Friday after an explosion ripped apart his car in the Qatari capital, the Interior Ministry said.

Yandarbiyev, also a poet and children's author, was killed in the 12:45 p.m. blast, which also injured his 13-year-old son, an official at the ministry told the Qatar News Agency.

A doctor at Hamad General Hospital said Yandarbiyev died en route, and his son was in critical condition.

They were the only two people brought to the hospital, the doctor said. Earlier, another official at the hospital had said earlier that two bodyguards were dead on arrival.

The Interior Ministry was investigating the incident, the news agency said. The Russian Embassy had no immediate comment.

Russia has been seeking the extradition of Yandarbiyev, who has been living in Qatar for more than three years. He was considered a key link in the Chechen rebels' finance network, channeling funds from abroad.

His death came one week after a bomb exploded in Moscow's subway, killing at least 41 people and injuring more than 100 others in a suicide attack that President Vladimir Putin blamed on Chechen separatist rebels.

Boris Labusov, a spokesman for Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, a top KGB successor, said his agency had no involvement in Yandarbiyev's death, according to the ITAR-Tass news agency.

The Interfax news agency quoted Chechnya's Kremlin-backed President Akhmad Kadyrov as saying, "Yandarbiyev was the main ideologue of the separatists, and therefore of the terrorist organizations bringing Chechnya to such severe consequences. He is guilty of everything that has happened."

Arab satellite channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya reported that two people were killed in the explosion.

Al-Jazeera said the explosion occurred after Yandarbiyev had prayed at a mosque in the upscale residential area of al-Dafnah, a northern suburb of Doha. He got into his private car, and the explosion went off at a road intersection 300 yards away.

The station showed a badly mangled and burned SUV, with only its white fender still recognizable. Security forces and a sniffer dog worked the area as a body, wrapped in white sheet, was loaded into a waiting ambulance.

Born in 1952, Yandarbiyev became vice president of the Russian republic of Chechnya under separatist president Dzhokhar Dudayev, and served as acting president of de facto independent Chechnya in 1996-97. He headed the rebel delegation to talks with then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin and then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in 1996.

Yandarbiyev opened a Chechen embassy in Kabul and a consulate in Kandahar during the reign of the hard-line Taliban militia.

The United Nations last year put Yandarbiyev on a list of people with alleged links to the al-Qaida terrorist network. The U.S. government also put Yandarbiyev on a list of international terrorists subject to U.S. financial sanctions.

Yandarbiyev denied links between Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network and Chechen rebels.

Russian forces withdrew from Chechnya in 1996 after a disastrous 20-month war with rebels, leaving the republic largely lawless and running its own affairs. Troops swept in again in 1999 after Chechnya-based militants launched raids into a neighboring region and after some 300 people were killed in apartment building explosions that Russian officials blamed on Chechen separatists.

Yandarbiyev was a nationalist poet and children's book author, and he became one of the most prominent proponents of radical Islam among the rebels. He came in third in de facto independent Chechnya's 1997 presidential elections, behind moderate Aslan Maskhadov and fiery rebel Shamil Basayev.

Yandarbiyev is the most prominent Chechen separatist to have been killed since the 2002 death of warlord Omar Ibn al Khattab, who reportedly was poisoned.

I always think of the term by which McVeigh and Nichols were known among the middle-easterners who had contact with them: "lily-whites"...

>>>>The United Nations last year put Yandarbiyev on a list of people with alleged links to the al-Qaida terrorist network.

At what point can we finally get rid of that word?

Since this article is only available in Cache now....I'm pasting it here for safe keeping

TRAIL OF TERROR
Lily Whites' Recruited to Carry Out OKC Bombing

Sunday, June 30, 2002 12:21 a.m. EDT

A congressional task force investigating the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing had information suggesting that Islamic plotters recruited two "lily whites" - non-Middle Easterners with no connection to prior terrorist activity - to carry out the attack ultimately perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, according to a report broadcast late Saturday.

Terrorism expert Yossef Bodansky discussed the previously secret evidence obtained by Congress during an interview with Fox News Channel's Rita Cosby.

COSBY: I'm going to read some information that we obtained here at Fox News - something else you wrote that, more importantly, that the congressional task force learned: That two "lily whites" - these are people sort of considered non-Middle Easterners - had been recruited to carry out the bombing of an American federal building.

BODANSKY: "Lily whites" are people that have no - nothing to do with ethnic background, that's not true. "Lily whites" is the term used for people who have no past known encounter with security authorities anywhere in the U.S. or anywhere in the world. And therefore, there's no way they will raise an alarm bell with the security authorities once they're involved in something.

COSBY: So these are people who would sort of be out of the scope?

BODANSKY: It can be somebody from the heart of Africa, somebody from the middle of Australia or anywhere else. (End of Excerpt)

Couple Bodansky comments with a report on Judicial Watch Radio last week, where Judicial Watch co-counsel Mike Johnson detailed a very specific warning that came just hours before the OKC bombing from Washington, D.C.'s then-top terrorism expert.

"Vincent Cannistraro, who is the former Chief of Counter-Terrorism for the CIA, called Special [FBI] Agent Kevin L. Foust, and informed him that one of his best sources from Saudi Arabia intelligence specifically advised him that there was a squad of people currently in the United States, very possibly Iraqi, and I'm quoting, 'who have been tasked with carrying out terrorist acts against the United States,'" said Johnson.

"The Saudi informant, who's part of the Saudi Counter-Terrorism Service, told him that he had seen the list and that 'first on the list was the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.'"

Johnson said other targets on the Saudi informant's list included Immigration and Naturalization Service offices in Houston and what was then the FBI's counterterrorism headquarters in Los Angeles.

Good thinking, Cal.

And I see the term doesn't mean anything ethnic, but more to do with their lack of connections to any other crime.

Maybe. Don't forget, this evil mindset seems to thrive off of 'dual'. Dual use, dual meaning, dual intent.