Workers Taped Together Explosive Pieces (Pantex Nuclear Plant)

AP/Yahoo ^ | 1-23-2004 | Matt Kelley

[Kirkwood]

Sounds to me like it wasn't that they were stupid, but rather that they were never properly trained to recognize the danger of what they did.

[U S Army EOD]

There was no danger. Trust me.

[MHGinTN]

Awarded posthumously.

[DMCA]

Because the got most of the info from this url: http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/pantex/cor_20040120_px.pdf

The Honorable Spencer Abraham Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20585-1000 Dear Secretary Abraham: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has followed closely events surrounding the recent discovery of cracked high explosive during a weapon dismantlement at the Pantex Plant. When damaged, the response of this particular conventional explosive is difficult to predict, but it is known that the explosive becomes more sensitive. Also, the configuration of the partially dismantled weapon and the nature of the cracks appear to have increased the opportunities for dropping all or part of the explosive during handling, and hence increased the potential for a violent reaction.

In such a case, one expects the most careful scrutiny and deliberate decision-making process in determining the best way to proceed. The Department of Energy has established mechanisms to ensure that this deliberate process takes place.
These include the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process, the Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) review process, and review by the appropriate design agency of Nuclear Explosive Engineering Procedures (NEEP). In this case, however, inappropriate conclusions degraded the effectiveness of these mechanisms: ! The USQ evaluation incorrectly concluded that the situation was bounded by existing safety analyses. Had the evaluation established the need for a more formalized hazard analysis and weapon response from the design agency, a USQ would have been declared, and processes would have been initiated to ensure a more thorough and measured analysis of the hazards involved. ! The NES review incorrectly concluded that the cracks observed and the actions being taken to address them constituted a trivial change. Taping and moving cracked explosive is not addressed in the current NES Study for this system. Had the NES review found this to be a nontrivial change, NES processes would have been initiated to ensure a more thorough and measured analysis of the hazards involved. ! The design agency did not fully identify the potential safety concerns associated with the NEEP or with the condition of the explosive.

The design agency does not appear to have consulted with the developer of the explosive regarding its potential hazards when damaged. The conclusion of the design agency that the taped explosive introduced no new hazards may have contributed to the inappropriate conclusions from the NES and USQ processes. The Honorable Spencer Abraham Page 2 In addition, the recovery procedure and associated training appear to have been inadequate: ! The NEEP, a one-time-use procedure developed to provide special handling instructions and complete the dismantlement, required clarification to the production technicians, did not anticipate potential behavior of the cracked explosive, and could not be completed. Further, the NEEP provided no cautionary notes to the production technicians regarding the condition of the explosive or the potential for dropping pieces of explosive. ! The training established for performing the NEEP did not require hands-on demonstration prior to execution. As a result, the required taping of the explosive was not performed as intended. !

Personnel responsible for developing the NEEP were not present to supervise its execution. The uncertainties and abnormalities of this situation would appear to have called for the presence of at least the process engineer. The prudent response of the production technicians as they saw unexpected behavior of the explosive provided the only effective barrier preventing a drop of explosives with potentially unacceptable consequences. However, the significance of the failures that preceded the technicians actions raises questions about the effectiveness of the mechanisms put in place to ensure safe nuclear explosive operations.

The Pantex Site Office and the Pantex contractor are moving forward with plans to address many of these questions; however, the Board would like to be informed of the analysis and corrective measures that will be taken. Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), the Board requests a comprehensive report within 30 days of receipt of this letter documenting a root-cause analysis of each of the failures that led to this situation, and including commitments for their resolution.

Sincerely, John T. Conway Chairman

c: The Honorable Linton Brooks The Honorable Everet H. Beckner Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.

[FreedomCalls]

These are partially dissembled war heads that do not have all the safties in place.

If the "pit" is exposed to be dismantled then the tamper casing is not there to reflect the fast neutrons back and sustain a symmetrical reaction -- it will not go critical. At most you will get the pit broken up and spread around the room from the force of the HE.

[DMCA]

There is a good chance you are correct. But people who work with Nuclear weapons should not take chances. We spend billions each year to test, in simulation, these damn things and they should not make it up as they go along.

The stakes are too high.

[U S Army EOD]

Yep that is the way it works. So what is the problem. My guess is that some ex EOD guy decided to use the tape. You do not want the explosive grinding against itself creating friction or static electricity.

[Trajan88]

Duct tape... not to be used for everything.

Trajan88

[DMCA]

Unless the HE breach the containment. Now that would not happen at a well ran plant, but is doesn't appear that all portions of the Pantex operation are well run. It would not be the first time that mistakes happened.

[U S Army EOD]

By the use of tape, they made it a safer situation by stabilizing the movement of the cracked explosive.

[Travis McGee]

You are making huge assumptions based on little fact and less understanding. The paragraph you pasted is purple prose by bureaucrats who have never seen the inside of an igloo or touched HE in their lives.

Have you ever handled high explosives?

[upchuck]

Interesting... as far as I can tell, the reporter never ID'd the plant's location. There used to be a Pantex plant in Amarillo TX. Maybe that's it?

[DMCA]

This is the bio of the guy that wrote it.

ohn T. Conway, Chairman
John T. Conway, an engineer and attorney, is Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. His nuclear experience includes 12 years on the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Congress (six years as Staff Director), 11 years as president/ Chairman of the Board of the American Nuclear Energy Council, and eight years as Chairman of the Con Edison Indian Point Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee. Following is a brief resume:



Oct. 1989 - Present Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Chairman

1982 - 1989 Consolidated Edison Company, Executive Vice President

1982 - 1989 American Nuclear Energy Council (ANEC),Chairman

1978 - 1982 American Nuclear Energy Council (ANEC), President, Chief Executive Officer

1968 - 1978 Consolidated Edison Company, Executive Assistant to Charles F. Luce, Chairman of the Board (1970 78,
duties included Chairman, Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee)

1956 - 1968 United States Congress, Staff Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (1958 62, Assistant Staff Director; 1962
68, Executive Director)

1950 - 1956 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Special Agent served in Kentucky, New York,
Washington, D.C.

1949 - 1950 Meighan & Necarlsomer Law Firm, Associate

[Mad_Tom_Rackham]

Sounds like a good topic for another "Reality TV" program. It could be entitled "Morons on the Job".

[U S Army EOD]

Now having Wackenhut there is another story. I put in for disability after leaving there because due to conditioned reflexes, every time I got in my deer stand and put my rifle down I fell asleep. While I was there, I was once questioned if I ever slept on duty to which I replied yes all the time. Asked why I slept on duty, my answer was just who in the hell am I supposed to talk to keep awake since everybody else was asleep. It was always important to try to fall asleep first in case the guy next to you snoared real loud which could prevent you from falling asleep and have to be bored all night.

[Squantos]

The prudent response of the production technicians as they saw unexpected behavior of the explosive provided the only effective barrier preventing a drop of explosives with potentially unacceptable consequences

......My guess is that some ex EOD guy decided to use the tape.

Them EOD guys are sooooooo damn smart !

Stay Safe !

[DMCA]

They shouldn't have been in that situation in the first place. These are Nuclear weapons that are needed to defend our country and an accident such as this could turn public opinion away from them.

As much as I dislike the damn things, they are a necessary evil and those that deal with them should treat them with respect and follow ever last procedure correctly. It should have not gotten to the point where they had to tape it.

[Travis McGee]

A guy who writes papers, and never handles HE. Similar to the wonks who were fired in this case.

[Travis McGee]

55: ROTFLMAO!!!

[U S Army EOD]

So he was in management a lot, when did he ever work with or learn to understand explosives. I met guys like him when I was working for Wackenhut at a DOE facility. All those guys know is how to get the career ticket punched.