Interesting... as far as I can tell, the reporter never ID'd the plant's location. There used to be a Pantex plant in Amarillo TX. Maybe that's it?
Posted on 01/23/2004 8:17:12 PM PST by blam
Workers Taped Together Explosive Pieces
By MATT KELLEY, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON - Workers at the only U.S. factory for dismantling nuclear weapons risked an explosion this month by taping together broken pieces of high explosive being removed from the plutonium trigger of an old warhead, federal investigators said.
The unorthodox handling of the unstable explosive increased the risk that the technicians would drop it and set off a "violent reaction," the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board said Tuesday in a letter to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham (news - web sites).
Such a reaction could have "potentially unacceptable consequences," board chairman John T. Conway said in the letter, which raised disquieting questions about safety at the Energy Department's Pantex nuclear weapons plant near Amarillo, Texas.
No one was hurt and nothing exploded.
However, the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the Energy Department's nuclear weapons programs, is investigating, spokesman Bryan Wilkes said Friday.
"Safety remains a priority for us," Wilkes said. "We are working to address the issues in the letter."
Conway's letter did not make clear whether the explosive had been separated at the time from the softball-sized chunk of plutonium that forms the "pit," or trigger, of a thermonuclear warhead. To prevent a thermonuclear blast, the pit would have to have been separated from the larger warhead.
But if the explosive were still connected to the trigger, an explosion could have injured or killed workers, and could have spread plutonium or other radioactive materials around the facility.
The taping and removal of the explosive did not go as planned, and only quick thinking by the technicians prevented them from dropping the explosive, Conway wrote.
Conway said that taping the explosives together was just one of several mistakes made by Pantex officials that risked an explosion. Pantex officials also downplayed the risk, Conway noted, calling the cracks in the explosive and the fact that workers taped it together a "trivial" change in procedures.
Jud Simmons, a spokesman for Pantex plant operator BWX Technologies Inc., did not return telephone messages on Friday.
The problem occurred when workers were dismantling the plutonium "pit" from a nuclear warhead. The pit is the sphere of plutonium metal surrounded by explosives. When those explosives detonate, the plutonium is compressed, causing a nuclear explosion. In a thermonuclear weapon, that explosion sets off an even stronger nuclear blast.
Workers found the explosives around the pit were cracked, making them more unstable and easier to detonate, Conway wrote. Their solution was to tape together the cracked explosives and move them to another location.
In his letter, Conway said problems with that included:
_ Failing to consult the explosives' manufacturer to determine how unstable the cracked explosives might be;
_ Performing an incomplete and inadequate safety review before going ahead;
_ Allowing workers to perform the taping and removal without practicing on a mock-up;
_ Failing to have experts who had developed the procedure watch the taping and removal to try to spot any problems.
Conway's letter does not elaborate on what might have happened if the explosive had detonated.
About 250,000 people live within 50 miles of the Pantex plant.
The Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has an inspector stationed at the Pantex plant and at the nation's other nuclear weapons sites. Weekly reports by that inspector, William White, show several concerns with safety at the plant, including flaws in the software designed to control the movement of nuclear and explosive materials around the site.
White reported in October that Pantex technicians had made a mistake while dismantling a W62 warhead from a Minuteman missile. A drill damaged part of the warhead's nuclear core, prompting officials to evacuate the facility until experts determined that no radiation had leaked, White wrote.
The Honorable Spencer Abraham Secretary of Energy 1000 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20585-1000 Dear Secretary Abraham: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has followed closely events surrounding the recent discovery of cracked high explosive during a weapon dismantlement at the Pantex Plant. When damaged, the response of this particular conventional explosive is difficult to predict, but it is known that the explosive becomes more sensitive. Also, the configuration of the partially dismantled weapon and the nature of the cracks appear to have increased the opportunities for dropping all or part of the explosive during handling, and hence increased the potential for a violent reaction.
In such a case, one expects the most careful scrutiny and deliberate decision-making process in determining the best way to proceed. The Department of Energy has established mechanisms to ensure that this deliberate process takes place.
These include the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process, the Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) review process, and review by the appropriate design agency of Nuclear Explosive Engineering Procedures (NEEP). In this case, however, inappropriate conclusions degraded the effectiveness of these mechanisms: ! The USQ evaluation incorrectly concluded that the situation was bounded by existing safety analyses. Had the evaluation established the need for a more formalized hazard analysis and weapon response from the design agency, a USQ would have been declared, and processes would have been initiated to ensure a more thorough and measured analysis of the hazards involved. ! The NES review incorrectly concluded that the cracks observed and the actions being taken to address them constituted a trivial change. Taping and moving cracked explosive is not addressed in the current NES Study for this system. Had the NES review found this to be a nontrivial change, NES processes would have been initiated to ensure a more thorough and measured analysis of the hazards involved. ! The design agency did not fully identify the potential safety concerns associated with the NEEP or with the condition of the explosive.
The design agency does not appear to have consulted with the developer of the explosive regarding its potential hazards when damaged. The conclusion of the design agency that the taped explosive introduced no new hazards may have contributed to the inappropriate conclusions from the NES and USQ processes. The Honorable Spencer Abraham Page 2 In addition, the recovery procedure and associated training appear to have been inadequate: ! The NEEP, a one-time-use procedure developed to provide special handling instructions and complete the dismantlement, required clarification to the production technicians, did not anticipate potential behavior of the cracked explosive, and could not be completed. Further, the NEEP provided no cautionary notes to the production technicians regarding the condition of the explosive or the potential for dropping pieces of explosive. ! The training established for performing the NEEP did not require hands-on demonstration prior to execution. As a result, the required taping of the explosive was not performed as intended. !
Personnel responsible for developing the NEEP were not present to supervise its execution. The uncertainties and abnormalities of this situation would appear to have called for the presence of at least the process engineer. The prudent response of the production technicians as they saw unexpected behavior of the explosive provided the only effective barrier preventing a drop of explosives with potentially unacceptable consequences. However, the significance of the failures that preceded the technicians actions raises questions about the effectiveness of the mechanisms put in place to ensure safe nuclear explosive operations.
The Pantex Site Office and the Pantex contractor are moving forward with plans to address many of these questions; however, the Board would like to be informed of the analysis and corrective measures that will be taken. Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), the Board requests a comprehensive report within 30 days of receipt of this letter documenting a root-cause analysis of each of the failures that led to this situation, and including commitments for their resolution.
Sincerely, John T. Conway Chairman
c: The Honorable Linton Brooks The Honorable Everet H. Beckner Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
If the "pit" is exposed to be dismantled then the tamper casing is not there to reflect the fast neutrons back and sustain a symmetrical reaction -- it will not go critical. At most you will get the pit broken up and spread around the room from the force of the HE.
Trajan88
Have you ever handled high explosives?
Interesting... as far as I can tell, the reporter never ID'd the plant's location. There used to be a Pantex plant in Amarillo TX. Maybe that's it?
......My guess is that some ex EOD guy decided to use the tape.
Them EOD guys are sooooooo damn smart !
Stay Safe !
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