Posted on 11/06/2003 7:31:54 PM PST by republicanwizard
Astounding Triumph of Republicanism.
THE NORTH RISING IN INDIGNATION AT THE MENACES OF THE SOUTH
Abraham Lincoln Probably Elected President by a Majority of the Entire Popular Vote
Forty Thousand Majority for the Republican Ticket in New-York
One Hundred Thousand Majority in Pennsylvania
Seventy Thousand Majority in Massachusetts
Corresponding Gains in the Western and North-Western States
Preponderance of John Bell and Conservatism at the South
Results of the Contest upon Congressional and Local Tickets
The canvass for the Presidency of the United States terminated last evening, in all the States of the Union, under the revised regulation of Congress, passed in 1845, and the result, by the vote of New-York, is placed beyond question at once. It elects ABRAHAM LINCOLN of Illinois, President, and HANNIBAL HAMLIN of Maine, Vice-President of the United States, for four years, from the 4th March next, directly by the People.
The election, so far as the City and State of New-York are concerned, will probably stand, hereafter as one of the most remarkable in the political contests of the country; marked, as it is, by far the heaviest popular vote ever cast in the City, and by the sweeping, and almost uniform, Republican majorities in the country.
RELATED HEADLINES
ELECTION DAY IN THE CITY: All Quiet and Orderly At the Polls: Progress of the Voting in the Several Wards: The City After Nightfall: How the News Was Received: Unbounded Enthusiasm of the Republicans and Bell-Everett Headquarters: The Times Office Beseiged: Midnight Display of Wide-Awakes: Bonfires and Illuminations
(Excerpt) Read more at nytimes.com ...
Here ya go. Can't be having you feel slighted. Besides, I bought this set of books just for you!
SOURCE: Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, pp. 168-76
The Right of Secession -- that subject which, beyond all others, ignorance, prejudice, and political rancor have combined to cloud with misstatements and misapprehensions -- is a question easily to be determined in the light of what has already been established with regard to the history and principles of the Constitution. It is not something standing apart by itself -- a factious creation, outside of and antagonistic to the Constitution -- as might be imagined by one deriving his ideas from the political literature most current of late years. So far from being against the constitution or incompatible with it, we content that, if the right to secede is not prohibited to the States, and no power to prevent it expressly delegated to the United States, it remains as reserved to the States or the people, from whom all the powers of the General Government were derived.
The compact between the States which formed the Union was in the nature of a partnership between individuals without limitation of time, and the recognized law of such partnerships is thus stated by an eminent lawyer of Massachusetts in a work intended for popular use:
"If the articles between the partners do not contain an agreement that the partnership shall continue for a specified time, it may be dissolved at the pleasure of either partner. But no partner can exercise this power wantonly and injuriously to the other partners, without making himself responsible for the damage he thus causes. If there be a provision that the partnership shall continue a certain time, this is binding."1
We have seen that a number of "sovereign, free, and independent" States, during the war of the Revolution, entered into a partnership with one another, which was not only unlimited in duration, but expressly declared to be a "perpetual union." Yes, when that Union failed to accomplish the purposes for which it was formed, the parties withdrew, separately and independently, one after another, without any question made of their right to do so, and formed a new association. One of the declared objects of this new partnership was to form "a more perfect union." This certainly did not mean more perfect in respect of duration; for the former union had been declared perpetual, and perpetuity admits of no addition. It did not mean that it was to be more indissoluble; for the delegates of the States, in ratifying the former compact of union, had expressed themselves in terms that could scarcely be made more stringent. They then said:
"and we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which, by the said confederation, are submitted to them; and that the articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent; and that the Union shall be perpetual."2
The formation of a "more perfect union" was accomplished by the organization of a government more complete in its various branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, and by the delegation to this Government of certain additional powers or functions which had previously been exercised by the Governments of the respective States -- especially in providing the means of operating directly upon individuals for the enforcement of its legitimately delegated authority. There was no abandonment nor modification of the essential principle of a compact between sovereigns, which applied to the one case as fully as to the other. There was not the slightest intimation of so radical a revolution as the surrender of the sovereignty of the contracting parties would have been. The additional powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were merely transfers of some of those possessed by the State governments -- not subtractions from the reserved and inalienable sovereignty of the political communities which conferred them. It was merely the institution of a new agent who, however enlarged his power might be, would still remain subordinate and responsible to the source from which they were derived -- that of the sovereign people of each State. It was an amended Union, not a consolidation.
It is remarkable fact that the very powers of the Federal Government and prohibitions to the States, which are most relied upon by the advocates of centralism as incompatible with State sovereignty, were in force under the old Confederation when the sovereignty of the States was expressly recognized. The General Government had then, as now, the exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, making treaties and alliances, maintaining an army and navy, granting letters of marque and reprisal, regulating coinage, establishing and controlling the postal service -- indeed, nearly all the so-called "characteristic powers of sovereignty" exercised by the Federal Government under the existing Constitution, except the regulation of commerce, and of levying and collecting its revenues directly, instead of through the interposition of the state authorities. The exercise of these first-named powers was prohibited to the States under the old compact, "without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled," but no one has claimed that the confederation had thereby acquired sovereignty.
Entirely in accord with these truths are the arguments of Mr. Madison in the "Federalist," to show that the great principles of the constitution are substantially the same as those of the Articles of Confederation. He says:
"I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. . . . Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the General Government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that, in the new Government as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.""The truth is," he adds, "that the great principles of the constitution proposed by the Convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the Articles of Confederation."3
In the papers immediately following, he establishes this position in detail by an analysis of the principal powers delegated to the Federal Government, showing that the spirit of the original instructions to the Convention had been followed in revising "the Federal Constitution" and rendering it "adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union."4
The present Union owes its very existence to the dissolution, by separate secession of its members, of the former Union, which, as we have thus seen, as to its organic principles, rested upon precisely the same foundation. The right to withdraw from the association results, in either case, from the same principles -- principles which, I think, have been established on an impregnable basis of history, reason, law, and precedent.
It is not contended that this right should be resorted to for insufficient cause, or, as the writer already quoted on the law of partnership says, "wantonly and injuriously to the other partners," without responsibility of the seceding party for any damage thus done. No association can be dissolved without a likelihood of the occurrence of incidental questions concerning common property and mutual obligations -- questions concerning common property and mutual obligations -- questions sometimes of a complex and intricate sort. If a wrong be perpetrated, in such a case, it is a matter for determination by the means usually employed among independent and sovereign powers -- negotiation, arbitration, or, in the failure of these, by war, with which, unfortunately, Christianity and civilization have not yet been able entirely to dispense. But the suggestion of possible evils does not at all affect the question of right. There is no great principle in the affairs of either of individuals ro of nations that is not liable to such difficulties in its practical application.
But, we are told, there is no mention made of secession in the Constitution.
Mr. Everett says:
"The States are not named in it; the word sovereignty does not occur in it; the right of secession is as much ignored in it as the procession of the equinoxes."
We have seen how very untenable is the assertion that the States are not named in it, and how much pertinency or significance in the omission of the word "sovereignty." The pertinent question that occurs is, Why was so obvious an attribute of sovereignty not expressly renounced if it was intended to surrender it? It certainly existed; it was not surrendered; therefore it still exists. This would be a more natural and rational conclusion than that it has ceased to exist because it is not mentioned.
The simple truth is, that it would have been a very extraordinary thing to incorporate into the Constitution any express provision for the secession of the States and dissolution of the Union. Its founders undoubtedly desired and hoped that it would be perpetual; against the proposition for power to coerce a state, the argument was that it would be a means, not of preserving, but of destroying, the Union. It was not for them to make arrangements for its termination -- a calamity which there was no occasion to provide for in advance. Sufficient for their day was the evil thereof. It is not usual, either in partnerships or in treaties between governments, to make provision for a dissolution of the partnership or a termination of the treaty, unless there be some special reason for a limitation of time. Indeed, in treaties, the usual formula includes a declaration of their perpetuity; but in either case the power of the contracting parties, or any of them, to dissolve the compact, on terms not damaging to the rights of the other parties, is not the less clearly understood. It was not necessary in the Constitution to affirm the right of secession, because it was an attribute of sovereignty, and the States had reserved all which they had not delegated.
The right of the people of the several States to resume the powers delegated by them to the common agency, was not left without positive and ample assertion, even at a period when it had never been denied. The ratification of the Constitution by Virginia has already been quoted, in which the people of that State, through their Convention, did expressly "declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them and at their will.5
New York and Rhode Island were no less explicit, both declaring that "the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness."6
These expressions are not mere obiter dicta, thrown out incidentally, and entitled only to be regarded as an expression of opinion by their authors. Even if only such, they would carry great weight as the deliberately expressed judgment of enlightened contemporaries, but they are more: they are parts of the very acts or ordinances by which these States ratified the Constitution and acceded to the Union, and can not be detached from them. If they are invalid, the ratification itself was invalid, for they are inseparable. By inserting these declarations in their ordinances, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island, formall, officially, and permanently, declared their interpretation of the Constitution as recognizing the right of secession by the resumption of their grants. By accepting the ratifications with this declaration incorporated, the other States as formally accepted the principle which it asserted.
I am well aware that it has been attempted to construe these declarations concerning the right of the people to reassume their delegations of power -- especially in the terms employed by Virginia, "people of the United States" -- as having reference to the idea of one people, in mass, or "in the aggregate." But it can scarcely be possible that any candid and intelligent reader, who has carefully considered the evidence already brought to bear on the subject, can need further argument to disabuse his mind of that political fiction. The "people of the United States," from whom the powers of the Federal Government were "derived," could have been no other than the people who ordained and ratified the Constitution; and this, it has been shown beyond the power of denial, was done by the people of each State, severally and independently. No other people were known to the authors of the declarations above quoted. Mr. Madison was a leading member of the Virginia convention, which made that declaration, as well as of the general Convention that drew up the Constitution. We have seen what his idea of "the people of the United States" was -- "not the people as composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteen soveriegnties."7
Mr. Lee, of Westmoreland ("Light-Horse Harry"), in the same Convention, answering Mr. Henry's objection to the expression, "we the people," said:"It [the Constitution] is now submitted to the people of Virginia. If we do not adopt it, it will be always null and void as to us. Suppose it was found proper for our adoption, and becoming the government of the people of Virginia, by what style should it be done? Ought we not make use of the name of the people? No other style would be proper."8
It would certainly be superflous, after all that has been presented heretofore, to add any further evidence of the meaning that was attached to these expressions by their authors. "The people of the United States" were in their minds the people of Virginia, the people of Massachusetts, and the people of every other State that should agree to unite. They could have meant only that the people of their respective States who had delegated certain powers to the Federal Government, in ratifying the Constitution and acceding to the Union, reserved to themselves the right, in event of the failure of their purposes, to "resume" (or "reassume") those powers by seceding from the same Union.
Finally, the absurdity of the construction attempted to be put upon these expressions will be evident from a very brief analysis. If the assertion of the right of reassumption of their powers was meant for the protection of the whole people -- the people in mass -- the people "in the aggregate" -- of a consolidated republic -- against whom or what was it to protect them? By whom were the powers granted to be perverted to the injury or oppression of the whole people? As no danger could have been apprehended from either of these, it must have been against the Government of the United States that the provision was made; that is to say, the whole people of a republic make this declaration against a Government established by themselves and entirely subject to their own control, under a constitution which contains provision for its own amendment by this very same "whole people," whenever they may think proper! Is it not a libel upon the statesmen of that generation to attribute to their grave and solemn declarations a meaning so vapid and absurd?
To those who argue that the grants of the Constitution are fatal to the reservation of sovereignty by the States, the Constitution furnishes a conclusive answer in the amendment which was coeval with the adoption of the instrument, and which declares that all powers not delegated to the Government of the Union were reserved to the States or to the people. As sovereignty was not delegated by the States, it was necessarily reserved. It would be superfluous to answer arguments against implied powers of the States; none are claimed by implication, because all not delegated by the States remained with them, and it was only in an abundance of caution that they expressed the right to resume such parts of their unlimited power as was delegated for the purposes enumerated. As there be those who see danger to the perpetuity of the Union in the possession of such power by the States, and insist that our fathers did not intend to bind the States together by a compact no better than "a rope of sand," it may be well to examine their position. From what have dangers to the Union arisen? Have they sprung from too great restriction on the exercise of the granted powers, or from the resumption? The whole record of our Union answers, from the latter only.
Was this tendency to usurpation caused by the presumption of paramount authority in the General Government, or by the assertion of the right of a State to resume the powers it had delegated? Reasonably and honestly it can not be assigned to the latter. Let it be supposed that the "whole people" had recognized the right of a state of the Union, peaceably and independently, to resume the powers which, peaceably and independently, she had delegated to the Federal Government, would not this have been potent to restrain the General Government from exercising its functions to the injury and oppressoin of such State? To deny that effect would be to suppose that a dominant majority would be willing to drive a State from the Union. Would the admission of the right of a State to resume the grants it had make, have led to the exercise of that right for light and trivial causes? Surely the evidence furnished by the nations, both ancient and modern, refutes the supposition. In the language of the Declaration of Independence, "all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing ther forms to which they are accustomed." Would not real grievances be rendered more tolerable by the consciousness of power to remove them; and would not even imaginary wrongs be embittered by the manifestation of a purpose to make them perpetual? To ask these questions is to answer them.
The wise and brave men who had, at much peril and great sacrifice, secured the independence of the States, were as little disposed to surrender the sovereignty of the States as they were anxious to organize a General Government with adequate powers to remedy the defects of the Confederation. The Union they formed was not to destroy the States, but to "secure the blessing of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."
[1] Parsons, "rights of a Citizen," chap. xx, section 3.
[2] Ratification appended to Articles of Confederation. (See Elliot's "Debates," vol. i, p. 113.
[3] "Federalist," No. xl.
[4] Ibid., Nos. xli-xliv. [5] See Elliot's "Debates," vol i, p. 360.
[6] Ibid., pp. 361, 369.
[7] Elliot's "debates," vol. iii, p. 114.
[8] Ibid., p. 71.
When the Articles of confederation were amended, when the new Constitution was substituted in their place and the General Government reorganized, its structure was changed, additional powers were conferred upon it, and thereby subtracted from the powers theretofore exercised by the State government; but the seat of sovereignty -- the source of all those delegated and dependent powers -- was not disturbed. There was a new Government or an amended government -- it is entirely immaterial in which of these lights we consider it -- but no new PEOPLE was created or constituted. The people, in whom alone sovereignty inheres, remained just as they had been before. The only change was in the form, structure, and relations of their governmental agencies.No doubt, the States -- the people of the States -- if they had been so disposed, might have merged themselves into one great consolidated State, retaining their geographical boundaries merely as matters of convenience. But such a merger must have been distinctly and formally stated, not left to deduction or implication.
Men do not alienate even an estate, without positive and express terms and stipulations. But in this case not only was there no express transfer -- no formal surrender -- of the preexisting sovereignty, but it was expressly provided that nothing should be understood as even delegated -- that everything was reserved, unless granted in express terms. The monstrous conception of the creation of a new people, invested with the whole or a great part of the sovereignty which had previously belonged to the people of each State, has not a syllable to sustain it in the Constitution, but is built up entirely upon the palpable misconstruction of a singleexpression in the preamble.
In denying that there is any such collective unit as the people of the United States in the aggregate, of course I am not to be understood as denying that there is such a political organization as the United States, or that there exists, with large and distinct powers, a Government of the United States; but it is claimed that the Union, as its name implies, is constituted of States. As a British author,1 referring to the old Teutonic system, has expressed the same idea, the States are the integers, the United States the multiple which results from them. The Government of the United States derives its existence from the same source, and exercises its functions by the will of the same sovereignty that creates and confers authority upon the State governments. The people of each State are, in either case, the source. The only difference is that, in the creation of the State governments, each sovereign acted alone; in that of the Federal Government, they acted in cooperation with the others. Neither the whole nor any part of their sovereignty has been surrendered to either Government.
To whom, in fine, could the States have surrendered their sovereignty? Not to the mass of the people inhabiting the territory possessed by all the States, for there was no such community in existence, and they took no measures for the organization of such a community. If they had intended to do so, the very style, "United States," would have been a palpable misnomer, nor would treason have been defined as levying war against them. Could it have been transferred to the Government of the Union? Clearly not, in accordance with the ideas and principles of those who made the Declaration of Independence, adopted the Articles of Confederation, and established the Constitution of the United States; for in each and all of these the corner-stone is the inherent and inalienable sovereignty of the people. To have transferred sovereignty from the people to a government would have been to have fought the battles of the Revolution in vain -- not for the freedom and independence of the states, but for a mere change of masters. Such a thought or purpose could not have been in the heads or hearts of those who molded the Union, and could have found lodgement only when the ebbing tide of patriotism and fraternity had swept away the landmarks which they erected who sought by the compact of union to secure and perpetuate the liberties then possessed. The men who had won at great cost the independence of their respective States were deeply impressed with the value of union, but they could never have consented, like "the base Judean," to fling away the priceless pearl of State sovereignty for any possible alliance.
[1] Sir Francis Palgrave, quoted by Mr. Calhoun, "Congressional Debates," vol. ix, Part 1, p. 541
SOURCE: Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol I, pp. 154-6.
The Constitution devotes the national domain to union, to justice, to defence, to welfare and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution.
Southerners simply wanted the Constitution obeyed, which the Northern states were not doing. Seward, having reaped the whirlwind with his earlier 'higher law' statement, finally backtracked and said the following in early 1861:
I agree that all laws of the States, whether free States or slave States, which relate to this class of persons, or any others recently coming from or resident in other States, and which laws contravene the Constitution of the United States, or any law of Congress passed in conformity thereto, ought to be repealed.
Perhaps you will take the word of a Lincoln cabinet member? Let's look at the account of Cabinet member Gideon Welles. From The Galaxy, Volume 13, Issue 5, May 1872, excerpted from pages 663-670:
…The Secretary of War [Stanton] manifested a desire to continue military ascendency after the overthrow of the Confederacy. In consultation with his confidants in Congress he proposed by an executive order to abandon the principles laid down by Mr. Lincoln in regard to suffrage, and without warrant from the Constitution, and in derogation of the rights of the States, to authorize the negroes to vote in the elections. President Johnson modified essentially Mr. Stanton’s draft for the temporary government of North Carolina, put the document in the form of a Proclamation instead of an Executive order, and made it more distinctly a civil than military paper. In that respect it was a great improvement on the original and on the Virginia draft. He did not issue the proclamation appointing the Provisional Governor and establishing a temporary government in North Carolina until the 9th of May. The disputed question of suffrage he carefully weighed and investigated, reviewed the whole subject, and while, like Mr. Lincoln, he felt as a man kindly disposed toward the colored race, and would have been gratified even to give them qualified suffrage if were they possessed of capacity, like President Lincoln he came to the conclusion that the subject belonged exclusively to the States and the people of the States respectively, and that the Federal Government had no legal power or legitimate control over it.…Three of the members of President Lincoln’s Administration in 1863 were in the Cabinet of President Johnson in May, 1865, two of whom are understood to have advised an adherence to the rule laid down in 1863. President Johnson agreed with them as to the correctness and legality of the principle, and made it his rule of action in reestablishing loyal governments. There was therefore no change of policy in 1865, on the part of the Administration, from the policy of 1863 in that regard. The views of President Lincoln and President Johnson were identical; yet an organized opposition was immediately commenced against President Johnson for the honest and conscientious discharge of his constitutional duty, which pursued him with vindictive and unrelenting ferocity during his whole Administration, and malignantly and without cause or justification attempted his impeachment. Other pretexts, frivolous and false, were assigned, but the real and true cause of assault and persecution was the fearless and unswerving fidelity of the President to the Constitution, his refusal to proscribe the white people in the rebel States and the States themselves by ex post facto laws, his opposition to central Congressional usurpation, and his maintenance of the of the States and the Executive Department of the Government against legislative aggression.
…But few, comparatively, sympathized with the violent Radicals at the beginning of their opposition to peaceable reconstruction. Tired of war and all its horrid cost, its calamities and abuses, devoted to the Union, and earnestly desiring reconciliation and peace, the masses were, like Mr. Lincoln and his successor, for conciliation and the restoration of friendly feelings. But the expression of these sentiments subjected those Republicans who uttered them to sneers and assaults from Radical partisans. The men who advocated clemency, union, and peace, were denounced as in alliance with Copperheads, as rebel sympathizers, not truly loyal men of unsound principles.
Sounds like you side with the Radicals over Presidents Lincoln and Johnson.
What do you do when Republicans disagree? That must cause a great pain in your head.
SOVEREIGNTY
By Jefferson Davis"The term 'sovereign' or 'sovereignty,' says Judge Story, "is used in different senses, which often leads to a confusion of ideas, and sometimes to very mischievous and unfounded conclusions." Without any disrespect for Judge Story, or any disparagement of his great learning and ability, it may safely be added that he and his disciples have contributed not a little to the increase of this confusion of ideas and the spread of these mischievous and unfounded conclusions. There is no good reason whatever why it should be used in different senses, or why there should be any confusion of ideas as to its meaning. Of all the terms employed in political science, it is one of the most definite and intelligible. The definition of it given by that accurate and lucid publicist, Burlamaqui, is simple and satisfactory -- that "sovereignty is a right of commanding in the last resort in civil society."1 The original seat of this sovereignty he also declares to be in the people. "But," he adds, "when once the people have transferred their right to a sovereign [i.e., a monarch], they can not, without contradiciton, be supposed to continue still masters of it.2 This is in strict accord with the theory of American republicanism, the peculiarity of which is that the people never do transfer their right of sovereignty, either in whole or in part. They only delegate to their governments the exercise of such of its functions as may be necessary, subject always to their own control, and to reassumption whenever such government fails to fulfill the purposes for which it was instituted.
I think it has already been demonstrated that, in this country, the only political community -- the only independent corporate unit -- through which the people can exercise their sovereignty, is the State. Minor communities -- as those of counties, cities, and towns -- are merely fractional subdivisions of the State; and these do not affect the evidence that there was not such a political community as the "people of the United States in the aggregate."
That the States were severally sovereign and independent when they were united under the Articles of Confederation, is distinctly asserted in those articles, and is admitted even by the extreme partisans of consolidation. Of right, they are still sovereign, unless they have surrendered or been divested of their sovereignty; and those who deny the proposition have been vainly called upon to point out the process by which they have divested themselves, or have been divested of it, otherwise than by usurpation.
Since Webster spoke and Story wrote upon the subject, however, the sovereignty of the States has been vehemently denied, or explained away as only a partial, imperfect, mutilated sovereignty. Paradoxical theories of "divided sovereignty" and "delegated sovereignty" have arisen, to create that "confusion of ideas" to which Judge Story speaks. Confounding the sovereign authority of the people with the delegated powers conferred by them upon their governments, we hear of a Government of the United States "sovereign within its sphere," and of State governments "sovereign in their sphere; of the surrender by the States of part of their sovereignty to the United States, and the like. Now, if there be any one great principle pervading the Federal Constitution, the State Constitutions, the writings of the fathers, the whole American system, as clearly as the sunlight pervades the solar system, it is that no government is sovereign -- that all governments derive their powers from the people, and exercise them in subjection to the will of the people -- not a will expressed in any irregular, lawless, tumultuary manner, but the will of the organized political community. expressed through authorized and legitimate channels. The founders of the American republics never conferred, nor intended to confer, sovereignty upon either their State or Federal Governments.
If, then, the people of the States, in forming a federal Union, surrendered -- or, to use Burlamaquie's term, transferred -- or if they meant to surrender or transfer -- part of their sovereignty, to whom was the transfer made? Not to "the people of the United States in the aggregate"; for there was no such people in existence, and they did not create or constitute such a people by merger of themselves. Not to the Federal Government; for they disclaimed, as a fundamental principle, the sovereignty of any government. There was no such surrender, no such transfer, in whole or in part, expressed or implied. They retained, and intended to retain, their sovereignty in its integrity -- undivided and indivisible.
"But, indeed," says Mr. Motley, "the words 'sovereign' and 'sovereignty' are purely inapplicable to the American system. In the Declaration of Independence the provinces declare themselves 'free and independent States,' but the men of those days knew that the word 'sovereign' was a term of feudal origin. When their connection with a time-honored feudal monarchy was abruptly severed, the word 'sovereign' had no meaning for us."3
If this be true, "the men of those days" had a very extraordinary way of expressing their conviction that the word "had no meaning for us." We have seen that, in the very front of their Articles of Confederation, they set forth the conspicuous declaration that each State retained "its sovereignty, freedom, and independence."
Massachusetts -- the State, I believe, of Mr. Motley's nativity and citizenship -- in her original Constitution, drawn up by "men of those days," made this declaration:
"The people inhabiting the territory formerly called the Province of Massachusetts Bay do hereby solemnly and mutually agree with each other to form themselves into a free, sovereign, and independent body politic, or state, by the name of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts."New Hampshire, in her Constitution, as revised in 1792, had identically the same declaration, except as regards the name of the state and the word "State" instead of "Commonwealth."
Mr. Madison, one of the most distinguished of the men of that day and of the advocates of the Constitution, in a speech already once referred to, in the Virginia Convention of 1788, explained that "We, the people of "thirteen SOVEREIGNTIES."4
In the "Federalist," he repeatedly employs the term -- as, for example, when he says: "Do they [the fundamental principles of the Confederation] require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent SOVEREIGNS? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed."5
Alexander Hamilton -- another contemporary authority, no less illustrious -- says, in the "Federalist":
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union."6In the same paragraph he uses these terms, "sovereign" and "sovereignty," repeatedly -- always with reference to the States, respectively and severally.
Benjamin Franklin advocated equality of suffrage in the Senate as a means of securing "the sovereignties of the individual States."7 James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, said sovereignty "is in the people before they make a Constitution, and remains in them," and described the people as being "thirteen independent sovereignties."8 Gouverneur Morris, who was, as well as Wilson, one of the warmest advocates in the convention of a strong central government, spoke of the constitution as "a compact," and of the parties to it as "each enjoying sovereign power"9 Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, declared that the Government "was instituted by a number of sovereign States.10 Oliver Ellsworth, of the same State, spoke of the States as "sovereign bodies."11 These were all eminent members of the Convention which formed the Constitution.
There was scarcely a statesman of that period who did not leave on record expressions of the same sort. But why multiply citations? It is very evident that the "men of those days" entertained very different views of sovereignty from thsoe set forth by the "new lights" of our day. Far from considering it a term of feudal origin, "purely inapplicable to the American system," they seem to have regarded it as a very vital principle in that system, and of necessity belonging to the several States -- and I do not find a single instance in which they applied it to any political organization, except the States.
Their ideas were in entire accord with those of Vattel, who, in his chapter "Of Nations or Sovereign States," writes, "Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on foreign power, is a sovereign state."12
In another part of the same chapter he gives a lucid statement of the nature of a confederate republic, such as ours was designed to be. He says:
"Several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without each in particular ceasing to be a perfect state. They will form together a federal republic: the delibertions in common will offer no violence to the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfill the engagements into which he has very willingly entered."13What this celebrated author means here by a person, is explained by a subsequent passage: "The law of nations is the law of sovereigns; states free and independent are moral persons."14
[ 1] "Principles du Droit Politique," chap v, section 1; also chap. vii, section 1.
[ 2] Ibid., chap. vii, section 12.
[ 3] "Rebellion Record," vol i, Documents, p. 211
[ 4] Elliot's "Debates," vol iii, p. 114, edition of 1836
[ 5] "Federalist," No. xl.
[ 6] Ibid, No. lxxxi.
[ 7] See Elliots "Debates," vol. v. p. 266.
[ 8] See "Life of Gouverneur Morris," vol iii, p. 193
[ 9] See "Writings of John Adams," vol vii, letter of Roger Sherman.
[10] See Elliot;s "Debates," vol ii, p. 197.
[11] "Law of Nations," Book I, chap i, section 4.
[12] Ibid, section 10.
[13] Ibid, section 12.
SOURCE: Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol I, pp. 141-5.
I believe there is a higher law than the Constitution.
Arkansas Democrat Gazette
Monday, December 1, 2003
Section B, Page 1
Confederate heritage claim to fame
Benton man says he is state's youngest living son of a Rebel veteran
By Rodney Bowers
Louis Fite never thought much of his father being an army veteran, even though he served the Confederate States of America.
That changed last year after Fite traveled to Arkadelphia for the rededication of a confederate statue damaged by the March 1997 tornado. At the ceremony, he was told he may be Arkansas' youngest son of a Confederate veteran.
"I walked into it blind," the 84-year-old Benton resident said of his reception at the ceremony. "Everybody wanted a piece of me. None of them had seen a true son" of a Confederate veteran.
Danny Honnoll of Jonesboro, Arkansas division commander of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, said Fite may very well be the state's youngest son. "I think he's probably accurate," Honnoll said, noting that the state's last Rebel, William Loudermilk, died in Honnoll's hometown in 1952 at the age of 104. The nation's last Confederate veteran died seven years later, he said.
Ben Sewell, executive direction of the national organization in Columbia, Tenn., figures Fite "is definitely in the top 10" among the nations youngest sons, of which he believes there are only about 100 still living.
[snip]
He picked up a copy of the Fugitive Slave Act, set fire to it, and said in the language of the Bible, "and let the people say Amen." The vast crowd responded, "Amen!" He picked up a copy of the decision which had sent Burns back to bondage, and copy of a charge to the jury which had tried Burns's erstwhile rescuers. He burned these, too, and asked the crowd to cry "Amen"; it did so eagerly.Then he reached for a copy of the Constitution, held it in his hand and declared that it was the "parent of all the other atrocities." "A covenant with death," he called it, "An agreement with Hell." He set it afire and cried out as it burned, "So perish all compromises with tyranny!" 'And let the people say Amen.'" A huge should of "Amen" echoed. But this time hisses and angry outcries were also audible.
The changed reaction of the crowd probably reflected more general dismay at such abuse of a treasured national symbol than disagreement with Garrison's constititional views.
Philip S. Paludan, A Covenant With Death, 1975, p. 3
Everyone should read what Davis said, and read the counterevidence provided in rebuttal by yourself and others, and decide whose argument is superior on facts and law, and whose argument is more persuasive.
Everybody suffering from insomnia should.
From nolu chan's earlier post (#936) of Lincoln's last cabinet meeting:
At the close of the session Mr. Stanton made some remarks on the general condition of affairs and the new phase and duties upon which we were about to enter.Page 526
He alluded to the great solicitude which the President felt on this subject, his frequent recurrence to the necessity of establishing civil governments and preserving order in the rebel States. Like the rest of the Cabinet, doubtless, he had given this subject much consideration, and with a view of having something practical on which to base action, he had drawn up a rough plan or ordinance which he had handed to the President.
The President said he proposed to bring forward that subject, althought he had not had time as yet to give much attention to the details of the paper which the Secretary of War had given him only the day before; but that it was substantially, in its general scope, the plan which we had sometimes talked over in Cabinet meetings. We should probably make some modifications, prescribe further details; there were some suggestions which he should wish to make, and he desired all to bring their minds to the question, for no greater or more important one could come before us, or any future Cabinet. He thought it providential that this great rebellion was crushed just as Congress had adjourned, and there were none of the disturbing elements of that body to hinder and embarrass us. [Stanton's Radical Republican allies with whom Lincoln had differences on reconstruction before, I imagine] If we were wise and discreet, we should reanimate the States and get their governments in successful operation, with order prevailing the the Union reestablished, before Congress came together in December. This he thought important. [This Johnson accomplished, making the Radicals fume] We could do better; accomplish more without than with them. There were men in Congress who, if their motives were good, were nevertheless impracticable, and who possessed feelings of hate and vindictiveness in which he did not sympathize and could not participate [the Radicals again]. He hoped there would be no persecution, no bloody work, after the war was over. None need expect he would take any part in hanging or killing those men, even the worst of them. Frighten them out of the country, open the gates, let down the bars, scare them off, said he, throwing up his hands as if scaring sheep. Enough lives have been sacrificed. We must extinguish our resentments if we expect harmony and union. There was too much of a desire on the part of some of our very good friends to be masters, to interfere with and dictate to those States, to treat the people not as fellow citizens; there was too little respect for their rights. He did not sympathize in these feelings.
Stanton's plan, whatever it was, doesn't appear to have been agreed to by the cabinet or Lincoln. And I don't read Gideon Welles account as Lincoln agreeing to a harsh reconstruction plan, like Stanton and his allies eventually came up with -- just the opposite. Lincoln was not for the vindictiveness and hate the Radicals demonstrated.
Do you take the Radical's side in the debate over reconstruction?
Correct. They were defending their own Constitution.
Then explain Lincoln's words about the hate and vindictiveness toward the South of some in Congress. Why did Lincoln want governments formed before Congress reconvened?
From American History 102 (Stanley K. Schultz, Professor of History, William P. Tishler, Producer) at the University of Wisconsin (History 102).
Both Lincoln and Johnson had foreseen that the Congress would have the right to deny southern legislators seats in the United States Senate or House of Representatives, under the clause of the Constitution that says: "Each house shall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members." This denial came to pass when, under the leadership of Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, those Congressmen who sought to punish the south refused to seat its duly elected Senators and Representatives. Then, within the next few months, the Congress proceeded to work out a plan of southern reconstruction quite different from the one Lincoln had started and Johnson had continued.
Here is another (When Republicans were Radical).
Composed mainly of pre-war abolitionists, the Radical Republicans wanted to punish the South for the horrors of slavery and for four years of civil war. They were led in the House by Thaddeus Stevens and George W. Julian and in the Senate men like Charles Sumner, Benjamin F. Wade, and Zachariah Chandler provided leadership. They had strongly disagreed with Lincoln’s program for Reconstruction maintaining it was much too lenient.In December 1863, Abraham Lincoln had drafted a program designed to reconstruct the South. Known as the “Ten Percent” plan, it offered a pardon to all Southerners (except Confederate leaders) who took a loyalty oath. When ten percent of that state’s voters had taken the oath, they could establish a new state government. The Radicals strongly opposed this plan and drafted their own course of action, the Wade-Davis bill. This bill, which was vetoed by Lincoln, proposed to delay the formation of new Southern governments until a majority of voters had taken the oath, and equal rights for former slaves must accompany the South’s re-admission to the Union.
Looks like you disagree with Lincoln.
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