Did the United States and Russia Just Agree to Collaborate on Data Centers?

Last Friday, hidden in the aftermath of the U.S. government’s decision to waive sanctions on Russia, was language proposing a joint U.S.-Russia project on data centers. As part of wider negotiations with the United States, Special Envoy to the Russian President Kirill Dmitriev suggested that a joint initiative between the two countries could focus on building data center infrastructure. Moreover, his statement suggested that several Russian companies were “actively participating” in the preliminary stages of these discussions.

Data centers are a delicate issue. Domestically, the rise in AI use is driving massive economic investment in data center development across the nation. Corresponding levels of opposition against data centers and AI remain high among the American public as the United States heads into midterm elections in November. Militarily, this proposal comes just as Ukraine conducted strikes against Russian data centers, disrupting services across Russia, and as President Zelensky vowed to continue targeting them, despite criticism from President Trump.

Most importantly, critical sectors across the U.S. economy and society depend upon data centers—which themselves hold sensitive data—making them vital national security and critical infrastructure assets. Collaboration with Russia in this sector poses severe risks to U.S. national security. Congress should act urgently to understand the proposal’s origin and substance before it becomes an irreversible reality.

Little detail has been released about the proposed idea, locations, participating parties, or timelines. Its origins are also unclear: Is it a serious proposal by the Russian government? Or subtle retaliation at Ukraine’s recent targeting of Russian data centers? Or a means of keeping what some are branding as Russia-Ukraine “peace negotiation” channels open?

Its timing suggests the idea is very much in its infancy. Last week, President Trump waived new sanctions and tariffs on Russia that the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 would have imposed. President Trump noted that the issuance of the waiver was in the “national interests” of the United States. However, the waiver does not appear to impact preexisting sanctions for the technology sector, levied against Russia beginning in 2022 by then-President Biden. Additionally, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce have regulations restricting financial transactions and information technology services with Russia that limit U.S. companies from selling technology to Russia.

This makes it especially unclear as to how such a deal would work in practice, such as whether the Treasury and Commerce regulations would require different exemptions or thresholds in order for the United States to collaborate with Russia. It is also unclear whether new commercial incentives would be needed in order for U.S. private sector companies to participate—let alone to navigate the sanctions landscape. In the current regulatory and political environment, and absent further executive or agency intervention to ease these longstanding regulatory restrictions, the U.S. technology sector would take on significant risk working with Russia on developing data centers.

Although there is historical precedent for security cooperation between the United States and Russia, such as on counterterrorism during the early days of the Global War on Terror, these attempts at cooperation went rapidly downhill. Most importantly, cooperation fell apart following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. A relationship marred by historical and mutual distrust, and a checkered history of cooperation, raises significant questions as to why cooperation on data centers would be possible with an adversary actively involved in war.

Developing a data center with a hostile adversary of the United States would be a terrible move for national security. Russia views itself as being at war with the West, and the Kremlin sees the United States as its main enemy. It has skilled and well-resourced security and intelligence organs, a large cyber web it can use to steal data from and disrupt Western systems, and a military and security apparatus pursuing a full-scale, illegal war on Ukraine and sabotage and destruction across Europe. The Russian government’s legal and extralegal architecture of repression enables its security services—especially the FSB, Russia’s Federal Security Service, which takes primacy at home—to compel or coerce cooperation from a wide range of Russian businesses, organizations, and individuals that do not advertise themselves as government-connected.

Russia’s domestic legal requirements for technology companies are onerous, autocratic, and subject to politically driven changes and discriminatory enforcement on a whim. Any server that sat in Russia or had a business agreement with a Russian entity would immediately expose itself to potential Russian government data access and cyber exploitation. Moreover, the Russian government would never permit such a project to take place without the active involvement of the Russian security services. This renders mere U.S.-Russia calls and emails (on U.S. government systems or nongovernment devices) about the potential deal itself, not to mention any infrastructure that could be built or allocated as part of the stated idea, a significant counterintelligence and cybersecurity threat vector for the United States.

For this reason, functionally speaking, setting up a U.S.-Russia data center deal could likely lead to one of two scenarios, neither of which is good for the United States and its national security:

1. A HOLLOW PACT: The first would be a scenario in which neither side trusts anything that would go into the data center, meaning neither side does anything of value with said infrastructure. The project would lack any clarity or clear sense of purpose, beyond to potentially create high-risk touchpoints between businesspeople in the United States and hostile actors in Russia. This would only serve to advance a Kremlin propaganda line about Russia as a place with which to do business. 2. ASYMMETRIC RISK: The second would be a scenario in which one or both countries—most likely the United States—put some data or software of note in said data center. Such a move would put all U.S. information, related technology, and related personnel at immediate risk of exploitation by the Russian security services. Again, the gains would be none, and the security risks to U.S. data, technology, people, and involved organizations would be enormous. Russia would again win in the propaganda sphere; it could position itself as a country with which one could do business, rather than an authoritarian state waging illegal war on Ukraine and not-so-covert, below-the-threshold conflict on the entirety of the West.

All 27 European Union (EU) Member States formally expressed their regret last week at the U.S. decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russian diesel imports. Moreover, the EU just imposed its largest-ever sanctions package against Russia for its sustained conflict against Ukraine. The proposal undermines these penalties and normalizes Russia’s aggression during active conflict, not to mention sending a message to other states—such as China—that aggression toward neighbors will be tolerated, undermining national sovereignty.

The proposal also poses severe implications for information sharing and data flows. Given that a joint U.S.-Russia data center would bridge two very different geographic and legal jurisdictions, one unintended consequence would be to push the United States’ close partners toward tighter restrictions on their data flows, storage, and greater sovereign architecture. There are also economic consequences: U.S. companies and organizations could face barriers and higher scrutiny operating internationally for fear of customer data being accessible to Russia.

The data center would also be considered a high-risk national security threat by close allies—particularly the Five Eyes, EU member states, and NATO. Even if the joint data center were solely for commercial or energy purposes, the national security risks would be beyond any acceptable risk tolerance. Under joint architecture with Russia, the potential for Russian espionage, cyberattacks, or data exfiltration would be ever-present. Though an extremely adverse consequence, it should come as no surprise if close U.S. allies decided to restrict intelligence sharing with the United States as a result.

The proposal remains in the early stages of discussion between the two governments. As that discussion continues, there needs to be significant scrutiny of the proposal. At a time when U.S. public sentiment is starkly against the building of new data centers in the United States, Congress can play a critical role. It should ask urgent questions of the Trump administration to understand why and how such a proposal should go ahead and whether it can be done safely. Additionally, lawmakers should summon U.S. tech and AI companies to clarify their equities in such a deal, and, most importantly, their preparedness efforts to protect U.S. data should the proposal become a reality.

Russia is an adversary of the United States and NATO. It is engaged in a persistent campaign of subversion and sabotage (and even assassination attempts) against the West, and it is actively involved in a conflict that runs counter to U.S. and NATO interests. A proposal to intermingle with Russia—at the core of the U.S. economy—risks endangering U.S. national security by whitewashing the proposal as part of a broader economic deal. By comparison, in a China-Taiwan conflict scenario, the United States would surely not strike a similar deal to build a data center with China. China is considered both a strategic competitor to the United States and a national security threat. A deal over a data center would legitimize China’s aggression, alienate allies, and signal a lack of U.S. strategic resolve. It would also invite a slew of national security risks from a state with a history of targeting U.S. critical sectors. So, why should the U.S.-Russia proposal be acceptable for U.S. interests? Data centers are a vital national security asset, not a bargaining chip to be used in negotiations with a long-term adversary of the United States.

The position of the US doesn’t make much sense unless there’s some information we, the public, don’t have. I’m guessing that the military has modeled another Soviet style collapse of the Russian Federation. There must be a significant possibility of the nuclear arsenal either ending up in the hands of multiple parties who hate each other, or of a collapse where it gets loose into the wider world.

The Russian military is breathtakingly corrupt. Apparently, the Clinton administration authorized the CIA to purchase any nukes that got onto the market. If so, it’s probably the only good thing Clinton ever did. Newly factory refurbished fighter planes were sold by people who simply had a pass to get onto the airfield. At least one, sent off fully fueled and armed, was never recovered. So, the idea that relatively small, transportable objects like nukes could be obtained by just about anyone in a collapse is possible.

After the first collapse an international inspection team was sent to remote positions in the woods to inspect truck transported nuclear missiles. They arrived to find the site deserted. They stayed there with the missile waiting for someone to come. At dusk the military team guarding the missile returned. They’d been hunting with their AK’s because they hadn’t been fed in months.

This is what a collapse looks like. It’s chaos.

Bizarre, isn’t it. Russia’s spent the last 25 years cyber-attacking anything in the USA that it can hit (from hospitals to police precincts).

The three other tech industries it excels at are

1. crypto scams (targeting American boomers mainly)
2. ransomware (targeting American businesses of all kinds)
3. troll farms (amplifying anti-USA sentiment while also interfering in American domestic political discourse).

One has to wonder which of those four the current US administration finds attractive enough to risk getting into bed with Russia.

There’s a pattern with Russia - if you get into bed with Moscow hoping to curry favor, they’ll screw you over, laugh to your face about how easily they were screwing you over, and carry on doing whatever it was that they were doing, that you hoped might slow down or stop IF you got into bed with them.

Don’t believe me? Ask Germany. Merkel spent years batting away anti-Putin / anti-Medvedev talking points; she ignored warnings from Poland; she laughed at President Trump in his first term when he warned about relying too much on Russia.

Eventually, even she realised she was on a hiding to nothing, and backed Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s serial abuse of negotiations in relation to Georgia and Ukraine.

Same happened with Ukraine - nothing escalated while the hostile Poroshenko was in power; Zelensky (by comparison far more sympathetic to Russian concerns) started delivering on Minsk and Putin’s response was to send impossible demands to NATO immediately before invading Ukraine.

Nobody in their right mind in any Western country would ever do a deal with Russia that put themselves at risk, given that Moscow has a prolific rap sheet for being abusive in negotiations, welching on its own signed commitments at the first opportunity, demanding the West deliver absolutely everything on that side of the deal despite already breaking the deal itself...

The correct acronym is not CIS which is the Center for Immigration Studies. The correct acronym is CSIS.

But no, there is no deal at all. It was broight up merely as a topic for discussion.

These talks were disclosed by Kirill Dmitriev, a special envoy for President Vladimir Putin, at the Russian Energy Week forum in mid-October 2026. Dmitriev stated that a concrete list of projects has been drafted with several Russian companies involved, and he expressed optimism that major joint initiatives would be announced soon.

In my opinionit has too many hurdles to overcome to ever become a reality. Sanctions technology sharing, public opinion & Comgress all stand in the way.

CSIS knows all of this, or should. Sounds like they may be engaging in election influencing interference to me. They are located in D.C. in the N.M. quadrant on Rhode Island St.

--- "CSIS knows all of this, or should. Sounds like they may be engaging in election influencing interference to me. They are located in D.C. in the N.M. quadrant on Rhode Island St."

Indeed, a DC lobbyist, with some interesting associations:

Thomas J. Pritzker DEMOCRAT
Executive Chairman, The Pritzker Organization; and Chairman of the Board of Trustees, CSIS
William Daley DEMOCRAT
Former Chief of Staff, President Barack Obama, and Former Secretary of Commerce
Sam Nunn DEMOCRAT
Cofounder and Co-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative; and Chairman Emeritus of the Board, CSIS
Leon Panetta DEMOCRAT
Chairman, The Panetta Institute for Public Policy
Paul Ryan RINO
Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
Frances F. Townsend -- RINO -- Trilateral Commision, Atlantic Council
Former Assistant to the U.S. President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
James Winnefeld Jr. -- served under Obama and Biden
Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense
CSIS donors include -- The Gates Foundation, Open Society Foundations, Wellcome Trust, European Climate Foundation, The Margot and Thomas Pritzker Family Foundation, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation,

Lots more names, though less well known to many. But essentially Democrats and RINOs, led by a Democrat.

Two CSIS articles were posted this morning by the OP.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.