Posted on 09/18/2026 8:21:17 AM PDT by Miami Rebel
Ukraine has carried out its deepest drone strike of the war against a major gas facility in Russia’s Arctic, demonstrating that its expanding long-range strike capabilities can reach the heart of the country’s strategically important Yamal-Nenets gas-producing region. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces said drones struck the Novy Urengoy condensate treatment plant and the nearby Purovsky gas-condensate processing plant on September 9, traveling more than 3,000 kilometers from Ukraine.
Russian regional authorities confirmed a drone attack and a fire at an industrial facility in Novy Urengoy, although they did not initially identify the target. Ukraine subsequently claimed responsibility. The strike was roughly 3,200 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, surpassing the previous Ukrainian long-range strike record of about 2,500 kilometers at the Omsk refinery in July, according to Ukrainian officials.
It was also the first confirmed Ukrainian strike in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, one of Russia’s most important oil and gas producing regions. The significance extends beyond the damage inflicted on a single processing facility. Novy Urengoy lies only about 600 kilometers from Russia’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 projects, bringing two of Moscow’s most important Arctic energy developments into the potential range of Ukrainian long-distance drones.
The Novy Urengoy condensate preparation plant is part of the infrastructure supporting the enormous Urengoyskoye oil, gas and condensate field. Gazprom says the plant has capacity to process about 19.5 million tonnes of raw material annually. A new de-ethanization unit commissioned in 2024 increased its capacity and allows it to handle condensate from the Achimov and Valanginian deposits. The plant is part of a wider processing chain producing stable condensate and other hydrocarbons. The Urengoyskoye is one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon fields, with initial gas reserves of 10.9 trillion cubic meters. Its Achimov deposits alone contain more than 1 trillion cubic meters of gas and 400 million tonnes of condensate, according to the company.
Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces said the Novy Urengoy and Purovsky facilities were critical to Russia’s gas-condensate industry. The drones reportedly struck a unit that processes gases released during condensate production process, including ethane used as a feedstock for petrochemical production. Ukraine has already demonstrated that distance is becoming a less reliable defense for Russian strategic infrastructure. In July 2024, Ukrainian intelligence claimed responsibility for a strike on the Olenya airfield in Russia’s Murmansk region, about 1,800 kilometers from Ukraine, damaging a Tu-22M3 strategic bomber. In June 2025, Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web reached Olenya again, this time using small drones covertly transported into Russia. The same operation struck Russian aircraft at bases thousands of kilometers from Ukraine, including Belaya in Siberia.
The September 9 attack represents the next step up in capabilities. It demonstrated that Ukraine can potentially deliver a conventional long-range drone strike against a fixed target deep inside Russia without relying on a covert launch close to the target. Russia has spent years building military infrastructure across its northern territories, including radar stations, airfields and layered air-defense systems. Strategic economic assets such as Yamal LNG have also been incorporated into this broader security architecture. A Chatham House assessment identified Sabetta as an FSB-protected facility for Yamal LNG, while US-based think tank CSIS has described protection of major oil and gas projects as an important element of Russia’s Arctic military posture.
There have been reports and commentary about Russia strengthening air defenses around Arctic energy infrastructure as the Ukrainian drone threat has expanded. Moscow now faces a much larger geographic area over which those defenses must operate. Novy Urengoy is about 600 kilometers from both Yamal LNG at Sabetta and Arctic LNG 2 at the Utrenny terminal on the Gydan Peninsula. Arctic LNG 2 and Yamal LNG are themselves only about 70 kilometers apart. Somewhat further to the northeast lies the newly opened Vostok Oil project. Russia has already demonstrated how seriously it regards the security of Arctic LNG infrastructure.
When the second Arctic LNG 2 production train was towed from Novatek’s construction center near Murmansk to the Utrenny terminal in 2024, the 640,000-tonne gravity-based structure traveled more than 1,000 nautical miles through the Barents and Kara seas. The operation involved a large convoy of vessels and extensive logistical planning, including at least two FSB vessels. That episode illustrated the enormous effort Moscow was prepared to devote to protecting a single piece of Arctic energy infrastructure.
The physical vulnerability of those facilities also differs from that of conventional Russian oil infrastructure. LNG plants contain highly concentrated, technically complex equipment. Even limited damage could potentially create disproportionate operational consequences, as could be seen with damage to Qatar's Ras Laffan facility struck by Iranian drones earlier this year. For Yamal LNG, political aspects may make it a less likely target – for now. While the EU is preparing to end Russian LNG imports from January 1, 2027, European shipping and maritime services will continue to have a role in transporting Russian LNG to third countries under exemptions. That means Yamal LNG could remain connected to European commercial interests even after the EU market closes.
Arctic LNG 2 is different. The project has been heavily sanctioned by the United States and has become a central symbol of Russia’s effort to develop new Arctic LNG capacity despite Western restrictions. Ukraine therefore faces fewer political sensitivities if it considers Arctic LNG 2 part of Russia’s energy infrastructure supporting the war effort.
That's not what I was referring to. The Yamal Cross is a pipeline hub where 85 percent of Russia's natural gas passes through. Destroy that and not only does it affect 85 percent of Russia's gas distribution, but 57 percent of Russia's power grid does dark. It is a vulnerability the Russians thought was safe from any attack. Ukraine drones stuck a facility 50 km from there, meaning they already have the capability to reach it.
Maximum pain to the enemy sounds like a winning strategy to me.
Ukraine is your enemy.
Yeah it is, retard.
If you can read, I invite you to read this:
https://politifact.com/article/2026/sep/15/diesel-oil-russia-ukraine-prices/
But is it the MAIN reason fuel prices are so high?
No one is arguing that the attacks on Russian refineries have NO impact on fuel prices, of course they do.
The MAIN reason fuel prices are so high is that the Strait of Hormuz is closed. What's the evidence? Price of diesel shot up AFTER the Iran war when the Strait of Hormuz was closed.
No, and I never said it was.
You’ve got serious reading comprehension issues.
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